Germany's security policy reality shock: How the US withdrawal and German fear of debate are undermining Europe's protection

Classification: From moral outcry to sober assessment

The vehement German reactions to the new US National Security Strategy follow a familiar pattern: outrage, moral judgments, warnings of the West's demise – and at the same time, a conspicuous ignoring of Germany's own shortcomings. The core message of the US strategy is essentially simple: the United States no longer wants to act as the sole guarantor of the global order, but demands that wealthy allies assume significantly more responsibility – financial, military, and political – in their regions.

This doesn't break the alliance, but it does shatter a decades-long state of psychological comfort for many Europeans – and especially the Germans. Germany has grown accustomed to living under the American security umbrella, while presenting itself economically and morally as a "civilian power." The US's now-articulated demand for a tough burden-sharing approach, in this context, seems like an imposition, which is being met reflexively with outrage in Berlin, rather than with sober strategic analysis.

The polarization in the German media is clearly reflected in the pointed statements of prominent politicians, which give the impression that the US has turned its back on Europe and even on Ukraine, and is scheming with "enemies of democracy" in Europe. However, such formulations shift the focus away from the central question: Why should US taxpayers be permanently willing to finance and militarily secure a European security architecture whose wealthiest members – above all Germany – have deliberately underfunded their own capabilities for decades?

The opportunistic clamor, which serves only to enhance one's own political standing or to market one's own book, stands in stark contrast to pragmatic and strategic political intelligence. While the former is shockingly naive and obvious, the latter is a major headache for the latter.

To answer this question seriously, moral outrage is not enough. What is needed is an economic and power-political analysis: of the actual burden-sharing within the alliance, of German defense and economic policy, of the domestic political framework – and of the increasingly strained German debate culture, which quickly relegates any business-friendly or power-politically realistic position to the "wrong" corner.

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• Fortress America: Why the US is quitting its "world police" role – The new US National Security Strategy

The American shift in strategy: From Atlas to a "burden-sharing" republic

The new US security strategy builds on a development that has been evident for years: The US remains the dominant military superpower, but no longer wants to shoulder the entire burden of the Western order like Atlas did. Instead, a network of shared responsibility is being formulated. Allies – whether in Europe, East Asia, or the Middle East – are primarily to secure their regions; the US increasingly sees itself as an organizer and amplifier, no longer as a primary insurer without a deductible.

“Burden-sharing” refers to the fairest possible distribution of costs, risks and concrete contributions within an alliance – usually involving military and security alliances such as NATO.

Specifically, this means:

No single state should bear the main burden of defense, deterrence, operations or infrastructure; rather, all partners should contribute according to their economic capacity and military capabilities.

Contributions can include money (e.g., a 2 or 5 percent target of GDP), troops, equipment, logistics, reconnaissance, or the provision of sites and infrastructure.

In the current debate, the US means by "burden-sharing" primarily that wealthy allies such as European NATO states should spend significantly more on their own security and build up military capabilities so that the US no longer has to pay and fight disproportionately for the protection of Europe.

The economic basis for this change in strategy is clear:

• In 2023, the US spent around 880 billion US dollars on defense, more than twice as much as China and Russia combined.
• The entire NATO alliance spent approximately 1.28 trillion US dollars on defense in 2023; of this, around 69 percent was attributable to the USA.
• The US is thus financing not only European deterrence, but a global presence – from East Asia to the Middle East and nuclear deterrence, from which Europe benefits via NATO.

It is often pointed out in Europe that the direct US contribution to the formal NATO budget is "only" around 16 percent and thus comparable to Germany's. While this is formally correct, it overlooks the crucial point: at just over three billion euros per year, the NATO budget is a minor item compared to national defense budgets. What matters is not the administrative budget in Brussels, but the ability to project credible military power – and here, the US has so far borne the lion's share.

Against this backdrop, it is rational for Washington – especially under a US administration that openly insists on national interests and cost-efficiency – to ask why wealthy states like Germany, which are among the world's leading economies, should systematically underperform in terms of security policy. The security policy "freebie mentality," which many US administrations accepted for decades as inconvenient but manageable, is increasingly viewed as an untenable misallocation of resources in light of growing domestic tensions and global rivalry with China.

The new security strategy describes this stance in the language of "hard realism": The US emphasizes that it will only assume comprehensive responsibility where this aligns with its interests and where partners significantly cooperate. This may sound cold-hearted to European ears, but it is consistent: Power politics follows cost-benefit calculations, not a long-term moral obligation.

