Oil crisis, Iran war and CO₂ price: Who really pays the energy bill in the end?

Energy shock in an already strained economy

At the beginning of 2026, the global economy is in a period of heightened uncertainty, characterized by multiple overlapping crises. The war between Iran, the US, and Israel has triggered a new energy shock, primarily through rising oil prices, which is impacting all areas of production, logistics, and consumption. Simultaneously, Germany and the EU are undergoing a politically mandated transformation of their energy systems towards decarbonization – with CO₂ pricing as a key instrument that systematically increases the cost of fossil fuels.

For businesses and private households alike, the question arises: Where does the actual additional burden come from – the geopolitically driven oil price shock or climate policy in the form of the CO₂ price? And more fundamentally: Would abolishing CO₂ pricing actually solve the problem, or would it merely mask symptoms and postpone other costs – such as delayed transformation or increased climate risks – into the future?

To answer these questions thoroughly, it is necessary to understand the mechanics of both price drivers, quantify their magnitudes, and consider their effects on different economic sectors separately. A sober, data-driven perspective is crucial: neither demonizing climate policy nor romanticizing the fossil fuel status quo is helpful when it comes to understanding the real economic distributional effects and deriving strategic decisions.

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1. Geopolitical stress factor: How the Iran war is driving up oil prices

The conflict with Iran is hitting a market that is already sensitive due to past crises, sanctions, and a strained supply-demand situation. The mere anticipation of potential supply disruptions, blockades of sea lanes, or further escalation is causing crude oil prices to rise significantly.

Several analyses indicate that the Iran war has triggered a new upward trend in energy prices, particularly noticeable in oil prices. For consumers, this manifests itself directly at the pump and indirectly in higher transport and production costs, which are reflected with a delay in the prices of goods and services.

Macroeconomic simulations, such as those conducted by the German Economic Institute, show that a persistently higher oil price level could significantly dampen growth in Germany. Scenarios with an oil price of around $150 per barrel indicate that gross domestic product in 2026 and 2027 would fall noticeably short of the otherwise expected trajectory.

At the same time, economic research institutes warn against directly comparing the current oil price shock to the one following the Russian attack on Ukraine. Iran is not Germany's main energy supplier, and part of the price movement is driven by speculation, risk premiums, and uncertainty. Several assessments suggest that the particularly sharp fluctuations in oil and gas prices could tend to subside again over the course of 2026, provided there is no massive escalation or expansion of hostilities.

From an economic perspective, it is important to note that the Iran war primarily impacts the supply side of the global oil market. It alters expectations of scarcity, leads to risk premiums, and thus shifts the overall price level upwards. These effects are external in nature, meaning they largely escape the direct influence of individual nation-states like Germany. National tax policies can only mitigate or redistribute these shocks, but not prevent them.

2. CO₂ price as a politically determined cost driver: Mechanics and magnitude

Parallel to the geopolitical price shock, the CO₂ price for fossil fuels is rising in Germany within the framework of the national emissions trading system and the European emissions trading system. A CO₂ price has been gradually introduced for fuels such as gasoline, diesel, heating oil, and natural gas since 2021. This price is planned as a fixed price until 2025 and will be subject to an auction system with a price corridor from 2026 onwards.

The legal framework stipulates that the CO₂ price will increase from an initial €25 per ton in 2021 to €45 by 2024 and to €55 in 2025. From 2026 onwards, certificates will be issued via auctions, with a corridor between €55 and €65 per ton defining the expected price range.

At the consumer level, this CO₂ price translates into a surcharge per liter of fuel or per kilowatt-hour of heating energy. For gasoline, a CO₂ price of up to €65 per ton results in a surcharge of up to approximately 18 to 18.5 cents per liter, and for diesel, up to approximately 20.5 to 20.7 cents per liter. This magnitude is not insignificant, but it falls within a range that has historically resulted from fluctuations in crude oil prices on the world market.

