How Ursula von der Leyen and the EU Commission first silently waved through the nuclear phase-out and now condemn it as a fatal mistake

Return to nuclear energy: Is Europe's green dream failing due to harsh reality?

For a long time, the European Green Deal was considered a shining example of a climate-neutral Europe – powered by wind, solar, hydrogen, and strict energy efficiency. Nuclear power seemed to be a political relic at the European level, its gradual phase-out in major member states a tacitly accepted consensus. But now, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is executing an unprecedented energy policy U-turn: At the World Nuclear Summit in Paris, she surprisingly described the former abandonment of nuclear power as a "strategic error" and announced millions in subsidies for new reactors. Is this sudden nuclear renaissance a necessary correction in light of the global energy crisis and ambitious climate goals? Or are we witnessing, rather, the opportunistic shift of a power politician merely adapting her agenda to the changing political climate? This in-depth analysis examines the hard economic facts behind the new nuclear hype, reveals dangerous dependencies on Russian uranium, and critically assesses the true costs of Europe's energy transition.

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When the architect of the Green Deal undermines her own foundation

On March 10, 2026, at the World Nuclear Energy Summit in Boulogne-Billancourt near Paris, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen uttered words that would have been unthinkable just a few years earlier. She stated that abandoning nuclear power had been a strategic mistake, and that Europe had turned its back on a reliable, affordable source of low-emission electricity. While in 1990 a third of Europe's electricity came from nuclear power, that figure has now fallen to just under 15 percent. The EU is neither an oil nor a gas producer, she declared, and Europe wants to participate in the global renaissance of nuclear energy. At the same time, she announced €200 million in risk guarantees for private investors in new nuclear technologies, as well as a European strategy for small modular reactors (SMRs), which are expected to be operational by the early 2030s.

These statements mark a fundamental break with the energy policy communication that von der Leyen has cultivated since taking office as Commission President in December 2019. It is a shift that raises numerous questions, not only about the future of European energy policy, but above all about the political credibility of the European Union's most powerful leader. This analysis traces the path Brussels has taken in energy policy, examines the economic realities behind the nuclear renaissance, and asks whether the current change of course is based on a fact-based reassessment or simply stems from political opportunism.

The Green Deal of 2019: Europe's moon landing without nuclear engines

When Ursula von der Leyen presented the European Green Deal to the European Parliament on December 11, 2019, just eleven days after taking office, she called it nothing less than Europe's moon landing. The ambitious program aimed to make Europe the first climate-neutral continent by 2050, reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 50 to 55 percent by 2030 compared to 1990, and introduce a comprehensive carbon border tax. It focused on climate neutrality, greater ambition, an effective carbon price, a renovation wave, sustainable mobility, and a circular economy.

What was conspicuously absent from this founding speech of the Green Deal and from subsequent official Commission documents was any substantial mention of nuclear energy as a strategic element of Europe's decarbonization pathway. Instead, the Commission emphasized investments in innovation, clean technologies, and green infrastructure—primarily wind, solar, storage, efficiency, and clean mobility. The official summary of the Green Deal speaks of a modern, resource-efficient, and competitive economy, whose transformation of energy supply, transport, and industry is intended to make Europe more sustainable. Nuclear energy was simply not mentioned as a key technology.

In the official Green Deal documents, nuclear energy was mentioned at best in a technology-neutral way as part of the existing energy mix of individual member states, without political support and without a discernible strategy to treat this technology as a central building block of European decarbonization. The section on clean and secure energy focused primarily on reducing fossil fuels, expanding renewable energies, and accelerating permitting processes. Even the REPowerEU plan of 2022, which aimed to drastically reduce dependence on fossil fuel imports in response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, prioritized energy savings, diversification of supply, and the accelerated adoption of renewable energies. Nuclear energy did not play a prominent role in this plan either.

Politically, the Commission sent an unambiguous signal: Europe's green path is based on renewable energies and efficiency. The gradual reduction of nuclear power in several member states, most notably Germany, was not called into question. On the contrary, the entire communication framework of the Green Deal suggested that climate neutrality could be achieved with wind turbines, heat pumps, and solar panels, without Brussels having to actively defend nuclear energy or even portray it as indispensable.

