Understanding the USA | The Architecture of American Power: How Four Schools of Thought Determine Washington's Course

The Architecture of American Power: Beyond the Monroe Doctrine

From benevolent hegemon to transactional titan: Why the USA is redefining its role in the world

Anyone who wants to understand the United States in the 21st century can no longer view it as a monolithic superpower or a mere guardian of the Monroe Doctrine. While the reflex to ward off foreign influence in the Western Hemisphere remains, Washington's actual course is now determined by a complex interplay of demographics, energy markets, constitutional logic, and the global economy. The US acts less as a moral agent and more as a system driven by geography, the dollar system, and domestic political tensions, a system that is currently undergoing a radical reassessment of its own role in the world.

At the heart of this transformation are four deeply rooted political traditions – Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, Wilsonian, and Jacksonian – which function like basic psychological programs of American power:

• Hamiltonians think in terms of markets, trade routes and a strong currency; they see the government as a service provider to the economy and the architect of a global system from which American companies in particular benefit.
• Opposing them are Jeffersonians who view every foreign policy commitment as a threat to freedom, budget and democracy at home, and see "endless wars" as the path to an all-powerful security state.
• Wilsonians, on the other hand, see the USA as a moral power that must promote democracy, human rights and institutions such as the UN and NATO – an approach that has lost support among the population after the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan.
• And finally, what is probably the most influential school of thought today: the Jacksonian school. It embodies the instinctive nationalism of the American heartland, distrusts elites and supranational organizations, and demands an overwhelming, uncompromising show of force in the event of conflict.

Current US policy is an attempt to fuse Hamiltonian economic focus with Jacksonian tribal nationalism, while Wilsonian missionary rhetoric and Jeffersonian restraint are marginalized. Added to this are profound material constraints, above all the role of the dollar as the world's reserve currency. The "exorbitant privilege" of being able to borrow in one's own currency rests on the Triffin Dilemma: To provide the world with sufficient dollar liquidity, the US must maintain a persistent trade deficit, i.e., import more than it exports. The consequence: structural deindustrialization, which leads directly to the decline of the Rust Belt, while the financial sector and consumers benefit from cheap imports. When Washington imposes tariffs today and promises reindustrialization, the struggle is paradoxically directed against the internal logic of its own monetary system – a withdrawal from this arrangement would trigger global shocks. In parallel, the shale gas and shale oil revolution has shifted the strategic map of the United States. In a short time, the world's largest energy importer has become its largest oil and gas producer, with increasing net energy independence and LNG exports to Europe and Asia. This diminishes the existential importance of the Middle East; the Carter Doctrine loses its rigidity, and a strategic withdrawal becomes possible—with worrying consequences for allies whose energy supplies remain dependent on the sea lanes controlled by the US Navy. The architecture of American power is thus undergoing a period of tectonic realignment: a domestically polarized superpower, caught between the promises of reindustrialization, the logic of the dollar system, the temptation of energy autarky, and the conflicting impulses of its four schools of strategic thought. Anyone who understands these mechanisms recognizes that at its core it is not about the whims of individual presidents, but about a system that is under enormous pressure to redefine its global role – beyond the classic Monroe Doctrine and the familiar image of the “benevolent hegemon”.

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From benevolent hegemon to transactional titan: The end of the “Accidental Empire”

To truly grasp the foreign and economic policies of the United States, simply referring to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 is no longer sufficient. While the aspiration to protect the Western Hemisphere from foreign influence remains a geopolitical reflex, the superpower's behavior in the 21st century is driven by far more complex, often contradictory, internal forces. Anyone who wants to understand the US must stop viewing it as a monolithic bloc and instead analyze the profound tectonic shifts between demographics, energy markets, constitutional power struggles, and economic imperatives. What we are witnessing today is not merely the whim of individual presidents, but the result of structural conditions that are forcing the American Leviathan into a new, post-global era.

The following analysis dissects these mechanisms. It looks under the hood of American grand strategy and identifies the economic and sociopolitical algorithms that determine Washington's actions—regardless of who is currently in the Oval Office. It is an attempt to understand the US not as a moral actor, but as a system driven by geography and economics that is in the process of radically reassessing its own role in the world.

