Five terawatts from the Sahara? Europe's energy promise or the most expensive dependency of the century?

Sahara as an energy supplier: reality or utopia for Europe?

The challenges of a five terawatt photovoltaic plant in the Sahara

The vision of a five-terawatt photovoltaic plant in the Sahara raises both hopes and challenges. The idea of ​​harnessing North Africa's immense solar radiation to supply Europe with energy has a compelling logic. But behind this radiant image lies a complex web of economic, political, and environmental issues. While Europe urgently seeks low-carbon energy sources, the Sahara could emerge as a strategic partner—provided the necessary infrastructure, technologies, and political frameworks are established. The scale of such a project should not be underestimated: it requires not only massive investments but also coordinated cooperation between different nations and economic sectors. In this article, we examine the potential and pitfalls of this ambitious initiative and ask whether the vision of an energy-independent future from the desert is truly achievable.

The sun is free – the system behind it wouldn't be: From the big picture to a reliable calculation

The idea of ​​a five-terawatt photovoltaic and industrial landscape in the Sahara possesses an almost irresistible logic. North Africa boasts exceptionally high solar irradiance, vast sparsely populated areas, geographical proximity to Europe, and a rapidly growing domestic energy demand. Europe, in turn, requires significantly more low-carbon electricity for electrification, industry, data centers, heat pumps, climate-neutral fuels, and transportation. China contributes industrial capacity, affordable solar technology, experience with high-voltage direct current transmission, and a strong willingness to finance large infrastructure projects. In theory, the three economic regions thus complement each other almost perfectly.

But five terawatts is not a large solar power plant; it's an energy system of global dimensions. This output would be equivalent to 5,000 gigawatts, or five million megawatts. With a plausible capacity factor of around 25 percent for very good desert locations, such a fleet could generate approximately 10,950 terawatt-hours of electricity annually. That would be significantly more than the current electricity consumption of the European Union and Africa combined. However, it wouldn't be the same as having five terawatts of power available at all times. At night, photovoltaic production drops to zero, while clouds, sand, heat, pollution, technical failures, and seasonal fluctuations further alter the yield.

The crucial correction to the grand narrative is therefore this: A five-terawatt photovoltaic fleet could theoretically provide enormous amounts of electricity, but it would not automatically supply Europe or Africa permanently and without interruption. This would require flexible demand, continental power grids, storage facilities, dispatchable power plants, wind energy, hydropower, potentially nuclear energy, reserve capacities, and professionally organized system management. The real economic achievement would not be to place as many modules as possible in the desert, but to reliably coordinate electricity generation, grids, storage, industry, and consumption across three continents.

A dimension beyond ordinary megaprojects

The sheer size of the project illustrates the scale of the undertaking. Depending on module efficiency, row spacing, terrain, maintenance access, and system design, one gigawatt of ground-mounted photovoltaics can require roughly 15 to 35 square kilometers of total area. For five terawatts, this would translate to an area of ​​approximately 75,000 to 175,000 square kilometers. That would represent only a small fraction of the entire Sahara, but is larger than the area of ​​many European countries. The often-repeated claim that only a tiny portion of the desert needs to be covered with solar panels is mathematically accurate, but economically misleading. While land is plentiful in the Sahara, suitable, developed, legally usable, and ecologically sound land is by no means free.

In addition, roads, substations, converter stations, power lines, submarine cables, battery storage facilities, workshops, residential and utility sites, spare parts depots, digital control centers, and potentially facilities for hydrogen, ammonia, synthetic fuels, or seawater desalination would be required. Modules would need to be cleaned regularly, inverters replaced, and damaged components exchanged. Sand deposits can significantly reduce yields, high temperatures lower electrical efficiency, and abrasive particles wear down surfaces and mechanical components. The desert offers excellent solar resources but is not a maintenance-free industrial location.

