Warlords, gold and hunger: Who really benefits from Sudan's economic death?

From beacon of hope to “failed state”: The tragic story of Sudan’s economic collapse

The notion that Sudanese companies might seek expansion into the European market amidst the current devastation clashes with a harsh and tragic reality. Any discussion of market entry strategies, business partnerships, or the “conquest” of German markets is not only premature but a fundamental misjudgment of the catastrophic situation in a country whose economic and social structures have been systematically pulverized. Sudan is not a difficult market—under the current circumstances, it is practically no longer a market at all.

The civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which has been raging since April 2023, has triggered a complete economic collapse. The figures paint a dystopian picture: Gross domestic product has plummeted by 42%, the inflation rate has skyrocketed to 200%, and 5.2 million jobs – half of all employment – ​​have been lost. What was once the economic heart of the country, the capital Khartoum, lies in ruins after almost two years of relentless fighting.

But behind these abstract figures lies a humanitarian tragedy of global proportions. With over 30 million people in need of aid and 12.9 million displaced, Sudan is experiencing the world's largest refugee crisis. Widespread famine is rampant across much of the country. The economy has not only been weakened but transformed into a war economy, where warlords finance their war machine by plundering resources like gold and stifle any civilian entrepreneurship.

This article is therefore not a guide to an impossible market entry. Rather, it is a stark analysis of the economic collapse, illuminating the structural reasons why Sudan has effectively ceased to exist as a business partner. It examines how a promising future was squandered, how the war economy functions, and why any hope for economic recovery depends on an end to the conflict and decades of arduous reconstruction.

From substance to speculation: Why Sudanese economic reality does not allow European expansion

The question of expansion opportunities for Sudanese companies in the German and European markets encounters an uncomfortable truth: Sudan currently lacks a substantial private-sector foundation that would justify or enable international business expansion. The civil war raging since April 2023 between the Sudanese armed forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces has not only devastated the country physically but also pulverized any existing business infrastructure. The economic situation is not merely difficult—it is catastrophic to such an extent that any discussion of market entry strategies in Europe becomes absurd.

The stark figures speak for themselves: Sudan's gross domestic product has plummeted from US$56.3 billion in 2022 to an estimated US$32.4 billion by the end of 2025 – a cumulative loss of 42 percent of total economic output. The inflation rate reached an astronomical 200 percent in 2024, while at the same time 5.2 million jobs were lost – half of the entire working population. This is not a downturn, but a total economic collapse. More than 30 million people – over 60 percent of the population – require humanitarian assistance, 12.9 million are displaced, and at least 14 regions are experiencing acute famine.

To speak of “Sudanese industries and companies” that could “expand their business in Europe” under these circumstances fundamentally misrepresents reality. There are practically no functioning Sudanese companies left that could operate beyond mere survival. Industrial production has plummeted by 70 percent, and agricultural value creation by 49 percent. Even the few large corporations that existed before the war—such as the DAL Group—have ceased or relocated their operations. The banking infrastructure has collapsed, trade routes are severed, and the capital, Khartoum, once the country's economic heart, lies in ruins.

This analysis therefore does not examine the chances of an illusory Sudanese expansion into Europe, but rather the structural reasons why Sudan does not effectively exist as an economic partner under current conditions – and what fundamental transformations would be necessary to ever be able to think about international business relations again.

From beacon of hope to war zone: The economic destruction of a country

The tragedy of Sudan lies not only in the current catastrophe but also in the missed opportunity. As recently as 2019, after the overthrow of dictator Omar al-Bashir, international hope began to emerge. Germany organized a Sudan Partnership Conference in June 2020, at which international partners pledged a total of US$1.8 billion to support the transformation process. In 2021, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank granted Sudan debt relief under the HIPC initiative, reducing its external debt from US$56.6 billion to approximately US$6 billion. It seemed as if Sudan, after decades of isolation, might become a stable partner.

These hopes were dashed by the military coup of October 2021, when General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan seized power and ousted the civilian transitional government. International aid was frozen, and development programs were suspended. But the real catastrophe opened in April 2023, when the power struggle between al-Burhan's army and the Rapid Support Forces led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo erupted into civil war.

The economic consequences were devastating and unprecedented in their speed. Industrial production was traditionally concentrated in the greater Khartoum area—precisely where the fiercest fighting raged. Factories were looted, machinery destroyed or stolen, and production facilities bombed. The Battle of Khartoum lasted almost two years and is considered one of the longest and bloodiest battles ever fought in an African capital, with over 61,000 dead in the capital region alone. It wasn't until March 2025 that the army largely succeeded in driving the RSF out of Khartoum, but by then the city was already a ruined shell of its former self.