"Accidental Empire" describes the idea that the USA did not deliberately and purposefully build a classic empire like previous colonial powers, but rather rose to global power and hegemony "unintentionally." This process was facilitated by various factors, such as victory in World War II, its role in the Cold War with strategies like containment (the containment of an adversary – especially in the context of the Cold War), the founding of NATO and the Marshall Plan, as well as its economic dominance, manifested in the dollar, the Bretton Woods system (the international monetary and financial order, 1944–1973), and globalization. This was complemented by a worldwide military presence through bases and alliances. The term "accidental" thus emphasizes that this was not a conscious, colonial project of conquest, but rather a gradual gradual development into a hegemonic role, driven by historical circumstances, its own strength, and the weakness of other powers.

The four psychological pillars of power

American foreign policy often appears schizophrenic to European observers. At times, the US acts as an idealistic global policeman, seeking to export democracy; at others, it abruptly withdraws and demands harsh tribute payments from its closest allies. These fluctuations are not a sign of instability, but rather the result of a constant struggle between four deeply rooted political traditions, which the historian Walter Russell Mead has meticulously identified. These four schools form the DNA of American strategy, and their respective blend determines the nation's course.

The first tradition is the Hamiltonian school. Named after Alexander Hamilton, it views the US government primarily as a service provider for the American economy. Its goal is the integration of the US into the global economy under conditions that benefit American companies. A Hamiltonian believes in free maritime trade, strong banks, and a stable currency. Globalization over the last thirty years has essentially been a Hamiltonian project. The protection of global trade routes by the US Navy was not altruistic, but rather a means to ensure the flow of goods and capital, from which Wall Street and American corporations profited.

In radical contrast stands the Jeffersonian school. Thomas Jefferson warned against “entangling alliances” and saw every foreign policy commitment as a threat to domestic democracy. Jeffersonians are the true isolationists. They ask with every military intervention and every trade agreement: What will this cost us in freedom and taxpayers’ money? They argue that building an empire inevitably leads to an overpowering state that erodes civil liberties. In recent years, this school of thought has experienced a renaissance, often disguised as criticism of the “endless wars” in the Middle East. When US politicians today ask why American money is flowing into Ukraine instead of repairing bridges in Ohio, we hear the echo of Jefferson.

The third school, the Wilsonian school, is the one Europeans know best and often mistakenly consider the only one. Named after Woodrow Wilson, it is based on the conviction that the US has a moral obligation to promote American values—democracy, human rights, and the rule of law—into the world. Wilsonians believe that American security depends on other countries also being democracies. Institutions such as the United Nations and NATO are classic Wilsonian instruments. This school dominated the post-Cold War era well into the 2000s, but has suffered a massive loss of credibility among the American electorate due to the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The fourth, and arguably most powerful, force is the Jacksonian school. Named after the populist president Andrew Jackson, it represents the gut feeling of the American heartland. Jacksonians are neither isolationists nor internationalists; they are nationalists. They are not interested in international law or nation-building. As long as the world leaves the US alone, they leave the world alone. But if America is attacked or treated disrespectfully, they demand an overwhelming, ruthless military response, with no regard for civilian collateral damage or postwar orders. The Trump era and the current hardening of rhetoric are classically Jacksonian: transactional, distrustful of elites and supranational organizations, and focused on the physical protection and economic advantage of one's own "tribe." Understanding these four schools is essential because current US policy is an attempt to fuse the Hamiltonian focus on economics with Jacksonian nationalism, while Wilsonian ideals and Jeffersonian restraint are pushed into the background.

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The paradox of exorbitant privilege

A key, often overlooked driver of US policy is the role of the US dollar as the world's reserve currency and the resulting economic constraints. Since the Bretton Woods Agreement and the subsequent abandonment of the gold standard, the US has enjoyed the "exorbitant privilege" of being able to borrow in its own currency. This means it is never truly insolvent, as it can theoretically print money to settle debts. However, this privilege comes at a price, known as the Triffin Dilemma, which has significantly distorted American industrial policy.

