Analysis of the security and resilience of rail and road infrastructure against sabotage and attacks

A fundamental safety assessment of transport modes – Why rail is indispensable despite all its weaknesses

How safe are rail and road in general comparison, and why is this distinction important for the debate on sabotage security?

The basic safety assessment of transport modes during normal operation forms the starting point for any further analysis of their vulnerability to deliberate disruptions. Statistically speaking, rail transport is by far the safest mode of land transport in Germany and Europe. Data from the Pro-Rail Alliance show that the risk of a fatal accident while traveling in a passenger car is 52 times higher in Germany than while traveling by train. The risk of suffering a serious injury in a car is even 137 times higher. The European average between 2013 and 2022 was 0.07 rail passengers per billion passenger kilometers; in Germany, this figure was significantly lower at 0.03. This outstanding safety record is the result of high technical standards, the system's inherent track-specific nature, centralized control by train dispatchers, and technical systems that largely eliminate human error, such as point-based train control (PZB) and line-based train control (LZB).

However, this high level of operational reliability, which refers to the prevention of accidents caused by technical or human error, should not be equated with security against deliberate, malicious attacks such as sabotage or terrorism. Tamper resistance describes the resilience of a system, i.e., the resistance to targeted attempts to disrupt it. The urgency of this debate was underscored by events such as the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines and the targeted attack on Deutsche Bahn's communications network in October 2022. These incidents have brought the vulnerability of critical infrastructure (KRITIS) into the focus of national security.

This analysis therefore examines the structural, technological, and operational characteristics of rail and road infrastructure to assess their respective vulnerability and resilience to sabotage. Particular attention is paid to testing the assumption that rail is easier to monitor and quicker to repair. This analysis reveals a paradox: the mechanisms that make rail extremely safe during normal operation – central control, complex signaling technology, uniform communication networks – turn out to be concentrated vulnerabilities in a targeted attack. A saboteur need not attack the physically robust train, but rather the nervous system that guarantees its safety in the first place. The road network, on the other hand, which is more dangerous due to its decentralized nature and the freedom of individual actors in everyday life, exhibits greater structural resilience to local failures because it lacks comparable central Achilles heels.

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Structural differences and their implications for security

What are the fundamental structural differences between the rail and road networks, and how do these influence vulnerability to attacks?

The fundamental differences in the network architecture of rail and road define their respective strengths and weaknesses in the context of tamper security. The rail network is designed as a linear, hierarchically centralized system. Trains are track-bound, follow fixed routes defined by signal boxes and control centers, and cannot deviate on their own initiative. This structure enables high efficiency and safety in regular operations. In contrast, the road network is a decentralized, highly meshed network that offers enormous flexibility in route selection and high redundancy through countless alternative connections.

In terms of capacity, rail is far superior to road transport. On a lane of the same width of 3.5 meters, rail can transport up to 30 times more people per hour than cars (40,000 to 60,000 compared to 1,500 to 2,000). Rail is also significantly more efficient and cost-effective for transporting large quantities of goods over long distances.

Access to the systems is also fundamentally different. The rail network is a largely closed system. Access to critical assets such as tracks, signal boxes, or maintenance facilities is strictly regulated and controlled. The road network, on the other hand, is by definition an open system freely accessible to everyone, making comprehensive access control virtually impossible. The following table summarizes these structural features and their implications for safety.

Comparative analysis of the safety and resilience characteristics of rail and road infrastructure

Comparative analysis of the safety and resilience characteristics of rail and road infrastructure – Image: Xpert.Digital

