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45 billion | EU loan to Ukraine: What the “accounting trick” means for European taxpayers – Civil aid, shared risk

45 billion | EU loan to Ukraine: What the “accounting trick” means for European taxpayers – Civil aid, shared risk

45 billion | EU loan to Ukraine: What the "accounting trick" means for European taxpayers – Civil aid, shared risk – Creative image on the topic, with AI: Xpert.Digital

How the EU plans to secure the loan: Why civil allocation does not solve the liability issue

EU loan for Ukraine: What has been decided – and what risks remain

Joint debt for Ukraine: How fair is the planned financing?

The European Union is planning an additional loan of up to €45 billion for Ukraine. Part of the money is intended to support civilian projects such as financing public services, while another part is earmarked for military purposes. The political rationale behind this is that even member states that oppose arms deliveries could have their contributions allocated to the civilian sector. However, this allocation does not automatically answer the crucial question: Who will bear the costs if Ukraine cannot repay the loan and expected payments from Russia fail to materialize?

The EU intends to raise the funds on the capital market and secure the financing through its budget. This creates a long-term risk, the actual distribution of which depends on the specific rules regarding liability, potential exceptions, and debt servicing. At the same time, the new loan is currently a legislative proposal and not a fully adopted or disbursed aid package. Therefore, for an objective assessment, existing commitments, new plans, and potential future burdens must be clearly distinguished.

The so-called "accounting trick" does not resolve these issues. While a civilian earmarking can make transparent what specific funds are used for directly, it eliminates neither the shared financing costs nor the economic interdependence between civilian support and the resilience of the Ukrainian state. Therefore, the crucial question is whether the political presentation is backed by verifiable rules and democratic oversight – and whether it is clearly stated what risks Europe actually assumes.

Europe's Ukraine loans: How civilian labels are supposed to make joint debt politically possible

The so-called accounting trick behind the planned European aid for Ukraine is not about making money disappear or dissolving debts through a simple calculation. It's about reconciling differing political positions by allocating funds within a single financing package. States that don't want to finance arms deliveries are supposed to be able to allocate their contribution to the civilian portion of the aid. Other states are assigned the military portion for accounting purposes. However, the European Union raises the money jointly on the capital market and guarantees the loan through its budget. The problem lies precisely between this political allocation of funds and the actual distribution of risk.

The proposal includes an additional loan of up to €45 billion for 2027. Of this, up to €20 billion is intended for general budget support and up to €25 billion for military purposes. The Commission hopes this will also include member states that oppose military support but generally favor civilian assistance. As of November 19, 2026, the loan is not yet a fully adopted and disbursed aid package, but rather a legislative proposal.

For European taxpayers, this arrangement is neither automatically unfair nor automatically harmless. The crucial factor is whether the political labeling is also supported by verifiable payment rules, transparent liability agreements, and democratic decisions. A civilian accounting entry can demonstrate the use of specific funds. However, it cannot, on its own, prevent the same states from indirectly bearing a shared financing risk.

A complicated loan structure doesn't automatically make the EU an autocracy or dictatorship. However, the question of whether political responsibility is being obscured by technical terminology is a valid one. The greater the discrepancy between public presentation and actual burden, the more serious the problem of democratic transparency becomes.

Two summits demonstrate why financial capacity translates into foreign policy power

The dispute over the loan is taking place in a geopolitically tense situation. While a meeting between Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, and Xi Jinping is scheduled in Shenzhen, representatives from 37 states are meeting in Berlin for the Coalition of the Willing. This European gathering is intended to demonstrate support for Ukraine and prevent key decisions on the European security order from being made without effective European participation.

This is not merely about diplomatic symbolism. Whoever provides financial and military support to a country influences its ability to continue a war, secure a ceasefire, or negotiate under less unfavorable conditions. A government whose solvency will end in a few months negotiates under different pressure than a government with secure funding.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, expected in Berlin, therefore needs more than just expressions of solidarity. Security guarantees, air defense, available ammunition, and a functioning state budget are all interconnected. The planned presence of American negotiators also underscores that European aid decisions and international negotiations cannot be considered separately.

