Edirpa: rockets, tanks, ammunition: the trick, why 20 EU countries suddenly buy weapons together

Edirpa: Analysis of a European instrument to strengthen the defense industry

With the EDIRPA program, the European Union uses a clever financial incentive to fix a long-term weakness: the fragmented procurement of armaments. Instead of acting as a buyer themselves, this short -term program encourages Member States to join in groups and jointly acquire defense goods such as rocket defense systems or ammunition. The calculation behind it is clear: large orders save money, improve military cooperation through compatible systems and strengthen European industry. Edirpa is not the marketplace itself, but rather the reward for joint purchase - because the EU reimburses part of the complex administrative costs as a bonus to the cooperating countries.

Edirpa is a short -term incentive program that promotes exactly that: cooperation when buying ammunition or rocket defense. The trick: The countries, currently 20 are involved in five projects, buy and pay for weapons themselves. However, the EU rewards its cooperation by reimbursing part of the administrative costs. So Edirpa is not a common weapon shop, but a bonus program that is rewarded with the additional effort for coordination and is supposed to make Europe's defense more powerful.

Strategic context and historical classification

What is the geopolitical trigger for the creation of Edirpa and how did the war in Ukraine change European defense policy?

The creation of the law to strengthen the European defense industry through joint procurement (Edirpa) is a direct and immediate consequence of the profound change in the European security architecture, which was triggered by the large -scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia on February 24, 2022. This event acted as a geopolitical shock and "turning point", which forced the European Union to fundamentally rethink its decades of attitude in defense policy. The European Council immediately called for specific measures to react to the new threat situation, which prompted the European Commission to propose a number of emergency instruments, including Edirpa to specifically strengthen the European defense industry.

The central knowledge from the first months of the war was the "return of the industrial war". The type and extent of the conflict, characterized by high intensity, massive material wear and enormous consumption of ammunition, relentlessly revealed the unpreparedness of most European armed forces and their industrial basis. For decades, the European defense industry was geared towards "craftsmanship" in peace, which specialized in the production of highly complex systems in small quantities, but not in the industrial mass production required for a large conflict. This structural weakness led to an acute crisis because the Member States tried to support Ukraine and at the same time replenish their own, quickly dwindling inventory.

Against this background, the main goal was clearly defined by Edirpa and related initiatives: to address the "most urgent and most critical defense needs" of the EU member states. The focus was on the closure of ability gaps, which had become particularly clear due to the massive support of Ukraine and the new threat situation on the eastern flank of the EU.

This process marks a fundamental change in the strategic thinking of the EU. Politicians shifted from a primary focus on crisis management and expedition missions to the requirements of territorial defense and the ability to conduct a highly intensive conflict. Strategic documents such as the European Defense Industry Strategy (EDIS) explicitly formulate this paradigm shift and aim to structurally rebuild European defense and to support the support for Ukraine on a sustainable basis.

Although the war in Ukraine was the immediate trigger for Edirpa, the instrument must be understood in response to a deeply rooted chronic disease of the European defense sector. The weaknesses - fragmentation, underfunding and lack of cooperation - have been known and well documented for decades. The war did not create these problems, but disclosed them in a brutal and undeniable manner and thus forced the political will to act. Edirpa's conception as a short -term emergency instrument underlines this character: it is a reactive measure to treat the acute symptoms of a long -term structural illness.

What structural weaknesses in the European Defense Industry and Cooperation existed before 2022 that Edirpa tried to remedy?

The creation of Edirpa was not only a reaction to the war in Ukraine, but also the attempt to tackle profound and long -existing structural deficits in the European defense sector. These weaknesses have undermined the EU's ability to act as a coherent security player for decades.

1. Chronic sub -investments: After the end of the Cold War, the European countries benefited from a "peace dividend" that led to drastic cuts in defense budgets. This phase of the lower investment was long and profound. The European Commission estimates that the Member States would have spent an additional 1.1 trillion euros for defense between 2006 and 2020 if they had consistently complied with the NATO target of 2 % of the gross domestic product (GDP). This deficit led to the atrophy of important military skills, to outdated equipment and to dangerously low inventory on ammunition and spare parts.
2. Penenting fragmentation: The European defense market is not an internal market, but a mosaic of 27 national markets that are often sealed off by regulatory and protectionist barriers. This fragmentation leads to massive inefficiency: unnecessary doubles in research, development and production, a variety of competing weapons systems for the same tasks and a resulting lack of interoperability between the armed forces of the Member States. Although EU guidelines for the allocation of defense orders exist, these are often avoided by calling national security interests (Article 346 TFEU) to protect domestic industry.
3. The "costs of non-Europe": the economic consequences of this lack of cooperation are immense. A study by the European Parliament from 2013 put the annual costs through double work and inefficiency at around 26 billion euros. Younger analyzes assume even higher potential savings that are between 24.5 and 75.5 billion euros per year, with some estimates even of up to 120 billion euros. A report from 2025 estimates the "costs of non-Europe" in the defense area to 17 to 58 billion euros annually. In fact, this money is wasted by a lack of coordination.
4. Supporting the common procurement: Despite clear political goals that were determined as part of the European Defense Agency (EDA) and the constant structured cooperation (Pesco), the joint procurement of armaments remained the exception. The goal of performing 35 % of the procurement projects was by far missed; The proportion recently dropped to 18 %. This is a clear indication of an ongoing "defense industrial nationalism", in which national interests and securing domestic jobs have priority against collective efficiency and military effectiveness.