Politically and economically, the CO₂ price fulfills a dual function:

• First, it internalizes external costs by putting a price on climate-damaging emissions. The goal is to influence investment and consumption decisions in such a way that more climate-friendly technologies and behaviors become worthwhile.
• Secondly, the state generates revenue that – at least in part – can be used to relieve other areas or to finance climate protection measures, infrastructure and targeted reimbursement mechanisms.

In the public perception, however, the CO₂ price is often equated with a purely burdensome effect. This view is too simplistic if one considers the overall balance not only from a fiscal perspective, but also in terms of the long-term risk reduction achieved through a diversified, less fossil-dependent energy base.

3. Price impact on the wallet: How significant are war and CO₂ prices in direct comparison?

To put the burden on citizens and businesses into perspective, it is worthwhile to quantify the effects of the Iran war and CO₂ pricing separately. This involves orders of magnitude, not daily cent amounts.

The effects of the war are directly visible at the pump via the price of crude oil. If the price of oil rises significantly above $100 per barrel due to the crisis, these additional costs are reflected at the pump. Even moderate increases can amount to a double-digit cent figure per liter, depending on the exchange rate and refinery margins.

In contrast, CO₂ pricing adds a fairly clearly defined, politically determined component to the final price. For 2026, depending on the price trajectory in emissions trading, surcharges of approximately 15 to 18.5 cents per liter of gasoline and 17 to just over 20 cents per liter of diesel are projected. Furthermore, analyses predict that the combination of CO₂ pricing and other climate policy instruments, such as greenhouse gas quotas, will result in increased compliance costs of several euros per 100 liters of fuel.

From a macroeconomic perspective, the Iran war therefore represents an exogenous shock that, through higher oil and gas prices, pushes the inflation rate back up. Estimates suggest that the energy price spikes associated with the conflict could increase annual inflation by several tenths of a percentage point.

In contrast, the CO₂ price acts more as a structural, calculable surcharge that predictably increases over years. It is not the result of a sudden event, but rather the expression of a longer-term climate policy path.

In everyday life, however, the effects are difficult to clearly separate, as both components become visible in a single overall price. A liter of gasoline that suddenly costs significantly more than two euros is perceived by many consumers as the result of a single cause, even though the global price of crude oil, taxes, levies, CO₂ costs, profit margins, and transportation costs are all intertwined.

4. Distributional effects: Who benefits from higher prices, who loses out?

While consumers and many businesses experience higher energy prices as a burden, there are actors who profit from these developments. At the geopolitical level, these include states and companies that generate additional revenue as producers or traders of oil and gas.

Rising crude oil prices lead to higher export revenues for producing countries, provided they are not simultaneously subject to sanctions or production restrictions. Large oil companies and parts of the fossil fuel industry typically record increased sales and profits during such periods, as long as demand and production volumes remain high.

The situation is different with the CO₂ price. Here, the revenues from the sale of certificates flow predominantly to government agencies or into specific funds and programs. The direct beneficiaries are therefore not companies in the classic market sense, but rather fiscal budgets and, secondarily, those who are relieved of burdens through levy or refund mechanisms.

For households and businesses, this leads to a complex distribution calculation:

• Lower-income households spend a relatively larger portion of their budget on energy and are therefore particularly hard hit by both effects – the oil price shock and the CO₂ price. Without targeted compensation, price increases for heating and fuel can translate into noticeable losses in real income, which in turn dampen consumption.
• While middle and higher incomes are under greater absolute pressure, they usually have more leeway to adjust their spending or invest in efficiency, such as better building insulation or more fuel-efficient vehicles.

Companies are affected differently depending on their industry. Logistics, construction, manufacturing, and energy-intensive sectors are under particular cost pressure, as energy accounts for a large share of their total costs. Companies with high fossil fuel energy demand and limited pricing flexibility are increasingly caught in this squeeze, while firms with largely decarbonized processes or high energy efficiency are relatively better off.