The planned European representation by Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Poland, along with representatives from the EU leadership, is intended to pool political influence. However, a joint appearance does not replace a binding funding commitment. Europe's influence depends significantly on its ability to actually finance, politically sustain, and industrially implement its commitments.

However, this does not give carte blanche for any financial arrangement. Especially when money is used as an instrument of strategic action, its scope, purpose, and limits must be transparent.

Which billions have already been approved and which are yet to be added

For an objective assessment, existing programs, new proposals, and future planning parameters must be considered separately. An EU support loan of €90 billion for 2026 and 2027 has already been approved. According to the planned allocation, this comprises €30 billion for macroeconomic support and €60 billion to strengthen Ukrainian defense capabilities. Financing will be provided through European capital market borrowing and is guaranteed by the EU budget.

The proposed 45 billion euros are an additional sum. This is therefore not simply a new name for aid that is already fully funded. At the same time, it would be wrong to attribute the entire 90 billion euros solely to the year 2027.

According to current plans, €45 billion from the existing program will be made available in 2027. In addition, Ukraine has an estimated further financing need of €70 billion. The new EU loan is intended to cover €45 billion of this additional shortfall. The remaining approximately €25 billion would have to be raised by international partners.

This results in a combined loan volume of up to €135 billion from both EU loan programs, disbursed over different periods. This sum is neither equivalent to an immediate tax burden nor to the total European aid provided to Ukraine since the start of the war.

Similarly, future funds for Ukraine should not simply be added to the European financial framework. It must first be clarified whether they will finance additional services, continue existing commitments, or cover already made loan commitments and interest costs. Mixing these categories either exaggerates the burden or downplays it.

How civilian allocation is supposed to work politically

The core of the political offer to skeptical member states is: You don't have to see yourselves as financiers of arms deliveries, but can allocate your share to schools, hospitals, administrative services and other civilian tasks.

Within the planned total volume of €45 billion, the civilian share of €20 billion represents approximately 44 percent. The military share of €25 billion accounts for roughly 56 percent. This means the civilian portion is large enough to theoretically accommodate several less-promoting states, provided their allocated contributions remain within this framework.

Such a division can be objectively legitimate. Other international programs also combine different funding streams under a common organizational umbrella. Not every joint administration means that all participants politically support every single expenditure.

The structure becomes problematic when a further claim is made based on the allocation of funds. The statement that a national contribution is allocated exclusively to civilian expenditures does not necessarily mean that this state has no economic connection whatsoever to the military component of the program.

For this to work, financing costs, potential payment defaults, and possible additional funding obligations would need to be clearly defined. Without this separation, the civilian allocation would primarily be a political compromise regarding the presentation of participation. The Commission has explicitly indicated its intention to allocate contributions from less proactive states to the civilian component. However, the legal and financial viability of this allocation will only be determined in the binding rules.

Why civilian support still creates military room for maneuver

Another relationship that cannot be fully explained by any accounting method is that money is at least partially interchangeable within a government budget. Economists refer to this as fungibility.

If a foreign donor assumes additional civilian expenditures, the supported state can use its own revenues differently. For example, if healthcare and public administration are stabilized through external support, less of the state's own tax revenue may need to be used for these purposes. This revenue can then be available elsewhere, including for defense.

This does not mean that every civilian payment is in reality a disguised arms shipment. Such an equation would obscure the real differences between medical care and military equipment. Civilian aid can directly save lives and prevent state collapse.

However, the opposite assertion would also be incorrect: A purely civilian designation of funds does not guarantee that the support has no impact whatsoever on military resilience. A functioning state collects taxes, organizes supplies, keeps transport routes open, and stabilizes its population. In wartime, these services constitute both basic civilian services and a component of national resilience.

The fair political description is therefore: Civilian support directly finances civilian tasks, but can also strengthen the entire Ukrainian state and thus indirectly its defense capabilities. Anyone who ignores this interplay oversimplifies the economic reality.

