EU surveillance plans and Germany's veto: How the German government overturns the controversial EU chat control

What is chat control and why is it the focus?

The so-called chat control law is a controversial European Union bill aimed at combating the spread of child sexual abuse material online. But what exactly does this term mean, and why is it dividing Europe?

Chat control is a planned EU regulation to prevent and combat child sexual abuse, which has been under negotiation since 2022. The official name is "Child Sexual Abuse Material/CSAM Regulation," but the term "chat control" has become common because the regulation would screen private communication in messaging services.

The core of the proposal stipulates that providers of messaging and hosting services such as WhatsApp, Signal, Telegram, or Threema could be required to automatically scan all messages, photos, and videos from their users for potential child abuse material. This would be done using so-called "client-side scanning" – a technology that checks content on users' devices before it is encrypted and sent.

How would chat control work technically?

The technical implementation of chat control is primarily based on client-side scanning (CSS), a process that would bring about fundamental changes in the way we understand private communication. But how exactly would this technology work?

Client-side scanning means installing software directly on the user's smartphone or computer that checks all content before it is sent. Specifically, this would mean that every photo, every video, and every file would be analyzed by algorithms and artificial intelligence before encryption. The technology would both detect known abuse images using digital fingerprints and attempt to identify new, previously unknown content.

This is particularly problematic for end-to-end encrypted services like Signal, WhatsApp, or Threema, which previously guaranteed that only the sender and recipient had access to the messages. To implement chat control, these services would have to implement client-side scanning before encryption, which would fundamentally undermine the security promises of these services.

In addition to detecting visual material, the technology is also intended to detect so-called "grooming" – the deliberate initiation of sexual contact with minors via the internet. For this purpose, algorithms would analyze text messages and detect suspicious communication patterns, meaning the content of text messages could also be monitored.

What positions do the various EU institutions take?

Opinions on the planned chat control are sharply divided within the various EU institutions, leading to a complex political struggle. These differing viewpoints highlight the challenge of finding a compromise between child protection and fundamental rights.

The EU Commission, under Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson, introduced the original proposal in 2022 and continues to support the idea of ​​mandatory chat monitoring. The Commission argues that without such measures, the spread of child abuse material online cannot be effectively combated, especially since more than half of such content is hosted in the EU.

The European Parliament, however, has taken a much more critical stance. As early as November 2023, the responsible Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) adopted a position largely rejecting the Commission's surveillance plans. Instead, Parliament demands that private messages should not be screened without cause and that encrypted services should be protected from chat monitoring. Targeted surveillance measures should only be possible in cases of concrete suspicion and a court order.

In the EU Council, where the governments of the member states are represented, there has so far been no unified position. Countries such as France, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, and Ireland generally support the original Commission proposal. Other member states, particularly Germany, have expressed concerns. Several attempts to vote on the proposal have failed because a sufficient majority could not be achieved.

Why does Germany reject chat control?

Germany's opposition to chat control is based on fundamental constitutional convictions, which were clearly articulated by the Federal Minister of Justice. The German position reflects a clear prioritization between child protection and fundamental rights.

Federal Justice Minister Stefanie Hubig (SPD) stated unequivocally on October 8, 2025: "Unjustified chat monitoring must be taboo in a constitutional state. Private communication must never be subject to general suspicion." This statement highlights the core of German concerns: blanket surveillance of all citizens without specific suspicion contradicts constitutional principles.

The minister further emphasized that the state should not force messaging services like WhatsApp or Signal to "mass-scan messages for suspicious content before sending them." Germany will "not agree to such proposals at the EU level," Hubig said. At the same time, she made clear that Germany certainly wants to take action against child pornography, but "even the worst crimes do not justify surrendering basic civil rights."

The CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the Bundestag also opposed random chat monitoring. Parliamentary group leader Jens Spahn (CDU) compared the planned measure to opening all letters: "It would be like opening all letters as a precautionary measure and checking whether there's anything illegal in them." This analogy illustrates how the CDU/CSU assesses the disproportionate nature of the planned measure.

The German position is supported by the coalition agreement, in which the government committed to ensuring the confidentiality of private communications "in principle." This position is particularly important because, as the most populous EU member state, Germany has an influential voice in the Council.

What impact would a German rejection have on the EU vote?

Germany's position on chat control could have a decisive influence on the fate of the entire EU regulation. As the EU's largest member state, Germany plays a key role in the negotiations.

Without Germany's approval, the current proposal of the Danish EU Council Presidency is unlikely to gain a majority in the EU Council of Ministers. This was already clear during the vote scheduled for October 14, 2025, where German opposition put the plans on the rocks. Since Germany is one of the most populous member states, the German government's stance is considered particularly influential.

Before the Danish Council Presidency, several EU countries had already failed in their attempt to find a majority for a chat control proposal. The repeated failed attempts to vote show that it is already difficult to achieve the necessary majority even without Germany. Germany's clear rejection now makes it even more unlikely that the proponents will prevail.