The pace of construction would also be unprecedented. If the system were built over 25 years, an average of 200 gigawatts of photovoltaic capacity would have to be added annually in the Sahara alone. Over decades, this would correspond to a significant portion of today's global solar expansion. The region would need to establish its own industrial base for modules, inverters, transformers, cables, steel structures, glass, power electronics, and maintenance robots. A purely import-based model would be neither logistically sound nor politically acceptable. The project would only be economically viable if a large share of the value creation took place in Africa.

Cheap modules do not automatically result in cheap electricity

The cost of photovoltaics has fallen dramatically over the past decade and a half. Globally, solar power is now among the cheapest forms of new electricity generation. However, this success tempts us to confuse module prices with system costs. With an average investment of, for example, $600 to $800 per kilowatt, the construction of just five terawatts of generating capacity would cost three to four trillion US dollars. Even if extremely large projects, favorable Chinese supply chains, and technological advances further reduced the price, the total would remain exceptionally high.

This would include the costs of the grid, converters, storage, reserve power, water infrastructure, ports, roads, industrial customers, and ongoing maintenance. Furthermore, parts of the system would require at least one major upgrade during a forty-year project phase. Inverters typically have a shorter lifespan than modules, battery storage systems undergo multiple replacement cycles, and lines and substations also require modernization. A realistic overall calculation would therefore have to consider not only the initial investment but also all capital costs, replacement investments, insurance, safety expenses, and decommissioning obligations over the entire life cycle.

Depending on the technical architecture, the total investment could range from five to ten trillion US dollars over several decades. This range is not a project calculation, but rather a plausibility zone. It illustrates that the project would not necessarily fail due to a lack of global capital availability, but rather due to its pooling, securing, and productive use. Spread over thirty years, six trillion US dollars would equate to an average of 200 billion US dollars per year. This would be macroeconomically feasible in principle, but would far exceed current energy investments in Africa and would require stable political and regulatory frameworks.

The cost of capital determines success

For capital-intensive technologies, it's not just the construction cost that matters, but also the cost of money. A solar power plant with low hardware costs can deliver more expensive electricity in a country with high interest rates, a weak currency, unclear property rights, and political risk than a technically identical plant in Europe or China. Africa, in particular, doesn't primarily suffer from a lack of sunshine, but from high financing costs. Exchange rate risks, the low creditworthiness of government customers, uncertain grid revenues, and weak institutions all drive up the return demands of private investors.

A viable model would therefore need to distribute risks strategically. Development banks could hedge political risks, support local currencies, and provide long-term loans. African states would need to guarantee transparent permits, reliable grid access, and independent regulation. European customers could conclude long-term power, hydrogen, or product purchase agreements. China could contribute technology, construction capacity, and financing, but should not be the sole lender, equipment supplier, and operator. While excessive concentration would accelerate decision-making, it would also create dependencies and increase political resistance.

Financing should not be provided through a single continental special purpose vehicle. A portfolio of independent projects with comparable technical and legal standards would be more sensible. This would allow for risk segregation, the involvement of local capital markets, and the gradual scaling up of successful models. A project in Morocco would have different requirements than one in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Mauritania, or Namibia. The idea of ​​a uniform Saharan infrastructure underestimates the differences in networks, legal systems, foreign policy, water availability, and institutional capacity.

Power corridors instead of a gigantic grid node

High-voltage direct current (HVDC) transmission is technically suitable for transporting large amounts of energy over long distances. Modern lines lose roughly three to four percent of the energy per 1,000 kilometers, in addition to losses in the converter stations. Depending on the route, transporting electricity from North Africa to Central Europe could result in losses in the low double-digit percentage range. This is technically manageable and, given the high solar yields, not prohibitive. The greater challenge would be the number of lines required and their integration into the European and African grids.

