More lobbyists than members of parliament: The sinister power of Meta, Google & Co. in the EU

Silicon Valley lobby in Berlin and Brussels – tech power, data policy and the future of democracy

When billion-dollar budgets and legions of experts collide with overburdened parliaments, democracy teeters on the brink. The world's most valuable technology companies—from Meta to Google to Amazon—have set their sights on Brussels and Berlin. With unprecedented record sums spent on lobbying, they are deliberately attempting to rewrite Europe's digital rules, such as the AI ​​Act or data protection regulations, according to their own vision. But it's no longer just about bothersome regulations or economic advantages: a creeping power shift is taking place. When private tech giants intervene deeply in legislative processes and exert pressure through new alliances from the US, a pressing question arises: Who will actually determine the rules of our society in the future—elected representatives or Silicon Valley?

Related to this:

• Whose Republic? The Power of the Business Lobby in Germany

When billions in lobbying money reprogram democracy: Who actually governs whom? A power shift in slow motion

In the antechambers of power, change is gradual but profound. While the European public debates supply chain laws, pension reforms, and fiscal policy, a structural upheaval of political influence is taking place behind the scenes. Some of the world's largest and most valuable companies—located in Silicon Valley, Seattle, or on the Texas plateau—have discovered that political power is for sale, though not in the crude sense of bribery. They are buying something more subtle: attention, access, and the power to define complex technological issues that even seasoned parliamentarians struggle to fully grasp.

The figures provided by recent analyses are striking. In 2025, the entire digital industry spent around €151 million annually on lobbying in Brussels – a record high and an increase of more than 55 percent compared to 2021. This is not organic growth from an industry modestly expanding its influence. It is a targeted offensive, fueled by the moment the EU began to seriously consider regulation.

Numbers that speak for themselves: The extent of the tech lobbying offensive

If numbers could speak, the data from the EU Transparency Register would tell a clear story. Meta, the parent company behind Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, is by far the largest single player among tech companies in Brussels, with annual lobbying expenditures of around ten million euros. Microsoft, Apple, and Amazon follow with seven million euros each, while Google rounds out the list with 4.5 million euros. These five companies alone thus invest a combined total of over 35 million euros to influence the political process in the EU.

Even more revealing is a look at personnel. The digital sector maintains more than 890 full-time lobbying positions in Brussels – exceeding the 720 seats in the European Parliament. 437 of these lobbyists possess credentials granting them virtually unrestricted access to Parliament. In the first half of 2025 alone, 378 meetings took place between representatives of Big Tech and EU decision-makers. This equates to an average of more than two meetings per working day. The number of digital companies and associations registered in the EU Transparency Register rose from 565 in 2023 to 733 in 2025.

The picture is similar in Germany: In 2024, the expenditures of all actors registered in the German Bundestag's lobby register amounted to almost one billion euros. The US tech companies known as GAFAM – Google, Amazon, Meta, Apple, and Microsoft – alone spent 8.8 million euros in Berlin. Amazon spends an additional 2.82 million euros in Germany to influence federal politics. These sums exceed the budgets that comparable companies in the pharmaceutical, financial, or automotive industries allocate for lobbying purposes – the tech sector has become the dominant lobbying force.

The principle: Lobbying as a democratic principle

Before a fair analysis is possible, a fundamental misunderstanding must be cleared up. Lobbying is not inherently a democratic evil. Properly understood and regulated by transparency laws, it is a legitimate and necessary element of the pluralistic legislative process. Legislators are not polymaths. When the European Parliament decides on the technical requirements for semiconductor factories, the ethical boundaries of AI decision-making systems, or the architecture of cloud infrastructures, expert input from those affected is not only useful—it is indispensable.

The Baden-Württemberg State Center for Political Education describes lobbying as the entirety of activities through which interest groups attempt to influence politicians via personal contacts – and emphasizes that this is fundamentally legitimate as long as it enriches political work through expertise. Rudolf Speth, a renowned lobbying researcher, precisely formulates the conditions for legitimacy: Lobbying is compatible with democracy when it is embedded in a regulated environment that ensures transparency regarding actors, interests, and expenditures.

