Fact check | Greenpeace article on profiteering: Gas station rip-off in wartime? What's really behind the allegations?

Expensive diesel & petrol: The secret game of the oil companies (and where Greenpeace is wrong)

The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in the spring of 2026 shook global energy markets – and German drivers and businesses are feeling the effects directly at the pump. With prices for gasoline and diesel well over €2, the already heated debate surrounding the pricing practices of oil companies has reignited. Amid this crisis, Greenpeace published a widely discussed article accusing the corporations of ruthlessly exploiting the geopolitical conflict for massive "excess profits." Based on a study by energy market expert Steffen Bukold, the environmental organization is calling for far-reaching political consequences, including the immediate introduction of a profit tax.

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• GREENPEACE : War in Iran / expensive fuel: Oil companies profit, households pay

But how valid are these accusations really? Is the drastic price increase solely due to the global market, or are the oil multinationals actually systematically exploiting their market power in the shadow of the war? We subjected Greenpeace's claims to a detailed fact check. The result is a mixed picture: The core of the problem – a misguided market due to oligopolistic structures – is real and is even confirmed by the German Federal Cartel Office. However, Greenpeace conflates legitimate criticism with politically motivated conclusions, ignores inconvenient facts, and oversimplifies complex economic causal relationships. Read on to find out, point by point, where the accusations are accurate, where reality is distorted, and why populist knee-jerk reactions won't solve the real problem at the gas pump.

Fact check: Greenpeace article on oil companies' excessive profits in the Iran war 2026

The Greenpeace article analyzes the connection between the war that broke out in Iran in February/March 2026, the resulting increases in fuel prices, and the profit margins of oil companies. The underlying study was authored by energy market expert Steffen Bukold. While the article contains factually sound core statements, it mixes these with politically motivated conclusions, sometimes simplistic claims of causality, and a deliberately one-sided portrayal of complex market mechanisms. A point-by-point analysis reveals the following:

What is correct

The price increase after the start of the war is real and documented

The war in Iran – triggered by US-Israeli attacks at the end of February 2026 – has indeed driven fuel prices in Germany up dramatically. Diesel prices rose by around 8 cents per liter in the first days of the war, and gasoline (E10) by about 6 cents. By the beginning of March, both fuels were over €2 per liter – the highest level since 2022. Heating oil prices reached a three-year high.

Strait of Hormuz as a price driver – correct

The claim that the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is the main driver of the oil price increase is factually correct. Around 20 percent of global oil exports flow through this strait daily. The de facto blockade by Iranian threats and tanker attacks temporarily drove the price of Brent crude oil to over $120 per barrel. Saudi Arabia also had to temporarily close its largest refinery after a drone attack.

Disproportionate price increases at petrol stations – proven

Greenpeace points out that the price of diesel at the pump has risen significantly more than the price of crude oil. This is confirmed by independent data. The Bukold study found that the price of crude oil increased by 13.1 cents per liter during the period studied; diesel at the pump, on the other hand, became 30.3 cents more expensive, and gasoline by 18.5 cents. The Federal Cartel Office also confirmed a striking decoupling of wholesale diesel prices from the price of crude oil in its Q1/2026 quarterly report – on March 19, the difference for diesel was around 25 cents higher than the increase in crude oil prices.

Oligopoly structure as a lever for pricing power – correct

The article points to the oligopolistic market structure. This is well-documented: The German Federal Cartel Office already determined in 2011 that BP/Aral, ConocoPhillips/Jet, ExxonMobil/Esso, Shell, and Total form a dominant oligopoly and do not engage in significant competition with each other. Combined with vertical integration—the same corporations own refineries and gas station networks—they can pass on price increases from their purchasing power to consumers without having to react to competition. The German Association of Gas Station Operators (TIV) also confirmed in 2025 that corporations "ruthlessly exploit" their market power and that lessees have no influence on prices.