A comparative analysis of the safety and resilience characteristics of rail and road infrastructure reveals clear differences. Rail infrastructure is characterized by a linear, hierarchical, and centralized network structure, whereas road infrastructure is meshed and decentralized. Critical nodes in rail infrastructure are interlocking points, cable ducts, communication centers, bridges, and tunnels, whereas road infrastructure primarily consists of bridges and tunnels. The monitorability of rail infrastructure is high due to its concentrated and clearly defined infrastructure, in contrast to road infrastructure, which can only be monitored to a limited extent due to its extensive and open network. In terms of redundancy and diversion capability, rail infrastructure exhibits low flexibility due to the limited number of alternate routes available, which depend on the switch density. Road infrastructure, with its many alternative routes via subordinate networks, offers high diversion capability. Access to rail infrastructure is well controlled, which is rarely the case with road infrastructure, as it is mostly open and publicly accessible. Repairing rail infrastructure is complex and requires specialized materials and personnel, whereas road infrastructure varies in complexity, ranging from simple asphalt repairs to complex bridge reconstruction. Typical sabotage targets also differ: In rail infrastructure, the focus is on communication and signaling cables and interlocking systems, while in road infrastructure, physical destruction of critical structures such as bridges and tunnels is common.

To what extent has investment policy in recent decades influenced the vulnerability of both systems?

Investment policies of recent decades have actively reinforced the structural weaknesses of rail infrastructure and significantly increased its vulnerability to disruption and sabotage. Between 1995 and 2018, 30 European countries studied spent a total of €1.5 trillion on expanding their road networks, while only €930 billion was invested in rail infrastructure. Germany exhibits a particularly large discrepancy here: During the same period, more than twice as much (110%) was invested in roads than in rail. This trend continued; from 1995 to 2021, investments in roads amounted to €329 billion, compared to only €160 billion for rail.

This chronic underfunding had direct physical consequences for the network. While the German Autobahn network has grown by 18% (over 2,000 km) since 1995, the rail network for passenger and freight transport shrank by 15% between 1995 and 2020, from approximately 45,100 km to 38,400 km. No other European country has closed more railway lines during this period. This dismantling included not only branch lines, but also the removal of switches, passing loops, and parallel lines in the main network.

The direct consequences of this policy are a drastically reduced redundancy and resilience of the rail network. If a main line fails due to sabotage or a technical malfunction, there are often no or inadequate alternative routes. The lower density of switches per kilometer of track in Germany compared to countries such as Switzerland or Austria severely limits operational flexibility for rerouting trains. In addition, there is a significant backlog of repairs, which further weakens the network. For example, one-third of all railway bridges are over 100 years old and in need of repair. The investment policy has thus directly increased the systemic vulnerability of the railway by systematically weakening its ability to compensate for disruptions, which is in clear contradiction to the political goals of a modal shift.

Analysis of physical vulnerability and acts of sabotage

What specific vulnerabilities do rail and road infrastructures have for physical acts of sabotage?

The physical vulnerabilities of rail and road infrastructure differ fundamentally and reflect their respective system architectures. In the rail network, the most critical points are concentrated on centralized components that are essential for safe operation. First and foremost are cable ducts, which bundle a multitude of communication and control cables, in particular the fiber optic cables for the digital train radio system GSM-R and signaling technology. A targeted attack on these cables at strategically important, often remote and unguarded locations can paralyze train traffic across regions. Other key vulnerabilities are the signal boxes, which act as the brains of railway operations and control switches and signals, as well as the overhead lines, the damage to which brings electric train operations to a standstill. Critical engineering structures such as bridges and tunnels also represent vulnerable bottlenecks. The complexity of these systems means that perpetrators often require specific knowledge to cause maximum disruption with minimal effort.

In the road network, the primary targets for physical sabotage are large and difficult-to-replace structures such as bridges and tunnels. Their destruction can have devastating consequences and disrupt important traffic arteries for long periods. However, due to the meshed network structure, such attacks usually result in regionally limited outages, as traffic can be diverted to numerous other roads. The road network itself, i.e. the road surface, is relatively robust against widespread paralysis by sabotage, unless massive destruction is carried out or blockades are erected at strategic bottlenecks. Historically, attacks on railways often aimed at the gross destruction of tracks or the blowing up of bridges. Modern acts of sabotage are more subtle and increasingly target technological control and communication systems.

What do past acts of sabotage, such as the October 2022 incident, teach us about attackers' tactics and the railway system's ability to respond?

