The Bundeswehr in Transition: Structural Problems and Need for Reform after the Turn of the Century
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Published on: October 1, 2025 / Updated on: October 1, 2025 – Author: Konrad Wolfenstein
The Bundeswehr in Transition: Structural Problems and Reform Needs after the Turning Point – Image: Xpert.Digital
A turning point failed? Why €100 billion won't make the Bundeswehr war-ready
Is the German defense really in a problematic state?
Three and a half years since Chancellor Olaf Scholz's proclamation of a turning point, the fundamental question arises as to whether the German armed forces are truly operational, despite historically high levels of investment. The answer is sobering: Military historians such as Sönke Neitzel of the University of Potsdam continue to diagnose the Bundeswehr as a "dysfunctional organization" that has failed to successfully adapt to the demands of modern warfare.
The central problem lies not in a lack of financial resources—Germany already spends more on defense than France—but in structural deficits that have developed over decades of peacetime. The €100 billion special fund was intended to make the Bundeswehr war-ready, but so far, success has been limited. The force continues to struggle with unmanned systems, drone deficiencies, and a cumbersome bureaucracy that prevents rapid adaptation to modern warfare.
What specific structural problems are affecting the Bundeswehr?
The Bundeswehr's personnel structure reveals a serious imbalance that fundamentally impairs its operational capability. Of the approximately 180,000 soldiers, less than half work in the army's core area—combat. This imbalance manifests itself in a top-heavy hierarchy: Almost one in four soldiers is an officer, a completely unusual ratio for a functioning armed force.
The ratio between leadership and front-line personnel is particularly problematic. Currently, the Bundeswehr employs almost as many lieutenant colonels as corporals—around 10,000 of each. During the Cold War, approximately 60 percent of the enlisted personnel were men compared to only eight percent of officers; today, this ratio has deteriorated dramatically. This "massive imbalance" leads to an organization with too many leaders and too few combatants.
The bloated staff of desk-bound officers results from a "disproportionately large number of older staff officers who have been performing administrative duties for many years." Over 50 percent of soldiers are not deployed in core mission fulfillment, but rather in ministries, staff offices, and agencies. Many of these soldiers are hardly employable in an emergency because they have been out of the military for too long, are no longer physically and technically fit, or are simply too old for active service.
Why is the Bundeswehr failing to procure modern weapons?
The failure to procure drones is a prime example of the structural problems of the German armed forces. While Ukraine loses 40 to 45 reconnaissance drones every day, the entire Bundeswehr has just over 600 drones. German drone companies estimate that the Bundeswehr would need 18,000 reconnaissance drones to withstand a one-year war against an adversary like Russia.
The armed forces' leadership spends its time "exchanging ideas in working groups" instead of making quick decisions. Too many offices, departments, and authorities hamper efficient procurement processes. Procurement is considered the Bundeswehr's Achilles heel, even though defense spending has risen steadily – from €32.4 billion in 2014 to over €46.9 billion in 2021.
The bureaucratic mentality of the peacetime army means that it's not the best military result that's rewarded, but rather the "flawlessly completed process step." No one wants to make decisions—a fatal attitude for national defense. Even with small items of equipment like warm underwear or tents, the system regularly fails.
What role does bureaucracy play in inefficiency?
Seventy years of peacetime have transformed the Bundeswehr into a sluggish administrative apparatus ill-suited for modern warfare. While armies typically streamline their administration during wartime, the German military has become increasingly sluggish over the decades. The result is an organization that is bogged down in aimless procedures and lacks the necessary attitude to correct these grievances.
The Federal Audit Office warns of waste and calls for reforms in personnel structure and administration. Tens of thousands of positions are entrusted with tasks that are not necessary for national and alliance defense. As an example, the Court cites the fact that around a third of all secretarial tasks are performed by sergeants – a blatant waste of military resources.
The combination of virtually unlimited resources and extreme time pressure increases the risk of inefficient action. Despite historically high budgets, the Bundeswehr is unable to use its resources effectively: in 2024, it spent €4.36 billion less than planned, while fundamental equipment deficiencies persist.
How does the personnel structure affect operational readiness?
The current personnel distribution renders the Bundeswehr unsuitable for modern conflicts. At the end of 2024, almost 20 percent of all positions in the careers above enlisted personnel were vacant, and the figure for enlisted personnel was as high as 28 percent. At the same time, 4,006 soldiers are awaiting promotion because the necessary positions are not available in the budget.
Of the nominal 180,000 soldiers, at least 20,000 would have to be withdrawn because they are no longer fully operational. The target strength is already not being reached, even though the force is understaffed for its core tasks. This personnel shortage combined with a simultaneous administrative overhead demonstrates the paradox of an army that is not focused on its core tasks.
Military historian Neitzel is therefore calling for drastic cuts: 30,000 of the current 90,000 non-commissioned officers and officers in management positions would have to go. The share of leadership, administration, and non-troop-related support roles should be limited to 30 percent. Those no longer fit for the core mission should be released from service.
Selected magazines: Problem identified, but what happens?