The crucial difference, therefore, lies not in the act of lobbying itself, but in the conditions under which it takes place. Lobbying becomes problematic when resources are so unequally distributed that a few large, capitalized actors dominate the political agenda, and weaker voices—such as consumer protection organizations, civil rights groups, or small businesses—are simply not heard. LobbyControl puts it succinctly: The pluralistic ideal, in which the best argument practically prevails on its own, is an illusion when some arguments are presented with ten million euros and legions of experts, while other interests have to manage without professional support.

The tools of influence: Far more than lobbyist talks

Tech companies possess a diverse arsenal of influence tools that extends far beyond traditional lobbying. One particularly effective, yet largely unknown, element is the funding and control of seemingly independent research institutes and think tanks. An investigation by LobbyControl revealed that a small group of management consultancies systematically produces supposedly neutral studies on behalf of tech companies, which are then introduced into regulatory processes. These studies are presented to legislators as objective economic assessments – without disclosing the true client.

Adding to the problem is the so-called revolving door effect: Politicians and civil servants move from their institutional roles to the boards or advisory committees of companies they previously regulated – and conversely, tech managers take up political advisory positions. These personnel connections create informal networks that are far more difficult to regulate than formal lobbying contacts. The result: Regulatory authorities lose institutional memory and normative independence, while industry gains a unique insider perspective on future regulatory projects.

The latest study by LobbyControl and the Corporate Europe Observatory also revealed a strategic shift: some of the largest US tech companies have begun to intensify targeted contacts with right-wing populist and far-right members of the European Parliament. Meta has significantly increased the number of its meetings with relevant political groups. This is based on the observation that anti-regulatory positions resonate with these political forces. This tactical alliance between financial power and political forces that portray European protection standards as an impediment to innovation represents a new level of influence.

The litmus test: The “Digital Omnibus” and its consequences

The most concrete example of Big Tech's actual political influence is the so-called Digital Omnibus Package, which the European Commission presented on November 19, 2025. Officially marketed as a simplification and competition-promoting measure, the package proposes far-reaching changes to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the AI ​​regulatory framework (AI Act). The Commission stated that it would "maintain the highest level of protection for personal data"—but data protection experts and civil society organizations strongly disagreed.

A comparison of the Commission's proposals with the existing lobbying positions of the tech companies revealed a disturbing finding: In at least seven cases, the Commission adopted the demands of Google, Meta, and Microsoft almost verbatim. Four of these adoptions concerned data protection, and three the AI ​​Act. The specific measures include a narrower definition of personal data—meaning that less data would be considered worthy of protection—restricted access rights for data subjects, and easier use of personal data for AI training.

The AI ​​Act package includes provisions for delays in implementation and a reduction in transparency obligations for high-risk AI. The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) and the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) explicitly rejected the planned redefinition of personal data in a joint statement, declaring that the Commission was going far beyond its own stated goal of targeted adjustments. Max Schrems, the Austrian data protection activist and founder of the organization noyb, succinctly summarized the situation: the “Digital Omnibus” would primarily benefit large technology companies, while offering no tangible advantages for average businesses in the EU. More than 127 civil society organizations signed an open letter warning of the biggest setback for digital fundamental rights in the history of the EU.

The position paper that served as the basis for key parts of this "Digital Omnibus" originated, as the data protection organization noyb analyzed, from the German Federal Government. At the summit on European digital sovereignty in Berlin, Chancellor Friedrich Merz emphasized the necessity of Europe's digital independence, but simultaneously advocated for reducing unnecessary regulation, arguing that it stifles European innovation. This tension between the desire for technological sovereignty and the pressure for deregulation reveals a structural ambivalence that tech companies are adept at exploiting.

Related to this:

• The “Digital Omnibus on AI” – Update from the EU Parliament: New details on AI competence, real-world laboratories and compliance

Transatlantic pressure build-up: Trump, Musk and the White House as lobbying tools

Silicon Valley's influence on European politics doesn't just come from millions of euros in Brussels offices. It also comes directly from Washington. Donald Trump's inauguration in January 2025 marked a turning point: In the front row sat Elon Musk, Mark Zuckerberg, Sundar Pichai, and Jeff Bezos—four of the world's most influential tech entrepreneurs. The elected members of the cabinet stood behind them. German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier commented on this image in no uncertain terms: A "historically unprecedented concentration of technological, financial, and political power" was emerging in the USA.