Acts of sabotage in the recent past provide precise insights into the tactics of attackers and the vulnerability of railway infrastructure.

The case study from October 2022 is exemplary. In a coordinated operation, unknown perpetrators deliberately severed fiber optic cables of the GSM-R network, which is essential for train radio, at two locations far apart from each other – in Herne (North Rhine-Westphalia) and Berlin-Karow – By choosing these two locations, both the main system and the redundant backup system were disabled, indicating detailed knowledge of the railway infrastructure. The result was a complete standstill of long-distance and regional traffic in large parts of northern Germany for approximately three hours, as communication between trains and control centers was interrupted. Although investigations later considered the possibility of a coincidence of copper thefts, the incident demonstrated the extreme vulnerability of the central communications system.

Another case study is the arson attack on a cable duct between Düsseldorf and Duisburg. Here, perpetrators placed an ignition device in a cable tunnel, thus crippling one of Germany's most important north-south connections. Repair work was delayed because additional damaged cables were discovered during the work. The incident, which a left-wing extremist group claimed responsibility for, led to massive train cancellations and delays in long-distance and local transport.

These events sparked an intense debate about the inadequate protection of critical infrastructure in Germany. They made it clear that previous security concepts were not designed for such targeted, intelligent attacks. In response, the federal government and Deutsche Bahn developed a 63-point package of measures to improve the protection of railway facilities. The incidents revealed the need to reassess the system's resilience and implement a comprehensive security architecture.

How does access control to critical facilities on the railway differ from the essentially open road network?

Access control concepts are fundamentally different for rail and road systems. The railway system is designed as a closed system, with critical areas subject to strict access restrictions. Entry to track areas is strictly prohibited and only permitted to authorized personnel performing specific tasks after prior training. Detailed safety regulations apply, such as the wearing of high-visibility clothing and observance of warning signals, which primarily serve occupational safety. Access to highly sensitive areas such as signal boxes is also strictly regulated. DB Sicherheit GmbH is responsible for the physical protection of stations, track systems, and depots and employs security personnel for this purpose. A modern access control tool is the electronic competency card (ElBa), a mobile app that digitally verifies the qualifications of personnel on construction sites, thus increasing security and making fraud more difficult.

Despite these comprehensive regulations, an "illusion of control" persists. Past acts of sabotage have shown that these protocols can be circumvented in practice, as they are designed more to control regular operations and protect employees than to fend off determined external attackers. The sheer extent of the network, over 38,000 kilometers, makes seamless physical security impossible. The attacks in October 2022 took place on remote, unguarded sections of the route, where massive concrete covers of cable ducts did not pose an insurmountable obstacle.

The road network, on the other hand, is designed as a public space and is therefore, in principle, freely accessible to everyone. Physical access control systems such as bollards or barriers are used only sporadically to secure specific zones, such as pedestrian areas or traffic-calmed zones. Comprehensive access control of the road network is neither possible nor intended.

Both modes of transport are subject to Critical Infrastructure (KRITIS) legislation, which requires operators to implement minimum security standards. However, these regulations primarily target facility operators and their IT security and cannot override the fundamental openness of the road network or the geographical expanse of the rail network.

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Surveillance and prevention: A technological and personnel comparison

What surveillance technologies are used to ensure rail and road safety, and how effective are they?

The monitoring strategies for rail and road are tailored to the respective system requirements and are technologically diverse. In rail transport, monitoring is multi-layered and serves both operational safety and hazard prevention. Operational control includes traditional systems such as signals, track magnets (PZB), and line train control (LZB), which monitor trains and can automatically brake in an emergency. Innovative technologies such as distributed fiber optic sensors (DFOS) are increasingly being installed along tracks and on bridges to detect strains, vibrations, or cracks in real time. To prevent crime and investigate incidents, massive investments are being made in video surveillance (CCTV) at stations and on trains; by the end of 2024, every major station in Germany is to be equipped with modern video technology. In addition, drones, some with thermal imaging cameras, are being used to inspect difficult-to-access sections of track. Future trains will also be equipped with a comprehensive sensor setup consisting of cameras, lidar, and radar for environmental awareness, which is a prerequisite for automated driving.