- Bundeswehr Journal: “The problem lies in the bloated caste of generals”
- Merkur: Bundeswehr “not viable” according to military expert – there is one main problem
- Welt: “Success rate poor” – Pistorius in the labyrinth of armament
- ZDF: Court of Auditors warns of waste in troops
- Frankfurter Rundschau: Too many desk warriors: Military expert takes issue with Pistorius – Bundeswehr “not viable”
What do foreign missions teach us about the Bundeswehr's capabilities?
The experiences from Afghanistan and Mali reveal the limitations of the German armed forces. The Mali mission, the largest and most dangerous foreign deployment after Afghanistan, clearly illustrates the problems facing the Bundeswehr. After ten years of presence in the West African country, the security situation has not improved—quite the opposite.
MINUSMA was considered one of the most dangerous UN missions worldwide, with approximately 280 peacekeepers killed. Despite the presence of over 1,000 German soldiers, chaos and violence continue to reign in the country. Terrorist groups have even intensified their activities, inspired by the Taliban's success in Afghanistan.
The Afghanistan mission ended, after 20 years, in de facto failure. The Bundeswehr attempted to put a positive spin on this failure by claiming that politics had failed while the military had fulfilled its mission. This self-deception prevents an honest analysis of the structural weaknesses. The Bundeswehr was sent on a "Mission Impossible," which also raises the responsibility of the military leadership.
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What are the shortcomings of modern military technologies?
The Bundeswehr's technological backwardness is particularly evident in the areas of electronic warfare and drone defense. Russia has placed a major emphasis on electronic warfare since 2008 and is now able to build a deeply echeloned electronic warfare front. Systems such as Shipovnik Aero and Pole-21 can suppress GPS signals from drones or distort their target coordinates.
The majority of the German drone fleet dates back to the anti-terror wars and is not designed for intensive electronic warfare. The Bundeswehr does not have a joint drone strategy; instead, each service develops its own concepts. While the primary focus is on drone defense, offensive capabilities are almost completely lacking.
The Bundeswehr's electronic warfare system focuses on outdated systems such as the Hummel jamming tank and the Hornisse. However, modern threats posed by satellite communications, artificial intelligence, and navigation warfare require entirely new approaches. Adaptation to these challenges is proceeding far too slowly for the rapidly changing threat landscape.
How effective has the €100 billion special fund been so far?
The special fund was intended to usher in a new era, but the results are mixed. By the end of 2024, all 100 billion euros had been committed, and a large portion had already been spent. The vast majority went into a manageable number of particularly expensive devices, weapons systems, and missiles.
However, inflation is significantly eroding the purchasing power of the special fund. Of the nominal €100 billion, only about €87 billion remains in real terms. Defense projects are becoming more expensive or are being called into question altogether, while supply bottlenecks are increasing. The originally planned investment volume will not be sufficient to fully cover the financing gap of recent years.
Rheinmetall benefits most from the arms buildup, receiving orders worth €42 billion—almost half of the total special fund. Of the approximately 125 major "Zeitwende" projects evaluated, 22 are attributable to Rheinmetall alone. This concentration on a single major supplier poses strategic risks to security of supply.
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Between aspiration and reality: The structural crisis of the Bundeswehr
Why do reforms fail in the Bundeswehr leadership?
The military leadership is blocking necessary structural reforms by insisting on rigid structures. Defense Minister Pistorius has undoubtedly achieved more than his predecessors, but the fundamental structural problems remain unresolved. The political will for far-reaching reforms is lacking – across party lines.
The military leadership spends too much time in working groups and cross-organizational approval processes. Instead of making quick decisions, everyday problems are turned into lists and discussed endlessly. This mentality is the opposite of what modern armed forces need for effective operations.
Neitzel therefore calls for a "far-reaching reform" of procedures, structures, and culture. In the future, everyone must be measured on their contribution to the army's success. The minister himself is required not only to deliver bold, groundbreaking speeches, but also to implement concrete measures. Pistorius's previous reforms, such as the Osnabrück Decree, are merely formal steps without fundamental structural changes.
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What role do political obstacles play in reform?
Politicians bear considerable responsibility for the desolate state of the Bundeswehr. The SPD has been called a "security risk for Germany," particularly because of its stance on conscription. Although the coalition agreement between the CDU/CSU and SPD calls for the creation of a "new, attractive military service," the left wing of the SPD is blocking such measures.
For years, the SPD prevented the introduction of armed drones, causing Germany to lose valuable years of training for its soldiers. This ideological blockade costs lives, as inadequately equipped soldiers would die in an emergency. The consequences would be "a great many coffins" being returned.
Political decision-makers shy away from unpopular measures like the reintroduction of conscription. Germany needs 30,000 to 40,000 men and women annually for defense, but politicians are hoping for volunteer models that demonstrably don't work. Without the political courage to make unpopular decisions, the Bundeswehr will remain trapped in its dysfunctional structure.
What impact does 70 years of peace have on the armed forces?
The long period of peace since 1955 had a fundamentally negative impact on the Bundeswehr. While other armies continually adapted and optimized their structures based on wartime experiences, a sluggish bureaucratic mentality was able to take root in Germany over the decades. The Bundeswehr evolved into an administrative organization rather than a powerful military force.