If only one terawatt were to be transmitted to Europe simultaneously, hundreds of high-capacity connections would be required for corridors with capacities of two to five gigawatts each. Every corridor would need land, permits, converters, backup systems, and safeguards against technical failures. A single, large-scale power transmission line from the Sahara northward would therefore be neither realistic nor desirable. A meshed system of western, central, and eastern corridors would be more resilient. Connections via Morocco and Spain, Tunisia and Italy, as well as Egypt, Greece, and the Balkans would be conceivable. Simultaneously, intra-African north-south and east-west connections would need to be established.

The economic principle should be that African demand takes precedence over exports, without preventing exports. Electricity exports could finance investments, but local households and businesses must not be left without a reliable supply alongside export lines. A fair contract would have to stipulate what share of production is marketed locally, how grid expansion and electrification are co-financed, and how export revenues are distributed between the state, communities, operators, and investors. Without visible local benefits, the system would be perceived as a new form of extractive infrastructure.

Storage doesn't solve every problem

Batteries can compensate for short-term fluctuations, shift solar power from midday to evening, and provide grid services. However, for completely bridging several nights, extended periods of weather, or seasonal differences, they would be extremely material- and capital-intensive at a capacity of several terawatts. The optimal architecture would therefore need to combine various sources of flexibility. These include battery storage for a few hours, pumped storage and thermal storage for longer periods, flexible electrolyzers, controllable industrial processes, load shifting, geographically distributed wind power, and reserve power plants using climate-neutral fuels.

The combination of solar and wind energy is particularly important because their production profiles partially complement each other. In addition to solar resources, North Africa also possesses attractive wind energy sites along the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Red Seas. A system relying solely on photovoltaics would place unnecessarily high demands on storage and grids. Therefore, a five-terawatt industrial matrix should not be understood as five terawatts of photovoltaics in the narrow sense, but rather as a target figure for a diversified renewable energy system in which solar energy forms the largest, but not the only, pillar.

European generation remains indispensable. Solar power from North Africa can supplement European supplies and offer seasonal advantages, but it should not replace domestic wind, solar, hydro, and storage projects. Security of supply arises from diversification. Europe should not be dependent on Russian gas, a single southern power corridor, or a single Chinese-dominated supply chain. The strategic value of North African energy lies precisely in creating additional options.

Hydrogen as a buffer and industrial building block

Green hydrogen is often portrayed as a universal solution for surplus solar power. Indeed, it can accommodate fluctuating production and serve as a feedstock for fertilizers, steel, shipping, or synthetic fuels. However, the conversion process is inefficient. Current electrolyzers require approximately 50 to 55 kilowatt-hours of electricity to produce one kilogram of hydrogen. If just one percent of the assumed annual production of the five-terawatt system were used for electrolysis, theoretically, well over two million tons of hydrogen could be produced. At ten percent, this figure would exceed twenty million tons.

These quantities would already require new ports, pipelines, storage facilities, ammonia plants, and industrial consumers. Therefore, hydrogen should not be produced primarily for later conversion back into electricity. Direct use in applications that are difficult to electrify is more economically viable. Even more attractive could be the direct production of energy-intensive products in North Africa. Green steel, ammonia, fertilizers, aluminum precursors, or synthetic fuels can often be transported more cheaply than the electricity required to produce them.

This shifts the focus from energy exports to industrialization. The Sahara would no longer be merely Europe's power plant, but the foundation of African value creation. This distinction is politically crucial. Those who simply transmit electrons to Europe and export raw materials reproduce old dependencies. Those who, on the other hand, develop processing, mechanical engineering, logistics, education, and research in Africa create a more sustainable partnership. China recognized this industrial policy connection earlier than many European actors. However, Europe possesses technological, financial, and market-related strengths that could have a significant impact through balanced cooperation.

Desalination opens opportunities and sets limits

Combining solar power with seawater desalination is technically feasible. Modern reverse osmosis plants require approximately 2.5 to 4 kilowatt-hours of electricity per cubic meter of freshwater under favorable conditions. If one percent of the assumed annual output of the five-terawatt system were used for desalination, theoretically, about 27 to 44 billion cubic meters of water could be produced. This would be a very large quantity, but it also illustrates how energy-intensive a comprehensive artificial water supply remains.