Road traffic monitoring primarily focuses on optimizing traffic flow and enforcing traffic regulations. Traffic control systems (TCS) use sensors such as induction loops, infrared sensors, or video cameras to collect traffic data and dynamically implement speed limits, warnings, or detour recommendations based on this data. Intelligent image processing systems are used for automatic license plate recognition for toll and speed enforcement. However, systematic monitoring of the extensive road network for acts of sabotage does not take place.

The effectiveness of these technologies must be assessed in a differentiated manner. Video surveillance at train stations and on trains can demonstrably contribute to the investigation of crimes and increase passengers' subjective sense of security. However, its preventive effect against planned acts of sabotage in remote locations is limited, as perpetrators can avoid such monitored areas. Infrastructure sensors such as DFOS can detect and report damage early, but cannot prevent the actual act of sabotage.

What role do staff – from train drivers to security teams – play in ensuring safety, and how do protocols differ between rail and road?

Personnel play a crucial, yet distinct, role in both systems. In rail transport, safety is characterized by a system of shared but clearly defined responsibilities. Train drivers undergo rigorous psychological and physical aptitude tests as well as comprehensive training, which includes regular training in simulators for dealing with incidents and emergency situations. During the journey, they are in constant contact with the control centers and are monitored by technical systems such as the safety control system (Sifa), which must be operated every 30 seconds. Train crews, consisting of train attendants and the DB Security security teams, are trained in passenger safety, enforcing house rules, and de-escalating conflicts. The presence of security personnel at stations and on trains is continuously expanded as an important measure to increase objective and subjective safety.

In road traffic, however, responsibility lies almost exclusively with the individual driver. While professional truck and bus drivers must comply with legal regulations such as driving and rest times and conduct regular vehicle inspections, there is no central authority that monitors and controls each individual journey in real time. Modern vehicles are equipped with a variety of driver assistance systems, such as emergency braking assistants, lane departure warning systems, and adaptive cruise control, which significantly increase safety, but ultimate control and responsibility remains with the driver. Bus drivers are subject to additional protocols to ensure passenger safety, such as seat belt requirements and rules of conduct on the bus. The fundamental difference lies in the system architecture: The railway relies on a redundant human-machine system with central monitoring, while the road system relies on decentralized individual responsibility, supported by vehicle technology.

How is cybersecurity addressed in the increasingly digitalized control and guidance systems of both modes of transport?

The advancing digitalization poses significant cybersecurity challenges for both modes of transport. While the introduction of technologies such as the European Train Control System (ETCS) and Digital Interlocking Systems (DSTW) in the railway sector has led to efficiency and capacity improvements, it also opens up new attack vectors. Until now, the critical control and signaling systems (CTS) were relatively well protected because they were based on proprietary, isolated (“air-gapped”), and often outdated technologies that were difficult for external attackers to access. Previous cyberattacks on the railway sector have therefore mostly targeted less critical “convenience functions” such as websites, passenger information, or payment systems. With the transition to standardized, IP-based networks (e.g., for FRMCS/5G) to increase interoperability and performance, this distinction is becoming blurred. These standard technologies are well-documented and vulnerable to known hacking tools, lowering the barrier to entry for attackers. In response, companies like Siemens Mobility are developing holistic cybersecurity solutions for the entire lifecycle of rail vehicles, and research projects like HASELNUSS are working on hardware-based security platforms specifically for the railway. Nevertheless, experts still consider the overall cybersecurity maturity of the railway sector to be insufficient.

In road traffic, intelligent transport systems (ITS), especially traffic control systems (TCS), are a potential target for cyberattacks. Compromise of these systems could lead to manipulated speed displays, false warnings, or deliberately induced traffic jams. Germany's national cybersecurity strategy, as well as European directives such as the NIS 2 Directive and the ITS Directive, create a legal framework that obliges operators of critical transport infrastructure to implement higher security standards. However, some of the technical regulations and algorithms used in existing TCS are considered outdated and no longer state-of-the-art, which poses an additional risk. Both systems therefore face the dilemma that the modernization and digitalization required for the future inherently create new and complex security risks that must be proactively addressed.