This peacetime attitude is reflected in the leadership's risk aversion. The reward is not the best military result, but rather the "flawlessly completed process step." Soldiers learn to hedge, weigh things up, and delay instead of making quick decisions. This mentality is completely unsuitable for modern warfare.
The personnel structure reflects this peace orientation: More and more soldiers were pushed into administrative tasks because there were no real military challenges. Older staff officers remained in their positions without ever gaining real combat experience. The result is an army that is structurally designed for peace but is meant to wage war.
What should a reform of the Bundeswehr look like in concrete terms?
Sönke Neitzel calls for a radical overhaul of the Bundeswehr's structure. A clean slate of the organization: procedures, structures, and culture must be fundamentally reformed. The share of leadership, administration, and non-troop-related support should be limited to a maximum of 30 percent.
Specifically, this means that 30,000 of the current 90,000 non-commissioned officers and officers in management positions would have to leave their positions. Redundant positions would have to be eliminated, and officers unrelated to the core mission would have to be reduced. Those who are no longer able to fulfill the mission would be subject to early retirement.
The active troops need to adapt to modern warfare: "Fewer foot soldiers, more drone specialists." The Bundeswehr must focus on unmanned systems, electronic warfare, and digital warfare. Instead of investing in outdated tank concepts, funds should be channeled into future technologies.
A joint drone strategy is long overdue. The services can no longer act in isolation but must develop integrated concepts. Software development and technological innovation must take priority over traditional armament projects.
Which international comparisons reveal German deficits?
An international comparison reveals the dramatic weaknesses of the German armed forces. Israel manages with less than half the German budget, without anyone accusing the Israeli armed forces of weakness. This demonstrates that the problem is not a lack of funding, but rather inefficient structures.
Ukraine, under the pressure of war, is revolutionizing its armed forces in record time. It is replacing artillery with drones and developing close ties between the Ministry of Defense and the startup scene. Innovation occurs much faster under wartime conditions than in the German peacetime bureaucracy.
Russia has been systematically investing in electronic warfare and drone defense since 2008. While Germany is still discussing procurement procedures, the Russians are building deeply echeloned electronic warfare fronts. This technological superiority would lead to dramatic German losses in an emergency.
NATO partners are also demonstrating greater efficiency in the use of resources. Germany already spends more than other allies, but achieves worse results. This is due to its bloated administrative structure and rigid procurement processes.
What risks arise from the current situation?
The Bundeswehr's structural problems create significant security risks for Germany and its allies. In the event of a conflict with Russia, German troops could only "die with dignity." The lack of equipment with drones, air defense systems, and electronic warfare would lead to extremely high losses.
NATO's deterrent effect is undermined by German weakness. If Europe's economically strongest partner is militarily inefficient, this emboldens potential aggressors. Putin could feel encouraged by German inefficiency to embark on further adventures.
Domestically, there is a threat of a loss of confidence in the country's defense capabilities. Despite historically high levels of investment, the Bundeswehr remains weak, raising questions about the competence of its political leadership. The waste of billions of euros combined with weakness could undermine confidence in state institutions.
Demographic trends are further exacerbating personnel problems. Without conscription and with a shrinking military-age population, it is becoming increasingly difficult to recruit sufficient soldiers. The time for fundamental reforms is running out.
Why has the change of times failed so far?
Chancellor Scholz's turnaround proved to be largely a symbolic gesture without substantial changes. While historic sums of money flowed into the Bundeswehr, the fundamental structural problems remained unresolved. Money alone cannot repair a dysfunctional organization.
The €100 billion special fund was largely invested in traditional defense projects rather than in future technologies. Almost half went to a single company, Rheinmetall, for conventional weapons systems. Innovation and structural reforms fell by the wayside.
The political leadership shied away from unpopular measures such as personnel reform or conscription. Minister Pistorius delivers strong speeches about military capability, but fundamental structural changes fail to materialize. The Bundeswehr remains the same dysfunctional organization it was before the turn of the century.
The bureaucracy proved resistant to reform. Instead of streamlining structures, only new command structures were created. The Osnabrück Decree on Bundeswehr reform is primarily a formal reorganization without fundamental changes to the personnel structure or procurement procedures.
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What conclusions can be drawn for German security policy?
German security policy must honestly acknowledge that this transformation has so far failed. Despite historic investments, the Bundeswehr remains a dysfunctional organization unsuited for modern warfare. Further disbursement of funds without structural reforms will only exacerbate the problem.
Germany needs a fundamental realignment of its defense strategy. The personnel structure must be radically streamlined, with drastic cuts in administration and a focus on combat troops. Modern technologies such as drones and electronic warfare must take priority over traditional weapons systems.
Political courage is required for unpopular decisions. The reintroduction of conscription, the early retirement of redundant staff officers, and the reorganization of procurement procedures are painful but unavoidable. Without these reforms, Germany will remain an unreliable ally.
The time for half-hearted measures has expired. The international threat situation is intensifying, while Germany, with a peacetime army, faces a potentially belligerent future. Only radical reform can save the Bundeswehr—or Germany must accept its permanent militarily irrelevant status.
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