The Triffin Dilemma states that the country that provides the global reserve currency must constantly supply liquidity to the world economy. To do this, the US must permanently import more than it exports, thus running a trade deficit. Only in this way will enough dollars flow into the rest of the world, where they can be held as reserves by central banks and corporations. The consequence is brutal for the American working class: the structural deficit means that the US has to cannibalize its own industrial base. It exports financial services and security (Treasury bonds) but imports physical goods.

For decades, the US establishment accepted this deal. Wall Street profited from global capital demand, and consumers benefited from cheap imports. But the deindustrialization of the Rust Belt is the direct economic consequence of this monetary architecture. When US politicians today call for tariffs and demand the reshoring of production, they are essentially fighting against the laws of gravity of their own monetary system. A serious attempt to balance the trade deficit would mean draining the world of dollar liquidity, which could trigger a global recession.

At the same time, the deficit is cemented by the US's status as a safe haven. In every global crisis, capital flees to the dollar, which appreciates the currency and further increases the cost of American exports. This creates a situation in which American economic policy is caught in a constant contradiction: Domestically, reindustrialization is promised, but the dollar's role as a global lubricant makes precisely this almost impossible. The increasing aggressiveness towards China and also the EU in trade matters is an attempt to break out of this dilemma without relinquishing superpower status. The US wants to retain the privilege of the dollar but no longer bear the burden of the deficit. This is hardly economically viable and leads to a volatile, protectionist trade policy based on ad-hoc deals rather than systemic rules.

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The geopolitical dividend of the shale gas revolution

Perhaps the most underestimated development of the last fifteen years is the radical transformation of the American energy balance. The shale gas and shale oil revolution (fracking) has completely redrawn the geopolitical map of the United States. Until around 2008, the US was the world's largest energy importer. Its foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East, was dictated by the need to secure the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. The Carter Doctrine, which stated that any attempt by a foreign power to gain control of the Persian Gulf would be considered an attack on vital US interests, was the operative law.

Today, the US is the world's largest producer of oil and gas. It is net energy independent and increasingly a major exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Europe and Asia. This energy self-sufficiency has dramatically reduced the strategic value of the Middle East for Washington. While regional stability and the containment of terrorism remain important, the existential dependence has disappeared. This allows the US a strategic withdrawal that is worrying for allied nations in Europe and Asia.

The US no longer needs to patrol sea lanes to secure its own oil. When the US Navy keeps the Strait of Malacca or the Strait of Hormuz open today, it does so primarily to ensure the energy supply of its allies—and its rivals like China. China imports over 70 percent of its oil, much of it via sea routes controlled by the US Navy. This gives Washington enormous strategic leverage. In the event of a conflict, the US could cut off China's energy supply without suffering any direct harm.

At the same time, the status of being an energy exporter is changing the relationship with Europe. US LNG is not just a commodity, but a geopolitical instrument for freeing Europe from its dependence on Russia for energy. The aggressive stance against projects like Nord Stream 2 was not only driven by security concerns, but also by the hard-nosed economic interest in securing market share for American gas. Energy independence allows the US to pursue a foreign policy that is less reliant on compromise. It can impose sanctions on oil producers like Venezuela, Iran, or Russia without fear of running out of gas at American pumps. This fosters a more unilateral, robust style of diplomacy that is less concerned with the sensitivities of traditional partners.

The fight against the administrative state

One aspect often missing from European analysis is the internal constitutional struggle that shapes the US executive's capacity to act. This is the conflict between the "Unitary Executive Theory" and the so-called "Deep State" or administrative state. This conflict is not merely a conspiracy theory, but a real struggle over the separation of powers and continuity.

The unitary executive theory states that, according to Article II of the Constitution, the president has sole and complete control over the executive branch. Every official, every agency, and every regulation must ultimately be subject to the president's will. This contrasts sharply with the reality of a vast bureaucratic apparatus—from the CIA and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to the State Department—that has grown over decades, possesses its own expertise, and is protected from political interference by laws and regulations. This apparatus ensures continuity and stability but is often perceived by proponents of the Jacksonian school as an undemocratic obstacle that sabotages the will of the electorate.