Should an agreement be reached among the member states, the proposal would then have to be discussed in so-called trilogue negotiations with the European Parliament. The chances of chat control being adopted there are slim, as the Parliament has already adopted a negative position. A broad majority from various political groups have spoken out against chat control – a rare cross-party consensus in the European Parliament.

How do messenger services react to the chat control plans?

The reactions of messaging service providers to the planned chat control are unanimously negative, reflecting the tech industry's deep concerns about the EU plans. Companies see not only their business models threatened, but also the technical foundations of secure communication.

Signal, one of the best-known security-focused messaging services, has had the strongest reaction. Signal CEO Meredith Whittaker announced that the service would leave Europe if chat control is implemented: "If we were faced with the choice of either undermining the integrity of our encryption and our privacy guarantees or leaving Europe, we would unfortunately make the decision to leave the market." This drastic announcement highlights how incompatible Signal sees the chat control plans with its own security commitments.

WhatsApp, the largest messaging service with billions of users, also voiced sharp criticism. A spokeswoman for Meta, WhatsApp's parent company, stated: "Despite claims to the contrary, the EU Council Presidency's latest proposal continues to undermine end-to-end encryption and endangers everyone's privacy, freedom, and digital security." WhatsApp remains committed to stronger security and believes governments around the world should do the same.

The Swiss messaging app Threema also took a clear stance against the plans. Spokesperson Philipp Rieger emphasized: "We remain firmly opposed to mass surveillance in any form. Just as confidential conversations can be conducted in physical space, we believe this should also be possible online." Threema argues that mass surveillance is not a suitable means of combating crime and is incompatible with democratic principles.

What are the technical and legal concerns about chat control?

Criticism of chat control extends far beyond political disagreements and encompasses fundamental technical and legal issues identified by experts worldwide. These concerns demonstrate why the implementation of chat control could be both technically problematic and legally questionable.

From a technical perspective, the biggest criticism is that client-side scanning would fundamentally undermine end-to-end encryption. Encryption experts warn that there is no such thing as "a little backdoor"—once scanning systems are installed on devices, there is no longer any technical way to restrict their use. These systems could be modified or extended through simple configuration changes via remote updates, making them potential gateways for cybercriminals or authoritarian governments.

Another technical problem is the high error rates of the algorithms used. AI-based detection systems are prone to errors and often lead to false positives. This means that even completely harmless content, such as family photos or vacation pictures, could be falsely classified as suspicious. The technical differentiation between legal and illegal content, such as family photos or vacation photos with children, remains unresolved.

Legally, the chat control plans conflict with the fundamental rights enshrined in the EU Charter. The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) and the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) have already warned that the regulation would violate Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which guarantee the right to private life and the protection of personal data. Mass surveillance without cause would place all citizens under general suspicion, without any specific reason for suspicion.

Data protection experts also criticize the fact that the planned discovery orders provide for the "reading of all users' private communications" without adequate oversight by data protection authorities. This contradicts fundamental data protection principles of proportionality and purpose limitation.

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What alternatives are there to chat control?

Given the massive criticism of the planned chat control, the question arises as to what alternatives exist to protect children from sexual abuse online without jeopardizing the fundamental rights of all citizens. Various stakeholders have already put forward concrete proposals for less invasive approaches.

The European Parliament has already drafted a counterproposal that would replace suspicion-independent mass surveillance with targeted measures. Instead of random chat monitoring, targeted surveillance would only be permitted on individuals or groups based on specific suspicion and a court order. This approach would uphold the constitutional principle of proportionality while still enabling effective investigations.

A key component of alternative approaches is the maintenance of voluntary detection measures by service providers. Many platforms, such as Google, Amazon, and various email services, already conduct voluntary scans to identify child abuse material. These proven mechanisms could be secured through a permanent legal basis without introducing a monitoring requirement.

Preventive measures could be another important focus. These include intensified awareness and education programs for children, young people, and parents about the dangers of cybergrooming. Improving reporting channels and raising awareness of warning signs could help ensure that suspicious contacts are identified and reported earlier.

Technical improvements to existing systems also offer alternatives to mass surveillance. Instead of screening all communication, expanded reporting mechanisms, better age verification systems, and improved moderation in public areas of platforms could be implemented. These measures would target the areas where most contact initiation occurs without compromising private communication.

How do child protection organizations assess chat control?

The assessment of chat control by child protection organizations is complex and reveals different perspectives, all of which pursue the goal of child protection but see different paths to achieving it. These organizations face the dilemma of demanding effective protection without jeopardizing other important rights.

Some international child protection organizations generally support increased measures against online child abuse. Thorn, an organization specializing in technological solutions to combat child abuse, welcomes the EU Commission's risk-based approach. It argues that the lack of legal certainty represents "a key obstacle to progress in the global fight against the dissemination of child sexual abuse material (CSAM) online" and creates "serious detection gaps."

Eurochild, a European network of child protection organizations, has spoken out in favor of the CSA regulation, but at the same time criticizes that technical and legal feasibility should not serve as an excuse "to look the other way." The organization calls on EU politicians to enable technical and legal feasibility instead of abandoning the plans.

