The four-year curse: Why politics is only managing instead of shaping the future
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Published on: November 2, 2025 / Updated on: November 2, 2025 – Author: Konrad Wolfenstein

The four-year curse: Why politics is only managing instead of shaping policy – Image: Xpert.Digital
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The principle of ambidexterity: An economic concept for politics?
Organizational ambidexterity is establishing itself in business as an effective concept for systematically managing the fundamental tension between optimizing existing businesses through exploitation and unlocking new opportunities through exploration. While companies increasingly recognize that long-term success requires a balance between these two modes, the application of this concept to political systems remains a largely neglected area. Yet, a structural deficit is evident, particularly in democratic systems of government, whose fundamental problems are strikingly similar to those of organizational ambidexterity. Politics in parliamentary democracies like Germany is almost entirely geared toward exploitation. Managing the status quo, optimizing established programs, and catering to short-term voter preferences dominate the political process, while exploratory processes for the strategic exploration of new solutions are structurally neglected.
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The problem-solving crisis: Why the future is falling by the wayside
The question of political exploration is by no means merely academic. It touches upon the very core of the functioning of modern democracies in times of accelerated change. Technological disruption, demographic shifts, the climate crisis, and geopolitical changes necessitate fundamental reorientations of government action. Yet the institutional structures of democratic systems of government systematically favor short-term perspectives and incremental adjustments over long-term strategic decisions. While in the economy the lack of exploratory capacity leads to market displacement in the medium term, a different phenomenon manifests itself in politics. Societies gradually lose their capacity for proactive problem-solving and increasingly become pawns of exogenous forces.
The competence dilemma: Political offices without specialist expertise
The problem begins with the appointment of personnel to top political positions. Ministers in Germany are primarily selected based on party-political criteria, regional proportionality, and coalition arithmetic, not on their professional expertise in their respective departments. The demand for greater expertise is regularly dismissed with the argument that ministers primarily need management skills and political acumen, while the technical expertise is provided by the ministerial bureaucracy. This logic, however, overlooks a crucial point. Genuine exploratory processes require more than administrative competence. They demand the ability to question established ways of thinking, recognize paradigm shifts, and take strategic risks. A minister without substantial subject-matter expertise is structurally overwhelmed by the task of navigating between the conservative expertise of their civil servants and alternative future scenarios.
The costly dependency: When external consultants shape policy
The problem is exacerbated by the systematic dependence of politics on external consultants. The German federal government has spent more than €1.6 billion on external consultants over the past ten years, and this figure is rising. Between 2020 and 2023 alone, spending increased by 39 percent to almost €240 million annually. These figures reveal a structural deficit. Despite a continuously growing federal administration with approximately 300,000 employees, the state is increasingly unable to fulfill its core tasks on its own. This development is particularly serious in the IT sector, where the federal government needs to develop its own expertise to avoid jeopardizing the integrity of the administration.
The real problem of dependence on consultants, however, lies deeper than the mere question of cost. The business models of large consulting firms are designed to create long-term dependencies and establish continuous client relationships. This is achieved through the creation of proprietary knowledge, control over implementation processes, and strategic placement within decision-making networks. Consultants have no intrinsic interest in empowering their clients to become self-reliant. On the contrary, their economic success depends on positioning themselves as indispensable. This conflict of interest creates a fundamental conflict of interest. When external consultants effectively take over core political tasks, such as drafting legislation or developing strategic programs, the democratic legitimacy of government action is undermined.
The revolving door effect: a gateway for special interests.
This problem is exacerbated by the so-called revolving door effect. High-ranking politicians and civil servants move into well-paid positions at consulting firms, lobbying organizations, or business associations after their terms in office. Between 1949 and 2014, 18 percent of former federal ministers moved within a year to high-profile positions in the private sector, often in areas for which they had previously been politically responsible. After ten years, this figure had risen to 24 percent. These career prospects create subtle incentives to shape political decisions in a way that favors specific interests. The mere suspicion of profiteering damages trust in the independence of political decisions. The fact that politicians monetize their contacts, insider knowledge, and influence for private interests after leaving office undermines the very idea of democratic public service.