Agriculture, which before the war contributed about 35 percent to GDP and employed 80 percent of the workforce, also suffered dramatic losses. Grain production in 2024 fell 46 percent below the 2023 level and 40 percent below the five-year average. Many farmers were unable to cultivate their fields because they had fled or because the areas had become battlefields. Prices for staple foods skyrocketed—rice, beans, and sugar became unaffordable in some regions, while meat prices more than doubled.

The gold sector, which generated approximately 70 percent of export revenues, has been effectively criminalized. Both warring parties—the army and the RSF—seized control of gold mines and use the revenues to finance their warfare. An estimated 80 to 85 percent of Sudanese gold is smuggled abroad, primarily to the United Arab Emirates. Official gold exports to the UAE of US$750.8 million in the first half of 2025 reflect only a fraction of the actual trade volume. This war economy prevents any orderly economic development and has turned Sudan into a failed state where organized crime and warlord structures have gained the upper hand.

The historically developed German-Sudanese economic relationship was already marginal before the war. Bilateral trade volume in 2021 amounted to a mere €128 million. Sudan's traditional exports to Germany – cotton, gum arabic, and sesame – constituted only a tiny fraction of Germany's import volume. Conversely, Sudan primarily imported machinery, equipment, and finished goods from Germany. Since the outbreak of the war, this already modest trade has virtually ceased, with UK statistics showing that even British trade with Sudan – albeit at a low level – now consists almost entirely of humanitarian goods.

Historical developments thus reveal a pattern of missed opportunities: Sudan certainly possessed economic potential after its independence in 1956, but squandered it through decades of civil war, mismanagement, and international sanctions. The brief period of hope from 2019 to 2021 was brutally ended by renewed military rule and war. The current situation represents a historic low point, from which recovery—even in the most optimistic scenario—will take decades.

The anatomy of a collapse: War economics and its profiteers

The Sudanese economic collapse follows specific mechanisms that go far beyond ordinary recessions. At its core is the transformation from a market economy – albeit a fragile one – to a war economy controlled by two military actors whose sole economic objective is to finance their war machine.

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), under General Dagalo, have secured control of the lucrative gold mines in Darfur and North Kordofan. This paramilitary militia, which originated from the notorious Janjaweed horsemen, controls large swathes of the western gold-mining regions. It is estimated that in 2024 alone, RSF-controlled mines in Darfur extracted gold worth US$860 million. The majority of this is smuggled illegally into the United Arab Emirates, which in return supply weapons and ammunition – a perfect example of the resource curse that perpetuates armed conflict.

The Sudanese armed forces, in turn, control strategic infrastructure, ports, and state-owned enterprises—insofar as these are still functioning. Port Sudan on the Red Sea, the country's most important seaport, serves as a transshipment point for oil and gold exports as well as arms imports. Neither side in the war has any interest in a functioning civilian economy; this would only jeopardize their control over resources and revenue streams.

For the remaining civilian population and the few remaining active businesses, this war economy amounts to de facto expropriation. International organizations report systematic looting by both sides, extortion, arbitrary arrests, and the confiscation of goods and means of production. Small and medium-sized enterprises, which form the backbone of any functioning economy, cannot operate under these conditions. The Dal Group, one of Sudan's largest private conglomerates with operations in food production and other sectors, has either ceased production or relocated it to safer locations.

Macroeconomic indicators reflect this institutional collapse. The inflation rate of 200 percent in 2024 resulted from a combination of money printing to finance wars, import disruptions, and the collapse of the Sudanese pound. The official exchange rate is meaningless; far worse rates are offered on the black market. This makes any calculation for import- or export-oriented business impossible. The currency is no longer a store of value, but merely a rapidly depreciating medium of exchange.

Unemployment has reached catastrophic levels, with the loss of 5.2 million jobs – roughly half of all formal employment. The situation is particularly dire in the service sector and industry, which were concentrated in and around Khartoum. Many workers have fled or no longer have jobs to which they can return. The informal economy, which accounted for over half of economic output even before the war, has also largely collapsed, as mobility is restricted and markets no longer function.

The banking system – a prerequisite for any modern economic activity – has effectively collapsed. ATMs are not working, international transfers are virtually impossible, and loans are not being granted. Even simple business transactions must be conducted in cash, which is hardly practical given the rampant hyperinflation and uncertainty. International sanctions, including an arms embargo, travel bans, and asset freezes, further complicate any cross-border business.