However, other child protection organizations have raised concerns about the proportionality of the measures. The Working Group for Child and Youth Services (AGJ) and other German organizations have pointed out in statements that effective child protection does not necessarily require mass surveillance. They emphasize that existing measures, such as the Digital Services Act, contain important child protection provisions that still need to be fully implemented.

It is also critically noted that few child rights organizations were consulted during the development of the chat control plans and that the analysis lacks a child rights-based approach. This raises the question of whether the proposed measures are truly in the best interests of children or whether they would disproportionately impact other children's rights, such as the right to privacy.

What economic impact would chat control have?

The planned chat control would have significant economic repercussions for various sectors of the digital economy, with small and medium-sized enterprises being particularly affected. These economic consequences could weaken Europe's position in the global tech competition.

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) would be most affected by compliance costs. Unlike large technology companies like Meta or Google, SMEs often lack the financial and technical resources to develop and maintain complex monitoring mechanisms. Compliance with chat control regulations would incur disproportionate costs or even force SMEs to exit the market.

This is particularly problematic for European messaging service providers, which often build their market position on offering the highest levels of data protection and privacy. Services like Threema, which originates from Switzerland, or other European providers would no longer be able to fulfill their core value proposition if they were required to implement surveillance technologies. This would give a competitive advantage to US Big Tech companies that already have the necessary infrastructure.

Signal's announcement that it is leaving Europe is a prime example of the drastic market changes that would be expected. Millions of European users would lose their most secure communication channel. This could result in a migration to less secure alternatives or force users to switch to services outside of EU jurisdiction.

Chat control also contradicts other EU initiatives aimed at strengthening Europe's digital sovereignty. The EU has invested significantly in cybersecurity initiatives such as NIS2, the Cyber ​​Resilience Act, and the Cybersecurity Act, all of which recognize encryption as essential to Europe's digital independence. A simultaneous weakening of encryption through chat control would undermine these efforts and make Europe more vulnerable to cyberattacks.

What might the future of chat control look like?

The future of the Chat Control Regulation depends on various political and legal developments, with the current majority opposing its adoption in its originally planned form. Nevertheless, several scenarios remain conceivable.

The most likely scenario at present is a failure or a significant weakening of the original plans. With Germany's clear opposition and the European Parliament's already negative stance, the necessary majority for the controversial surveillance measures is lacking. Even if the Council were to adopt a watered-down version, it would have to be agreed upon in the trilogue negotiations with the Parliament and the Commission, where further weakening is likely.

An alternative scenario would be a fundamental reorientation of the regulation along the lines proposed by Parliament. This would mean completely abolishing indiscriminate mass surveillance and replacing it with targeted, court-ordered surveillance measures based on specific suspicion. Such a solution could gain broad support and reconcile effective child protection with the protection of fundamental rights.

It is also possible that the negotiations will be postponed indefinitely, as has happened several times already. In this case, the existing legal situation, which already allows voluntary detection measures by providers, would remain in force. The current exemption from the e-Privacy Directive, which allows providers to voluntarily detect and report child sexual abuse, could be extended.

If chat control were to be adopted in a significantly weakened form, legal challenges before the European Court of Justice would be likely. Threema already assumes that chat control, in its currently promoted form, is incompatible with EU fundamental rights and would ultimately be struck down by the ECJ. Such proceedings could take years and would create additional legal uncertainty.

What does this mean for Europe’s digital future?

The debate over chat control is more than just a dispute over a single regulation—it raises fundamental questions about Europe's digital future and the relationship between security and freedom in the digital age. The decisions made now could have long-term implications for Europe's position in the digital world.

A key aspect is the question of Europe's digital sovereignty. While the EU is trying to achieve technological independence with initiatives such as the Digital Services Act, the GDPR, and various cybersecurity laws, chat control would undermine these efforts. Weakening encryption would make Europe more vulnerable to cyberattacks and could damage trust in European technology companies.

The debate also highlights the tensions between different value systems within the EU. While some member states are willing to sacrifice fundamental rights for greater security, others, like Germany, insist on protecting privacy. These differing approaches reflect deeper differences in the assessment of surveillance and state control.

For the tech industry, the chat control debate could lead to a migration of companies from Europe. If secure communication can no longer be guaranteed in Europe, both companies and users could switch to services in other jurisdictions. This would significantly damage Europe's ambitions to become a leading center for digital innovation.

At the same time, a failure of chat control could send an important signal for the defense of fundamental digital rights. It would demonstrate that not every surveillance measure is acceptable, even in the name of child protection, and that constitutional principles also apply in the digital space. This could establish Europe as a model for other regions that must make similar trade-offs between security and freedom.

The debate over chat control is unlikely to be the last of its kind. As digitalization progresses, situations will repeatedly arise in which security interests and fundamental rights must be balanced. The way Europe deals with chat control could set a precedent for future conflicts of this kind and lay the foundations for Europe's digital value system.

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