Published on: June 26, 2025 / Updated on: June 26, 2025 – Author: Konrad Wolfenstein
Europe's awakening from security policy complacency – Image: Xpert.Digital
Superficial reporting overlooks: Trump's NATO analysis hits the nail on the head regarding European defense deficits
Europe's awakening from security policy complacency
The criticized headlines about the “sycophantic summit” and the “subservience” of NATO partners to Donald Trump miss the true dimension of current security policy developments. This superficial portrayal overlooks the fundamental weaknesses of the European defense architecture, which Trump has ruthlessly exposed with his direct criticism.
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The reality of European defense dependency
Europe's structural dependence on the US is actually more serious than is often discussed in public debate. The European NATO states are currently unable to command a large formation like a corps of up to 50,000 soldiers without American support. This leadership weakness extends across all military dimensions: from strategic planning to operational implementation.
The US acts as an indispensable integrator of the various national armed forces of Europe. Only the US possesses the necessary structures, command centers, command systems, and associated staff to effectively and efficiently coordinate the activities of the entire NATO alliance in a crisis. These command capabilities are further underpinned by strategic support forces such as AWACS aircraft and tanker aircraft – capabilities that the Europeans possess only to a very limited extent.
Structural deficits in numbers
A recent analysis by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy and the Brussels-based Bruegel Institute illustrates the extent of European dependence: Should the US withdraw, the Europeans would have to establish approximately 50 additional brigades with a total of 300,000 soldiers. This would require at least 1,400 new main battle tanks and 2,000 infantry fighting vehicles – exceeding the current inventory of the combined German, French, Italian, and British land forces.
The financial dimensions are equally impressive: A self-sufficient European defense would require substantial investments of around €250 billion annually. This corresponds to an increase in European defense spending from the current two percent to between 3.5 and four percent of GDP.
The NATO decisions from The Hague as a strategic necessity
The NATO summit in The Hague marked a historic turning point with the agreement on the five percent target. NATO member states committed to investing five percent of their gross domestic product annually in defense and security, starting no later than 2035. This drastic increase from the previous two percent is broken down into several categories: 3.5 percent for core defense areas such as troops and weapons, and a further 1.5 percent for expanded security-related investments such as cybersecurity and militarily usable infrastructure.
This decision is by no means opportunistic subservience, but rather a long overdue adjustment to the changed security policy reality. In 2024, only 22 of the 32 NATO members spent two percent or more of their GDP on defense. Poland led the way with more than four percent, while Spain ranked at the bottom with less than 1.3 percent.
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Technological dependencies as a strategic risk
Europe's dependence on key American technologies poses a significant strategic risk. Many of the most advanced weapons systems used by European countries, such as the F-35 fighter jets and Patriot air defense systems, rely on continuous support from the United States. These systems require regular software updates, GPS clearances, and communication signals from American networks.
A particularly critical example is the F-35 fighter jet: Complete control over the software of these jets lies in the hands of the US manufacturer Lockheed Martin, meaning the US military could deactivate the IT systems at any time. This technological dependency also extends to satellite navigation, where Europe, despite its own Galileo system, remains heavily reliant on American GPS services.
The fragmented European defense industry
The structural problems of the European defense industry further increase its dependence on the US. Arms production in EU countries is highly fragmented and relies on redundant, inefficient structures. This fragmentation leads to higher costs, longer development times, and reduced economies of scale.
A concrete example of this problem can be seen in ammunition production: Germany is not alone in facing an ammunition deficit – even a week's worth of ammunition reserves would be wishful thinking for the Bundeswehr (German Armed Forces). NATO sets a target of 30 days' ammunition reserves, but for Germany this is currently "still unthinkable".
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Threat scenarios: Russia and China
The threat situation has fundamentally worsened since 2022. Despite heavy losses in the Ukraine war, Russia has massively increased its military capabilities and had approximately 700,000 soldiers in Ukraine at the end of 2024 – significantly more than during the large-scale invasion of 2022. At the same time, around 1,550 new tanks and 5,700 armored vehicles were produced or repaired in 2024.
China poses an additional strategic challenge. As the world's second-largest military power, China has been working for years to modernize its military, aiming to transform it into a "world-class" army by 2050. Particularly worrying is China's support for Russia: China has crossed its own red lines and is now supplying Russia with lethal drones.
NATO Europe without the USA: The military reality
A recent Greenpeace study shows that NATO Europe is militarily superior to Russia even without the US. The European NATO partners, excluding the US and Canada, possess 2,073 fighter jets, while Russia has 2,141. The European NATO states also significantly exceed Russia in military budgets.
Nevertheless, serious weaknesses remain: On paper, Europe has around one million ground troops not otherwise committed, but in practice this number is significantly lower. Only a few countries have close to 100,000 active soldiers. France and Greece lead with around 98,000 and 92,000 soldiers respectively, followed by Italy and Poland with approximately 89,000 each.
Munitions and production deficits
European arms production is lagging dramatically behind demand. Europe is consuming more ammunition every day in the Ukraine war than it can produce. Former General Marc Thys warned emphatically: “This is no joke, we are in deep trouble. It will take another five to seven years to modernize Western industry to the point where it is capable of deterrence.”.
Germany is striving to remedy the situation: Rheinmetall plans to increase its artillery ammunition production capacity twentyfold by 2026. A framework agreement with the German Armed Forces for artillery ammunition covers projectiles worth up to 8.5 billion euros. Nevertheless, systemic problems persist: Germany often purchases only individual projectiles instead of complete rounds, which limits its operational capability.
Nuclear dimension of dependence
Europe's nuclear deterrence relies almost entirely on US nuclear weapons within the framework of nuclear sharing. US nuclear weapons are stored in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and Germany. Trump's repeated questioning of NATO's mutual defense commitment has sparked a debate about European nuclear weapons, including a possible Europeanization of the French nuclear umbrella or even the nuclear armament of Germany.
Trump's justified criticism
The superficial criticism of NATO partners as "sycophants" overlooks the strategic dimension of current developments. Trump's criticism of insufficient European defense contributions is not only justified but strategically necessary. For decades, Europeans have become complacent in their security policy and neglected their defense capabilities.
The structural dependencies on American leadership capabilities, key technologies, and logistical capacities are so severe that Europe would be unable to defend its security interests independently without fundamental reforms. The Hague decisions do not signify subservience, but rather the long-overdue beginning of a strategic realignment.
Europe must face reality: The era of security policy complacency is over
The geopolitical challenges posed by Russia and China, combined with the American shift towards the Indo-Pacific, necessitate a fundamental strengthening of European defense capabilities. Trump's "wake-up call" was not only justified but strategically essential for Europe's security future.
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