Initiatives like "Schedule F," a plan that would strip tens of thousands of civil servants of their job security and replace them with political appointees, are symptoms of this struggle. When a US administration massively replaces personnel in key positions or ignores scientific expertise within government agencies, it directly impacts the reliability of the US as a partner. Treaties negotiated by diplomats over years can be canceled overnight by a new president who views the bureaucracy as hostile.

The Supreme Court's jurisprudence, such as the overturning of the "chevron doctrine" (a principle that instructed courts to follow the expertise of government agencies when interpreting unclear laws), also weakens the administrative state. This means that future US administrations will be less constrained by expert knowledge within government departments, but also less informed by it. For foreign policy, this means it will become more volatile. The institutional memory, traditionally guaranteed by career civil servants in the State Department or Pentagon, is eroding. US partners must prepare themselves for the fact that commitments will have a half-life of no more than four years and that American foreign policy will become increasingly personalized and less institutionalized.

The isolated ecosystem of the military-industrial complex

Another structural pillar is the decoupling of the American defense industry from the rest of the civilian economy. With a defense budget exceeding $800 billion annually, the US maintains a gigantic machine that is becoming increasingly inefficient. After the end of the Cold War, the US defense industry consolidated into a few large corporations (prime contractors) that now hold near-monopoly positions. These companies operate in a market without genuine competition, financed by taxpayer money and protected by regulatory barriers.

The problem is the lack of pace of innovation compared to the civilian tech sector. While development cycles in Silicon Valley are measured in months, the Pentagon plans in decades. The isolation of this sector means that the US possesses the most expensive and complex weapons systems in the world, but struggles to rapidly scale up cheap, mass-producible technologies (such as drones), as the war in Ukraine demonstrates.

Economically, the military-industrial complex functions like a vast Keynesian job creation program, cleverly spread across all 50 states to secure political support in Congress. This makes reforms almost impossible. In foreign policy, this creates pressure to maintain threat scenarios that justify the purchase of large-scale, high-tech systems (aircraft carriers, fighter jets), even when modern warfare might require entirely different means. The US is trapped in an arms logic geared toward a major war against a peer competitor like China, but potentially too rigid for today's asymmetric conflicts. This industrial rigidity is one of the US's greatest strategic weaknesses, yet it also forces it to always view conflicts through the lens of technological superiority, rather than through diplomatic nuance.

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The demographic bet on 2030

Despite all its internal strife and political dysfunction, the US has an ace up its sleeve that sets it apart from almost all other industrialized nations: its demographics. While Europe, China, Japan, and Russia are aging rapidly and their working-age populations are shrinking, the US remains relatively demographically stable. The Millennial generation is larger than the Baby Boomer generation, and Generation Z is rapidly following. This guarantees that the US will still have robust domestic consumption and a sufficient labor pool well into the 2030s.

In comparison, China is heading toward a demographic precipice of unprecedented historical proportions. The consequences of the one-child policy will fully materialize within the next decade, massively dampening China's growth potential. From an American perspective, this is a reason for strategic patience—or for dangerous arrogance. The assumption in Washington is often that time is on America's side. It's not necessary to defeat China militarily; one simply has to "wait it out" until it loses momentum under the weight of its internal contradictions and aging population.

This demographic resilience, combined with the geographic security afforded by two oceans and friendly neighbors (Canada and Mexico), fosters a sense of invulnerability. Geostrategist Peter Zeihan argues that, due to its geography (particularly the Mississippi River system for cheap transportation) and its demographics, the US is the only country capable of surviving the end of globalization unscathed. This awareness leads to a foreign policy less reliant on cooperation. Believing oneself to be the only lifeboat in a stormy global ocean makes one less inclined to compromise in order to save the other boats.

The US is thus moving toward a future in which it will pursue a more selective global presence. It will intervene where it serves its direct economic or security interests (for example, in semiconductors in Taiwan or raw materials), but will withdraw from the role of general security guarantor. For Europe, this means: The US will remain a partner, but it will be a partner that expects payment for its protection – be it through increased defense spending by NATO partners or more favorable trade terms. The era of a free security architecture is over, not out of malice, but due to cold, data-driven calculations of its own national interests.

Konrad Wolfenstein

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call me under +49 89 674 804 (Munich)

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