Washington's quiet withdrawal from NATO: These are the weapons the US is now pulling out of Europe

Europe's billion-dollar shock: The US withdrawal from NATO will cost us dearly

A classified list of planned cuts from Washington has sent shockwaves through European capitals: Under President Donald Trump, the US is planning a drastic and concrete reduction of its military capabilities within NATO. From fighter jets and essential reconnaissance drones to aircraft carrier strike groups, the American focus is irrevocably shifting to the Indo-Pacific. For Europe, this geostrategic shift not only means a massive loss of conventional deterrent power against Russia, but also forces the continent to undertake an unprecedented financial and industrial effort. To close the now gaping security gaps, the European allies are beginning a dramatic race against time.

When America disarms – and Europe gets the bill

A document that shakes the security architecture of Europe

What was long considered political posturing is now taking concrete form. A classified list, obtained by the Axel Springer network and reported on by WELT and BILD, reveals for the first time with stark clarity which military capabilities the United States intends to withdraw from NATO. These are not symbolic gestures or vague political declarations of intent, but concrete cuts to the so-called NATO Force Model—the operational planning framework that, since 2022, has definitively stipulated which alliance member provides which troops and weapons systems for collective defense within which timeframe.

The existence of this list is not an isolated event. It is the preliminary result of a strategic rethink in Washington that has been developing for at least a decade and is now being implemented with unprecedented radicalism under President Donald Trump. As early as January 2026, the US Department of Defense published a strategy paper that unequivocally states: American armed forces will henceforth focus on the defense of its own territory and the Indo-Pacific region. Europe, the implicit message goes, must provide for its own conventional defense.

This shift is neither accidental nor motivated by short-term considerations. It is the result of a sober geostrategic calculation, in which the US is realigning its limited resources against what it considers the primary threat from China in the Indo-Pacific. Russia is described in this document as a persistent but manageable threat—a formulation perceived in European capitals as an arrogant understatement that ignores the realities of an ongoing conflict on the eastern flank.

The list of cuts in detail: What America is withdrawing from NATO

The specific figures on the classified list read like a systematic dismantling of the transatlantic defense architecture. They are not abstract, but precise and have far-reaching military consequences. In the area of ​​aerial refueling, an often overlooked but war-deciding capability, the US plans to reduce its fleet of older KC-135 tanker aircraft from 71 to 63. Even more serious is the complete removal of all eight modern KC-46 tanker aircraft from NATO plans. Without sufficient aerial refueling capabilities, even modern fighter jets lose their strategic range—they are limited to short combat radii and lose the ability to conduct wide-area air operations over European territory.

The reduction in combat aircraft is also substantial. Instead of the previous 99 F-16 fighter jets, the US will only maintain 63 in NATO plans. The more modern F-15Es will also be reduced from 54 to 36 aircraft. One of two strategic bomber squadrons will be completely withdrawn. This corresponds to a reduction in combat aircraft capacity of between one-third and one-half in some categories—a drastic cut that significantly weakens the ability to achieve air superiority over European territory.

In the area of ​​unmanned aerial systems, the cuts hit a particularly strategically sensitive area. All long-range reconnaissance drones are being completely removed from NATO planning. The number of armed MQ-9 drones, considered the workhorses of modern warfare and used for both reconnaissance and ground attack, is to be reduced by almost half. These drones are not easily replaced. Currently, only five countries operate the MQ-9A variant: the USA, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, and Spain. Europe is only just beginning to develop its drone capabilities.

The planned cuts to naval forces are particularly serious. One of the two aircraft carrier battle groups will be decommissioned, dramatically limiting maritime power projection in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Almost half of the cruiser and destroyer squadrons are to be eliminated. Underwater missile launch capabilities, a crucial component of deep deterrence, will be completely removed from the plans. Finally, the number of Boeing P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, indispensable for maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare, will be reduced from 26 to 15. This is not a minor issue: especially in the North Atlantic and the Baltic Sea, where Russian submarines are increasingly active, anti-submarine warfare is a core competency of maritime defense.

The NATO Force Model and the strategic logic behind it

To fully grasp the implications of these cuts, one must understand the NATO Force Model within its operational context. It is a planning tool developed after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and has been legally binding since 2025. The model defines how many and which troops the alliance can deploy to the front within three different timeframes: first, the most readily available units within ten days; second, the rapid reaction forces between ten and thirty days; and third, the bulk of the troops within up to six months, which form the actual backbone of NATO deterrence.