In the long term, companies that switched to energy-efficient and low-emission technologies early on can benefit. They suffer less from CO₂ costs and are also, in some cases, less dependent on oil price shocks. In this sense, the CO₂ price acts as a differentiation mechanism that strengthens the competitive position of pioneers.

5. What would be the effect of abolishing the CO₂ price – in the short and long term?

The obvious political demand to suspend or significantly reduce the CO₂ price in the face of a geopolitical energy shock would initially bring noticeable relief at the fuel pump and in heating costs.

In the short term, the price per liter of gasoline or diesel could fall by the amount currently allocated to CO₂ pricing – roughly 15 to 20 cents per liter, depending on the actual price range of certificates. This would provide immediate relief for frequent commuters, logistics companies, and heating oil customers.

However, the central driver of the current price increase – the price of crude oil, which is influenced by the war in Iran – remains unaffected. The structural scarcity and risk premiums on the global market do not disappear simply because a single country refrains from pricing CO₂ emissions.

The elimination of the CO₂ price would have further economic consequences:

• Price signals favoring low-emission technologies would weaken. Investments in alternative drive systems, building renovations, or renewable heating would appear less attractive because the costs of fossil fuel alternatives would be artificially suppressed.
• The state would lose a growing source of revenue, which could be used either in the form of direct tax relief (such as planned climate funds) or to finance the transformation. These funds would have to be compensated for through other taxes, debt, or cuts elsewhere.

From a climate policy perspective, the likelihood would increase that the set emissions targets would be missed or could only be achieved through stricter, often less market-based interventions. From an economic standpoint, a CO₂ price is a comparatively efficient instrument for reducing emissions where it is most cost-effective.

The central question is therefore not only whether eliminating CO₂ pricing would provide short-term relief, but at what long-term cost it would be achieved. From an economic perspective, foregoing CO₂ pricing means either higher adaptation costs in the future or a greater risk of physical and economic damage resulting from unchecked climate change.

6. Double shock: The interplay between the oil crisis and the CO₂ price

Currently, two logics are clashing and overlapping in the price of energy: a geopolitical one and a climate policy one.

The geopolitical logic is characterized by uncertainty, volatility, and a lack of controllability. A conflict in the Middle East can generate market price spikes within days or weeks, to which states can only react with delay and indirect measures.

In contrast, the climate policy logic of the CO₂ price is deliberately planned and designed to be phased in gradually. It is intended to provide companies and households with reliable signals over several years, so that investments in low-emission technologies and efficiency improvements can be rationally calculated.

The challenge lies in synchronizing these two levels in policymaking. A rigid climate policy that disregards external shocks risks social and economic overload. An opportunistic policy that suspends climate pricing during every crisis destroys the credibility and effectiveness of the instrument.

Possible solutions include temporary compensation mechanisms that cushion high global market prices without permanently damaging the structure of the CO₂ price itself. These could include targeted relief for particularly affected groups or sectors, time-limited transfers, or the faster introduction of a climate payment that primarily benefits low- and middle-income households.

A dynamic adjustment of the CO₂ price path, which focuses more on relief during periods of extreme oil or gas price shocks while increasing more consistently during calmer periods, is also repeatedly mentioned in the discussion. Crucially, the long-term direction – increasing the price of fossil fuels to reduce emissions – must not be called into question, while short-term flexibility is created to limit social hardship.

7. Sectoral perspective: Households, transport, industry

The impact of the oil crisis and the CO₂ price is not uniform across all sectors of the economy. Different sectors have varying energy intensities, substitution options, and pricing flexibility.

Private households bear the brunt of the burden, particularly in the areas of mobility and housing. Fuel and heating are the most visible cost drivers, especially for people who commute or live in poorly insulated buildings. Households with low incomes and a high energy share of their budget are more vulnerable than those with high incomes and more flexible consumption patterns.

Rising fuel prices have an immediate impact on both freight and passenger transport. Logistics companies, freight forwarders, road freight transport, and parts of the public transport system are facing higher costs. In highly competitive markets, these costs can only be partially passed on to customers, putting pressure on margins. At the same time, this creates a stronger incentive to invest in more efficient vehicles, alternative drive systems, or optimized route planning.