Researcher Francesca Bria describes the phenomenon as "state capture"—a situation in which private actors no longer merely lobby from the outside, but embed themselves within the machinery of the state itself. Tech executives are appointed to military ranks, deployed to federal agencies, and their platforms become the informal operating system of the government. What is already happening in the US has direct repercussions for Europe: US Vice President JD Vance, once an investor in Silicon Valley and ideologically influenced by PayPal co-founder Peter Thiel, publicly criticized the European Digital Services Act as an infringement on freedom of expression and an attack on American platforms.

Mark Zuckerberg himself described European regulation as "institutionalized censorship"—an accusation the European Commission vehemently rejected. This narrative is part of a deliberate communication strategy: regulation is reinterpreted as stifling innovation, data protection is portrayed as an economic obstacle, and anyone who wants to protect consumer rights is branded as an enemy of progress. Former MEPs like Marietje Schaake explicitly warn that tech companies are increasingly operating without democratic oversight and taking on administrative tasks that should actually be reserved for state institutions.

Our global industry and economic expertise in business development, sales and marketing - Image: Xpert.Digital

Industry focus areas: B2B, digitalization (from AI to XR), mechanical engineering, logistics, renewable energies and industry

More information here:

• Expert Business Hub

A thematic hub offering insights and expertise:

• Knowledge platform covering global and regional economies, innovation and industry-specific trends
• A collection of analyses, insights, and background information from our key areas of focus
• A place for expertise and information on current developments in business and technology
• A hub for companies seeking information on markets, digitalization, and industry innovations

Data – raw material or civil right? Overcoming the simplistic narratives

In public debate, data is often portrayed as either entirely problematic or entirely neutral. Both positions are wrong and dangerous. A nuanced analysis shows that data is a socially significant resource with enormous potential for the common good, innovation, and economic value creation – but only if the framework for its collection and use is fair, transparent, and based on the rule of law.

Economists and strategy consultants are no longer speaking metaphorically when they refer to data as the "new oil"—although the analogy is incomplete. Unlike oil, data is not finite; it doesn't lose value as more of it exists, but often actually gains value. Some economists are already discussing data as a fourth factor of economic production, alongside land, capital, and labor. McKinsey estimated that Germany is only utilizing around ten percent of its digital potential—thus missing out on potential GDP growth of approximately €500 billion by 2025. According to McKinsey, this equates to an untapped potential of €2.5 trillion for the whole of Europe.

Germany's digital economy generated total revenue of approximately €245 billion in 2026, thus positioning itself as an anchor of stability in a structurally weakening economy. Here, data is not merely abstract columns of figures, but the foundation for productivity gains, new business models, and jobs. Companies that systematically make data-driven decisions experience measurably higher growth and greater profitability than companies that rely on conventional methods.

Fittingly:

• Digital EU bus and AI: How much special legislation can Europe's data order tolerate?

Where data pays societal dividends: Specific application areas

The societal value of data is not an abstract promise, but can be demonstrated in concrete fields of application.

In healthcare, AI-powered analyses of patient data have the potential to fundamentally transform medical care. Algorithms independently analyze molecular biological and clinical data, helping physicians diagnose diseases more precisely and initiate individually tailored therapies. Countries with consistent digital data use in the healthcare sector are better able to mitigate demographic challenges, rising costs, and staff shortages. A 2026 BMC report showed that data-driven risk assessment can significantly improve individualized prevention—insured individuals with an increased risk of disease could be specifically targeted before illnesses manifest. Germany lags considerably behind in international comparisons in this area.

In logistics and transportation, real-time data from connected vehicles and IoT sensors enables route optimization, resulting in fuel savings, time savings, and a significant reduction in CO₂ emissions. Big data analytics allows logistics companies to anticipate bottlenecks and proactively manage supply chains instead of reactively. In urban areas, data-driven smart city concepts can significantly alleviate delivery traffic, which currently accounts for approximately 30 percent of inner-city traffic and 80 percent of congestion.

In industrial production, predictive maintenance—that is, AI-supported prediction of machine failures based on sensor data—enables a dramatic reduction in downtime and repair costs. Digital twins of entire manufacturing plants allow production processes to be optimized virtually before they are physically implemented. These applications do not require the disclosure of personal data; they utilize machine and process data, the societal benefits of which, with proper regulation, clearly outweigh any potential risks.