The announced US cuts affect all three categories and thus the entire depth of deterrence. If the US withdraws its commitments to the Force Model, it will not only create a short-term capacity gap, but also a structural credibility problem for collective defense. Deterrence only works if potential aggressors are convinced that the costs of an attack outweigh its possible benefits. Every known gap in the Force Model undermines this calculation.

Pentagon official Alexander Velez-Green had already briefed the political directors of the defense ministries of NATO member states on the planned reductions in a closed-door meeting in Brussels. This transformed an informal threat into a formal announcement—and a political debate into an operational problem to which the Europeans must respond within a few months.

The official NATO reaction appears outwardly calm. Spokeswoman Allison Hart emphasized that there had been an over-reliance on the US in the past and that Europe and Canada could shift the balance of responsibilities through increased investment. This statement is diplomatically correct, but it obscures the temporal dimension of the problem: The capabilities that the US is now withdrawing cannot be replaced by Europe within months or a few years. They can only be built up over a longer period and with massive investment—if the political will to do so exists.

The geostrategic background: Washington's pivot to the Indo-Pacific

Those who dismiss the NATO spending cuts as an isolated political escapade by Donald Trump overlook the deeper structural forces driving this decision. The strategic shift of the US toward the Indo-Pacific began under President Barack Obama, who announced the so-called "Pivot to Asia" in 2011. Since then, China's geopolitical importance to the US has increased considerably. China is now the only power capable of competing with the US on an equal footing economically, militarily, and technologically.

The new US defense strategy paper from January 2026 makes it unequivocally clear that Washington intends to provide only limited and crucial support for Europe in the future—while the primary responsibility for the conventional defense of the European continent will fall to the Europeans themselves. The US nuclear umbrella over Europe is to be maintained in principle—this is referred to as NATO 3.0, in which nuclear deterrence remains an American commitment, while conventional defense is Europeanized.

From a purely economic perspective, this step is understandable for the US. For decades, the United States has borne a disproportionately high burden for the common defense of a continent whose collective GDP exceeds that of the US and which for a long time failed to make sufficient efforts of its own in terms of defense. Trump communicated this more aggressively than his predecessors, but the basic principle of burden-sharing was repeatedly addressed from Obama to Biden. The demand for five percent of GDP for defense—provocative as it sounds—is less a demand than a conversation starter that sheds light on the structural underfunding of European defense.

At the same time, the geopolitical opportunity costs of the US withdrawal from Europe must be considered. Every US resource that remains tied up in Europe is unavailable for competition with China in the Indo-Pacific. The stationing of an aircraft carrier strike group or several fighter jet squadrons in Europe automatically means less maritime deterrence in the South China Sea, less responsiveness in the event of a potential Taiwan crisis, and a thinner deterrent line against North Korea.

Europe's capability gaps: A ruthless assessment

An honest assessment of European defense capabilities must begin with the observation that the planned US budget cuts will hit Europe where it is most vulnerable. In the areas of strategic reconnaissance, aerial refueling, maritime surveillance, and anti-submarine warfare, European NATO members are dependent on the US to a degree that has long been politically ignored as an inconvenient truth.

Let's take the specific example of maritime reconnaissance: The German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) possess P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, but only eight of them—a number that is barely sufficient even for national tasks, let alone for a substantial NATO offering. To fill the gap created by the US withdrawal of eleven P-8As from the NATO Force Model, several European countries would have to upgrade their arsenals jointly and in a coordinated manner—a process that takes years and requires massive investment. The Bundeswehr did, however, order eight MQ-9B drones for maritime reconnaissance in January 2026, which are scheduled to be operational from 2028. But this procurement is a first step in a broad field, not a solution.

The situation is similar with drone capability. Europe is only just beginning to build up its capabilities in this area, which plays an increasingly dominant role in modern conflicts. As part of its Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, the European Commission has announced a European Drone Defence Initiative, which aims to establish a Europe-wide drone and anti-drone network. However, the timeframe of 2028 to 2030 for achieving full operational capability is significantly out of step with the immediate threat situation if the US budget cuts take effect in the short term.

The situation is somewhat less dramatic with fighter jets, as several European countries maintain their own fleets. However, strategic air superiority over a large battlefield requires not only sheer numbers, but above all system integration, reconnaissance support, aerial refueling capabilities, and electronic warfare—areas in which Europe lags significantly behind. The fragmentation of European weapons systems, which McKinsey explicitly points out in a recent study, hinders efficiency and interoperability.