Fukushima's long shadow and Germany's special path

To grasp the magnitude of today's shift in policy, one must understand the history of European nuclear policy. The Fukushima nuclear disaster on March 11, 2011, fundamentally altered the energy landscape in Europe, albeit to very different degrees. At the EU level, the immediate response was the implementation of so-called stress tests for all 143 nuclear power plants in the European Union. The then EU Energy Commissioner, Günther Oettinger, convened an emergency meeting with energy ministers and regulatory authorities within days, which led to unanimous agreement on Europe-wide safety reviews.

These stress tests, however, were voluntary and primarily computer-based, which drew considerable criticism from environmentalists. The EU stress test achieved, for the first time, an EU-wide review of all nuclear power plants based on common criteria, but it never constituted an EU-wide phase-out strategy. The actual nuclear phase-out remained a national decision, primarily a German one.

Germany had already decided on its nuclear phase-out in 2002 under the red-green Schröder government, initially reversed this decision under the black-yellow Merkel coalition, and then accelerated it after Fukushima in 2011. The last three German nuclear power plants – Emsland, Isar 2, and Neckarwestheim II – were taken offline on April 15, 2023. With an installed capacity of around 4 gigawatts, they had most recently covered about 7 percent of Germany's electricity demand. Due to the energy crisis triggered by the Soviet invasion of Europe, their operating lives had already been extended by several months beyond the originally planned shutdown date of 2022.

According to reputable studies, the economic impact of Germany's nuclear phase-out on electricity prices was significantly less than often suggested in public debate. An analysis by the Leibniz Institute for Economic Research Halle concluded that wholesale electricity prices in 2023 would have been approximately 1 to 8 percent lower with nuclear power. A model calculation by the analysis firm Prognos quantified the effect at around 0.3 to 0.4 cents less per kilowatt-hour with a hypothetical extension of the operating lives of nuclear power plants. The wholesale electricity price even fell significantly after the nuclear phase-out – from €99.01 per megawatt-hour in April 2023 to €55.01 in April 2024. Other factors, such as the abolition of the EEG surcharge, the reduction of the electricity tax, a high share of renewable energies, and falling gas prices, had a greater dampening effect on prices than the phase-out had on them.

Brussels never actively questioned this German exceptionalism. On the contrary, the Green Deal was communicated in such a way as to portray the energy transition, including the phase-out of nuclear power by individual countries, as feasible, without the Commission actively defending nuclear energy. This was not an oversight, but a calculated political move. It allowed the Commission to sell the Green Deal as a broad consensus that did not offend either pro-nuclear states like France or countries phasing out nuclear power, such as Germany.

The taxonomy turn: A quiet shift in the ruleset

The first discernible shift in European nuclear policy did not occur on a grand stage, but rather within the technical framework of financial market regulation. On February 2, 2022, the European Commission presented a delegated act that classified investments in nuclear and gas-fired power plants as climate-friendly under certain conditions. This decision, within the framework of the EU taxonomy, the classification system for sustainable financial products, was highly controversial politically.

Nuclear power plants should be considered climate-friendly if a construction permit is granted by 2045 and the country in question can present a plan and financial resources for nuclear waste disposal. The European Parliament could have overruled the Commission, but the objection failed on July 6, 2022, by a vote of 278 to 328, far short of the required absolute majority of 353 votes. The taxonomy rules thus entered into force on January 1, 2023.

Reactions were sharply divided. Green MEP Michael Bloss called it an absurd project, comparing it to trying to turn fries into salad. Over 330,000 signatures were collected against the plans. Austria even filed a lawsuit with the EU General Court against the classification, accusing Brussels of greenwashing – labeling something as climate-friendly when it isn't. However, the General Court of the European Union dismissed the case in September 2025, ruling that nuclear power generation produces virtually no greenhouse gas emissions and that there are currently no sufficient alternative technologies available to meet energy demand consistently and reliably.

The taxonomy decision was the institutional gateway to today's pro-nuclear rhetoric. It created the regulatory foundation upon which von der Leyen's subsequent change of course could build. It is noteworthy that the Commission primarily presented this policy shift in 2022 as a technical and financial measure, without openly addressing the political dimension. It was a quiet change of course within the regulatory framework, not a loud public declaration.