The joint household guarantee is the actual risk channel

The EU does not intend to disburse the additional funds solely from existing budget resources. It plans to issue bonds and pass the proceeds on to Ukraine. Investors will provide the Union with capital and in return receive a claim to interest and repayment.

The safeguard is provided through the so-called budgetary margin, often referred to as headroom. In simple terms, this is the difference between the legally permissible upper limit of European own resources and the amounts already claimed by the budget. This margin is not a cash register; it represents a legal safeguard upon which the Union can base its ability to mobilize additional funds if necessary.

This is the crucial difference between liquidity and a guarantee. The bond creates money that is available today. The budget guarantee establishes the credibility that the EU can meet its obligations later.

EU capital market creditors do not have to wait to see if Russia will eventually pay reparations. Their debtor is the Union. If the expected repayments fail to materialize, the EU must still meet its own obligations in accordance with the bond terms.

Therefore, the central question is not simply whether a euro is spent on civilian or military purposes in Kyiv. It is also crucial to determine from which European revenues interest and principal payments will be financed if the planned external repayment fails to materialize.

A loan is not automatically a fully-fledged economic asset

Legally, the support is considered a loan. Economically, it must also be examined under what conditions this loan will actually be repaid.

The new proposal envisions a loan with limited recourse. Ukraine would only have to repay the principal amount once it receives reparations from Russia. This means that repayment is not simply tied to future Ukrainian economic performance or a fixed repayment date, but rather to a politically and legally uncertain event.

This arrangement protects Ukraine from being immediately overwhelmed by ordinary debt repayments during the war and reconstruction. However, it shifts the risk to European financing.

Such a claim can have economic value. However, this value does not necessarily correspond to its nominal amount. It depends on whether reparations can be enforced, when they are paid, and what competing claims exist.

Therefore, it would be misleading to portray the program as practically cost-neutral simply because a formal claim against Ukraine arises. It would be equally wrong to already book the entire loan amount as a certain, final loss.

A sound assessment must differentiate between loan volume, expected repayment, interest burden, and potential default. Uncertainty is not a minor detail, but an essential characteristic of the structure.

Why Russian assets are not immediately available financing

The political notion that Russia should pay for the damage must be distinguished from the actual access to Russian assets. Frozen state assets, ongoing income from them, and reparations agreed upon later are three different sources of financing.

The Commission wants to be able to use future extraordinary income from immobilized Russian state assets, under certain conditions, to service new loans to Ukraine. According to the proposal, existing obligations from previous G7 loans would be taken into account. Furthermore, the EU reserves the right to use immobilized Russian assets for loan repayment in accordance with European and international law.

This does not mean that the entire frozen asset portfolio is already available and unencumbered for the new loans. The same expected income cannot fully secure multiple loan programs simultaneously.

In addition, there is the interest rate risk: The ongoing returns from invested assets depend, among other things, on the market interest rate level. Falling interest rates can reduce these returns. At the same time, the financing costs of European bonds do not necessarily develop to the same extent or at the same time.

Responsible budget planning must take potential Russian payments into account. However, it should also include a scenario in which such payments are absent for an extended period. Only this scenario reveals the true burden that European budgets would have to bear.

Why a guarantee from the EU budget does not automatically burden all states equally

The wording that a loan is guaranteed by the EU budget is not sufficient to determine the final distribution of burdens between the member states.

The existing €90 billion program opted for enhanced cooperation among 24 member states. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia are not participating financially. Compensation arrangements are in place for them to ensure that the program does not create corresponding financial obligations for them. Nevertheless, this program is also secured through the European budgetary framework.

This highlights an important limitation of this simplistic critique: Common budgetary safeguards and identical financial contributions from all member states are not the same thing. Within a common budgetary framework, specific accounting and exception rules can be agreed upon.

Therefore, for the new loan, it must be specifically examined whether such exceptions are again planned, should be eliminated, or should be replaced by the civilian allocation.

The difference is significant. A state could give political approval but remain legally exempt from certain costs. It could also give its approval and be fully financially involved, while only its contribution is classified as civilian.