Decades of security policy complacency: Germany's dependence on the USA

Germany is a prime example of what appears from a US perspective as "free-riding." In the decades following the Cold War, the Federal Republic repeatedly reduced or capped its defense spending while simultaneously demanding greater political responsibility. The Bundeswehr was viewed in planning terms more as an "army in action" under US protection, not as the core of an independently defensible nation in an increasingly uncertain environment.

Some key data illustrate the pattern:

• Until 2014, Germany regularly fell significantly short of the NATO target of spending two percent of GDP on defense.
• Only after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and increasingly after the major Russian attack on Ukraine in 2022, did public opinion shift: According to studies, the proportion of Germans who wanted higher defense spending rose from under 20 percent in the long term to almost 60 percent in 2022.
• Politically, the 100 billion euro special fund and the announcement that more than two percent of GDP will be allocated to defense in the future heralded a "turning point".

However, these figures are less impressive than they initially appear. Analyses conclude that even if fully utilized, the special funds will not be sufficient to close existing capability gaps that accumulated before 2022. A credible modernization of the Bundeswehr would require a structural increase in the regular defense budget over several years – estimated at around 0.5 percentage points of GDP – and this over a decade as part of a "Decade of Security."

At the same time, political and social ambivalence remains high:

• On the one hand, majorities now support higher defense spending and a strengthening of the German armed forces.
• On the other hand, a clear majority of Germans reject a military leadership role for Germany in Europe; in a recent survey, around two-thirds were opposed to such a role.

This strategic schizophrenia – more money, yes; genuine leadership, no – is a central problem from the perspective of a security policy realist. It signals to the US and Eastern European partners that Germany is willing to pay, but is not prepared to bear the logical consequences in the form of higher risks, clear prioritization, and political leadership.

Germany's "turning point": Ambitions, budget and structural brakes

The German "turning point" is often seen internationally as a watershed moment that strengthens Europe's security policy. On paper, that's true:

• Germany plans to meet or exceed the NATO two percent target when the special fund is taken into account.
• NATO's overall defense spending has been rising steadily since 2015 and now significantly exceeds the 1.4 trillion US dollar mark.
• More and more allies are reaching or exceeding the two percent target; significantly more than in 2021.

But the real question is less "How high is the sum?", but rather: "What do you get for it?" In Germany, increased funding is meeting structural problems that have grown over years:

• Complex and lengthy procurement processes that cause additional expenditure to be wasted on time and bureaucracy.
• Political reluctance to make long-term commitments that clash with the debt brake and competing spending needs (climate, digitalization, demographics).
• A security policy culture that long viewed armed forces and military resources as a morally problematic evil to be minimized.

From an economic perspective, this is about prioritizing scarce resources. A credible defense capability requires directing a significant portion of the nation's overall investment capacity toward security over several legislative periods – instead of into ever-new sectoral funding projects, symbolic programs, or redistribution compromises. Studies indicate that in the coming years, Germany would need to invest roughly one additional percentage point of GDP not only in defense, but also in climate protection, digitalization, and infrastructure, in order to achieve its strategic goals. This is politically sensitive, but objectively unavoidable.

Against this backdrop, sweeping complaints about a "reckless US withdrawal" appear remarkably selective. The American side has maintained or even increased its defense spending at a high level for years, while many European states – including Germany – have consistently reaped the peace dividend. Anyone now expressing outrage at US demands for burden-sharing, without honestly addressing their own underfunding and organizational dysfunction, is operating more in the realm of political marketing than in that of serious strategic analysis.

The German reaction: Moral rhetoric instead of strategic self-criticism

The German reaction to the new US course involves a mixture of two elements:

• a real concern that Europe alone is overwhelmed in terms of security policy,
• and a rhetorical exaggeration that portrays US policy as a general departure from democracy and from the West.

When prominent German politicians claim that the USA is no longer standing by Europe or Ukraine "for the first time since the Second World War", they ignore the facts: The USA is by far the largest single donor of military, financial and humanitarian aid to Kyiv.

• By mid-2025, total US commitments amounted to over 130 billion US dollars, while Europe, although contributing more in total, did so in a highly fragmented and time-stretched manner.
• In the military sphere, the US contribution – at least in the early stages of the war – exceeded the sum of European bilateral commitments.