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Intellectual monoculture: The danger of uniform thinking
Furthermore, the consulting culture leads to an intellectual monoculture. Large consulting firms like McKinsey, Boston Consulting Group, Roland Berger, and others represent specific management philosophies and economic paradigms. Their recommendations often follow similar patterns, regardless of the specific context. Efficiency gains through standardization, privatization of public services, New Public Management approaches, and market-oriented control mechanisms form the ideological foundation of this consulting logic. However, genuine exploratory processes require intellectual diversity, the ability to think outside the box, and a willingness to fundamentally question dominant paradigms. A political system that systematically relies on advice from a few large consulting firms gradually loses this capacity for cognitive diversity.
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Trapped in the election cycle: The structural shortsightedness of democracy
The structural lack of exploratory thinking in politics is fundamentally exacerbated by the incentive structures of democratic systems. The four-year election cycle defines the time horizon of political action. Politicians must demonstrate tangible successes within this period to secure their re-election. Long-term investments in infrastructure, education, or research, whose benefits only become apparent after years or decades, are rationally unattractive from this perspective. The costs are incurred immediately and burden the budget, while the benefits are realized only in the distant future and will likely accrue to a different government. Conversely, measures that are popular in the short term are favored, even if they are counterproductive in the long run. This phenomenon is described in political economy research as the political business cycle.
The short-term nature of political planning is exacerbated by the phenomenon of permanent election campaigns. In Germany, due to its federal structure, state elections are held almost continuously. Federal governments are therefore under de facto constant electoral pressure. Bold reforms with painful short-term adjustment costs are systematically postponed or watered down. The prevention paradox described by Lars-Hendrik Röller, Angela Merkel's former economic policy advisor, reinforces this mechanism. If politicians solve a problem in a timely manner, no one recognizes the need for action. However, if an initiative fails, scapegoats are immediately sought. This asymmetric susceptibility to failure favors reactive crisis management over proactive prevention.
Institutional brakes: Reform inertia due to policy entanglements
The institutional structures of German politics further reinforce this tendency toward exploitation. The system of policy interdependence, in which the federal and state governments must make joint decisions in numerous areas, leads to complex negotiation systems dominated by conflict avoidance and the lowest common denominator. The resulting inertia in reform has been the subject of critical analysis for decades. What is often overlooked, however, is the exploratory dimension of this problem. Interdependence systems are geared toward consensus building. But consensus is more easily achieved through incremental improvements to the existing system than through fundamental realignments. Exploration requires a willingness to question established arrangements and to engage in conflict. It is precisely this willingness to engage in conflict that is systematically dampened by interdependence structures.
The risk-averse bureaucracy: Stability at the expense of innovation
The ministerial bureaucracy, as the core of the government organization, further reinforces this exploitative orientation. Civil servants are trained in continuity, legal certainty, and the application of established procedures. Their careers are based on the reliable execution of assigned tasks, not on risky innovations. The civil service structure, with its safeguards, creates a risk-averse organizational culture. While new state secretaries can be replaced during changes of government, the department head level and the middle management structure remain largely stable. This continuity has advantages for the functioning of the state apparatus but simultaneously hinders fundamental shifts in direction. When a new minister takes office with innovative ideas, they encounter an established bureaucracy that subtly or openly resists changes that threaten its established routines and power structures.
What does exploration mean in politics?
The question of whether the concept of ambidexterity can be applied to politics first requires a precise analogy. In economics, exploitation refers to the optimization of existing business models, while exploration means the search for new business areas and innovations. In politics, exploitation corresponds to the day-to-day business of governing. Legislation, budget planning, crisis management, balancing interests, and the administration of existing programs dominate everyday political life. These activities are indispensable for the functioning of society. Political exploration, on the other hand, would encompass the systematic search for new solutions, the anticipation of future challenges, the testing of innovative policy approaches, and the fundamental questioning of established political paradigms.