Only the second option would replace the existing phase-out with a different political justification. Whether that's fair can only be determined by looking at the binding burden-sharing agreement, not by the label.

How interest costs turn a one-time decision into a long-term obligation

Public debate often focuses on the loan amount. However, for future budgets, ongoing financing costs are also crucial.

A simplified model calculation illustrates the scale of the problem. If €45 billion remains completely outstanding, this would result in €1.35 billion in interest at an annual interest rate of three percent. At four percent, it would be €1.8 billion, and at five percent, €2.25 billion.

Over 20 years, assuming a constant principal amount, this would theoretically result in €27, €36, or €45 billion in interest. The original €45 billion would still not be repaid. This is not a forecast, but an illustration without considering interim repayments, compound interest, or changes in financing costs.

Even a figure of up to €50 billion in interest payments, mentioned in political debate, cannot be meaningfully assessed without information on the reference amount, the term, and the interest rate path. It could refer to multiple programs or a long period. Without this information, the figure primarily creates an impression.

The parliamentary background material for the existing 90-billion-euro program indicated financing costs of approximately one billion euros for 2027 and around three billion euros annually from 2028 onwards. This illustrates that the ongoing burden is relevant even independently of the new proposal. (782649?locale=EN)

Why 2027 does not create an automatic liability limit

The EU's current multiannual financial framework ends in 2027. However, this does not mean that European debt or guarantees will disappear at the end of the year. A long-term bond remains a commitment, even if the budget framework changes.

The correct approach is that the specific financing of future interest and, where applicable, amortization payments must be made compatible with the budget architecture after 2027. In principle, additional revenues, higher national contributions, lower expenditures in other areas, or a combination of these options are available for this purpose.

The new Commission proposal explicitly includes an amendment to the current financial framework so that the European budget can guarantee the additional credit. At the same time, the longer-term burdens are to be integrated into future budget planning.

The uncertainty therefore does not concern the continued existence of the obligation, but rather its future political backing. That is a crucial distinction.

Even the figure of €100 billion for Ukraine discussed in the next financial framework would not be proof of sufficient funding. First, it would need to be clarified what expenditures this amount includes and what additional burdens would arise.

Long-term loan commitments should therefore always be linked to a multi-year debt service plan. Otherwise, current policymakers will decide on benefits, while future parliaments will have to decide on their financing under significantly tighter constraints.

What burden actually falls on taxpayers

Taxpayers do not necessarily fund European loan programs through an immediate, explicitly designated special tax. The burden can arise through various channels.

Higher national contributions to the EU must be financed within the member states. This can be achieved through additional tax revenue, new national debt, or reduced spending in other areas. While domestic European revenue can redistribute the burden, it does not automatically eliminate it.

If funds are reallocated within the EU budget instead, opportunity costs arise. Money needed for debt servicing is not simultaneously available for research, infrastructure, regional development, or other tasks.

It would be an oversimplification to equate every additional euro of aid to Ukraine directly with a specific school or road project being cut. Budgets are flexible, and economic growth can generate additional revenue. Nevertheless, the principle remains: public funds and political attention are limited.

The actual distribution between households, businesses, and income groups depends on which revenue and spending cuts are decided upon. Taking out a loan does not answer this distribution question; it merely postpones part of the decision.

That is precisely why governments should not only state the current volume of loans, but also explain which groups would likely be burdened in the event of an unfavorable outcome.

When joint financing can be considered fair

Fairness cannot be measured solely by whether a country pays in more than it directly receives back from businesses or households. Security deposits have the character of a public good: their benefits can extend across national borders.

If stabilizing Ukraine reduces the risk of further military escalation, additional refugee flows, or major economic disruptions, even states that do not receive direct payments will benefit. Under this assumption, joint financing can be objectively justified.

However, the benefits and burdens are unevenly distributed. States geographically close to Russia often assess the immediate security risk differently than more distant countries. Economic capacity, existing defense spending, and the acceptance of Ukrainian refugees also differ.