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Resilience and recovery after an incident

How do experts assess the theory that rail can be repaired more quickly after an attack than road?

The thesis that rail infrastructure can generally be repaired more quickly must be viewed in a differentiated manner, as the repair time depends crucially on the type and extent of the damage.

When damage occurs to the railway's operational infrastructure, such as the cable harnesses frequently affected by acts of sabotage, repair is a highly specialized process. Technicians must completely replace the damaged cables, which can extend for dozens of meters, and then conduct complex tests and measurements before the line can be safely put back into operation. As the incidents in Düsseldorf and northern Germany demonstrated, this work can take from several hours to several days. Deutsche Bahn maintains a 24/7 emergency service with the DB Bahnbau Group that specializes in such incidents and can respond quickly nationwide. Compared to major road construction projects, the repair of tracks, switches, or signals can often be completed more quickly because the components are standardized and the processes are established.

The situation is quite different with road infrastructure, especially when it comes to damage to large engineering structures. While a simple pothole or damaged road surface can be repaired relatively quickly, the repair or reconstruction of a damaged or destroyed bridge is an extremely complex, expensive, and lengthy undertaking that can take months or even years. This requires complex structural calculations, lengthy concrete curing processes, and the complex integration of construction measures into flowing traffic. While regular structural inspections according to DIN 1076 serve the purpose of early detection of damage, they cannot shorten the duration of repairs after a sudden destructive event.

In conclusion, when damage occurs to the "working" infrastructure (cables, tracks, signals), rail tends to be more quickly repaired. In the case of catastrophic damage to key "engineering structures" such as bridges or tunnels, both systems are severely affected and for a very long time.

How do the concepts for diversions and maintaining operations differ in the event of disruptions to the rail and road network?

The ability to compensate for disruptions through diversions is one of the most fundamental differences between rail and road networks and a key aspect of their respective resilience.

Due to its nature, the rail network offers only very limited diversion options. These options depend directly on the density of the network and the availability of switches and parallel lines. Due to decades of dismantling, redundancy in the German network is low, especially compared to Switzerland or Austria. When a main line is closed, trains often have to be diverted over long distances, leading to significant delays and capacity bottlenecks on the alternative routes, or they terminate prematurely at a station, from where rail replacement bus services are organized. The high network utilization exacerbates this problem, as free capacity for diversionary services is almost nonexistent. Deutsche Bahn informs passengers via digital channels such as the DB Navigator app or its website, with information often updated at short notice due to the dynamic situation.

The road network, in contrast, possesses a high degree of natural redundancy. Its meshed structure means that when a major artery, such as a motorway, is closed, a multitude of alternative routes via federal, state, and district roads are usually available. Modern traffic management centers actively utilize this flexibility. With the help of traffic control systems, in particular dynamic signposts with integrated traffic jam information (dWiSta), traffic is directed in a targeted and widespread manner to less congested alternative routes in order to avoid or minimize congestion. This concept of active network control makes the road system inherently more resilient to local failures. In comparison, the rail infrastructure, optimized for efficiency but thinned out, is a fragile system in which local disruptions can quickly lead to cascading, network-wide impacts.

What overarching strategies is Germany pursuing to strengthen the resilience of its critical transport infrastructure?

In light of the identified vulnerabilities, Germany has begun implementing overarching strategies to strengthen the resilience of its critical infrastructures. In July 2022, the German Federal Government adopted the "German Strategy for Strengthening Resilience to Disasters." This strategy pursues a comprehensive all-hazards approach, ranging from natural disasters to terrorism and sabotage, and defines resilience as a task for the whole of government and society, requiring close cooperation between the federal government, states, municipalities, the private sector, and civil society.