Anyone suggesting, in light of these figures, that Washington has "abandoned" Europe is confusing legitimate criticism of US domestic policy and individual presidents with a de facto abandonment of alliance interests. A more realistic diagnosis would be: The US remains committed, but not indefinitely; it expects Europe to assume the majority of conventional deterrence against Russia in the medium term, while Washington shifts its focus more towards China and the Indo-Pacific.

The debate becomes particularly problematic when American contacts with European right-wing parties or national-conservative forces are categorically labeled as "cooperation with enemies of democracy." The concern that a US administration could embolden authoritarian or illiberal forces in Europe is not unfounded—for example, with regard to segments of the radical right that explicitly invoke "America First" rhetoric. However, the label "enemy of democracy" risks becoming a political weapon in domestic politics, one that categorically delegitimizes any conservative or system-critical position instead of engaging with it through reasoned argument.

Those who condemn US contacts with certain parties in Europe should also honestly address their own dependence on US security policy and US financial markets – and not pretend that Germany is the morally superior but politically equal partner. This cognitive dissonance, however, characterizes large parts of the Berlin debate.

Elite rhetoric without a power base: Why the tone of Norbert Röttgen & Co. is problematic

The extreme statements made by figures like Norbert Röttgen are symptomatic of a German elite that likes to express itself in foreign policy in the guise of a "values-driven power" without possessing the corresponding means of power. When one comments on US policy in the tone of a disillusioned moral arbiter, several uncomfortable questions arise:

• Firstly: From a German perspective, why should Washington "once again" take the fall when central European states still haven't developed the capacity to independently stabilize their neighborhood or credibly deter them?
• Secondly: What concrete alternative security policy proposal does Germany offer, apart from appeals and financial commitments, which often flow slowly and fail due to internal blockages?
• Thirdly: What signals does it send to Eastern European partners if Berlin, on the one hand, portrays Washington as unreliable or morally questionable, but on the other hand, is not prepared to offer independent security policy leadership?

From an economic perspective, Germany benefits from an international order in which open markets, reliable legal frameworks, and military stability are largely guaranteed by others—primarily the USA. However, this benefit of the order is rarely discussed in German domestic politics as an "imported security service." Instead, the impression is given that Germany is primarily a moral authority, shaping the world on an equal footing with the USA, regardless of its own power base.

However, a realistic foreign policy requires acknowledging one's own vulnerability and dependence – especially as an export nation whose prosperity depends on secure trade, functioning sea lanes, and stable financial systems. A political culture that revels in normative self-assurances about democracy and human rights, while simultaneously chronically underinvesting in hard power, appears strategically inconsistent.

For years, Norbert Röttgen has operated in a gray area between a serious foreign policy expert and a highly assertive author – and the two reinforce each other. The criticism focuses less on the existence of his books than on the way he intertwines media presence, crisis rhetoric, and personal self-promotion.

Röttgen clearly acts as a career politician who uses his books as political instruments and amplifiers of his agenda – not as a neutral publicist. The harsh criticism is directed less at his professional background than at the impression of a professionally managed personality cult in which every crisis is also an opportunity for communication and marketing.

In interviews about his books, Röttgen stages crises—such as the war in Ukraine or the strategic dependence on Russia and China—as proof that his foreign policy demands and warnings are timely and correct. Critics see this as a two-pronged communication strategy: real security policy problems are addressed seriously, but at the same time exaggerated to such an extent that they make his own book appear as the "book of the moment" and him as an indispensable political voice.

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Domestic political imbalance: Economic bashing and the political economy of weakness

In addition to security vulnerabilities, there is a domestic political trend of increasingly attacking economic pillars rhetorically. The case of Labor Minister and SPD party leader Bärbel Bas is a striking example: At a youth congress of her party, she described an employers' day as a pivotal moment when it became clear to her "who we actually have to fight against together"—meaning employers. This left-wing populist formulation triggered massive criticism from business associations, entrepreneurs, and even parts of the governing parties, who saw it as an unprecedented confrontation with those who create jobs and finance social security systems.

What makes this rhetoric economically dangerous is not just its symbolic effect. It reinforces a climate in which entrepreneurial initiative, risk-taking, and profit orientation tend to be viewed with suspicion. In a situation where Germany, after years of stagnation and growing location-related problems—from bureaucracy to energy prices to a shortage of skilled workers—urgently needs private investment, government rhetoric of a "fight against employers" sends a devastating signal.