The crucial difference from the business world lies in the structure of legitimacy. Companies can switch relatively freely between exploitation and exploration, as long as they convince their stakeholders. Democratic politics, however, is subject to continuous scrutiny through elections, the media, and civil society. Every experimental policy carries the risk of failure and thus a loss of legitimacy. This fundamental uncertainty largely explains the aversion to exploration among political actors. Furthermore, political decisions are binding for society as a whole. Business experiments primarily affect the individual company and its immediate stakeholders. Political experiments, on the other hand, potentially affect all citizens. The risks of failure are therefore significantly greater.
Approaches to an ambidextrous policy: Institutional innovations
Despite these structural differences, approaches to political exploration can be identified. The structural ambidexterity from organizational theory would, in the political sphere, mean the creation of separate institutional units tasked exclusively with exploratory work. Rudimentary forms of such approaches already exist. Scientific advisory boards, think tanks, commissions on the future, and expert councils partially assume exploratory functions. They are formally independent of day-to-day politics and can develop long-term perspectives. However, the problem with these structures lies in their lack of enforcement power. Their recommendations often have no effect if they do not align with the government's short-term interests. Furthermore, the credibility of these bodies is regularly undermined by conflicts of interest. If members of scientific advisory boards simultaneously work as consultants for companies, or if think tanks are funded by special interests, their independence is called into question.
A serious structural ambidexterity in politics therefore requires institutional innovations that go beyond the existing system. Finland has established an interesting approach with its parliamentary committee on the future. This committee deals exclusively with long-term strategic issues and works systematically with future scenarios. Its recommendations are advisory in nature but are taken seriously in the political process. Germany could establish similar structures, perhaps in the form of a second chamber outside the Bundesrat (Federal Council), dedicated exclusively to long-term sustainability issues. This chamber could be composed of representatives from various societal groups who are not subject to the immediate election cycle. Such a body could be granted veto power over legislative proposals that jeopardize long-term sustainability goals.
Another approach to structural ambidexterity would be the establishment of innovation labs within government ministries. Some German states and municipalities have already experimented with such structures. These labs develop experimental policy approaches, test new administrative procedures, and trial innovative forms of participation. The problem, however, lies in their marginal position. Innovation labs are often seen as a mere facade, while the actual political business continues unchanged. True structural ambidexterity would require exploratory units to have substantial budgets, decision-making authority, and the ability to integrate their findings into the political mainstream.
Beyond Structures: Paths to an Exploratory Culture
Contextual ambidexterity, a concept in organizational theory, is based on the ability of organizations to switch between exploratory and exploitative modes without structural divisions. In politics, this would mean that ministries and public administrations develop the cultural and methodological competence to shift situationally between routine operations and exploratory thinking. However, this requires skills that are underdeveloped in German administrative culture. Design thinking, agile methods, participatory scenario development, and systematic evaluations are increasingly established in companies, but remain exceptions in public administration. Establishing an exploratory administrative culture would require fundamental changes in training, career incentives, and leadership structures.
A key element of exploratory policymaking would be the systematic evaluation of existing policy measures. Evidence-based policymaking, that is, shaping policy based on scientifically validated evidence of effectiveness, is significantly more developed in countries like Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries than in Germany. While these countries systematically evaluate which policy measures achieve their intended effects, Germany often lacks the willingness to conduct honest performance reviews. Too often, programs are continued because they are politically expedient, not because their effectiveness has been proven. Exploratory policymaking would require a willingness to end failed approaches and expand successful models. However, this presupposes a culture that embraces mistakes and does not automatically interpret political failure as a loss of legitimacy.
The role of external expertise needs to be fundamentally redefined in an ambidextrous political system. Instead of the current dependence on commercial consulting firms with their own economic interests, independent structures for scientific policy advice are needed. These structures must meet strict transparency standards. All sources of funding, potential conflicts of interest, and methodological limitations must be disclosed. Quality assurance in scientific policy advice requires peer review processes, public discussion of recommendations, and the possibility of dissenting minority opinions. Only in this way can policy advice be prevented from degenerating into a means of legitimizing decisions that have already been made.
