Despite full order books: Why exoskeleton star German Bionic suddenly has to file for bankruptcy

Europe's exoskeleton pioneer fails due to a capital shortfall – A lesson in structural weaknesses in the German high-tech ecosystem

The insolvency filing of German Bionic Systems in November 2025 marks another painful blow to the German high-tech landscape. The Augsburg-based company, which since its founding in 2017 had been considered a European technology leader in intelligent, AI-powered exoskeletons, was forced to file for standard insolvency proceedings at the Augsburg District Court. With around 70 employees and a broad patent portfolio, German Bionic was among those innovative companies that analysts and politicians alike considered to play a key role in addressing major societal challenges. The case raises fundamental questions about the functioning of the European innovation system and reveals structural deficiencies that extend far beyond the fate of a single company.

The chronicle of a failure foretold

The paradox of German Bionic's insolvency lies in the seemingly contradictory combination of operational success and financial collapse. Managing Director Armin G. Schmidt explicitly emphasized that the company's insolvency was not caused by its operational situation, but rather by the sudden withdrawal of promised investments. Despite very positive revenue growth and a dynamically expanding market, the company was confronted with the unexpected cancellation of investment commitments. The failure of a final financing round triggered an acute liquidity shortage, making insolvency filing unavoidable. German Bionic had expected to reach break-even by summer 2026 and was thus in a phase where hardware startups typically still rely on external capital injections.

This situation reveals a fundamental design flaw in the financing model of hardware-heavy deeptech startups. While software companies can often reach profitability within six to eighteen months, hardware startups require significantly longer lead times. Developing physical products, building production capacity, and establishing complex supply chains necessitate multi-year investment cycles. German Bionic went through typical development phases of a hardware startup: from its founding in 2017, through product development and market launch, to planned scaling. The expectation of reaching break-even only in the summer of 2026 corresponds to a nine-year development cycle and is thus at the upper end of what bank loans would finance, but still within the range that venture capitalists accept for promising deeptech companies.

The investor puzzle: From Samsung to the European Investment Bank

German Bionic's financing history reads like a who's who of international technology financing and simultaneously illustrates the complexity of modern venture capital structures. In December 2020, the company secured $20 million in a Series A financing round from a prominent consortium. Samsung Catalyst Fund and Munich-based MIG AG led the round, accompanied by Storm Ventures, Benhamou Global Ventures, and the Japanese investor IT Farm. For MIG AG, which achieved legendary success with its early investment in BioNTech and generated record distributions of €600 million for its investors from BioNTech share sales in 2020 alone, German Bionic represented its fourth new investment of the year.

The investment by the Growth Fund Bavaria, supported by LfA Förderbank Bayern and Bayern Kapital, underscored the strategic importance attributed to the company at the state level. Following the European Investment Bank's (EIB) €50 million investment, the Growth Fund Bavaria 2 had a total volume of €165 million and was intended to specifically support innovative Bavarian startups. In December 2022, the EIB itself provided German Bionic with a €15 million venture debt loan, supported by the European Union's InvestEU program. This form of financing, in which the return is largely tied to the company's success, complements existing venture capital financing without diluting the founders' equity. The loan was intended to fund research and development and drive international expansion.

Despite this impressive list of investors and a total investment volume exceeding €35 million, the capital was insufficient to bring the company to profitability. The failed final financing round at the end of 2025 marked the abrupt end of a success story that seemed to possess all the ingredients of a European technology champion: innovative technology, a relevant market, renowned investors, and public funding. The sudden absence of promised investments points to a fundamentally changed investment climate that is plunging even promising deep-tech companies into existential crises.

The exoskeleton market: Between growth forecasts and realization risks

The market potential that analysts attribute to the exoskeleton sector is so vast that the failure of German Bionic seems all the more painful. Leading market research institutes predict exponential growth: The global exoskeleton market was valued at US$555 million in 2025 and is projected to reach US$4.23 billion by 2035, representing an annual growth rate of 22.5 percent. Other forecasts are even more optimistic, anticipating a market volume of US$30.56 billion by 2032, which would equate to an average annual growth rate of 43.1 percent.