The trade balance reveals the structural imbalance: In the first half of 2025, Sudan primarily exported gold (USD 750.8 million to the UAE), live animals (USD 159.1 million to Saudi Arabia), and sesame (USD 52.6 million to Egypt). Imports consisted mainly of machinery from China (USD 656.5 million), foodstuffs from Egypt (USD 470.7 million), and chemicals from India (USD 303.6 million). This demonstrates that even in a state of war, Sudan exports raw materials and imports finished goods—a colonial trade pattern that provides no basis for industrial development or high-value exports.

The actors in this system are clearly defined: the military and militias control lucrative sectors like gold and oil; international smuggling networks ensure illegal exports; neighboring states—especially the UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—profit as buyers of cheap raw materials and suppliers of expensive weapons. Civil society and entrepreneurs are victims in this equation, not actors. There is no sign of an entrepreneurial middle class capable of conquering international markets.

A landscape of ruins instead of a business environment: The status quo in November 2025

In November 2025, Sudan's economic situation presents itself as a humanitarian and economic catastrophe of historic proportions. The country is experiencing the largest displacement crisis in the world and one of the worst famines in recent history.

The most important quantitative indicators paint a bleak picture: GDP is projected to reach US$32.4 billion in 2025 – 42 percent below the pre-war level of 2022. Inflation fluctuates between 118 and 200 percent, wiping out savings and making any price calculation impossible. Per capita income has fallen from US$1,147 (2022) to an estimated US$624 (2025). This places Sudan among the poorest countries in the world.

The humanitarian dimension defies imagination: 30.4 million people – more than half of the estimated total population of 50 million – require humanitarian assistance. This is the world's largest humanitarian crisis. 12.9 million people are displaced, including 8.9 million internally displaced persons and 4 million refugees in neighboring countries. Egypt has taken in the most Sudanese (an estimated 1.2 million), followed by Chad (1 million), South Sudan (1 million), and other neighboring states.

The food situation is catastrophic: 24.6 million people suffer from acute food insecurity, and 637,000 people – the highest number worldwide – are facing catastrophic famine. A famine was officially declared in the Zamzam camp in North Darfur in August 2024 – the first of its kind in years. At least 14 other regions are acutely threatened by famine. Over a third of children suffer from acute malnutrition, with the rate in many areas exceeding the 20 percent threshold that defines famine.

Infrastructure is destroyed across large parts of the country. In Khartoum, the economic and political capital, once home to over 6 million people, entire neighborhoods are in ruins. Residential buildings have been bombed, hospitals looted, and schools converted into military bases. 31 percent of urban households have been forced to relocate. The road network is damaged by fighting, and bridges are destroyed or closed by the military. Khartoum Airport was only recaptured by the army at the end of March 2025, but it is not yet operational.

Electricity and water supplies are no longer reliable in most urban centers. This not only disrupts daily life but also makes any industrial production impossible. Hospitals have to operate on emergency generators, if at all. The healthcare system has collapsed: many health facilities are closed, looted, or destroyed. Medicines are in short supply. Cholera and measles epidemics have been raging since 2024; by April 2025, nearly 60,000 cholera cases with over 1,640 deaths had been recorded.

The educational infrastructure is also in ruins. Schools and universities have been closed since the beginning of the war or have been repurposed as emergency shelters for displaced persons. An entire generation of children and young people is no longer receiving an education. This will have long-term consequences for human capital development and will hinder any economic recovery.

For businesses, this status quo means: there is no functioning business environment. There is no legal certainty, no trustworthy institutions, no contract fulfillment. Even in regions less affected by the war, such as the Red Sea state where Port Sudan is located, normal business operations are impossible. Although the port city is under army control and has taken in many refugees from Khartoum, it suffers from overpopulation, inflation, and constant insecurity. Even here, the cost of living has skyrocketed – a kilogram of meat costs 26,000 Sudanese pounds (US$43), roughly double the pre-war price.

The most pressing challenges can be summarized as follows: First, the immediate safeguarding of the survival of millions of people threatened by hunger, disease, and violence. Second, an end to hostilities and a sustainable ceasefire—for which there is currently no sign. Third, the gradual restoration of basic state functions and infrastructure. Fourth, the long-term economic transformation, which would mean a shift away from a war economy and dependence on raw materials toward diversified, productive economic activity. A chasm yawns between the current situation and this long-term goal, a chasm that no marketing concept, however ambitious, can bridge.