The energy crisis as a catalyst: When ideology meets reality

The energy crisis of 2022 and 2023, triggered by Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, acted as a brutal reality check for European energy policy. The turmoil in the gas markets drove electricity prices to historic highs. The wholesale electricity price in Europe temporarily exceeded €850 per megawatt-hour, with the weekly average at the end of August 2022 reaching €586 per megawatt-hour. The annual average price for 2022 was €240 per megawatt-hour, eight times the price in 2020. The inflation rate in the eurozone reached its highest level since the eurozone's inception in July 2022, at around 8.9 percent.

The crisis ruthlessly exposed Europe's vulnerability to its dependence on imported fossil fuels. The dwindling supply of Russian gas plunged Europe into recession and led to social tensions and conflicts over resource distribution. The REPowerEU initiative, launched by the Commission in May 2022, mobilized up to €300 billion to end dependence on Russian fossil fuels as quickly as possible. However, even in this crisis management effort, the focus remained on renewable energies, energy efficiency, and diversifying gas supplies, not on nuclear power.

At the same time, the crisis showed that France's nuclear-dominated energy system was by no means immune to disruptions. Half of France's nuclear power plants had to be temporarily taken offline in 2022 due to corrosion problems and maintenance work, causing a drastic drop in production and temporarily turning France from an electricity exporter to an importer. It wasn't until 2024 that EU nuclear energy production rose again, by 4.8 percent compared to the previous year, driven primarily by the recovery of the French fleet.

The crisis fundamentally shifted the political discourse. Energy security and supply sovereignty moved to the forefront, while purely climate policy arguments lost weight. In this changed environment, nuclear energy could be repositioned as a domestic, low-CO2, and baseload-capable energy source – an opportunity that the pro-nuclear faction in the EU consistently exploited.

The economic reality of the nuclear renaissance

Von der Leyen's commitment to nuclear energy and her announcement of a SMR strategy for Europe must be measured against hard economic facts. And these facts paint a considerably more complex picture than the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance suggests.

The Flamanville disaster in France serves as the most prominent warning sign. The Flamanville 3 EPR reactor, whose construction began in 2007 and which was supposed to go online in 2012, only became operational in December 2024 – twelve years behind schedule. Costs exploded from an initial estimate of €3.3 billion to €23.7 billion, according to the French Court of Auditors, a sevenfold increase in the budget. To generate a profit of four percent over the entire 60-year lifespan, EDF would have to sell the electricity for over 12 cents per kilowatt-hour, and in the more likely scenario, for almost 14 cents. For comparison, the French industrial electricity price was 4.2 cents per kilowatt-hour, but is set to rise to 7 cents in 2026. The French Court of Auditors certified the project as having, at best, mediocre profitability and, due to the accumulation of risks and constraints, called for an immediate halt to all of Macron's nuclear power expansion plans. EDF has now accumulated a debt mountain of over 50 billion euros.

Similar cost overruns are evident in other EPR projects. In Hinkley Point C in the United Kingdom, an impairment loss of approximately €11 billion is recorded after the Chinese co-shareholder withdrew, leaving EDF to finance the majority of the project on its own. This pattern is globally apparent: large-scale conventional nuclear power plants systematically suffer from massive cost and schedule overruns.

The small modular reactors (SMRs) that von der Leyen is now focusing on are still largely a thing of the future. Apart from pilot projects in China and Russia, there are practically no commercially operated SMRs worldwide. The most prominent Western SMR project, NuScale Power in the USA, had to revise its estimated generation costs upwards from $58 to $119 per megawatt-hour – a doubling that ultimately led to the project's failure. Construction costs were revised from $3.6 billion in 2017 to $6.1 billion in 2020. A majority of experts assume that the first SMRs in Europe will not be operational before 2036 to 2040, and a larger number of reactor units with a total capacity of more than five gigawatts will not be operational before 2045.

Recent editions of the World Nuclear Industry Status Report confirm this skepticism. The number of operating reactors worldwide has stagnated for years, while the construction of new plants is increasingly delayed and expensive. Only a few new reactors are connected to the grid each year, while older units are being permanently decommissioned – there is no sign of dynamic global expansion. In the European Union, the number of operating reactor units is significantly below previous peaks, and the share of nuclear energy in the electricity mix is ​​declining in the long term. It is particularly striking that Russian and Chinese reactor designs dominate the projects still under construction worldwide. Thus, the Western-dominated nuclear renaissance that von der Leyen rhetorically invokes remains primarily a political narrative – economic and industrial reality tells a different story.