The European Commission has recognized this economic reality. The EU Data Act, which entered into force in September 2025, and the Data Governance Act, which has been in force since September 2023, create a legal framework designed to facilitate data exchange between companies, public authorities, and citizens while safeguarding data protection and trade secrets. These instruments aim to untangle the Gordian knot between data protection and data use – through voluntary exchange models, clear governance structures, and the development of European data spaces in key sectors.

Why data protection is not an obstacle to innovation – and why it can still be reformed

There is a persistent flaw in this debate: the notion that strong data protection and economic innovation are mutually exclusive. This dichotomy is false. It primarily serves the interests of those who profit from the relaxation of data protection standards, without considering the actual trade-offs. The GDPR, which came into force in 2018, did not strangle the European digital economy – it created trust that can form the basis for a sustainable data economy.

Nevertheless, the GDPR is not a sacrosanct document. It was written at a time when AI-supported mass processing was not yet commonplace. The EU Commission itself announced that it would evaluate the regulation after five years to determine where improvements were needed. Moderate modernization—for example, through clearer regulations for anonymized and pseudonymized data in research, simplified compliance for small and medium-sized enterprises, and more practical AI training regulations—would be objectively justifiable and socially acceptable.

The problem with the “Digital Omnibus” is not that it reforms the GDPR, but how it does so. The redefinition of the term “personal data,” as proposed by the Commission, would de facto mean that a company could process data about a person as long as it—not necessarily a third party—cannot identify that person. This seemingly technical change has far-reaching consequences: it opens the floodgates to systematic data collection on a scale that eludes the control mechanisms of the data subject. Max Schrems summed up the criticism perfectly: what Europe needs is not “a haphazard approach of creating loopholes in the law,” but rather a “strategically sound, long-term plan.”.

In short: The question is not whether data should be used, but under what conditions. A regulatory framework that is sufficiently flexible for innovation need not be so weak that it allows for abuse. Finding this balance is the genuine political task – and it should not be made under the pressure of multi-billion-dollar lobbying machines.

The meta-example: How AI training becomes a question of power

No other example illustrates the intersection of data protection, economic interests, and political pressure better than Meta's approach to training its AI systems in Europe. In March 2025, Meta launched its AI assistant in the EU. Shortly thereafter, the company announced that it would henceforth use publicly accessible posts from adult users on Facebook and Instagram to train its AI models—unless the users actively opt out.

The North Rhine-Westphalia Consumer Center issued a warning to Meta, criticizing both the opt-out approach and the lack of transparency. Meta cited a December 2024 ruling by the European Data Protection Board, which deemed the practice permissible under certain conditions. However, the Hamburg Commissioner for Data Protection warned that training data is irrevocably incorporated into AI models; a subsequent objection does not eliminate data that has already been used.

This example illustrates the fundamental power imbalance in the data economy. A single corporation effectively decides on the use of data from hundreds of millions of European users by offering an opt-out solution that, experience shows, only a small fraction of users actively utilize. This is legal data access on a mass scale – precisely what the GDPR was originally intended to prevent. At the same time, it should be noted that if Meta did not use the user data, other AI providers – including Chinese corporations – could use the same publicly available data. The question of whether European data protection remains effective under these conditions must not be ignored.

Counterweights and future architecture: What protects everyone's interests?

The diagnosis is clear; the question of treatment is more difficult. How can a digital order be designed that reconciles openness to innovation and the protection of fundamental rights, the economic exploitation of data and the data sovereignty of citizens? There is no easy answer, but there are structural approaches that go beyond mere individual measures.

First, Europe needs a significantly strengthened transparency and lobby control regime. The EU Transparency Register is an important first step, but it still has serious loopholes. Lobbying meetings are increasingly being disclosed, but the funding of think tanks, transparency regarding the commissioning of scientific reports, and the revolving door effect remain insufficiently regulated. A full disclosure requirement for external expertise that informs legislative processes—analogous to scientific publication standards with conflict of interest declarations—would be an effective step.

Secondly, political institutions themselves must invest in digital expertise. When 890 tech lobbyists meet 720 parliamentarians, who often lack their own AI and data economy experts, the imbalance is structural. Policy advisory units like the UK Parliament's Parliamentary Technology Office or its European equivalent, STOA, need to be strengthened in terms of personnel and funding to build genuine institutional counter-competence.