This discrepancy between different market forecasts already illustrates the uncertainty associated with future markets. While the basic assumptions about the drivers of market growth appear to be largely agreed upon, the quantitative assessments diverge considerably. It is undisputed that several megatrends are driving the demand for exoskeletons: Demographic change is leading to an aging workforce that must remain in the workforce longer. Worldwide, between 250,000 and 500,000 people suffer spinal cord injuries annually. Musculoskeletal disorders account for approximately 23 percent of all sick days. The chronic shortage of skilled workers in physically demanding industries is continuously worsening.

In Germany, experts believe the shortage of skilled workers in the logistics sector is more dramatic than in the nursing sector, measured by the number of employees. As early as 2021, there was a shortage of approximately 36,000 professional truck drivers, and another 36,000 retire each year, while only 15,000 new drivers enter the profession. In the nursing sector, a shortage of around 36,000 nursing staff is projected by 2027, and the Federal Statistical Office anticipates a tripling of the demand for nursing personnel by 2049. These structural bottlenecks theoretically create ideal conditions for technologies that support and complement human labor.

Technological excellence as a necessary but not sufficient condition

German Bionic positioned itself as the world's first company to develop a fully networked, AI-based exoskeleton for the workplace. The flagship product, Cray X, now in its fourth generation and weighing only seven kilograms, could support loads of up to 30 kilograms during lifting. The intelligent software not only recognized lifting movements but also corrected back-damaging patterns: the less ergonomic the wearer's lifting technique, the stronger the support provided by the exoskeleton. Two motors, controlled by intelligent software, pulled the wearer upwards at the shoulders, and the force was redirected to the thighs.

The technological differentiation lay in the integration with German Bionic IO, a self-learning robotics solution for the cloud that could be incorporated into factory processes. The system collected real-time data from the exoskeletons and automatically adjusted the lifting capacity to the optimal level of performance for each specific requirement. This combination of hardware and cloud-based software platform distinguished German Bionic from providers of passive exoskeletons that relied solely on mechanical components such as springs. The ability to deliver real-time ergonomic data from everyday work situations was intended not only to protect the health of employees but also to optimize workflows based on data.

This technological excellence manifested itself in numerous awards: The Bavarian and German Founders' Awards 2019, the CES Best of Innovation Award, the Fast Company Innovation by Design Award, and the European Investment Bank's Innovation Champion Award all recognized the company's achievements. The broad patent portfolio and the highly qualified teams at the Augsburg and Berlin locations underscored its innovative strength. Customers like DPD, who used the Cray X in long-term tests at their logistics centers, reported positive experiences. In a two-month trial at the Malsch parcel center near Karlsruhe, where over 860,000 packages of 26-kilogram copy paper were unloaded annually, employees found the exoskeletons to be a practical aid in their daily work. The response was so positive that DPD extended the trial and equipped additional locations.

But all these technological successes couldn't disguise the fact that a gap exists between technological feasibility and commercial scalability, a gap that many hardware startups fail to bridge. Developing a working prototype is one thing; building production capacity ready for mass production, establishing sales structures, and generating sufficient revenue is quite another. German Bionic had opened a 1,000-square-meter manufacturing facility in Augsburg and had a global presence with offices in Europe, North America, and Asia. However, this international expansion consumed capital, and revenues were not yet sufficient to cover ongoing costs and investments.

The dilemma of hardware startups: Capital intensity meets investor reluctance.

The difficulties faced by hardware startups differ fundamentally from those of software-based business models. Studies show that approximately 97 percent of consumer hardware startups fail to deliver their product. The reasons are manifold: high initial hardware costs, inefficient teams, a lack of focus on defining a minimum viable product, scaling problems in production, complex supply chains, and long development cycles. While software startups can scale with comparatively limited resources, hardware products require significant upfront investments in tooling, molds, production facilities, and quality assurance.