Related to this:

• World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2025
• IAEA Power Reactor Information System (PRIS)
• World Nuclear Association, reactor database
• “Plans for New Reactors Worldwide”

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The true cost: Renewables versus nuclear

A sober analysis of the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) reveals that the economic arguments for nuclear power are weaker than political rhetoric suggests. A study by the European wind energy association WindEurope and Hitachi Energy, which compared five different scenarios for the European electricity system up to 2050, arrives at a clear conclusion: An ambitious expansion of renewable energies, including all necessary investments in electricity grids, storage, and electrification, is the most cost-effective option. Scenarios that forgo a significant expansion of renewables will result in additional costs of between €487 billion and €860 billion by 2050. A renewables-based scenario is even €1.6 trillion cheaper than one that would fail to meet climate targets.

These figures put into perspective the narrative that European decarbonization is unaffordable without nuclear power. Renewables have undergone impressive cost reductions in recent years. More than 47 percent of European electricity now comes from renewable sources. Solar energy capacity has more than doubled since 2019, reaching a record 406 gigawatts, while wind power capacity has increased by 234 gigawatts. Dutch researchers at Utrecht University have calculated that renewables, together with short-term storage, could cover around 92.5 percent of European electricity demand in the future, with the remaining 7.5 percent potentially being met by green hydrogen.

This is not to say that nuclear energy cannot play a role in a diversified energy system. For countries like France, where 67.3 percent of electricity comes from nuclear power, or Slovakia with 61.6 percent, an abrupt phase-out is neither realistic nor sensible. But portraying nuclear energy as an indispensable lifeline technology without which Europe cannot achieve its climate goals does not stand up to economic scrutiny.

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The dependency trap: From Russian gas to Russian uranium

A particularly sensitive aspect of Ursula von der Leyen's pro-nuclear shift concerns the issue of energy independence. She argues that Europe must become less dependent on imported fossil fuels, and that nuclear energy is a domestic energy source. This portrayal, however, ignores an inconvenient reality: Europe obtains around 40 percent of its enriched uranium from Russia and its close ally Kazakhstan.

The dependence goes far beyond just fuel. Rosatom, the Russian state-owned corporation, dominates the international nuclear market. In the EU, 41 of a total of 133 nuclear power plants are of Russian design. These pressurized water reactors require hexagonal fuel rods of Russian manufacture, which Western manufacturers have so far been unable to replace without jeopardizing operation. It is telling that the nuclear sector has remained untouched despite eight EU sanctions packages against Russia. Five days after the start of the Russian invasion, a special permit was even granted for a Russian aircraft to transport nuclear fuel to Slovakia.

The situation has not eased since 2022, but rather worsened. France lost its most important uranium source, Niger, after the military coup in 2023, forcing the country to purchase large quantities of uranium from Russia indirectly – partly via Germany. The idea that expanding nuclear power can strengthen European energy sovereignty without simultaneously addressing dependence on Russian nuclear services and products is naive at best, and hypocritical at worst.

The political chronology of opportunism

The chronological sequence of Ursula von der Leyen's energy policy positions reveals a pattern that suggests political opportunism rather than an evidence-based reassessment.

From 2019 to 2021, the Commission President promoted the Green Deal as a renewable energy success story in which nuclear power played no discernible role. The focus was on wind, solar, hydrogen, grids, storage, and energy efficiency. The European Green Deal was presented as the new growth strategy, intended to invest in renewable energies and algorithms. The Just Transition Fund targeted coal regions, not the nuclear phase-out.

From 2022 onwards, there was a subtle shift in policy regarding the taxonomy, which classified nuclear energy as a sustainable transitional technology. In February 2024, the Commission launched the European Industrial Alliance for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), which aims to accelerate the development and deployment of SMRs in Europe. And in March 2026 came the open admission: the nuclear phase-out was a strategic mistake; long live the renaissance of nuclear energy!.