A particularly critical issue is the legal framework for the US withdrawal. While the National Defense Authorization Act for 2026 (NDAA 2026) restricts the possibility of reducing troop levels in Europe below 76,000 without prior consultation with NATO allies and certification to Congress, this law does not prevent phased reductions that remain below this threshold—and it does not apply to reductions in the Force Model, which do not involve physical troop redeployment but merely planning notifications.

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The economic dimensions: What defense will cost

The geopolitical debate would take on a fatal dimension if considered without its economic consequences. And these are considerable. In 2025, European NATO members increased their defense spending to a total of €739 billion—a 14 percent rise compared to the previous year, the strongest increase since the 1950s. Germany's defense spending now stands at €97 billion, representing a 24 percent increase compared to 2024 and placing it fourth in global defense spending.

These figures sound impressive, but they mask a fundamental discrepancy. The NATO summit in The Hague in the summer of 2025 adopted a new target: member states should increase their total defense spending to five percent of GDP—3.5 percent for nuclear defense and 1.5 percent for security-related expenditures. For Germany, this meant that the Federal Ministry of Defense had budgeted for more than €108 billion in 2026, rising to around €152 billion by 2029. The 3.5 percent GDP target is to be reached as early as 2029—six years earlier than NATO's requirement.

At the EU-wide level, the Commission plans to mobilize up to €800 billion for defense by 2030—around €300 billion more than in 2025. Of this, €150 billion will be provided in EU loans under the ReArm Europe program, and defense spending will be exempt from the strict EU debt rules. This fiscal flexibility is a structural shift that allows European states to borrow without violating the Maastricht criteria—a paradigm shift whose implications can hardly be overstated.

However, a McKinsey analysis from February 2026 shows that budget increases alone are insufficient. The study identifies a significant discrepancy between the increase in defense budgets and the resulting operational combat power. The fragmentation of European weapons systems considerably hinders efficiency and interoperability, and consolidating supply chains could unlock nine billion euros annually. The problem is not only quantitative—too little money—but also qualitative: too many different systems, too little joint planning, too little integration.

The Sparta 2.0 study, developed by experts modeling a gradual European independence from the US, estimates the costs for the ten most critical areas—including independent command and control systems, mass production of drones, air defense, and satellite reconnaissance—at €150 to €200 billion by 2030. Overall, the authors anticipate costs of around €500 billion over a decade, or approximately €50 billion per year. Significant progress, the experts say, is possible within three to five years—but only if decisive political action is taken.

Germany's position: Between ambitions and structural deficits

Germany plays a key role in this debate—not only because of its economic size, but also because of its geographical location in the heart of Europe and its historically rooted reticence on military matters. In April 2026, Defense Minister Boris Pistorius presented a new military strategy that aims for nothing less than the creation of the strongest conventional army in Europe. The goal: 460,000 combat-ready soldiers—active troops and reserves combined.

This is an ambitious goal. The German Armed Forces currently have around 185,000 active soldiers, falling far short of the targeted strength. The plan envisions three phases: Troop strength is to increase rapidly until 2029; from 2029 to 2035, a structured increase will follow, driven by the introduction of new weapon systems; and from 2035 onward, automation and artificial intelligence will determine personnel requirements. This is a realistic long-term plan, but its first phase will face significant bottlenecks in personnel, infrastructure, and arms procurement.

To accelerate procurement, Pistorius presented a defense reform agenda in May 2026, which restructures the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support. The goal is to simplify procurement procedures, promote innovation more effectively, and improve cooperation with industry. New procurement teams, operating agilely across land, sea, air, cyberspace, and space, are intended to be more flexible and faster than previous administrative structures.

Defense expert Thomas Erndl of the CSU party is calling for faster progress in building up the Bundeswehr (German Armed Forces) and for the quicker and more comprehensive use of new technologies. The focus must be on an action plan that will make Germany visibly more capable of defending itself by 2029, and Pistorius must finally present the future structure of the Bundeswehr, the development of which is long overdue. This demand is met with resistance from a bureaucracy that is structurally not geared towards speed – one of the biggest institutional challenges of German defense reform.

At the same time, a debate is taking place in Germany about arms procurement that extends far beyond military issues. The 2026 defense budget stipulates that only eight percent of procurement contracts should be awarded to the USA—the majority is to go to European manufacturers. This is a deliberate industrial policy decision: Europe is not only to become more militarily independent, but also to develop its defense industry as a strategic economic infrastructure that secures jobs, technological leadership, and economic resilience in the long term.