Household burdens – mathematically plausible

Greenpeace's projection that a persistently high oil price level will burden households with up to approximately €500 in additional costs per year is methodologically sound. Specifically, the calculation shows additional costs of €923 for a single-family home with oil heating and €835 for diesel car drivers. These figures are based on oil prices projected for mid-March 2026 and typical consumption profiles – they are scenario calculations, not actual measurements.

Market power in passing on price reductions – a structural problem

The observation that price increases are passed on quickly, but reductions slowly – the so-called “rockets and feathers effect” – is well-documented scientifically. The German Federal Cartel Office also observed this pattern in its ongoing 2026 monitoring program.

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• The logic of replacement value, or why tomorrow's price determines today's price

What is simplified or distorted

Price increases in Germany are not above average compared to other EU countries

The article suggests that Germany was particularly hard hit and that corporations were reaping especially high excess profits there. While this is true for the first weeks of the war, it is not tenable overall. EU Commission data shows that at the end of March 2026, Germany ranked 17th out of 27 EU member states with a 40 percent increase in diesel prices and 16th with a 29 percent increase in gasoline prices – placing it in the middle of the EU rankings. Therefore, the implicit claim that corporations were siphoning off profits particularly heavily in Germany cannot be substantiated in such general terms.

The claim that Germany does not need diesel imports is too simplistic

Greenpeace claims that in Germany "almost every liter of diesel" is refined domestically, and that dependence on increased import prices "virtually does not exist." This is a considerable oversimplification. While Germany did cover about 67 percent of its diesel needs through domestic refining in 2023, it simultaneously imported around 12.7 million tons of diesel (2024) – primarily from the Netherlands, Belgium, and other countries. Diesel is therefore significantly dependent on imports, and the global diesel/gasoil market is directly strained by the closure of the Persian Gulf, as important refineries have been cut off. Greenpeace's statement that excess profits are the "only plausible reason" for high diesel prices ignores this market dynamic.

Fuel prices "must" follow the price of crude oil – economically wrong

The article suggests that since the gasoline sold was purchased cheaply as crude oil months ago, price increases are not justified. This cost-principle fallacy is widespread, but economically incorrect. Prices in market economies are determined by supply and demand, not by historical unit costs. An oil company that knows its inventory will be more expensive to replace tomorrow has every rational incentive to adjust the current price today – even without collusion. This pricing logic applies to all goods (e.g., residential real estate, farmland), not just fuels.

Excess profit tax as a simple solution – politically and ideologically overshadowed

Greenpeace presents the demand for an excess profit tax as an obvious solution. However, economic experts and legal professionals point out that its practical implementation poses significant problems

• Definition: What exactly is an "excess profit"? Which comparison period applies?
• Legal certainty: A sector-specific special tax could be constitutionally challenged.
• Effectiveness: Internationally operating corporations can shift profits internally to more tax-friendly jurisdictions.
• Market distortion: Excess profit taxes can reduce investment incentives for future capacities.

This doesn't mean that such a tax is fundamentally wrong – several EU countries (Italy, Spain, the UK) introduced it in 2022. However, Greenpeace presents it as a straightforward solution without mentioning these complexities.

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The Austrian pricing model as a role model – contradictory

The idea that Germany should follow the Austrian model (allowing only one price increase per day) surfaced in German political debates and was implemented in Germany on April 1, 2026. Ironically, Austrian price trends during the same period showed that gasoline prices rose even more sharply there than in Germany. Competition economist Justus Haucap had already assessed this model as counterproductive in 2012: it allows corporations to "draw a large amount of money from the bottle" once a day.

What is overly moralistic or misleading

The term "excess profits" – legitimate, but imprecise

The term "excess profits" is politically effective but economically imprecise. The Bukold study measures the difference between the increase in crude oil prices and the increase in fuel prices at the pump as "additional profits"—this is a methodologically valid approximation, but implicitly assumes that no margin expansion would have occurred without the crisis. In reality, refinery profit margins fluctuate considerably; the question of what margin is "normal" cannot be answered definitively.