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The illusion of expansion: Why Sudanese companies cannot come to Europe

A sober assessment of which Sudanese industries and companies might seek to expand their business into Germany and Europe leads to a clear answer: there are none. The notion that Sudanese companies could use Germany as a "starting point for conquering the German and European markets" in the current situation is entirely without factual basis. Neither do functioning Sudanese companies with export capacities exist, nor would they be able to meet the complex regulatory, logistical, and capital-related requirements for market entry in Europe.

Let's consider the most theoretically interesting sectors. Gum arabic would traditionally be a high-potential export product. Sudan produces roughly 70 to 80 percent of the world's gum arabic, which is used in the food and beverage industry. However, production has plummeted since the start of the war and is controlled by warring factions. Supply chains are disrupted, quality controls have ceased to exist, and processing—if it takes place at all—is carried out under the most rudimentary conditions. Entry into the highly regulated European food market, which requires strict certifications and traceability, is simply impossible.

The situation is similar with sesame, where Sudan was historically one of the largest exporters, accounting for 40 percent of African production. However, sesame-growing regions are located in war zones, the harvest has drastically declined, and the few exports that do exist go to China, Japan, and neighboring countries, not to Europe. Value creation is limited to raw material exports; there is no processing, no branding, no product differentiation. A Sudanese company wanting to market sesame products in Europe would have to compete against established suppliers from India, Myanmar, and Latin America—a hopeless task for a war-torn producer lacking capital, technology, and market access.

The gold sector is the only one still generating significant export volumes, but this is happening illegally and financing wars. Sudanese gold traders who wanted to export to Europe would immediately face international sanctions and anti-money laundering regulations. The Kimberley Process and similar certification mechanisms for conflict minerals would prevent any trade. Even if it were possible to export “clean” gold, the competition from established gold refiners in Switzerland, Germany, and the UK would be overwhelming.

Livestock farming is another traditional sector with theoretical potential – Sudan has one of the largest livestock populations in Africa, and live animal exports constitute a significant portion of its export earnings, primarily to Arab countries. However, the export of live animals to Europe is highly regulated and increasingly controversial due to animal welfare and veterinary concerns. Even if Sudanese exporters could meet European standards, it would be a low-margin business with significant logistical hurdles. Processed meat products from Sudan, which would allow for higher margins, are currently out of the question, as the processing infrastructure is destroyed and hygiene standards cannot be maintained.

Sudan's few remaining large companies – such as the Bank of Khartoum, Sudan Telecom, and state-owned oil companies – operate, if at all, only domestically and are struggling to survive. These firms lack both the resources and the strategic focus for international expansion. Most are also state-owned and subject to international sanctions or at least heightened due diligence by Western banks.

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which form the backbone of the economy and drive innovation in export businesses in many developing countries, currently exist only in rudimentary form in Sudan. During the war, hundreds of micro-enterprises emerged, producing basic necessities such as dairy products, packaging materials, and detergents. However, these businesses are geared towards local markets, often use rudimentary technologies, have extremely limited resources, and lack experience in exporting or international business. The idea that a small Sudanese producer of clay pots or soap could conquer the German market is absurd.

The comparison with successful African expansion stories makes the impossibility even clearer. Kenyan tech startups, Ethiopian coffee exporters, and Moroccan automotive suppliers achieved their success in functioning states with relative political stability, infrastructure, and access to capital. Sudan offers none of that. Even countries like South Sudan or Somalia, which are also plagued by conflict, have at least some stability in certain areas and have been able to maintain rudimentary economic structures. Sudan is in total collapse.

The regulatory and practical hurdles for Sudanese companies entering the European market are overwhelming. EU import regulations require proof of origin, quality certificates, customs clearance, and compliance with product standards. German business partners would conduct due diligence checks, raising questions about company registration, financial statements, tax records, and reputation. No Sudanese company can currently meet any of these requirements. Even money transfers would be problematic, as the Sudanese banking system is dysfunctional and international banks would reject transactions from Sudan due to sanctions and money laundering risks.

The idea of ​​a “strong and specialized German partner in marketing, PR, and business development” does not solve these fundamental problems. Marketing cannot sell a non-existent product. PR cannot transform a war-torn country into an attractive business partner. Business development cannot build business relationships where there is no business. A reputable German service provider would advise against collaborating with Sudanese “partners,” as the reputational risks, legal uncertainties, and practical impossibilities would destroy any potential business.