This capital intensity clashes with a venture capital market that is becoming increasingly risk-averse. In Germany, there has been a reluctance to invest in capital-intensive deep tech companies for years. While the number of corporate insolvencies rose to 4,187 in the first quarter of 2025, an increase of one percent compared to the same quarter of the previous year, the situation for startups worsened dramatically. In 2025, 336 startups filed for insolvency, around 17 percent more than in the previous year and a staggering 85 percent more than in 2022. The German startup landscape is developing into a two-tier system: A select few companies, primarily in the defense and artificial intelligence sectors, receive millions in venture capital and achieve valuations in the billions, while the majority struggle against insolvency.

The end of government support measures following the COVID-19 pandemic, significantly increased interest rates, and a general risk aversion have fundamentally altered the capital landscape. After years of adhering to the "growth at all costs" mantra, venture capitalists, private equity investors, and exit markets are sending a clear message: only startups with positive cash flow are investable. This shift is a direct response to changed macroeconomic conditions. While just a few years ago high growth rates were accepted even with increasing losses, today the motto is profitability over growth.

For German Bionic, this presented a paradoxical dilemma: To achieve profitability, the company would have had to accelerate its international expansion and realize economies of scale. This, however, required additional capital. To acquire this additional capital, investors would have needed to see a clear prospect of imminent profitability. While the planned break-even point in the summer of 2026 was within reach, investors were apparently no longer willing to provide the bridge financing. The positive sales figures and the dynamically growing market were insufficient to secure confidence in the final financing round. When the promised investments were withdrawn at short notice, the whole house of cards collapsed.

Scale-up financing: The forgotten gap in the German innovation ecosystem

The insolvency of German Bionic highlights a structural problem that has long been recognized in German startup and innovation policy but is only inadequately addressed: the scale-up financing gap. While various programs exist for early-stage financing and capital is also available for established medium-sized companies, Germany suffers from a glaring lack of growth capital for companies in the critical phase between product validation and profitable mass production. Despite increased government involvement, investment volumes differ significantly from those in other countries such as the USA or China, and venture capitalists are considerably more risk-averse.

European deeptech startups face the paradoxical situation of receiving funding earlier and earlier, while their technological maturity is simultaneously decreasing. A study by First Momentum on the European deeptech market reveals significant shifts: In 2025, not a single pre-seed deal had generated revenue, compared to 11.5 percent in 2024. At the same time, 80 percent of pre-seed companies are in the concept or lab demonstration phase, compared to 60 percent the previous year. Funding volume is increasing while the technological maturity is being reached earlier. This means that while companies receive capital early on, they then run out of funding in later stages when their capital requirements increase dramatically.

The study also documents the increasing professionalization of founding teams: 90 percent of founders in pre-seed rounds hold relevant doctorates, and 42 percent have more than five years of industry experience. Nevertheless, revenue plays a subordinate role even in later financing phases: 30 percent of Series B companies are not yet generating any revenue, and only 29 percent of Series A startups have established a repeatable sales process. These figures illustrate that deep tech companies have fundamentally different development cycles than software startups. The valuation logic that works in the software industry cannot simply be transferred to hardware-centric business models.

This creates a fatal dynamic for scale-ups: To achieve profitability, they must cut costs and reduce expenses. However, cost-cutting measures lead to weaker growth, which in turn deters investors. The example of Anyline, which laid off up to 40 percent of its workforce in 2025 and abandoned its venture capital financing model, exemplifies this dilemma. Many scale-ups resort to drastic cuts to achieve profitability within 12 to 18 months. While these measures may seem operationally necessary, they create a new problem: Without growth, startups are unattractive to investors.

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The lessons from Lilium: When billions in investment aren't enough

The insolvency of German Bionic joins a series of spectacular bankruptcies of promising German high-tech companies. The case of Lilium, the Munich-based air taxi developer, shows particularly striking parallels. Founded in 2015, Lilium had raised around €1.5 billion in investor funding since its inception and was considered one of Europe's most ambitious aviation startups. The company developed an electric air taxi capable of vertical takeoff and landing, with planned ranges of up to 400 kilometers. Despite this enormous capital base, Lilium was forced to file for insolvency for the first time in October 2024 because it could no longer pay wages.