Thirdly, a proactive data policy is needed that views use and protection not as opposites, but as complementary goals. The European approach of building shared data spaces in key sectors – health, mobility, energy, and industry – is a step in the right direction. Within these spaces, data can be shared and analyzed without disclosing personal information. They enable data-driven innovation without increasing the concentration of power in the hands of individual private actors.

Fourth, Europe must strengthen its own technology pathway. The German government's High-Tech Agenda, through which Germany intends to invest in key technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and microelectronics, is a first step. At the 2025 Digital Summit, Chancellor Merz emphasized the need for European cloud providers to protect critical data through sovereign infrastructures. European competitors to Big Tech—not as national champions, but as truly European projects—could, in the long term, reduce the power imbalance that makes the current regulatory debate so asymmetrical.

The systemic challenge: Between sovereignty and dependence

The overarching question is not whether Google, Meta, or Amazon should be allowed to lobby in Brussels. It is whether Europe's institutional and regulatory systems are strong enough to withstand the pressure and shape a digital policy that serves the common good—and not primarily the interests of the actors who control the technical infrastructure. This question is urgent because the infrastructure itself has become a form of power.

Search engines, social networks, cloud computing, and digital marketplaces have become indispensable elements of the global economy and communication—and they are largely privately owned, controlled by a few companies that are subject to little democratic oversight. While parliaments take years to negotiate laws, tech companies set new standards every week that directly affect billions of people. This structural asymmetry is the core problem—not the existence of lobbying per se.

With the DSA, DMA, and AI Act, Europe has created a regulatory framework that sets global standards. However, a regulatory framework is only as effective as its enforcement. The European Commission is investigating several tech companies for potential violations. In January 2026, the Commission launched an investigation into Grok, the AI ​​system of the X Group, sending a clear signal: even large platforms are subject to European oversight. At the same time, the "Digital Omnibus" demonstrates how fragile this regulatory progress is when lobbying pressure becomes sufficiently intense.

Felix Duffy of LobbyControl aptly described the situation: Big Tech is investing record sums to weaken European digital regulations – precisely when these regulations are more important than ever. The challenge for European democracies is to recognize this dynamic without succumbing to reflexive anti-Americanism or technophobic panic. Data is valuable, technology is useful, innovation is necessary – and that is precisely why the struggle over the conditions under which all of this takes place is so significant.

Balance of power as an ongoing task

The conflict between the platform giants of Silicon Valley and the regulatory institutions in Brussels and Berlin is not a temporary one. It is a persistent structural challenge to the European understanding of democracy. At stake is the question of who sets the rules of economic and social life in an increasingly digital society – elected parliamentarians acting on behalf of all citizens, or a small elite of private companies that wields a new form of political power through technological infrastructure and financial superiority.

The answer to this question is not a given. It is renegotiated daily – in lobbying corridors, committee rooms, courtrooms, and public debates. What Europe needs is not a regulatory ideology, but institutional robustness: transparency regarding influence, sufficient autonomy for political institutions, a proactive data policy serving the common good, and the political will to defend its own standards even against external pressure. Then data will be what it can be: a societal resource that benefits everyone – and not a tool for the concentration of power for a select few.

☑️ Our business language is English or German

☑️ NEW: Correspondence in your native language!

Konrad Wolfenstein

I and my team are happy to be available to you as your personal advisor.

You can contact me by filling out the contact form here or simply call me at +49 7348 4088 965. My email address is : [email protected]

I'm looking forward to our joint project.

☑️ SME support in strategy, consulting, planning and implementation

☑️ Creation or realignment of the digital strategy and digitization

☑️ Expansion and optimization of international sales processes

☑️ Global & Digital B2B trading platforms

☑️ Pioneer Business Development / Marketing / PR / Trade Fairs

The quasi-in-house solution: How Xpert.Digital closes operational gaps in B2B marketing and sales – Smart Content-Driven Business - Image: Xpert.Digital

Xpert.Digital is a data-driven B2B industry hub led by Konrad Wolfenstein . The company acts as an external, quasi-in-house solution for industrial partners, closing operational gaps in marketing, content, and sales – without requiring additional resources on the client side.

More information here:

• The quasi-in-house solution: How Xpert.Digital closes operational gaps in B2B marketing and sales – Smart Content-Driven Business