Desalination alone won't turn the desert into a breadbasket. Water must be pumped from the coast to the fields, stored, and distributed. Energy requirements and costs increase with distance and altitude. Soils can become saline if drainage and irrigation are poorly managed. Concentrated brine pollutes marine ecosystems if discharged without proper dilution and control. Added to this are nutrient requirements, cold chains, roads, labor, seeds, crop protection, quality standards, and market access.

Desalinated water would be economically viable primarily for cities, industry, and high-value agriculture near the coast. Cultivating water-intensive staple foods on distant desert lands would generally be too expensive. Greenhouses, controlled organic farming, fruit, vegetables, seed production, and other high-value crops offer better yields per cubic meter of water. Drip irrigation can improve water application and reduce evaporation losses, but it does not automatically lead to a decrease in overall consumption. If more efficient technology triggers an expansion of cultivated land, water consumption can even increase. Therefore, water rights, measurement, and withdrawal limits are just as important as irrigation technology.

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Food security cannot be achieved through electricity alone

A strong agricultural sector along the southern Mediterranean and Red Sea coasts could improve food supplies for North Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. It could fill seasonal gaps, promote regional processing, and create jobs. However, the claim that a solar and desalination program could permanently solve the food problems of three major regions goes too far. Hunger is rarely solely the result of insufficient production. Income, distribution, wars, transportation, storage, trade restrictions, land rights, and government capacity are at least as important.

Furthermore, there is a conflict of objectives between export revenues and local supply. High-quality vegetables for European supermarkets can be more economically attractive than basic foodstuffs for local markets. Without clear framework conditions, water, land, and energy might flow to where the highest purchasing power exists. A partnership-based strategy would therefore have to contractually guarantee local food security, fair working conditions, and affordable access to water.

A regional division of labor would be beneficial. Coastal areas could utilize desalinated water and protected cultivation systems. More fertile regions would become more productive through more precise irrigation, improved seeds, cold chains, and processing. Solar energy could power pumps, refrigeration, and storage. Digital systems could monitor weather, soil moisture, and supply chains. The greatest contribution to food security would likely not lie in a spectacular greening of the Sahara, but rather in a more efficient use of existing agricultural land and a significant reduction in post-harvest losses.

Africa's energy needs should not be underestimated

The idea that a five-terawatt power plant could permanently supply Europe and Africa is often based on current consumption levels. However, Africa's per capita electricity consumption is very low, and hundreds of millions of people still lack reliable access to electricity. With growing populations, urbanization, industrialization, air conditioning, digital infrastructure, and electric vehicles, electricity demand will increase dramatically. A more prosperous Africa will not only connect more people to the grid but will also consume significantly more energy per capita.

A large portion of future energy production would therefore not be surplus export energy, but rather a prerequisite for African development. Data centers, cooling, transportation, mining, metal processing, chemicals, construction, and modern agriculture all require a reliable, round-the-clock electricity supply. Those who primarily view the Sahara as a supply area for Europe underestimate the future domestic market. From an economic perspective, this market could prove more attractive and stable in the long run than pure exports.

This also changes the negotiating power. North African states are not merely location providers, but could become industrial platforms between Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia. Morocco is already demonstrating how free trade agreements, the automotive industry, port infrastructure, and renewable energy can work together. Egypt has a large domestic market and the Suez Canal. Mauritania possesses vast areas, wind and solar resources, and access to the Atlantic Ocean. Algeria contributes energy infrastructure and industrial experience, but would need to improve investment conditions and regional cooperation.

The 20-million-vehicle vision put to the test

The idea that Africa could become a production base for at least 20 million electric vehicles annually within four decades is conceivable as a long-term industrial policy vision, but currently cannot be proven as a guaranteed development path. The continent currently produces only a small share of the world's vehicles. Even medium-term African plans tend toward a few million vehicles per year. A leap to 20 million units would require a complete transformation of income, financing, roads, power grids, the automotive supply industry, ports, standards, and regional trade.