Comparative analysis: When war destroys the economy

A look at other countries affected by armed conflicts or economic crises highlights both the unique nature and the tragedy of the Sudanese situation. The comparative analysis reveals the conditions under which economic recovery is possible – and why Sudan currently fails to meet these conditions.

Syria has experienced an even longer and bloodier civil war, which has been ongoing since 2011. Yet even in Syria, rudimentary economic structures have survived in government-controlled areas. Damascus and other cities continue to function, albeit on a limited scale. Syrian exporters, mainly from the diaspora, maintain business relationships, and Syrian products—olive oil, textiles, food—reach international markets, often via third countries. The crucial difference: Syria has a functioning government that controls territory and a diaspora with capital and international networks. Sudan has neither to a sufficient degree.

Ukraine offers a different comparison: a country at war that nevertheless attempts to maintain economic ties and attract international investors. Ukrainian companies continue to export grain, steel products, and IT services. International conferences discuss reconstruction and mobilize billions in aid. Ukraine enjoys massive Western support, has a relatively developed infrastructure (despite war damage), an education system, and a functioning administration in large parts of the country. Moreover, Ukraine is fighting against an external aggressor, which mobilizes international solidarity. Sudan, on the other hand, is a civil war in which both sides commit war crimes and international sympathy is limited.

Somalia is perhaps the most comparable case: a country scarred by decades of civil war and state collapse. Yet even Somalia has seen modest economic development in certain regions—particularly in the relatively stable Somaliland. Cattle breeding, money transfer services, and local trade are functioning. Somali diaspora communities in Europe and North America are strong and invest in their homeland. Sudan's diaspora is smaller and less interconnected, and the conflict is more widespread, leaving no safe sub-regions where economic activity can flourish.

Rwanda after the 1994 genocide is an example of successful transformation following catastrophic violence. The country witnessed the murder of approximately one million people within a few months. Nevertheless, it achieved a remarkable recovery, driven by strong (albeit authoritarian) governance, international aid, investment in education and infrastructure, and a deliberate policy of reconciliation and economic development. Sudan lacks all of these prerequisites: there is no recognized government with authority and legitimacy, international aid is limited and often blocked, education is nonexistent, and reconciliation is impossible given the ongoing violence.

Iraq after 2003 offers another comparison: a war-torn country with destroyed infrastructure, but enormous oil reserves that financed reconstruction. International corporations returned, lured by oil and construction contracts. The crucial difference: Iraq had a functioning oil industry and massive international military and development aid. Sudan largely lost its oil reserves with the independence of South Sudan in 2011; the remaining oil is being exploited by the warring parties, not used for reconstruction.

Yemen, much like Sudan, is embroiled in a brutal civil war, demonstrating the dangers of a protracted war economy. There, too, various factions (Houthis, the Saudi-backed government) control parts of the country and finance themselves through raw material exports, smuggling, and external aid. The economy has collapsed, and the population suffers from hunger and disease. The comparison shows that without a political solution, there is no economic future. Sudan risks becoming a “second Yemen”—a failed state with a permanent civil war and a perpetual humanitarian crisis.

The analysis shows that economic recovery after conflict is possible, but requires specific conditions: a functioning (even if authoritarian) state, control over resource revenues to finance reconstruction, massive international support, an educated and capable population, and a minimum of security and predictability. Sudan meets none of these conditions. Instead, the country combines the worst elements: ongoing war, fragmented governance, resource plunder by warring parties, a lack of international priority, mass exodus of the educated class, and total insecurity. To speak of business development or market expansion in this context is not only unrealistic but cynical.

The inconvenient truths: risks, dependencies, and structural distortions

A critical assessment of Sudan's economic situation leads to several uncomfortable truths that are often ignored in euphemistic development discourses.

First, the war economy is profitable for certain actors. General Dagalo, leader of the RSF, is considered one of the richest men in Sudan, with a fortune acquired through gold trading and land ownership. The UAE profits from cheap Sudanese gold and sells expensive weapons in return. Egyptian traders exploit the plight of Sudanese refugees. Warlords in Darfur control mines and smuggling routes. These actors have no interest in peace and the rule of law, as this would jeopardize their profits. As long as the incentive structures reward war, it will continue. This is the “resource curse” in its purest form: resource wealth—especially easily extractable and smuggleable goods like gold—makes war lucrative and perpetuates it.