Chancellor Friedrich Merz personally agreed, while Environment Minister Carsten Schneider of the SPD criticized the EU plans as a backward-looking strategy whose core element was new subsidies for nuclear power plants. The German Greens described the pro-nuclear shift as the stupidest thing the EU Commission could do. The Greens argued that new nuclear power plants were not a realistic option due to long construction times, high costs, and incalculable risks.

The most striking aspect of this chronology is the absence of a consistent analytical foundation. At no point did von der Leyen present a systematic cost-benefit analysis explaining why the path she hailed in 2019 as Europe's moon landing is suddenly considered deficient. There is no official Commission study demonstrating that climate targets are unattainable without a massive expansion of nuclear power. Instead, the rhetoric adapted to the changing political climate: when the Greens were strong, the focus was on renewables; when geopolitical realities and the conservative shift in Europe rehabilitated nuclear power, it was discovered to be indispensable.

Germany's electricity imports: The argument of nuclear power opponents and its proponents

A frequently raised argument in the German debate is that Germany has been importing massive amounts of nuclear power from abroad since phasing out nuclear power, thus rendering the decision absurd. The data, however, paints a more nuanced picture. In 2024, Germany was a net importer of electricity, with France being the largest supplier at 12.9 terawatt-hours, followed by Denmark at 12.0 terawatt-hours. By 2025, the situation had shifted: Denmark took the lead with 12.4 terawatt-hours, ahead of France with 11.2 terawatt-hours, followed by the Netherlands and Norway. The net electricity trade in 2025 was around 22 terawatt-hours, favoring imports.

The fact that Germany imports electricity is not in itself a sign of failure, but rather an expression of a functioning European single market. Denmark itself generates a great deal of wind power and is supplied with hydropower and nuclear power via imports from Norway and Sweden. German electricity imports are therefore by no means predominantly nuclear power. At the same time, the share of renewable energies in EU electricity was 47 percent, which undermines the claim that Europe's electricity supply would be at risk without nuclear power.

It is true, however, that Germany lost its position as an electricity exporter due to the nuclear phase-out and, in certain situations, such as high demand and low availability of renewable energies, is dependent on imports, some of which come from nuclear power plants in France or Belgium. This argument has some merit, but must be weighed against the fact that the European electricity market as a whole functions well and security of supply was never seriously threatened.

The IEA and the global picture: Between wishful thinking and reality

The International Energy Agency (IEA) is fueling the narrative of a nuclear renaissance, albeit with important caveats. According to the IEA, global nuclear power generation reached a new peak in 2025, driven by reactor restarts in Japan, increased production in France, and new capacity in China and India. The IEA forecasts average annual growth in nuclear power of 2.8 percent until 2030. Interest in nuclear energy is at its highest level since the oil crisis of the 1970s, with over 40 countries aiming to expand their operations.

However, the IEA also points to two fundamental problems. First, the expansion of nuclear power relies heavily on Chinese and Russian technology and resources, which carries the risk of future dependencies. China is increasing its output significantly, while traditional nuclear power countries like the US and France are struggling with cost overruns and delays. Second, the global growth of nuclear energy contrasts with the reality that the number of reactors worldwide actually declined slightly: At the beginning of 2026, 404 nuclear power plants were in operation, five fewer than a year earlier. Four new plants were commissioned, while seven were decommissioned.

The nuclear renaissance so often touted by von der Leyen is, globally speaking, more of a renaissance of declarations of intent than a renaissance of actual capacity. Europe has everything it needs to win the technological race in nuclear energy, she said in Paris, pointing to half a million highly skilled workers in the nuclear sector. However, given the Flamanville disaster and the lack of commercially operated SMR projects in Europe, this optimism sounds less like an evidence-based assessment than political wishful thinking.

The European divide: 27 member states, 27 opinions

Ursula von der Leyen's pro-nuclear stance ignores a fundamental fact of European energy policy: there is no consensus among the 27 member states. In 2024, twelve EU countries operated nuclear power plants, while fifteen did not. Austria and Luxembourg have not only challenged the taxonomy classification but also fundamentally reject nuclear energy. Germany has completed its nuclear phase-out, and according to the operators, the dismantling of the plants is practically irreversible. Taiwan will complete its nuclear phase-out in 2025. Italy has been nuclear-free since 1990.