The impact on industry is heterogeneous. Energy-intensive sectors such as chemicals, steel, cement, and paper suffer from high procurement costs for energy and CO₂ certificates, unless these costs are already partially offset by EU mechanisms. Less energy-intensive industries feel the effect more indirectly through higher intermediate product and logistics costs.

In the real estate sector, the CO₂ price primarily impacts heating costs. The extent to which the burden is shared between landlords and tenants is the subject of political debate and legislative adjustments. In any case, incentives are created for investments in more efficient heating systems and improved insulation – provided the regulatory framework is designed in such a way that these investments pay for themselves.

8. Political-economic dimension: Perception, blame, and legitimation

In public debate, actors tend to oversimplify complex chains of cause and effect. High energy prices are often attributed to a dominant narrative – either “the war” or “the CO₂ tax”.

These monocausal narratives are politically understandable, but analytically problematic. They overlook the overlapping nature of geopolitical market forces and politically imposed price signals. Those who solely blame the CO₂ price for high fuel prices ignore the role of the Iran war and the global supply and demand situation. Conversely, those who blame only the war overlook the fact that even without the conflict, a steadily rising CO₂ price would have led to increased costs for fossil fuels.

This perception is crucial for the political legitimacy of climate policy. A CO₂ price can only be sustainable in the long term if the population understands why it is being introduced, what goals it pursues, and how the burdens are fairly distributed or offset.

Transparent communication about the composition of energy prices, the amount and use of CO₂ revenues and the expected long-term benefits of a decarbonized economy is therefore not a minor matter, but a central component of economic policy.

9. Strategic perspective: Resilience instead of symptom management

The current situation demonstrates the vulnerability of an economy that remains highly dependent on fossil fuel imports. Oil price shocks, whether triggered by wars, sanctions, or other crises, have immediate and sometimes drastic effects on inflation, growth, and social stability.

From a strategic perspective, the focus is therefore less on making short-term adjustments to individual price components and more on systematically increasing energy resilience. This means:

• Greater diversification of energy sources and carriers, in particular the consistent expansion of renewable energies and storage.
• An acceleration of efficiency measures in industry, buildings and transport to reduce absolute energy dependence on fossil imports.
• A further development of the CO₂ pricing system that gives reliable long-term signals for decarbonization, while at the same time being able to cushion extreme external shocks in a socially acceptable manner.

In this logic, the CO₂ price is not primarily "the" burden, but rather an instrument to escape a structure that is repeatedly created by geopolitical shocks and thus generates new burdens. The Iran war demonstrates that the real economic vulnerability lies in the continued dependence on fossil fuels.

10. Classification of the initial question: Who is the actual cost driver?

Against this background, the central question of whether the actual burden of the current oil crisis arises from the CO₂ price and who would benefit from its abolition can be answered in a differentiated manner.

The sharp rise in energy prices is primarily caused by the Iran war and the resulting movements in the global oil and gas market. These effects are global, difficult to control, and affect all importers of fossil fuels.

CO₂ pricing has an additional effect, but its magnitude is manageable in the context of a massive oil price shock. With surcharges of just under 20 cents per liter of fuel in 2026, it is certainly not a marginal phenomenon, but it does not alone explain the high overall prices.

Eliminating the CO₂ price would provide short-term relief, particularly for households with high vehicle traffic, logistics companies, and energy-intensive industries. Those who would benefit most would be those who currently consume a disproportionate amount of fossil fuels.

In the long term, however, the costs would be different:

• The transformation towards a less fossil-dependent economy would be slowed down, which keeps vulnerability to future energy crises high.
• Achieving climate goals would be made more difficult, which in the medium term could lead to stricter, possibly less efficient interventions or greater climate damage.
• Government budgets that can currently use revenue from CO₂ prices for relief and transformation would lose an important fiscal policy lever.