A takeover by the investor consortium Mobile Uplift Corporation failed despite a signed purchase agreement and a promised €200 million in fresh capital, as the pledged financing never materialized. A second insolvency followed in February 2025. The parallel to German Bionic is striking: here, too, investments were promised but never came. Slovakian entrepreneur Marian Bocek repeatedly assured investors that €150 million would be transferred, but the money never arrived. Insiders suspect that Bocek himself lacked the funds or that his own investors withdrew their support.

The Lilium case reveals that even billions of euros are insufficient if the business model fails to generate viable revenue early on. The aircraft never reached mass production, despite years of development. The complex insolvency structure, with its multiple legally separate entities, further complicated the search for solutions. Ultimately, the patents—over 300 intellectual property rights related to high-voltage systems, battery management systems, flight control technology, and electric propulsion systems—were sold to the US competitor Archer Aviation. The intellectual property, into which €1.5 billion had been invested, was transferred abroad.

This development illustrates a fundamental problem: Europe, and Germany in particular, invests considerable sums in the development of future technologies, but fails to guide these companies to commercial maturity. The critical juncture between technological validation and profitable scaling becomes a breaking point. While patient capital is readily available in the US and China, financing even during extended periods of hardship, in Europe, funding dries up as soon as the first difficulties arise. The consequence: technologies and know-how migrate, often to international competitors who then reap the benefits of European research and development.

Structural change and automation: The macroeconomic perspective

Despite the failure of individual companies, Germany is undergoing a profound structural transformation towards automation and robotics. In 2024, German industry installed approximately 27,000 new industrial robots, nearly matching the previous year's record. With 40 percent of all factory robots in the European Union, Germany continues to dominate the continental robotics market. Robot density stands at 415 industrial robots per 10,000 employees, placing it third internationally, behind only South Korea and Singapore. The total number of operational robots reached 278,900, an increase of four percent compared to the previous year.

These figures demonstrate the high level of automation in the German economy and its pioneering role in Europe. Particularly noteworthy is the growth in the metalworking industry, with an increase of 23 percent to 6,000 installed robots. The chemical and plastics industries, with a 71 percent increase and 3,100 installed units, also show that the potential for growth in robotics is far from exhausted. Service robotics is growing significantly faster than traditional industrial robotics, at 30 percent, opening up new opportunities, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Collaborative robots have proven to be game-changers, as they can work safely alongside humans, are easy to program, and offer flexible deployment options.

Revenue in the German robotics market is projected to reach approximately US$4.5 billion by 2025, with service robotics accounting for the largest share. Demand for automation solutions is steadily increasing in sectors such as manufacturing, healthcare, and logistics, driven in part by demographic shifts and the resulting skills shortage. The logistics industry is poised for a paradigm shift in the coming years, fueled by advanced robotics and artificial intelligence.

Against this backdrop, the failure of German Bionic appears all the more paradoxical: The company developed precisely the technologies that the market needed and demanded. The macroeconomic conditions pointed to success: increasing automation, an acute shortage of skilled workers, an aging workforce, and rising healthcare costs due to musculoskeletal disorders. However, a gap exists between societal need and individual willingness to pay. Investment cycles in industry are long, procurement processes complex, and the amortization periods for exoskeletons must be calculable for potential customers. A Cray X cost up to €40,000, representing a considerable investment that would only pay off over several years through reduced sick days and increased productivity.

The role of public funding: Between aspiration and reality

The involvement of public and semi-public investors in German Bionic raises fundamental questions about the effectiveness of government-funded innovation. The Growth Fund Bavaria, supported by LfA Förderbank Bayern and Bayern Kapital GmbH, invested in the company with the stated intention of specifically promoting Bavarian startups with highly innovative business models. The European Investment Bank provided €15 million in venture debt financing, supported by the InvestEU program. EU Commissioner for Economic Affairs Paolo Gentiloni emphasized that InvestEU plays a crucial role across Europe in helping companies access the financing they need for innovative research and development.