Against the backdrop of increasing defense burdens, the conflict of objectives is intensifying:

• The government wants to spend more on security, climate, and social welfare.
• At the same time, an anti-business climate dampens the willingness to invest and growth, which is the basis of all redistribution and rearmament projects.

Put another way: Those who criticize the US for its pragmatic definition of its security and economic policy interests, while simultaneously discrediting those in their own country who generate added value and tax revenue, weaken their own economic viability. Strategic autonomy, however, presupposes that a country or continent possesses a robust, growing economic base capable of bearing greater defense and security burdens.

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• Consequences for Europe and Germany: The end of the comfort zone

Freedom of expression, cancel culture, and the narrowing of legitimate discourse

Furthermore, there is a problematic development in the political culture: In Germany, freedom of expression is robustly enshrined in the constitution, but is subject to significantly narrower limits than, for example, in the USA. Criminal insults, incitement to hatred, the denial of historical crimes, and certain forms of hate speech are legally sanctioned. This is the result of historical experience with totalitarian regimes and is intended to protect democracy.

In recent years, however, this protective logic has shifted into areas that are ambivalent from a democratic theory perspective. Examples include:

• State-funded reporting portals and so-called "trusted flaggers" operate under the EU Digital Services Regulation, reporting content and effectively forcing platforms to remove it. Critics argue that legitimate expressions of opinion are too quickly classified as hate speech or prohibited statements, resulting in a form of preemptive censorship.
• the expansion of criminal protection provisions for politicians (for example, by tightening the definition of the offense that protects the honor of public officials in a special way), which has led to a sharp increase in criminal proceedings for insulting online statements.
• Tendencies towards a “cancel culture”, in which unwelcome voices – such as critical scientists, entrepreneurs or intellectuals – are informally excluded, disinvited or publicly defamed if they deviate from the dominant line of interpretation.

Each of these steps may be justifiable in itself. Taken together, however, they create the impression of an increasingly narrow corridor of what can be said – especially on topics such as neoliberal economic reforms. Anyone who expresses a clearly pronounced pro-business stance or addresses harsh security policy realities quickly risks being labeled "populist," "insensitive," or "undemocratic."

This is dangerous for a society that must prepare for tougher times in its foreign policy. Strategic adjustment processes—such as a substantial increase in defense spending, structural reforms, or a reassessment of migration or energy policy—require open, constructive debates. However, if every position that, from the perspective of the dominant groups, sounds too much like the market, power, or borders is hastily morally disqualified, the ability to solve problems diminishes.

Put another way: One cannot simultaneously complain that the USA is increasingly focusing on a sober national interest, while politically and culturally sanctioning those in one's own country who demand a similar sober analysis of interests for Germany.

Europe's strategic autonomy: aspiration and reality

In Brussels, Paris, and Berlin, there has been talk for years of Europe's "strategic autonomy"—the ambition to become economically, technologically, and in terms of security policy sufficiently independent to avoid dependence on the US (or China). Since the new US security strategy, at the very latest, it has become clear that this ambition is not merely European self-affirmation, but an American expectation: Europe is expected to largely organize and finance its own security.

However, analyses of European strategic autonomy repeatedly arrive at similar results:

• Without a massive, long-term build-up of military capabilities – including arms industry, logistics and command structures – “autonomy” remains a political buzzword.
• Germany is the key player here: Without a significantly stronger German role in financing, structural development and political leadership, Europe cannot develop an independent security policy pole.
• At the same time, significant internal contradictions exist: Eastern European states fear that “strategic autonomy” could in reality mean a decoupling from the USA; southern European states fear fiscal overload; Germany itself wavers between a transatlantic reflex and a European ambition to shape policy.

The new US course exacerbates these tensions: On the one hand, it increases the pressure to rapidly develop capabilities in Europe; on the other hand, it intensifies the mistrust of those states that continue to primarily base their security on the US nuclear guarantee. The result is a paradoxical situation: There are calls for greater European sovereignty, but there is a structural unwillingness to bear the associated financial, military, and political costs.

Economically, true strategic autonomy means nothing other than that Europe invests a larger share of its value creation in hard security, critical infrastructure, defense technology, and resilience – at the expense of other spending priorities. For Germany, the situation is further complicated by an aging population, high social spending, and the costs of transformation (energy, climate, digitalization), which are already limiting fiscal leeway.