Nevertheless, the vision has a rational core. Africa is becoming increasingly urbanized, its population is growing, and the current per capita vehicle ownership rate is low. Electric buses, motorcycles, delivery vehicles, and compact cars could become economically viable in many markets, especially when imported fuels are expensive and domestic electricity generation is inexpensive. However, the early phase is likely to be characterized more by electric two-wheelers, buses, fleet vehicles, and local assembly than by the immediate mass production of conventional cars.

China boasts particularly competitive manufacturers, battery technology, and supply chains. Chinese companies are already investing in African battery and vehicle projects, especially in countries with port access, raw materials, and access to European markets. Europe should not respond to this with isolationism alone. A more promising approach would be a joint industrialization strategy that combines European safety, quality, and circular economy standards with Chinese scalability and African location advantages. Competition would remain necessary, but could take place within transparent rules.

Producing 20 million vehicles would only make sense if a significant portion of the added value were generated locally. Simply assembling imported kits generates less productivity than a chain encompassing battery materials, cell manufacturing, power electronics, software, body construction, recycling, and mechanical engineering. Training systems and regional standards would be particularly important. The African free trade area could create sufficient market size, provided that tariffs, registrations, payment systems, and transportation are effectively harmonized.

China is a partner, competitor, and risk factor

China would be difficult to replace for such a project. The country dominates large parts of the photovoltaic, battery, and electrolyzer supply chains and has experience with very large power grids and rapid construction programs. Chinese capital is sometimes more willing to accept longer time horizons than Western financial investors. At the same time, Beijing pursues its own industrial, trade, and strategic interests. A partnership would therefore be neither an act of charity nor automatically a threat, but rather a process of negotiation between competing interests.

The European Union must avoid replacing its previous dependence on fossil fuel suppliers with a new dependence on Chinese equipment and African manufacturing. To achieve this, it needs multiple suppliers, European production capacity for critical components, open technical standards, cybersecurity, transparent credit conditions, and robust rules for data access and plant control. African states, in turn, should prevent infrastructure, debt, and export earnings from being permanently controlled by single external actors.

A sensible trinational structure would not rigidly divide tasks according to origin. African companies and public institutions would have to assume ownership, operation, and value creation. European actors could contribute financing, market access, mechanical engineering, grid integration, and regulation. Chinese companies could contribute scalability, components, construction expertise, and cost-effective production. Joint ventures, local stock market listings, and pension fund participation could prevent the system from being perceived as a foreign enclave project.

Geopolitics without conspiracy theories

The assumption that Western financial centers, intelligence agencies, military organizations, and foundations would unanimously oppose such a project is analytically unsound. Within the United States, Great Britain, and Europe, very different interests exist. Financial investors could profit from infrastructure, networks, hydrogen, and industrial projects. Security agencies would assess risks but might also be interested in more stable energy relations and economic development. European governments would weigh security of supply, climate policy, competitiveness, human rights, and dependencies.

Resistance would still be likely, but for more concrete reasons. Affected communities could defend land rights and access to water. Environmental groups would raise concerns about sensitive ecosystems, bird migration routes, and marine pollution. European energy companies might see competition for their own projects. Trade unions might fear the relocation of industrial jobs. States could resist losing control over critical infrastructure. These conflicts are real and must be addressed politically; they cannot be meaningfully explained as a unified front of sabotage.

The project also fails to provide a sound justification for Chinese nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. Military protection of civilian energy infrastructure via large carrier groups would increase geopolitical tensions and draw partner countries into strategic rivalries. The most effective protection would consist of a decentralized architecture, international ownership, mutual economic interests, local acceptance, redundant networks, professional site security, and coordinated cyber defense. The more militarized a system becomes, the more likely it is to become a strategic target itself.