A fundamental problem in the current situation lies in the lack of rotation between politics, administration, academia, and practice. While in other countries, moving between these spheres is considered enriching and is institutionally encouraged, in Germany the boundaries are relatively rigid. Civil servants generally remain in administration for their entire careers. Academics who move into politics are often viewed with suspicion. Conversely, it is difficult for political actors to return to other areas after leaving politics without being suspected of corruption. This lack of permeability hinders the transfer of knowledge and the development of diverse skills that would be necessary for exploratory processes.
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Power, media, and morality: The deep roots of the status quo
The question of the obstacles to exploratory politics leads directly to the power dynamics within the political system. Established interest groups benefit from the status quo and have little interest in fundamental change. This applies not only to economic lobbies but also within the political system itself. Parties, as organizations, have their own tendencies toward inertia. Their program structures, coalitions of interests, and ideological positions create path dependencies that hinder exploratory realignments. A party representing its traditional constituency cannot easily implement fundamental policy shifts without alienating that constituency. This commitment to established voter segments systematically restricts the scope for genuine exploration.
The media landscape further amplifies this dynamic. The news cycle privileges conflicts, scandals, and spectacular events. Long-term strategic debates are difficult to communicate through the media. A minister launching an exploratory program to test new policy approaches receives little media attention unless something goes wrong. However, if an experiment fails, it is branded as a failure. This asymmetric susceptibility to error leads to a preference for risk-averse routine over experimental approaches. The professionalization of political communication has intensified this tendency. Politicians increasingly act as brands that cannot afford to show weakness. Genuine exploratory processes, which necessarily involve uncertainty and learning through trial and error, do not fit into this communication paradigm.
Civil society could theoretically play a crucial role in political exploration. Social movements, NGOs, and citizens' initiatives often introduce innovative ideas into the political discourse. The problem, however, lies in the difficulties of translating civil society innovation into political implementation. Civil society actors rarely possess the resources and institutional power to integrate their ideas into the political mainstream. Conversely, when civil society innovations are adopted by policymakers, they are often so diluted and institutionalized that their innovative core is lost.
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Practical implementation: Legitimation, financing, and organization
An ambidextrous policy would need to develop mechanisms to systematically organize this translation process. Participatory policymaking, which involves citizens, experts, and practitioners in developing new policy approaches, would be a crucial component. Countries like Taiwan have experimented with digital participation platforms that enable the use of collective intelligence for policymaking. Germany could establish similar approaches that go beyond symbolic participation and enable genuine co-production of policy. However, this requires the willingness of political elites to relinquish control and to make decisions in an open-ended manner.
Financing exploratory policy presents another fundamental problem. By definition, exploratory processes are open-ended and carry the risk of failure. From a fiscal policy perspective, however, it is difficult to justify funding for experiments whose success is uncertain. The budgetary structure, with its yearly budget planning, further complicates long-term exploratory projects. One solution could be the establishment of separate innovation budgets explicitly reserved for experimental policy approaches. These budgets would need to be partially decoupled from regular budgetary discipline and exhibit greater tolerance for failure. At the same time, a rigorous evaluation culture would need to ensure that lessons are learned from failures and that successful experiments are scaled up.
The concept of temporal ambidexterity from organizational theory would mean, in politics, that phases of intensive exploitation and phases of strategic exploration are systematically alternated. This could be achieved, for example, through institutionalized strategy processes at the beginning of a legislative period, in which fundamental decisions are made, followed by phases of implementation. The problem, however, lies in the unpredictability of the political process. Unforeseen crises constantly force adjustments to the agenda. The COVID-19 pandemic has exemplified how external shocks can render all long-term planning obsolete. A temporally structured ambidexterity would therefore require the ability to maintain exploratory capacities despite acute crises, instead of exclusively succumbing to crisis mode.