A key legislative instrument for implementing this strategy is the KRITIS umbrella law. For the first time, it establishes uniform national minimum standards for the physical protection and resilience of critical infrastructure operators and obligates them to take appropriate measures and report security incidents to the responsible federal authorities.

To improve coordination, the "Joint Critical Infrastructure Coordination Staff" (GEKKIS) was established at the government level. This body is intended to compile cross-departmental situation reports, identify challenges, and act as a crisis team in the event of acute incidents.

Following the acts of sabotage, concrete measures were initiated specifically for the transport sector. The federal government and Deutsche Bahn have developed a joint package to improve the protection of railway facilities. This includes the increased use of video and sensor technology at critical points, an increased presence of security forces from the Federal Police and DB Security, and the targeted redundant expansion of particularly critical cable connections to reduce individual points of failure. At the same time, cybersecurity is being strengthened through the implementation of the European NIS 2 Directive, which requires more companies to adhere to higher IT security standards.

Synthesis and other advantages of rail transport

What other advantages does rail transport offer beyond mere security against sabotage that are relevant for a societal assessment?

Beyond the debate about security against tampering, rail transport offers a number of fundamental advantages that are crucial for a societal assessment of transport modes. First and foremost is environmental and climate protection. Rail transport is significantly more environmentally friendly than road transport. Every ton of freight transported by rail instead of road produces 80 to 100 percent fewer CO2 emissions. Given that the transport sector is the only sector in the EU that has not been able to reduce its emissions since 1995, shifting traffic to rail is a key lever for climate protection.

Another key advantage is superior land use efficiency. A single railway line of the same width can transport many times more people or goods than a single highway lane. Specifically, on a 3.5-meter-wide line, up to 30 times more people per hour can be transported by rail than by car, drastically reducing land use in densely populated regions.

From an economic perspective, a differentiated approach is also necessary. While truck transport is often perceived as more flexible and cost-effective over short distances, road transport causes massive external costs through accidents, traffic jams, noise, and environmental pollution. These costs are not entirely borne by the polluters, but rather by the general public. Rail transport has a significantly more positive overall balance in this regard.

Finally, the aforementioned safety aspect during normal operation is an invaluable advantage. The significantly lower probability of being killed or seriously injured in an accident compared to a car saves lives every year and prevents human suffering and high subsequent costs for the healthcare system.

Defense logistics in wartime: The strategic advantage of the defender

The importance of the fast vanguard

In a war effort, the rapid advance force is of crucial strategic importance. These first units must be ready to deploy on the eastern flank within 48 to 72 hours to establish the initial defensive lines. NATO has already implemented this insight in its Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP), in which multinational combat units are permanently stationed on the eastern flank.

The 45th Panzer Brigade in Lithuania exemplifies this vanguard function: With state-of-the-art equipment such as the Leopard 2A8 main battle tank and the Puma S1 infantry fighting vehicle, German forces ensure the first supply of defensive equipment to the eastern flank. This rapid response capability is supported by pre-positioned equipment and ammunition, gaining critical time in establishing the defensive lines.

The rapid construction of defensive lines

The success of the defense depends largely on the rapid construction of robust defensive lines. The Baltic states have already begun installing mobile tank barriers and fortified defenses along their borders with Kaliningrad and Belarus. These measures follow the principle of "defense in depth" – a multi-layered defense strategy that creates various obstacles and defense layers.

Time is critical: While the defender can prepare and reinforce his positions, the attacker must operate under time pressure and without local knowledge. The defender uses this time to:

• Construction of barriers and obstacles
• Preparation of combat positions
• Establishment of ammunition and supply depots
• Establishment of secure communication lines

Establishment and expansion of secure supplies

After the initial defense phase, the focus shifts to establishing a sustainable and secure supply system. The Bundeswehr Logistics Command, with its 18,000 members, is specifically structured for this task. Defense logistics benefits from several key advantages:

Established infrastructure

The defender can rely on existing transport routes, warehouses, depots, and communications networks. Germany, as a NATO logistics hub, has a dense network of 80 logistics locations.