Second, the international community has largely abandoned Sudan. While Ukraine and Gaza receive significant international attention and aid, Sudan is a “forgotten conflict.” The reasons for this are manifold: geopolitical insignificance (Sudan is neither energy-politically relevant nor strategically central), conflict fatigue after decades of Sudanese crises, racist hierarchies in the international attention economy, and the complexity of a civil war without clear “good” and “evil” sides. The consequence: humanitarian aid is massively underfunded. In 2024, Sudan received only about one-third of the required US$4.2 billion in humanitarian aid. Development aid has virtually ceased. This international neglect means that Sudan cannot expect the kind of “Marshall Plan”-style reconstruction aid that has been granted to other crisis-stricken countries.

Thirdly, the long-term ecological and demographic consequences are devastating. Millions of children are receiving no education; an entire generation is growing up amidst violence, hunger, and hopelessness. The trauma is widespread. At the same time, the environment and agricultural resources are degrading due to overexploitation, lack of maintenance of irrigation systems, and climate change. Desertification is accelerating. When the war ends, Sudan will be left with an uneducated, traumatized population and degraded natural resources—hardly a good foundation for development.

Fourth: Social fragmentation and ethnic division are deepened by the war. The RSF is accused of carrying out ethnic cleansing in Darfur against non-Arab populations. The army indiscriminately bombs civilian areas. Both sides use sexual violence as a weapon of war. These atrocities leave deep rifts between communities that will last for generations.

Even if a ceasefire is reached, the question remains: How can a society so deeply divided find its way back to peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation? Experiences from Rwanda, Bosnia, and other post-conflict societies show that reconciliation is possible, but it takes decades and requires active political effort – which is not currently foreseeable in Sudan.

Fifth: Dependence on commodity exports perpetuates underdevelopment. Sudan's export structure—gold, sesame, gum arabic, livestock—is typical of a commodity exporter without industrialization. These products have low added value, volatile prices, and create few jobs. They are also vulnerable to control by elites and warlords. Sustainable economic development requires industrialization, diversification, and value chains—all things that are impossible in war-torn Sudan. The war has destroyed the already weak industrial base; reconstruction will take decades.

Sixth: Existing international sanctions make even well-intentioned business difficult. UN, EU, and US sanctions include arms embargoes, travel bans, asset freezes against individuals, and restrictions on financial transactions. While these sanctions officially target only specific sectors and individuals, they de facto have a deterrent effect on all business activity. Banks and companies avoid Sudan for fear of compliance violations. This means that even if a Sudanese company wanted to export legitimately, it would struggle to find an international bank willing to process transactions or a logistics provider willing to transport goods.

The controversial debates revolve around the question of responsibility and solution. Is the West obligated to help Sudan, or is this an “African” crisis that must be solved by Africans? Should sanctions be tightened to exert pressure on the warring parties, or would they hinder humanitarian aid? Should negotiations be held with warlords to gain access for aid organizations, or would this legitimize war criminals? These questions have no easy answers, and the international community remains divided and paralyzed.

The conflicting objectives are obvious: immediate humanitarian aid versus long-term state-building; negotiations with warring parties versus justice for victims; focus on urban centers versus rural regions; investment in infrastructure versus social programs. In the current war situation, survival inevitably takes precedence; strategic development issues are a luxury. But without a long-term perspective, Sudan will remain trapped as a failed state.

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Between dystopia and hope: Possible development paths until 2035

The forecast for Sudan is bleak, but not without alternatives. Three scenarios are emerging, outlining drastically different futures.

Scenario 1: Permanent failed state

In this pessimistic, but unfortunately realistic, scenario, the civil war drags on for years without either side achieving a decisive military victory. Sudan fragments into spheres of influence controlled by various militias, warlords, and foreign actors. The war economy, based on gold, smuggling, and external support, becomes entrenched. The humanitarian catastrophe becomes permanent. Millions remain in refugee camps in neighboring countries that are becoming increasingly hostile. The international community grows accustomed to the crisis and further reduces its already inadequate aid. Sudan becomes a “second Somalia” or “Yemen”—a permanently failed state on the margins of the international community. In this scenario, any economic development is impossible; the country remains a war zone and a humanitarian disaster for the foreseeable future. The expansion of Sudanese companies into Europe would be as absurd as imagining Somali pirates opening boutiques in Hamburg.

Scenario 2: Fragile stabilization and slow reconstruction

In this moderately optimistic scenario, a fragile ceasefire is achieved in the coming years, perhaps mediated by the African Union, IGAD, or international powers. The warring parties agree on power-sharing or a federation with autonomous regions. Under international supervision, a reconstruction process begins, building on the HIPC debt relief of 2021. International development banks and bilateral donors provide billions. Priority is given to restoring basic infrastructure, health and education facilities, and agriculture.