Overall, it is therefore economically unconvincing to identify the CO₂ price as the main cause of the current burden. It is a noticeable, but politically controllable component of the energy price, the effects of which can be managed through targeted refunds, social policies, and industrial policies. The real explosive potential for inflation and growth lies in the geopolitically driven crude oil and gas prices, which Germany can only influence indirectly.

Therefore, an appropriate response to the current situation does not consist of questioning climate policy instruments across the board, but rather of intelligently linking them with measures for social and economic mitigation while systematically reducing vulnerability due to fossil fuel dependence.

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Who pays more? CO₂ price or Iran war – a comparison of real annual costs in 2026

To make the sometimes abstract sums of the current energy burdens caused by the Iran war and CO₂ pricing more tangible, a look at concrete annual balances for 2026 is helpful. The following calculations illustrate that both drivers have a noticeable impact, but the oil price surcharge caused by the war carries more weight in most energy-intensive scenarios.

The calculations assume a CO₂ price for 2026 at the upper end of the auction corridor (65 euros per ton). This corresponds to a CO₂ burden of approximately 18.5 cents per liter of gasoline, just over 20.7 cents per liter of diesel, and about 0.42 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh) of natural gas, compared to a tax-free scenario. As a "crisis surcharge" due to the Iran war, an exemplary, market-standard price increase of 25 cents per liter for fuels and 2 cents per kilowatt-hour for natural gas is assumed, added to the existing market price.

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• The fuel price illusion: Why the state is actually the biggest beneficiary at the gas pump

Target group logistics: The medium-sized freight forwarding company

A logistics company operates a fleet of twenty heavy articulated lorries. Each of these trucks has an average mileage of 120,000 kilometers per year and consumes around 38 liters of diesel per 100 kilometers under normal operating conditions.

The annual fuel consumption of the entire fleet is therefore 912,000 liters of diesel.

The CO₂ pricing amounts to slightly more than 20.7 cents per liter for this consumption level. This translates to an annual CO₂ levy burden of approximately €188,700 for the freight forwarding company. This is a significant, but for the company, a predictable long-term cost that must be factored into freight rates.

If the war-induced oil price shock now impacts the transport company, increasing the price of diesel by an additional 25 cents per liter, this will result in unplanned additional costs of €228,000 per year. Together, these two price drivers add up to over €416,000 in additional costs compared to a hypothetical scenario without a CO₂ price and without a crisis surcharge. The geopolitical crisis thus has a noticeably harsher and, above all, more unpredictable impact here – even with a high CO₂ price level for 2026.

Target group: Industry – Energy-intensive manufacturing companies

A medium-sized metalworking or chemical company requires significant amounts of natural gas for its process heat. For example, its annual consumption is 15 gigawatt hours (15,000,000 kWh).

The CO₂ tax increases the price of natural gas in Germany by approximately 0.42 cents per kilowatt-hour, assuming a certificate price of €65 per ton. For the industrial company, this translates into predictable annual CO₂ costs of exactly €63,000.

The gas market is also highly sensitive to the Middle East conflict and potential supply bottlenecks. A war-related risk surcharge of, conservatively estimated, 2 cents per kilowatt-hour (20 euros per megawatt-hour) leads to additional annual costs of 300,000 euros for this level of consumption. In industry, particularly in gas-intensive processes, the crisis shock often exceeds domestic CO₂ pricing many times over. While the CO₂ price can be reduced over the years through efficiency measures, the exogenous market price directly impacts profit margins when alternatives are lacking.

Target group: Private households: Families in rural areas

A family of four lives in an older, poorly renovated detached house (140 square meters) in a rural area. The house is heated with a gas boiler, resulting in an annual consumption of approximately 22,400 kilowatt-hours. Since their workplaces are some distance away, both partners commute by car. The primary vehicle (diesel) travels 20,000 kilometers with a fuel consumption of 6 liters per 100 kilometers, while the secondary vehicle (gasoline) travels 10,000 kilometers with a fuel consumption of 7 liters per 100 kilometers. Their total fuel consumption is 1,200 liters of diesel and 700 liters of gasoline.