Causal attribution "greed" – simplification

The terms "shameless arbitrariness" and "greed" imply deliberate, coordinated misconduct. The German Federal Cartel Office and independent economists describe the phenomenon in a more nuanced way: In an oligopoly, prices rise faster than costs, not because corporations are actively "ripping people off," but because the market structure allows it and rational self-interest has no countervailing power. This is a structural problem that justifies regulatory intervention—but not a deliberate cartel.

Comparative calculations (electric cars, heat pumps) – politically instrumentalized

The calculation that the "excess profits" could finance 1,300 electric cars or 840 heat pumps daily is factually correct – but rhetorically designed to promote a specific energy policy. It implies a direct diversion of corporate profits, which would be legally and politically complex.

Overall rating

The claim that the price increase is caused by the Iran-Iraq War and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is correct and well-documented. The fact that gas station prices rise disproportionately to the price of crude oil is also confirmed—among others, by the German Federal Cartel Office and independent analyses. The observation that oligopolistic structures and vertical integration give corporations pricing power is accurate; corresponding evidence can be found in the 2011 report by the Federal Cartel Office and was confirmed in later studies (2022/2026). However, the portrayal of Germany as being uniquely affected compared to other EU countries is exaggerated: Germany is actually in the middle of the pack. The statement that there is no need to import diesel in Germany is an oversimplification: in 2024, around 12.7 million tons were imported, representing approximately 33% of the supply. The criticism that price increases are not justified with reference to the "old" purchase price is economically flawed, as opportunity costs play a role in market logic. The demand for a profit tax as a simple solution is one-sided: there are definitional problems, constitutional questions, and risks of profit shifting. Finally, the Austrian model cannot be considered proof of a working solution, as it is unsubstantiated that it prevents price increases—Austria even experienced higher price increases at times.

Expert conclusion

The Greenpeace article is based on a methodologically sound, externally commissioned study and addresses a real problem: The market structure in the German petrol station sector encourages a decoupling of pump prices from crude oil costs, especially during times of crisis. This finding is supported by independent institutions such as the Federal Cartel Office.

However, the article tends to oversimplify complex market mechanisms, omit unfavorable counter-data (EU comparison, diesel import dependency), and present political demands – excess profit tax, energy transition, e-mobility – as inevitable consequences of the facts. This does not diminish the relevance of the topic, but the presentation clearly serves a political mobilization goal, not a balanced analysis of the facts.

The Greenpeace article addresses a genuine structural problem, but uses it as a political lever

For Xpert readers (logistics, industry and energy managers), two levels must be distinguished:

Level 1 – The real problem

The Iran war has plunged an already oligopolistic industry into an exceptional situation where the lack of competition is measurably detrimental to businesses and consumers. This is not a Greenpeace narrative, but a market failure documented by the German Federal Cartel Office. For B2B decision-makers who bear significant fleet, energy, or logistics costs every month, this is an operational reality.

Level 2 – Political Instrumentalization

Greenpeace packages valid facts into an activism framework aimed at accelerating the energy transition and introducing a profit tax. From a business perspective, this falls short: a profit tax doesn't structurally solve the oligopoly problem, and comparisons within the EU show that Germany isn't doing exceptionally badly in terms of price increases. The real weakness lies in the lack of separation between refineries, wholesalers, and gas stations – an issue Greenpeace mentions but doesn't emphasize.

The hidden cause of high energy prices: Market decoupling instead of treating the symptoms

Those who fail to address the market structure will pay just as dearly for the next oil price shock – regardless of whether it is triggered by war, a natural disaster, or geopolitical escalation. Political activism (special taxes, price caps) merely treats the symptoms. Structural reforms (unbundling, increased competition in the gas station market, diversification of energy sources) would be the more robust response – and that is a message that industry leaders expect from a fact-based platform.