The question of the democratic legitimacy of exploratory structures is of fundamental importance. If exploratory units are granted significant decision-making powers, the question of their democratic control arises. A future council or innovation labs that are not directly elected and not subject to an immediate election cycle could be criticized as lacking in democratic legitimacy. Delegating decision-making power to experts is politically sensitive, as the debates surrounding the independence of central banks or the role of scientific advisory boards during the COVID-19 crisis have demonstrated. Democratically legitimized exploration would therefore need to include mechanisms of accountability, transparent procedures, and the possibility of parliamentary oversight. At the same time, however, it must be sufficiently decoupled from the short-term election cycle to allow for the development of long-term perspectives.
Germany's federal structure inherently offers potential for exploratory policy. Different federal states can serve as testing grounds for innovative policy approaches. Successful models can then be transferred to the federal level. However, this potential is partially counteracted by the aforementioned policy entanglements and the pressure for harmonization. Furthermore, systematic mechanisms for policy learning between the federal states are lacking. An exploratory federalism policy would need to establish institutionalized forms of exchanging experiences, comparative evaluation, and targeted knowledge transfer. This would go beyond the informal networks that currently dominate.
Specific areas for action: Where exploratory policy is lacking
The European Union could theoretically represent a level of exploratory policy. Its relative distance from national election cycles and its task of shaping long-term integration predispose it to exploratory functions. Indeed, the EU has developed visionary policy approaches in some areas, such as climate policy or digital regulation. The problem, however, lies in its chronic legitimacy crisis and the complex decision-making processes that often lead to compromises based on the lowest common denominator. An ambidextrous European policy would have to readjust the balance between supranational strategic governance and national democratic legitimacy.
Artificial intelligence and digital technologies are opening up new possibilities for exploratory policy. Simulations, scenario analyses, and data-driven policy modeling make it possible to assess the effects of policy measures before their implementation. However, the danger lies in a technocratic oversimplification that misunderstands political decisions as mere optimization problems. True exploratory policy involves normative decisions about desirable futures, which cannot be made by algorithms. Technology can support exploratory processes, but it cannot replace them.
The climate crisis highlights the dilemma of political exploration with particular urgency. The necessary transformation to climate neutrality requires fundamental changes in energy, mobility, industry, agriculture, and consumption. These are classic exploratory challenges. The timeframes required for this transformation extend beyond several legislative terms. The costs are incurred in the short term, while the benefits only materialize in the long term. Moreover, the burdens of adaptation are unevenly distributed, leading to resistance. An ambidextrous climate policy would have to strike a balance between stabilizing existing economic structures during the transition phase and consistently exploring climate-neutral alternatives. Current climate policy oscillates between these poles without developing a coherent ambidextrous concept.
Demographic aging presents a further challenge that requires exploratory policy. Existing social systems are based on assumptions about population structure and employment histories that are becoming increasingly obsolete. An exploratory social policy would have to develop, test, and evaluate alternative models. Basic income experiments, flexible pension models, or new forms of care organization would be examples of such exploratory approaches. However, current social policy largely remains focused on incremental adjustments to existing systems instead of exploring fundamental alternatives.
Digitalization also requires exploratory policy approaches. The regulation of digital platforms, the handling of artificial intelligence, the design of digital infrastructures, and the balance between innovation and regulation are issues for which there are no established solutions. An exploratory digital policy would have to test experimental regulatory approaches, such as regulatory sandboxes in which new business models can be tested under controlled conditions. However, German digital policy is traditionally characterized by skepticism and risk aversion, which systematically hinders exploratory approaches.
Education policy exemplifies the difficulties of political exploration. Demographic change, digitalization, and evolving labor market demands necessitate fundamental educational reforms. However, the federal fragmentation of the education system, ideological infighting, and the power of educational bureaucracy hinder systematic innovation. Individual exploratory approaches, such as alternative school concepts or innovative university formats, remain niche projects without systemic impact. An ambidextrous education policy would need to create systematic spaces for experimentation, identify successful innovations, and facilitate their transfer without jeopardizing the stability of the overall system.