A fair burden-sharing arrangement would therefore have to take several contributions into account: financial support, military aid, humanitarian costs, and the respective capacity to pay. Focusing solely on a single loan program can overlook existing burdens.

Such a structure would be particularly unfair if certain states portrayed their political participation as purely civilian, while assuming unclear or unlimited economic risks without disclosing this to their parliaments and citizens. It would be equally problematic if other states claimed permanent security advantages but evaded any appropriate participation.

The alternative to help is not automatically free

A complete economic analysis must also consider the costs of withholding support. A failure of civilian state functions in Ukraine could trigger economic instability, additional migration, and greater humanitarian hardship. A military collapse could alter the European security landscape and necessitate additional defense spending.

This does not mean that all help is worth its price. Nor can any support be justified retrospectively by claiming that everything would have been more expensive otherwise.

To make a sound decision, different scenarios would have to be compared: continuation of support, reduced support, more militarily oriented aid, more civilian stabilization, or a ceasefire with varying security guarantees.

Not only direct expenditures are relevant, but also the probability of occurrence and subsequent costs. An expensive measure can be economically sound if it effectively reduces an even greater risk. Conversely, a comparatively small expenditure can be poorly spent if it makes no substantial contribution to the intended goal.

The decisive criterion is therefore not whether support is expensive in the abstract. It is what verifiable security and stability benefits Europe achieves per euro invested, and what realistic alternatives exist.

Why arms contracts are not a free repayment

Part of the military support is intended to be used for products from Ukrainian and European companies. The existing loan program explicitly links defense financing to industrial capacity and includes corresponding rules of origin as well as exceptions in cases of urgent need.

This could strengthen European jobs, production facilities, and technological capabilities. Additional capacity could also be relevant for national defense capabilities.

Nevertheless, the claim that the money flows back into the European economy is not a sufficient justification for fiscal policy. A public contract generates company revenue, but not a full repayment to the state. Wages, intermediate goods, energy, depreciation, and profits are financed from this revenue. Only a portion is returned through taxes and levies.

Furthermore, there is the question of additionality. If companies are already operating at full capacity, additional demand can initially increase prices and delivery times instead of directly creating more production. New factories and qualified specialists cannot be made available at short notice.

A European procurement preference also presents conflicting objectives. It can promote industrial independence, but may also make the fastest or cheapest delivery more difficult. It will only become economically convincing if security benefits, delivery capability, and costs are assessed together.

Those who give democratic approval and those who only submit a proposal

The European Commission cannot make a binding decision on the new loan solely through a press conference. It submits legislative proposals, which the relevant European institutions then decide upon according to their respective procedures.

The existing loan program saw the adoption of the loan instrument and amendments to the Ukraine Facility with the participation of the European Parliament and the Council. The amendment to the multiannual financial framework required unanimity in the Council and the consent of the European Parliament. (782649?locale=EN)

For democratic evaluation, a distinction must therefore be made between the European Council of Heads of State and Government, the Council of the EU as legislator, and the directly elected European Parliament. A summit can achieve political unity. It does not automatically replace the necessary legal acts.

The blanket statement that everything must be decided unanimously is just as inaccurate as the claim that Brussels can override every national "no." Different components of a package are subject to different majority rules.

National parliaments also remain important because they oversee governments and decide on national budgets. What additional involvement is necessary in each individual case depends on the specific legal act and the respective constitutional order. Therefore, European approval does not automatically mean that every national member of parliament must vote separately on each individual payment.

Why a lack of referendums does not necessarily mean a dictatorship

In a representative democracy, citizens do not vote directly on every government loan. They elect parliaments and, directly or indirectly, governments that make decisions within their legal jurisdictions.

Therefore, aid to Ukraine is not illegitimate simply because it was not subject to a separate referendum. Long-term infrastructure projects, pension schemes, and defense spending are also regularly based on parliamentary decisions rather than individual referendums.