The costs of the CO₂ tax for this family in 2026 are as follows: Natural gas will become approximately €94 more expensive due to the tax. Diesel will cost about €248 (1,200 liters at 20.7 cents per liter), and gasoline about €130 (700 liters at 18.5 cents per liter). In total, the family will incur annual costs of almost €472 due to the CO₂ price.

The effects of the Iran war are clearly evident here as well. With a surcharge of 2 cents per kilowatt-hour for gas, heating costs increase by 448 euros. A fuel price increase of 25 cents due to expensive crude oil raises the cost of driving both cars by a total of 475 euros (1,900 liters total consumption). The war's impact thus costs the family an extra 923 euros per year.

For private households, the price increases amount to approximately €1,400 annually. While the CO₂ price, at almost €500, is a significant factor in the family budget, the immediate burden caused by the geopolitical crisis is almost twice as high.

Here is a concise and direct comparison of the annual additional costs for the year 2026. This table summarizes the previously calculated scenarios and makes the structural relationship between the politically fixed CO₂ price (assumed at the upper end of 65 euros/ton) and a war-related oil/gas price shock (assumed to be +25 cents/liter or +2 cents/kWh) visible at a glance.

Overview of the annual additional costs due to CO₂ pricing and the oil crisis (2026)

The overview of the annual additional costs due to the CO₂ price and the oil crisis for 2026 shows significant differences between the affected groups. A freight forwarding company with 20 trucks and an annual diesel consumption of 912,000 liters would be burdened with approximately €188,784 due to the CO₂ price; the assumed crisis shock (market price surcharge) amounts to €228,000, resulting in a total additional burden of €416,784 – the ratio of crisis to CO₂ is thus approximately 1.2:1. A medium-sized industrial company that consumes 15,000,000 kWh of natural gas for process heat anticipates additional costs of approximately €63,000 due to the CO₂ price, while the crisis shock is estimated at €300,000. The total burden thus amounts to €363,000, and the crisis-to-CO₂ ratio is approximately 4.8:1. An average private household (family) with a gas consumption of 22,400 kWh and a fuel consumption of 1,900 liters would be burdened with approximately €472 by the CO₂ price and with about €923 by the crisis shock, resulting in a total additional burden of €1,395 and a ratio of approximately 2.0:1. The calculations are based on a maximum CO₂ price of €65/ton for 2026 (corresponding to approximately 20.7 ct/l diesel, 18.5 ct/l gasoline, and 0.42 ct/kWh gas); the crisis shock is based on an assumed market price surcharge of +25 ct/l fuel and +2 ct/kWh natural gas. Overall, the data clearly show that the external price shock on global markets poses a significantly greater financial challenge for most market participants than domestic emissions pricing – this is particularly pronounced in industry, where geopolitical uncertainties make gas prices highly volatile. Against this backdrop, strategic resilience measures are gaining importance, such as dynamic pricing agreements or "floater models" for diesel and CO₂ costs, to mitigate short-term market price risks.

Strategic Resilience 2026: How Logistics and Industry Can Escape the Double Energy Price Shock

Both sectors – logistics and industry – face the challenge in 2026 that external price shocks (such as the Iran war) will massively exacerbate the already rising predictable costs of CO₂ pricing. Simply waiting for political relief measures, as currently demanded by industry associations (such as a suspension of the CO₂ toll component or diesel price caps), is not a sufficient business strategy.

Here are the data-driven and operational levers that both target groups can use to actively manage their cost risks.

Solutions for logistics: Bridging technologies and price pass-through

The transport industry traditionally operates with razor-thin margins. When a truck fleet is suddenly confronted with over €400,000 in additional costs per year, its very existence is at stake.

1. Dynamic price adjustment (diesel and CO₂ floaters)

The most important commercial lever is the consistent contractual passing on of fluctuating costs. Freight forwarders must structure their freight contracts in such a way that they don't get stuck with price spikes.