Despite this public support, which together with private investments totaled over €35 million, German Bionic could not be saved. This raises the question of whether public funding programs are structured in such a way as to actually support companies until they reach commercial maturity, or whether they merely postpone the point of failure. The EIB typically offers venture debt financing between €5 million and €50 million, and the fee is based on the equity risk of the companies. Venture debt loans are repayable at maturity and complement existing venture capital financing without diluting the founders' equity stakes.

This model only works, however, if companies actually reach break-even and can repay the loans from operating cash flow. If the final financing round fails, as in the case of German Bionic, public loans also become non-performing. The question then arises: Should public investors be able to step in during critical phases and help companies through lean periods, even if private investors withdraw? Or would this lead to a misallocation of public funds, since the market is apparently signaling that the business model is not viable?

Experience with MIG AG demonstrates that successful venture capital investments are possible. Their early investment in BioNTech, at the time €13.5 million, generated distributions of over €600 million to MIG fund investors. This illustrates the fundamental principle of venture capital: the few successful investments must generate such high returns that they more than compensate for the numerous failures. However, public investors operate according to different principles than private funds. They cannot simply wait for one big exit but must demonstrate a high success rate to justify their existence.

Insolvency administrators and restructuring prospects: The rocky road forward

The Augsburg District Court appointed attorney Oliver Schartl of the law firm Müller-Heydenreich Bierbach & Partners as the provisional insolvency administrator. Schartl, an experienced restructuring expert, faces the task of securing the company's economic viability and protecting its existing assets. According to the company, operations with approximately 70 employees continue without interruption. German Bionic states that the insolvency will have no impact on existing systems in the market or ongoing customer projects. These statements are intended to reassure customers and signal that the company could continue operating as a whole.

The chances of a successful restructuring depend on several factors: First, an investor must be found who is willing to inject fresh capital and take over the company. Second, the operating business must actually be as robust as management claims. The positive revenue trend and the dynamically growing market suggest that a viable business model exists. Third, it must be clarified how to handle the existing liabilities, in particular the EIB loan. The European Investment Bank, as the creditor, will have to assess whether continuing its involvement makes sense or whether claims need to be written off.

Ideally, a strategic investor will be found who can integrate German Bionic's technology into their product portfolio or continue the company as an independent entity. Given the growing market for exoskeletons, international competitors or companies from the automation sector could be interested. It's also conceivable that a consortium of existing investors could form, restructure the company, and continue operating it with reduced capital requirements. The alternative would be a breakup, in which patents and technologies are sold off, as happened with Lilium.

Cross-sectoral implications: What does this mean for Germany's innovative capacity?

The insolvency of German Bionic is not an isolated event, but part of a worrying pattern. In 2025, numerous German high-tech startups had to file for bankruptcy, including Evum Motors in the electric commercial vehicle sector, the Berlin-based charging startup Jucr, and the care startup Kenbi. These developments illustrate that even innovative business models are not immune to the challenges of raising capital. The German startup scene is experiencing a massive wave of bankruptcies, which is not sparing even flagship companies, despite significant investments in recent years.

The business climate within the highly heterogeneous startup sector is as poor as it has been since the pandemic. Almost half of all startups now use artificial intelligence at the core of their products, demonstrating that technological innovation alone is insufficient. Funding is increasingly concentrated in a few sectors, particularly defense and AI, while capital-intensive hardware companies are struggling to find investors. This development poses significant risks to Germany's industrial base.

Germany has historically been strong in the development and production of physical products, from machinery and vehicles to precision instruments. This expertise is at risk of being lost if hardware startups systematically fail and investors focus on purely digital business models. While the density of robots in German industry may be high, these robots increasingly come from foreign manufacturers. If European technology leaders like German Bionic fail, it opens the door for foreign competitors. The global exoskeleton market will not disappear simply because a European supplier is out of business. Demand will remain, and other companies, possibly from the US or Asia, will fill the gap.

This has far-reaching consequences for Europe's technological sovereignty. The European Union has adopted the High-Tech Agenda Germany to make the country a leading location for new technologies. The German government is realigning its research, technology, and innovation policy with the aim of achieving greater added value, competitiveness, and sovereignty. However, if promising companies fail during the critical growth phase, this strategy remains incomplete. The focus on six key technologies—artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, microelectronics, biotechnology, fusion, and climate-neutral energy production, as well as technologies for climate-neutral mobility—is the right approach, but implementation is hampered by a funding gap.