In this scenario, Sudan could experience a modest recovery by 2030-2035. Model calculations show that restoring agricultural productivity to pre-war levels and investing approximately US$1 billion in infrastructure could reduce poverty by 1.9 million people. The economy could grow by 3-5 percent annually, but given the massive losses, this would represent only a slow recovery. The population would remain largely poor, and Sudan would remain a typical LDC (Least Developed Country), dependent on commodity exports and international aid.

In this scenario, there might be a few Sudanese companies—mainly in agricultural production (gum arabic, sesame) or in the service sector (for example, startups founded by the diaspora)—that engage in modest exports. However, even here, these would be niche products, not a broad export offensive. Market entry in Europe would be arduous, requiring years of preparation, certifications, and capital. At best, Fair Trade-certified products from Sudan might appear in specialized shops, marketed with the story of reconstruction—similar to Rwandan coffee or Bosnian handicrafts after the conflicts there. There is no question of a “conquest” of the European market.

Scenario 3: Transformative Renaissance

In this optimistic but highly improbable scenario, the war ends swiftly with a comprehensive peace agreement supported by a broad civil society movement. A democratic transitional government, including civil society, assumes power. Impressed by this change of course, the international community mobilizes massive support in the style of a “Marshall Plan for Sudan.” Truth and reconciliation commissions are established, modeled on those in Rwanda or South Africa. Investments flow into education, health, renewable energy, and digital infrastructure.

Sudan is harnessing its enormous agricultural potential – 85 million hectares of arable land, access to the Nile, and a suitable climate – and becoming the “breadbasket of East Africa.” Gold production is being legalized and regulated, with revenues flowing into the state budget. A young, tech-savvy generation is building startups, particularly in fintech, agritech, and renewable energy. The Sudanese diaspora is returning with capital and expertise. By 2035, Sudan will be a middle-income country with a functioning democracy, a diversified economy, and a growing middle class.

In this scenario, Sudanese companies could indeed target international markets – food producers exporting organic products to Europe; IT companies providing services to international clients; logistics firms leveraging Sudan's strategic location between Africa and the Middle East. However, even in this most optimistic scenario, such development would take 10-15 years and require significant prerequisites.

Scenarios for Sudan: Development opportunity or permanent failure?

Reality will likely lie somewhere between scenarios 1 and 2: a fragile ceasefire after years of further war, followed by a laborious, underfunded reconstruction. Potential disruptions are numerous: climatic shocks (droughts, floods) could further jeopardize the already fragile food security; regional conflicts (such as renewed civil war in South Sudan or instability in Ethiopia) could spill over into Sudan; global economic crises could cause commodity prices to plummet and reduce development aid; technological changes (such as alternatives to gum arabic) could devastate Sudan's export markets.

Regulatory changes in the EU could also have an impact: stricter rules on conflict minerals, proof of origin, and sustainability would make it even more difficult for Sudanese exporters to reach European markets. At the same time, EU programs to promote African development—such as the Global Gateway Initiative—could theoretically offer opportunities if Sudan meets the minimum political and economic standards.

The geopolitical situation is also uncertain. China and Russia have historical interests in Sudan (oil, mining, access to ports on the Red Sea), but their willingness to support a war-torn country is limited. The Gulf States (UAE, Saudi Arabia) are both part of the problem (arms deliveries, gold smuggling) and potential partners for reconstruction. The EU and the US have largely written off Sudan, but could show renewed interest in the event of political change, not least because of migration control.

In summary, Sudan faces a long and arduous road. In the best-case scenario—fragile peace and international reconstruction—the country will make modest progress until 2035 and remain a low-income developing nation. In the worst-case scenario—continued civil war—Sudan will become a permanent failed state. In no realistic scenario will Sudanese companies be able to substantially conquer European markets or use Germany as a "starting point" within the next ten years. The idea remains what it is: an illusion, far removed from any economic reality.

The bitter conclusion: No country for entrepreneurs

The final assessment must be sobering: Sudan, in its current state, is not a place for entrepreneurial ambitions, let alone international business expansion. The comprehensive analysis leads to several key findings that are relevant for political decision-makers, economic actors, and also for Sudanese diaspora communities.