Protected supply lines

Within its own territory, logistics operates in a relatively secure environment, protected by its own frontline defense forces. This enables:

• Continuous material supply without constant threat
• Use of civilian transport capacities and infrastructure
• Redundant supply routes through known alternative routes

Decentralized logistics network

Modern military logistics relies on distributed, small supply points instead of large, vulnerable depots. This "logistics network" with many nodes significantly increases resilience.

The attacker's challenges

In contrast, the attacker faces enormous logistical challenges:

Lack of infrastructure

The attacker must operate in enemy territory, where neither secure transport routes nor protected storage facilities are available. Every bridge and every road could be mined or destroyed.

Vulnerable supply lines

The attacker's supply lines are constantly under attack – from artillery, drones, special forces, or partisans. The experience from Ukraine demonstrates how vulnerable long supply lines are.

Time pressure and resource consumption

The attacker is under considerable time pressure, as every day without progress depletes their resources and gives the defender time to reinforce. The rule of thumb is that an attacker needs a threefold superiority to succeed.

The strategic advantage of homeland defense

Military theory, especially Clausewitz, emphasizes the inherent advantages of the defender:

• Familiarity with the terrain: Local knowledge enables optimal position selection and freedom of movement
• Prepared positions: Time to build fortifications and obstacles
• Inner lines: Shorter routes for reinforcements and supplies
• Supporting the population: access to local resources and information

Modern defense logistics enhances these traditional advantages by:

• Digital networking and real-time information
• Predictive maintenance and AI-supported demand forecasting
• Integration of civil and military logistics capacities

What is the conclusion in the security comparison between rail and road in the context of sabotage and attacks?

Defense logistics enjoys decisive systemic advantages over attack logistics. While the defender operates in a secure, known environment with established infrastructure, the attacker must overcome all logistical challenges under enemy pressure and without local support. The modern NATO strategy, with its Enhanced Forward Presence and focus on rapid response, optimally exploits these advantages. Germany, as NATO's logistics hub, demonstrates how well-thought-out defense logistics contributes to deterrence and can make the decisive difference in an emergency.

A final assessment of rail and road security against sabotage reveals a complex and ambivalent picture, with no clear winner. Both systems exhibit specific, structural strengths and weaknesses.

Rail benefits from its centralized and controlled nature, which enables targeted and technologically advanced monitoring. Its superior security during normal operations is undisputed, as is the case in a defense scenario as described above. However, centralization also creates critical nodes and "single points of failure," particularly in the communications and control network. These make the system vulnerable to targeted acts of sabotage, which can cause widespread, cascading failures across the entire network with relatively little effort. Decades of political and financial neglect have exacerbated this systemic vulnerability by reducing redundancies and creating a significant backlog of repairs. However, the problem can be remedied relatively quickly.

The road's decentralized, meshed, and open network structure makes it inherently more resilient to local disruptions. A single attack, even on a critical structure like a bridge, rarely leads to a nationwide collapse, as traffic can divert to numerous alternative routes. At the same time, this openness makes comprehensive surveillance impossible and, in everyday operations, leads to a far higher number of accidents and casualties due to the multitude of individual, fallible actors.

The faster repairability of rail is achievable with appropriate modernization measures on the periphery. This applies to damage to existing infrastructure such as cables or tracks, where standardized processes allow for relatively rapid repair. However, the destruction of large structures such as bridges or tunnels (a major enemy attack with no or weak defense lines) severely disrupts both modes of transport for very long periods of time, which also affects roads to the same extent.

Protecting the railway against sabotage therefore depends crucially on future strategic investments. These must go beyond the mere installation of cameras and sensors and, above all, focus on strengthening network resilience. This means the targeted expansion of redundancies through multi-track lines, additional switches, and alternative cable routing, as well as the physical and digital hardening of critical infrastructure components. The recent security policy debate and the measures initiated by the federal government and the railway indicate the beginnings of a rethink. However, transforming the existing, efficiency-oriented but fragile system into a truly resilient network remains an immense, costly, and long-term task.

Markus Becker

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Konrad Wolfenstein

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