Options for action and reform perspectives: What needs to be done

To prevent future cases like German Bionic, structural reforms are needed in the German and European innovation ecosystems. First, the scale-up financing gap must be closed. The European Commission is planning a Scale-up Europe fund, to be established as part of the European Innovation Council's fund in cooperation with the private sector, which aims to close the financing gap for technology-intensive scale-ups. This fund is expected to launch in 2026. Crucially, it must actually provide sufficient growth capital with sufficient patience.

Secondly, public investors must be able to invest counter-cyclically. When private investors withdraw during difficult periods, public funds should be able to step in to help promising companies weather tough times. This requires appropriate mandates and risk budgets. The European Investment Bank has the financial resources in principle, but its risk appetite is limited. Increasing EU budget guarantees under InvestEU could enhance its risk capacity.

Thirdly, better coordination between different funding instruments is needed. German Bionic received support from the Bavarian Growth Fund, the European Investment Bank, and private investors. However, it appears that they failed to develop a coherent financing strategy across multiple funding rounds. A structured program that supports companies from the seed phase to exit, with defined milestones and reliable follow-up financing, could increase the success rate.

Fourth, public procurement should be used more extensively as a tool to support innovative companies. Exoskeletons could be deployed in public institutions such as hospitals, nursing homes, or municipal depots. Reliable public contracts would generate predictable revenue and signal to private customers that the technology is mature. The US systematically uses public procurement to promote startups, particularly in the defense sector. Europe could develop similar mechanisms.

Fifth, Germany's corporate culture needs to become more innovation-friendly. The high risk aversion, both among investors and customers, hinders the diffusion of new technologies. Exoskeletons may be technically mature, but as long as companies hesitate to adopt them, the market remains limited. Tax incentives, depreciation allowances, or subsidies could increase investment readiness. Cultural factors also play a role: In the US, a startup's failure is seen as a learning opportunity, while in Germany it is often perceived as a personal failure. This attitude must change if Germany wants to promote innovation.

An avoidable failure with symbolic power

The insolvency of German Bionic is more than just the failure of a single company. It is a symptom of deeper structural deficiencies in the European innovation system. A technologically excellent company with a relevant product, prominent investors, public funding, and positive sales growth failed because the final financing round fell through at the crucial stage. This reveals that the interplay between private investors, public funding bodies, and the market is not functioning. The scale-up financing gap, the lack of patient capital, and the low risk appetite of German investors create a toxic mix that drives promising companies into insolvency.

The macroeconomic environment points to a thriving market for exoskeletons. Demographic change, the shortage of skilled workers in physically demanding professions, and rising healthcare costs due to musculoskeletal disorders are creating a structural need. Robot density in Germany is steadily increasing, and automation is progressing rapidly. However, if German companies cannot serve these markets due to a lack of capital, foreign competitors will fill the gap. Europe's technological sovereignty is gradually eroding, company by company.

The lessons from German Bionic are clear: Technological excellence alone is not enough. A coherent financing ecosystem is needed to support companies from idea to profitability. Public funding must be used more strategically, with longer time horizons and a greater appetite for risk. Private investors must become more patient and accept that hardware startups have different development cycles than software companies. And customers must be willing to adopt innovative technologies early on to enable companies to scale.

Whether German Bionic will get a second chance will become clear in the coming months. The provisional insolvency administrator will examine whether restructuring is possible or whether the company must be broken up. In the best-case scenario, an investor will be found who will continue the founders' vision and lead the company to profitability. In the worst-case scenario, patents and know-how will go abroad, and 70 highly qualified employees will lose their jobs. Regardless of the outcome, the insolvency of German Bionic remains a stark reminder of the fragility of the German innovation ecosystem and the urgent need for structural reforms. The next generation of deep tech startups will be watching closely what becomes of German Bionic and whether Europe is capable of protecting its innovators, or whether they would be better advised to establish their companies directly in Silicon Valley or Shenzhen.

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