First: The Sudanese economy does not currently exist as a functioning system. What is happening in Sudan is not an economy in the modern sense – with markets, institutions, legal certainty, and a division of labor – but a war economy in which military actors plunder resources, the population struggles for survival, and all productive activity has collapsed to a subsistence level. To speak of “market development” or “expansion” from this starting point fundamentally misunderstands the basis of economic activity.

Secondly, the question of Sudanese industries that could expand into Europe is flawed. It presupposes something that doesn't exist: functioning Sudanese companies with production capacity, export capability, and strategic business acumen. The reality is that the few companies that have survived are struggling for their very survival. New micro-enterprises that emerged during the war serve basic local needs under the most rudimentary conditions. Neither of these have the resources, capital, or know-how for international business.

Thirdly, even in theoretically exportable sectors—gum arabic, sesame, gold, livestock—structural obstacles prevent any serious export offensive. These obstacles include: loss of control over production areas due to hostilities, disruption of supply chains and logistics, loss of quality and lack of certifications, international sanctions and compliance risks, hyperinflation and currency devaluation, bank collapses and the impossibility of international payments, and reputational damage from association with war and conflict minerals. These obstacles cannot be overcome through marketing or business development; they are fundamental, systemic problems that can only be solved through peace, state reconstruction, and years of institutional development.

Fourth: The role of a “German partner in marketing, PR, and business development” would be, if anything, that of a reality advisor. A reputable German service provider would have to explain to Sudanese prospects that expansion into Europe is impossible under current conditions and that all resources should instead be focused on survival, humanitarian aid, and long-term reconstruction preparation. Marketing cannot create products that do not exist. PR cannot polish an image that has been fundamentally damaged by war, hunger, and atrocities. Business development cannot build deals where there is no basis for them.

Fifth: The long-term implications of Sudan's collapse extend beyond Sudan itself. With 12.9 million refugees and internally displaced persons, the conflict is destabilizing the entire region – Egypt, Chad, South Sudan, and Ethiopia are overwhelmed by the influx of Sudanese. The famine situation will cause long-term health and developmental damage for millions of children. Regional economic integration – for example, through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) – is hampered by Sudan's collapse. Sudan is not just a national disaster, but a regional catastrophe with global implications (migration, extremism, humanitarian costs).

Sixth: The strategic implications for different actors are clear. For European and German companies: Sudan is not a market. There is nothing to buy or sell there that would be worthwhile. Engagement should be purely humanitarian or – for construction companies and infrastructure specialists – geared towards long-term reconstruction after the war, similar to how companies are positioning themselves with regard to the reconstruction of Ukraine. For political decision-makers in Germany and the EU: Sudan does not need trade promotion, but rather conflict mediation, humanitarian aid, and a long-term development strategy. The existing sanctions should remain targeted to affect warlords without hindering humanitarian aid. For international investors: Sudan is a no-go for the foreseeable future. The political risk is maximum, the rule of law does not exist, and expropriation and violence are always possible. For Sudanese diaspora communities: Engagement is important for long-term reconstruction, but under realistic conditions. Diaspora investments should focus on education, health, and civil society, not on short-term business deals.

Seventh: There is a bitter irony in the original question. The idea that Sudanese companies could “conquer” Europe reverses the actual power dynamics. Historically, European colonial powers—Great Britain, France—exploited and dominated Africa. Even today, raw materials flow from Africa to Europe, while finished goods and capital flow in the opposite direction—a structural inequality that is worsening, not diminishing. Sudan is the extreme example of a country at the absolute bottom of this hierarchy: poor, war-torn, resource-dependent, lacking technological capabilities or institutional capacity. The notion that such countries could “conquer” developed European markets completely ignores these structural realities.

The final assessment is therefore: Sudan is not a partner for business expansion, but a humanitarian emergency of historic proportions. The priority must be ending the war, alleviating human suffering, and building a sustainable state. Only when these fundamental conditions are met—and this will take decades at best—can questions about economic development, exports, and international integration be meaningfully addressed. Until then, any discussion about Sudanese market penetration in Europe remains not only unrealistic but also cynical in light of the immeasurable suffering of the Sudanese people.

The strategic recommendation for all involved actors is clear: maintain a realistic view, do not raise false hopes, set humanitarian priorities and prepare for the long, arduous road of reconstruction – but do not undertake business adventures in a country that currently only exists as a war zone.

Konrad Wolfenstein

I would be happy to serve as your personal advisor.

contact me under Wolfenstein ∂ Xpert.digital

call me under +49 89 674 804 (Munich)

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