As long as these conflicting objectives are not openly negotiated politically, "strategic autonomy" remains largely a rhetorical facade. Against this backdrop, it seems inconsistent when German politicians criticize the US for questioning the historical burden-sharing model without telling their own societies with equal clarity that strategic autonomy is expensive, risky, and requires sacrifices elsewhere.

What a realistic German course would require

A geopolitically realistic and at the same time democratically responsible German course in this situation would have to combine several elements:

First: Honesty about dependencies

Germany needs to openly communicate that its prosperity and security over the past decades have been largely based on a combination of US security guarantees, cheap Russian energy (until 2022), Chinese demand, and an open global economy. This constellation has been irreversibly damaged. The following follows:

• There is no return to a "comfortable niche" without harsh power projection and without geopolitical risks.
• Moral self-reassurance is no substitute for a security architecture.

Second: Prioritization in the state budget

If Germany seriously wants to spend two to two and a half percent of its GDP on defense on a permanent basis, while simultaneously investing in critical infrastructure, climate adaptation, digitalization, and demographics, it needs a debate on priorities that is not overshadowed by symbolic class-struggle rhetoric. This means:

• Less piecemeal clientelism, more long-term investment programs.
• Reducing bureaucracy and implementing reforms that increase growth and productivity, so that higher security expenditures remain economically sustainable.

Thirdly: Rehabilitation of the language of power and interests

A mature democracy must be able to discuss national and European interests without immediately resorting to ideological clichés. Someone who soberly observes that Germany needs more military investment and robust borders to secure its trade routes, airspace, or digital infrastructure is not automatically "right-wing," "populist," or "anti-democratic." Conversely, not every appeal to human rights and values-based politics is automatically rational.

Fourth: Protection of freedom of debate

State measures against hate crime, incitement to hatred, and targeted disinformation are legitimate in a "defensive democracy." However, they must adhere closely to the principle of proportionality and must not de facto establish a state-supported system of opinion manipulation.

• “Trusted Flaggers” and reporting portals need transparent oversight and rule-of-law safeguards.
• Legal protection for public officials must not lead to the de facto criminalization of sharp criticism of the government.
• Universities, media outlets and institutions should promote not only formal but also lived plurality – even if certain positions are unpopular in their own circles.

Fifth: Redefine the strategic division of labor with the USA

Germany and Europe cannot replace the USA, but they can reduce the asymmetry. A realistic goal would be:

• Europe is assuming the majority of conventional deterrence against Russia and is largely stabilizing its southern neighborhood on its own.
• The US is focusing more on the Indo-Pacific and nuclear deterrence, but remains the guarantor of security in the final instance.
• In return, European states gain more say in strategic issues – but on the basis of their own material contributions.

Without a power base, values-based politics is merely rhetoric.

The German government's confrontation with the new US security strategy reveals a fundamental pattern: a country that likes to portray itself as a normative shaping power, but has undermined its security policy and economic power base over the years, reacts with outrage when its former protector demands a tougher burden-sharing arrangement.

It's convenient to portray the "new American" as a cold cost-cutter or even a traitor to the alliance, colluding with "enemies of democracy." It's considerably more uncomfortable to question one's own structures.

• a German armed forces that, despite special funds, still exhibits significant capability gaps;
• a domestic political culture in which companies and high achievers are increasingly branded as adversaries;
• a landscape of opinions in which differing but legitimate positions on economics, security and society are quickly stigmatized or delegitimized.

The central lesson from the US repositioning is this: security, prosperity, and the right to shape policy are no longer "insured." Anyone who wants to be taken seriously in a world of growing bloc conflicts, technological rivalry, and fragile orders must be prepared to bear the costs – financial, military, political, and cultural.

For Germany, this means less condescension towards Washington, more self-criticism and a willingness to reform at home. Only if the Federal Republic remains economically attractive, militarily credible, and capable of engaging in domestic political discourse can it continue to shape the future in a tougher international environment, rather than being shaped by it.

However, as long as moral outrage and symbolic class-struggle rhetoric overshadow the sober debate about power, interests, and responsibility, Germany's contribution to the Western security order will fall short of its own claims. In such a situation, it is only a matter of time before the question is raised not only in Washington, but also in Warsaw, Vilnius, and Kyiv: Is Germany prepared to be what it claims to be—a reliable, responsible pillar of a free and democratic order, and not merely its vocal commentator?

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