However, this only addresses the formal aspect. Substantive democratic legitimacy additionally requires that voters be able to understand what policies a government is pursuing, what costs are involved, and what alternatives are available to them.

A serious problem arises when politicians assume far-reaching risks while simultaneously creating the impression, through evasive language, that no one will be held accountable. Equally problematic would be to permanently shift essential decisions into detailed technical procedures that can only be reviewed by parliament.

However, the terms autocracy and dictatorship describe fundamentally different power structures. A controversial financial decision alone is not proof of this. More precise criticism focuses on a lack of transparency, insufficient oversight, excessive executive dominance, or a potential erosion of parliamentary budgetary rights.

These terms name the specific problem without blurring the institutional differences.

Political pressure is not the same as unlawful coercion

Linking aid to Ukraine with negotiations on the future EU budget increases the pressure on more hesitant member states. Making approval of a large financial package contingent on concessions on another issue is an exercise of political negotiating power.

Such package negotiations can enable legitimate compromises. States with differing interests often do not reach agreements through isolated individual decisions, but rather through mutual concessions.

At the same time, this method can become democratically problematic. The larger and more complex the package, the harder it is to determine which state has agreed to which risk and for what reason. A parliament could approve a comprehensive agreement even though it rejects individual components because their failure would jeopardize other important objectives.

Whether this constitutes unlawful coercion cannot be determined solely from the harshness of political statements. The decisive factors are the means employed and the legal limits.

Criticism of political blackmail therefore initially describes a perception of conflict. It does not replace a legal assessment. Conversely, the stronger side cannot retreat to the argument that every formally permissible exertion of pressure is also politically astute and promotes democratic trust.

Which controls would actually protect the taxpayer?

The most important safeguard is not a particularly reassuring name for the loan, but verifiable rules.

What is needed first is a consolidated overview of all European commitments to Ukraine. This overview must separately list grants, loans, guarantees, funds already disbursed, and outstanding commitments. Otherwise, neither additional burdens nor potential double counting can be identified.

In addition, a long-term debt service plan is needed, including several interest rate scenarios and different assumptions about Russian payments. A baseline scenario alone is insufficient if repayment depends significantly on uncertain political events.

For the civilian allocation to be valid, it would be necessary to disclose which states are contributing which amounts and whether the separation also includes interest and defaults. Without this information, the structure remains convenient from a communicative standpoint, but economically unclear.

Equally important are verifiable disbursement conditions, independent oversight, and effective anti-corruption measures. The new proposal links budget support to reforms, particularly in the areas of the rule of law and the fight against corruption. Whether this will be sufficient depends on its concrete implementation and the willingness to actually take action in cases of violations.

Ultimately, parliaments should be able to regularly decide on goal achievement, remaining funding needs, and changing risks. A one-time approval should not be interpreted as unlimited pre-authorization for every subsequent expansion.

The reasoned verdict: Support can be right, concealing it would not

The so-called accounting trick is essentially an attempt to overcome political opposition to military aid by allocating national contributions to civilian expenditures. This can be a legitimate compromise if the civilian use is realistic, verifiable, and honestly documented.

However, it is not an economic miracle solution. The division of funds eliminates neither the interchangeability of public funds nor the shared financing costs. Most importantly, it does not answer the question of who pays if Russia fails to provide sufficient reparations and the expected returns from Russian assets are inadequate.

For European taxpayers, such support can be justifiable despite considerable costs if it plausibly limits larger security and consequential costs. However, this benefit must be substantiated and continuously monitored. References to European security must not replace a cost-benefit analysis.

What is democratically crucial is whether the responsible institutions give informed consent, exercise their right of oversight, and disclose the actual burdens. A controversial European loan is not a dictatorship. However, a policy that hides long-term liability behind vague-sounding terms would damage trust and democratic accountability.

The most honest description is therefore this: Europe wants to provide additional funds today and is thereby assuming a real, long-term financial risk, the final extent of which is uncertain. Anyone who politically defends this decision should say precisely that. Civil labels can facilitate a compromise. They are no substitute for sustainable financing or acceptance of its actual consequences.

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