The future viability of democracy under scrutiny
The question of political ambidexterity is ultimately a question of the future viability of democratic systems. Societies that rely solely on exploitation gradually lose their adaptability. They become reactive systems that only react to external shocks instead of proactively shaping the future. The COVID-19 pandemic painfully exposed this reactivity. Despite years of warnings about pandemic risks, capacities for crisis prevention and response were completely inadequate. An exploratory policy would have developed scenarios, implemented precautionary measures, and built flexible response capabilities. Instead, improvisation was necessary in crisis mode.
Establishing an ambidextrous policy requires a cultural shift. The acceptance of uncertainty, a willingness to learn through trial and error, and the capacity for strategic long-term thinking must be cultivated as political virtues. This contrasts with the current political culture, which prioritizes control, predictability, and the avoidance of mistakes. An exploratory political culture would encourage politicians and bureaucrats to take calculated risks, view failed experiments as learning opportunities, and develop alternative future scenarios without this being interpreted as a weakness.
The role of citizens in an ambidextrous political system requires reflection. Democracy is based on the sovereignty of the people. However, when short-term voter preferences systematically dominate long-term necessities, a democratic dilemma arises. An exploratory approach to politics could be criticized as elitist, pushing through long-term projects against the majority opinion. The solution cannot lie in disempowering democratic control, but must lie in developing deliberative forms that allow for the integration of short-term and long-term perspectives. Citizens' assemblies addressing long-term future issues could be one such element. Their legitimacy would not derive from elections, but from a transparent, inclusive process of deliberation.
A plea for a courageous and ambidextrous democracy
The question of resources for exploratory policy remains central. Exploration requires time, money, and personnel. In a system of permanent overload, these resources are systematically lacking. Ministers and civil servants are overburdened with day-to-day business. Time and resources are lacking for strategic reflection, the development of alternative scenarios, and the testing of innovative approaches. An ambidextrous policy would therefore have to consciously create spaces that are decoupled from operational pressures. This could be achieved through sabbaticals for executives, the establishment of dedicated time for reflection, or the systematic reduction of routine tasks through digitalization and bureaucracy reduction.
The power of habit should not be underestimated. Institutions develop routines and cultures that defy conscious control. Therefore, ambidextrous politics requires not only structural reforms but fundamental changes to the organizational DNA of political institutions. This is a lengthy process, inherently exploratory in nature. There is no blueprint for ambidextrous politics; it must be developed, tested, and adapted step by step.
The question of political exploration is not an academic exercise, but an existential challenge for modern democracies. In a world of accelerated change, multiple crises, and fundamental transformation needs, societies can no longer afford a politics focused solely on exploitation. The systematic neglect of exploratory processes leads to a gradual erosion of the capacity for action. Societies lose the ability to actively shape their future and become passive objects of global developments.
Establishing ambidextrous politics is possible, but it requires courage. Courage for institutional innovation, courage to delegate power to exploratory structures, courage to confront established interests, and courage to accept uncertainty. It also requires a willingness to further develop democratic processes without sacrificing their fundamental principles. An ambidextrous democracy would combine short-term responsiveness to voter preferences with long-term strategic governance. It would combine the stability of established institutions with the flexibility of experimental politics. It would utilize scientific expertise without succumbing to technocracy.
The alternative to ambidextrous politics is creeping irrelevance. Political systems that merely react instead of shaping the future lose their legitimacy. Citizens turn away from a political system that offers no answers to the pressing questions of the future. Trust in democratic institutions erodes when they are perceived as incapable of solving problems. The crisis of democracy in Western societies is also a crisis of insufficient exploratory capacity. Populist movements promise simple solutions and a return to a sense of past security. In contrast, ambidextrous politics would acknowledge complexity, develop diverse options for the future, and enable citizens to make informed decisions about their shared future. This would be a democracy that lives up to its responsibility to future generations.
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