• Diesel floater: A variable surcharge on the freight rate, which is based on a neutral index (e.g., from the Federal Statistical Office) and is adjusted monthly or even weekly to the current diesel price.
• CO₂ Floaters: Similarly, progressive logistics companies integrate politically mandated CO₂ costs (both the certificate price and the CO₂ component of truck tolls) into contracts as a transparently displayed, dynamic factor. This makes it clear to the shipper which part of the cost increase is politically mandated and which is market-driven.

Related to this:

• The end of "just-in-time": Why companies are now radically restructuring their logistics

2. HVO100 as a short-term wildcard

Since the complete electrification of heavy fleets is not yet a widespread option for many medium-sized companies in 2026 due to a lack of charging infrastructure (depot charging vs. public charging) and high acquisition costs, the synthetic fuel HVO100 (Hydrotreated Vegetable Oil) is coming into focus.

• HVO100 can be used in most modern diesel trucks without any technical modifications.
• It burns almost climate-neutrally, which – depending on the exact legal design and proof requirements – has a positive effect on toll costs and the company's CO₂ balance (Scope 3 for shippers).
• According to surveys, more than half of freight forwarders plan to rely more heavily on this fuel in 2026 in order to decarbonize their fleets in the short term and at the same time slightly diversify their dependence on extremely volatile fossil diesel prices.

3. Digital Fleet Management and Eco-Routing

The most efficient liter of diesel is the one that isn't used in the first place. Savings of 5 to 10 percent are realistic through rigorous use of telematics. This means:

• Strict monitoring of tire pressure and aerodynamics.
• Training and monetary incentives for drivers to practice anticipatory, fuel-efficient driving.
• AI-supported route planning that avoids traffic jams, incorporates elevation profiles, and radically minimizes empty miles through intelligent freight exchange integration.

Solutions for industry: Hedging and electrification

In energy-intensive industries (e.g., metals, chemicals, paper), fluctuations in gas prices immediately impact the production costs of intermediate products. Since gas is more difficult to replace as process heat than electricity, longer-term strategies are required.

1. Active price hedging (futures contracts)

Companies must not leave the purchase of natural gas to the spot market when the geopolitical situation is highly volatile.

• Through forward contracts, the company secures gas deliveries for the coming quarters or years at a price fixed today.
• This protects against sudden spikes (such as the +2 cent/kWh shock from the model calculation), but requires professional risk management, as one remains bound to the more expensive contract if spot prices fall later.
• At the same time, industrial companies should examine whether they can purchase CO₂ certificates early and counter-cyclically via the EU Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS) in order to cushion price peaks.

2. Electrification of process heat (Power-to-Heat)

The dependence on gas and its price shocks can be most effectively broken by a change in technology.

• For temperature ranges up to approximately 200 °C, large industrial heat pumps are becoming increasingly economical, especially when the CO₂ price on fossil fuels rises.
• Electrode boilers (E-boilers) can be used in processes that require steam.
• This electrification shifts energy demand from gas to electricity. To avoid falling into the next price trap, companies ideally secure this electricity through long-term Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) directly from wind and solar farms. These contracts offer fixed, crisis-proof electricity prices for 10 to 15 years.

3. Waste heat utilization and flexibility

Many industrial processes waste valuable energy. The rigorous capture and utilization of waste heat (e.g., feeding it into internal heating networks or converting it into electricity) significantly reduces primary gas demand.
Furthermore, "demand-side flexibility" is rewarded: if a company can manage its energy-intensive processes so that they run when electricity is cheap on the market (e.g., during periods of high wind/solar power) and are throttled back during price spikes, substantial energy cost savings can be achieved.

Both industries must acknowledge that the CO₂ price is a politically driven trend, with crises like the Iran-Iraq War representing unpredictable spikes. Those who invest today in efficiency, bridging technologies (HVO100), or electrification not only reduce their CO₂ tax burden but also protect their business model against the next geopolitical crisis.