On the other side are France, with nuclear power accounting for 67.3 percent of its gross electricity generation, Slovakia with 61.6 percent, and Hungary, Bulgaria, Belgium, Finland, and the Czech Republic with shares around 40 percent. Poland, Romania, and the Czech Republic are pushing ahead with plans for new nuclear power plants, including SMRs. These countries welcome the new Brussels policy because it legitimizes their national investment decisions and gives them access to EU funding.

Von der Leyen's strategy of financing €200 million in risk mitigation for nuclear investors with emissions trading funds may seem modest in absolute terms. However, its symbolic significance is considerable: it signals that EU climate protection funds can now also flow into nuclear energy, fundamentally altering the nature of the Green Deal. A program that focused on renewables and efficiency is becoming a more technology-neutral construct, in which nuclear energy stands on an equal footing with wind and solar.

Between necessity and hypocrisy: An assessment

The crucial question is not whether nuclear energy can play a role in a European energy mix. It can, and for certain member states it has for decades. The crucial question is whether von der Leyen's portrayal of the nuclear phase-out as a strategic error represents an honest reassessment or an act of political opportunism that obscures her own shared responsibility for the course taken so far.

The facts tend to support the latter. As Commission President, von der Leyen not only failed to include a pro-nuclear component in the Green Deal, she actively promoted it as a renewable energy success story in which nuclear power played no strategic role. She never publicly described national nuclear phase-outs as problematic as long as doing so was politically inopportune. She presented the REPowerEU plan without a prominent nuclear component, even though the energy crisis should have made the supposed indispensability of nuclear power obvious. And now she is presenting nuclear power as the solution without openly addressing the massive economic risks, the unrealistic timelines for SMRs, and the continued dependence on Russian nuclear technology and Russian uranium.

The Green Deal politically rubber-stamped the nuclear phase-out by portraying it as compatible with the goal of climate neutrality. Now, the same Commission President is selling precisely this course as a strategic error, without explaining why she didn't correct it back in 2019 when she had the power to do so. This behavior is not the intellectual humility of a politician who learns from mistakes, but rather the adaptability of a power-hungry politician who adjusts her rhetoric to the prevailing political currents.

The real strategic question: diversification instead of dogma

Beyond the question of political credibility, the fundamental question arises as to how Europe should shape its energy future. The answer lies neither in a dogmatic adherence to the nuclear phase-out nor in an uncritical nuclear renaissance, but in an evidence-based diversification strategy.

Renewable energy sources have proven to be cost-effective, rapidly scalable, and largely free from import dependencies. Their costs have fallen dramatically over the past two decades, and scenarios based on their significant expansion are, according to available studies, the most economically advantageous option for the European electricity system by 2050. At the same time, they have weaknesses in baseload capability and require massive investments in storage, grids, and backup capacities.

Nuclear energy offers baseload capability and low-CO2 generation, but suffers from systematic cost and time overruns in new construction, unresolved issues regarding final storage, dependence on Russian technology and fuels, and the risk of large-scale accidents. SMR technology is promising, but commercially unproven and will not be available on a significant scale until the late 2030s at the earliest.

A rational European energy policy would recognize that existing and safe nuclear power plants should continue operating as long as justifiable, that the massive expansion of renewable energies remains the economically and strategically superior main strategy, that SMR research should be promoted but not sold as a short-term solution, and that energy sovereignty requires a diversification of all dependencies, including nuclear supply chains. What Europe doesn't need is a Commission President who adapts her strategic analysis to political trends every few years, thereby sacrificing the coherence of her own policies.

The cost of inconsistency

The real strategic error Ursula von der Leyen made was not the nuclear phase-out, which she never actively pursued, but the inconsistency of her energy policy communication. Investors need long-term planning certainty. Industrial companies need reliable framework conditions. Citizens need the confidence that political decisions are based on facts and not opportunism.

Anyone who sells the Green Deal in 2019 as a moon landing based on renewable energies and then, in 2026, labels the phase-out of nuclear power a strategic error without resolving the contradictions, undermines precisely this trust. The European energy transition doesn't need a new dogma, whether for or against nuclear power. It needs an honest, data-driven, and long-term consistent strategy that soberly assesses all available options and isn't guided by the political mood of the day. Von der Leyen's appearance in Paris was the opposite of that.

Konrad Wolfenstein

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