Migration cannot be switched off

Large energy and industrial investments could create jobs, increase incomes, and stabilize government revenues. This could mitigate some of the root causes of involuntary migration. However, the claim that this would effectively eliminate refugee flows is untenable. Migration has many causes: wars, persecution, political instability, demographic pressure, social networks, environmental changes, educational aspirations, and income inequality.

Economic development can initially even increase migration. People then have more money, better information, and higher expectations. Only with greater prosperity can the pressure to emigrate decrease in the long term. Furthermore, most of the facilities would be capital-intensive. Many jobs would be created during construction, but significantly fewer during subsequent operation. Long-term employment would primarily arise from downstream industries, services, agriculture, research, and local supply chains.

A responsible strategy should therefore not promise to end migration through solar panels. A more credible goal would be to broaden economic opportunities, make cities more resilient, and better organize legal mobility. Investments in education, administration, and local businesses would be just as important as power plants. Infrastructure can enable development, but it does not replace institutions.

Security begins with architecture

A concentrated infrastructure of this size would be vulnerable to sabotage, cyberattacks, political blackmail, accidents, and natural disasters. Five terawatts in a centrally controlled system would pose a systemic risk. The answer should not be maximum militarization, but rather consistent decentralization. Thousands of geographically separated facilities, multiple owners, independent transmission routes, and local island grids could limit outages.

The digital architecture should also be built according to the principle of least dependency. Control systems should not be entirely dependent on a single manufacturer or a foreign cloud. Critical components require tested software, local maintenance capabilities, and spare parts reserves. Network operators from Europe and Africa must develop common standards for cybersecurity, data access, and fault management. China should be involved, but not granted sole control.

Physical security could be improved through regional security forces, civil security services, satellite surveillance, drone inspections, and rapid repair units. Crucially, this would depend on public acceptance. Communities that receive ownership shares, affordable electricity, water, training, and tax revenue have a vested interest in protecting the facilities. Conversely, where people only see expropriation, fences, and exported electricity, the risk of conflict increases.

Ecology and land rights as economic factors

The Sahara is not a blank slate. It contains fragile ecosystems, grazing lands, traditional transport routes, archaeological sites, and habitats of adapted species. Large solar farms alter surface temperatures, runoff patterns, and local habitats. Roads and pipelines fragment landscapes. Desalination plants produce concentrated brine, while new agricultural practices can introduce fertilizer and pesticide runoff.

These impacts are not merely ethical footnotes, but also investment risks. Unresolved land rights lead to delays, lawsuits, and social conflicts. Inadequate environmental assessments increase subsequent remediation costs. The project therefore requires clearly defined exclusion zones, binding environmental standards, transparent compensation, and independent monitoring. Nomadic and local communities must be involved from the outset.

A circular economy should be planned from the outset. Millions of tons of modules, cables, batteries, and power electronics will eventually need replacing. Recycling facilities in Africa could recover raw materials and create new industries. Producer responsibility, decommissioning guarantees, and standardized product passports should be mandatory. Without such regulations, a massive waste problem threatens to erupt after decades.

A realistic structure in four development stages

The most sensible path to a very large Saharan industrial matrix would not be a political decision on five terawatts, but rather a learning-based development program. In a first phase, several corridors with 10 to 30 gigawatts each could be created. These would combine local energy supply, industry, desalination, and limited exports. Crucially, it would be essential to collect real-world data on construction costs, dust levels, water consumption, power outages, financing, and local value creation.

In a second phase, total capacity could increase to several hundred gigawatts. Regional production clusters for modules, cables, transformers, electrolyzers, and batteries would then be economically viable. Power connections across the Mediterranean would be complemented by intra-African grids. Industrial ports could export green ammonia, steel precursors, and synthetic fuels.