Nuclear umbrella: The unresolved core question

Amid the debate about conventional capabilities, a more fundamental question risks being overlooked: What will happen to the US nuclear umbrella? So far, the official line is that Washington intends to maintain nuclear deterrence within the framework of NATO 3.0. But this commitment is less irrevocable than it sounds. The end of the New START treaty between the US and Russia, which expires definitively in 2026, has prompted NATO to call for restraint and responsibility in the nuclear field.

The German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) has analyzed three scenarios of expanded US nuclear deterrence in Europe. All scenarios demonstrate that without a credible nuclear guarantee, Europe's security would be dramatically weakened—and that the European alternatives, particularly the French and British nuclear forces, cannot provide a sufficient equivalent on their own. France, with its Force de Frappe, and the United Kingdom, with its Trident missiles, are national, not European, nuclear powers. Extending the nuclear umbrella to other EU member states would pose enormous political, legal, and financial hurdles.

The nuclear dimension makes it clear that Europeans cannot simply replace US capabilities one-to-one in their conventional defense build-up. Conventional strength and nuclear deterrence are in a complex interplay: A weak conventional defense forces an alliance to resort to the threat of nuclear escalation sooner—raising the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons and thus the strategic risk.

The window of opportunity and Europe's Defense Readiness Roadmap

Between the point at which the US effectively reduces its NATO commitments and the point at which Europe is able to close these gaps lies a dangerous window of strategic vulnerability. The European Commission, with its Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, has defined four key major projects: Eastern Flank Watch for expanding surveillance capabilities on the eastern flank, the European Drone Defence Initiative for a Europe-wide drone and anti-drone network, the European Air Shield for a multi-layered air defense system, and the European Space Shield for protecting critical satellite infrastructure.

These projects are scheduled to launch in 2026, with full operational capability to be achieved between 2028 and 2030. This is an ambitious timeline that can only be met if the participating states abandon their historically fragmented national procurement structures in favor of genuine joint planning and financing. The European Commission has called on member states to form voluntary coalitions by the end of the first quarter of 2026 to address nine defined military capability gaps—ranging from space reconnaissance and air defense to military transport.

Whether this timeline is realistic must be assessed with healthy skepticism. Historically, large-scale defense programs in Europe have been subject to considerable delays. The example of the Eurofighter, whose development began in the 1980s and whose first operational units were not available until 2003, illustrates the structural limitations of European defense cooperation. The underlying problems—diverging national interests, differing industrial policy priorities, lengthy procurement processes, and a lack of capacity for joint financing of large projects—have not simply vanished overnight.

Between dependence and autonomy: A strategic repositioning of Europe

The entire debate surrounding the US NATO spending cuts is ultimately a symptom of a deeper question: How much strategic autonomy does and can Europe develop? This question is not new, but it has now become an existential priority. The 2026 Munich Security Conference clearly demonstrated that European security experts and government representatives have recognized the need for greater independence. The EU is mobilizing up to €800 billion and investing in capabilities ranging from air and missile defense to drones and military mobility.

For their part, the US is signaling—at least superficially—no fundamental disinterest in Europe. Under the banner of NATO 3.0, the US is to continue playing a central role in the alliance, particularly in nuclear deterrence and certain key capabilities such as intelligence and communications. Furthermore, a US defense bill from 2026 prevents the Pentagon from using its budget to reduce troop levels in Europe below 76,000 without prior consultation and congressional approval.

Ultimately, one thing is clear: the strategic paradigm has shifted. The question is no longer whether, but how quickly and to what extent Europe will assume the burden of its own defense. Trump accelerated this process—with a ruthlessness that was perceived as a shock in Europe, but whose structural logic was already present before his presidency. Europe faces a choice: either to build strategic independence as a proactive strength or to experience the erosion of its own security architecture as a reactive weakness.

The fact that European defense spending rose more sharply in 2025 than at any time since 1953 is a hopeful sign. The fact that military spending by European NATO members has increased to €739 billion, with Germany ranking fourth globally at €97 billion, demonstrates a growing political commitment. However, the path between writing checks and building actual military capability requires political resolve, industrial capacity, joint planning, and the courage for institutional reform—not just in national capitals, but in Brussels and across the alliance as a whole.

The list of proposed cuts, which has now come to light, is therefore far more than a military planning note. It is a catalyst for a debate that Europe must have—about its values, its strategic role in the world, and its will to assert itself in an era in which the guarantees of the past are no longer guarantees for the future.

Markus Becker

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Konrad Wolfenstein

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