A third phase, in the range of one to two terawatts, would already constitute a global economic transformation program. It would require functioning institutions, harmonized markets, and a high degree of local vertical integration. Only when this stage is operating reliably would an expansion towards five terawatts make sense. The target figure should therefore not be a rigid construction obligation, but rather a long-term framework for orientation.

This phased approach reduces the risk of costly planning errors. Technology, demand, and political relationships will change over decades. Perhaps electricity transmission will become more attractive, perhaps hydrogen, perhaps direct industrial production. Flexible corridors allow for adaptation. A monolithic master plan, on the other hand, would lock in assumptions early on that could later prove to be wrong.

Europe's strategic decision

For Europe, the opportunity does not lie in a supposedly definitive solution to the energy question. No single technology or supply area can provide this. Rather, the opportunity lies in an additional pillar for energy supply, climate protection, and industrial cooperation. North African solar and wind power could complement European generation, green hydrogen could supply certain industries, and joint manufacturing could diversify supply chains.

Germany and the European Union should not attempt to completely exclude Chinese participation. Given China's cost and economies of scale, this would likely be expensive and slow. Equally wrong would be to leave the entire value chain to Chinese corporations. Europe needs an active industrial policy that strengthens its own technology providers, supports joint ventures, and links access to the European market to sustainability, data security, local value creation, and fair financing.

A credible offer to Africa is particularly important. This must not be reduced to access to raw materials, migration control, and cheap energy. It must encompass education, technology transfer, participation, industrial development, and African market integration. Europe's advantage over a purely transactional model could lie in reliable rules, long-term market access, and high environmental and social standards. However, these standards must not act as bureaucratic market barriers but must be made practically achievable through financing and technical assistance.

The actual pyramid consists of institutions

Technical feasibility is not the weakest point of the vision. Photovoltaics, high-voltage direct current transmission, battery storage, electrolysis, desalination, and drip irrigation already exist. The necessary capital is also available worldwide. What is lacking, however, is trust, coordinated regulation, long-term contracts, efficient administrations, and politically accepted rules for the distribution of costs and benefits.

A sustainable model would require an independent regulatory structure with African leadership, European and Chinese participation, and clear rights for local communities. Contracts would need to be published, debt risks transparent, and tenders competitive. Disputes would require reliable arbitration and judicial mechanisms. Network access, electricity prices, export quotas, and local value creation should not be governed by secret, one-off agreements.

Crucially, a fair ownership structure would also be essential. African states, municipalities, pension funds, and companies should hold substantial stakes. International investors need protection but must not gain permanent control over critical infrastructure. Profits should be partially reinvested in education, internet access, water, and regional development. Only in this way can a major technical project become a development project.

The verdict between vision and megalomania

A five-terawatt industrial matrix across the Sahara is physically feasible, technologically manageable in its individual components, and financially viable in the long term. However, as a single, unified construction project, it would be too large, too centralized, and politically too risky. On the other hand, as a network of numerous energy, water, industrial, and agricultural corridors growing over decades, the idea possesses considerable potential.

The vision's strongest claims are also its weakest. It would not definitively solve the energy question, end hunger, stem migration, or legitimize a military protecting power. Such promises generate attention but diminish the quality of the economic debate. They underestimate systemic costs, institutions, local interests, and the dynamics of future African demand.

The resilient core remains significant. North Africa can become one of the most important locations for renewable energy and green industries. This allows Europe to diversify its energy supply and forge new industrial partnerships. China can contribute technology and scale. Africa can combine energy access, industrial value creation, and export revenues. The prerequisite is that the continent not only becomes a supplier again, but also an owner, producer, and primary beneficiary.

The pyramid of the 21st century would therefore not be an endless field of solar panels. It would be an institutional construct built on trust, networks, industry, water, education, and common ownership. Its size should not be measured by a spectacular number, but by its ability to reliably deliver electricity, increase local productivity, fairly distribute risks, and remain politically viable for decades. Five terawatts can be a reasonable target. However, the primary measure is not terawatts, but the quality of the partnership.

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