The history of European defense integration is characterized by this area of tension. Initiatives such as the failed European defense community (EVG) 1954, but also the gradual establishment of the common security and defense policy (GSVP), EDA (2004) and Pesco (2017) created important basics, but were never able to overcome the core problem of fragmentation.

Edirpa embodies the fundamental tension between the economic logic of integration and the political primacy of national sovereignty in defense. The economic arguments for closer cooperation are overwhelming and proven by numerous studies. It promises efficiency, interoperability and a better price-performance ratio. The political reality, however, is that defense remains a core attribute of national sovereignty. Member States are hesitating to hand over control of their forces and their defense industry. Edirpa was designed as a compromise that navigates this tension. The instrument does not prescribe joint procurement and does not create a supranational procurement agency. Instead, it uses the EU budget to offer financial incentive-the reimbursement of administrative costs-to promote voluntary cooperation between sovereign states. This approach, which aims to reconcile national behavior through financial incentives with a common European goal without feeling the national skills, is a classic method of the EU. He tries to make the economically rational choice (cooperation) politically tasty.

Edirpa - the instrument in detail

What are the core destinations, the budget and the term of Edirpa?

Edirpa was designed as a targeted, short -term instrument in order to react to the challenges tightened by the war in Ukraine. Its architecture reflects the urgency of the situation and the need to achieve quickly tangible results.

Core goals

Edirpa's goals are four times and address both the demand and the offer page of the European defense market:

• Promotion of cooperation: The primary goal is to move the Member States for cooperation in the joint procurement of defense goods in order to cover the most urgent and critical needs.
• Strengthening the industrial basis (Edtib): The bundling of demand is to strengthen the European defense technology and industrial basis (EDTIB). Bundled major orders offer industry the necessary planning security to invest in the expansion of its production capacities.
• Increasing interoperability: The joint procurement of identical systems by several armed forces automatically leads to a higher military interoperability, which improves the ability to carry out joint operations.
• Increasing efficiency: The use of scale effects in large orders should achieve a better price-performance ratio for national defense budgets.

Budget and its reduction

Edirpa's final budget amounts to 300 million euros from the EU budget. This amount is supplemented by a contribution of around 10 million euros, which takes part in the program as an associated country.

Originally, a significantly higher budget of 500 million euros was planned for the instrument. The reduction was made to 300 million euros because funds in favor of the law to support the ammunition production (ASAP) were rededicated. This redistribution is characteristic: it shows a political prioritization in real time, in which the immediate crisis on the offer side - the acute lack of production capacities for ammunition - was classified as even more urgent than the structural problem of coordination on the demand side. While Edirpa addresses the bundling of demand, ASAP aims directly at increasing production. In view of the dramatic situation on the Ukrainian front, where the lack of artillery cables became a decisive factor, the EU decided to remedy the most direct bottleneck in the production lines first.

Duration

Edirpa is explicitly designed as a short -term and temporary instrument. It came into force on October 27, 2023 and its term is limited until December 31, 2025. This short duration underlines its character as an emergency measure, which is intended to serve as a bridge to a more permanent solution.

How does Edirpa's financing mechanism work exactly and what are reimbursable “administrative costs”?

Edirpa's financing mechanism is the core of its functioning and was deliberately designed in such a way that it deals with political hurdles and at the same time creates maximum incentives for cooperation.

Mechanism of reimbursement

It is crucial that Edirpa does not finance the defense goods himself. The costs for tanks, rockets or ammunition are still fully borne by the national households of the procuring Member States. Instead, the EU reimburses part of the costs that arise from the complexity of a common procurement. The instrument compensates for the "additional administrative costs" that arise when three or more countries negotiate a complex multinational contract instead of simply obtaining nationally.

Reimbursement rates

The amount of the reimbursement is staggered to promote certain political goals:

• The standard reimbursement rate is up to 15 % of the estimated value of the joint procurement contract.
• A bonus incentive increases this sentence to up to 20 %if the procurement has been proven to benefit small and medium-sized companies (SME) or MIDCAP companies. This should ensure that not only the large armaments companies benefit from the orders.

Definition of "administrative costs"

Although the EDIRPA regulation does not contain a final list, the definition is based on general EU practice. Administrative costs include expenditure for "general management, supervision, coordination, evaluation and reporting". In the context of a multinational armor procurement, this can be concrete:

• Personnel costs for project managers and coordinators who control cooperation between the ministries.
• Costs for legal advice on the design of complex international contracts.
• Travel expenses for coordination meetings between the nations involved.
• Costs for the development of common technical specifications and requirements.
• Costs for the joint evaluation of offers and contract monitoring.

In the event of simple national procurement, these costs are not incurred or only to a much lesser extent. Edirpa therefore specifically subsidizes the additional effort that arises from cooperation.

The lever effect

The true strength of the instrument lies in its enormous economic lever effect. The five selected projects have prompted the 300 million euros from the EU budget to make procurements with a total value of over 11 billion euros. This corresponds to a lever of more than 36: 1. It shows that a relatively small financial incentive from Brussels is sufficient to mobilize many times in national investments by reducing the hurdles for the cooperation.

This financing mechanism is a politically clever compromise. It is designed to subsidize the process of cooperation, not the product of defense. The direct financing of national armaments purchases from the EU budget would be politically extremely sensitive and would encounter the resistance of some Member States. However, one of the greatest hurdles for voluntary cooperation are the high transaction costs - the additional administrative, legal and political effort that is necessary to synchronize the procurement processes of several countries. Edirpa skillfully targets this hurdle. By offering the EU to assume part of this "costs of complexity", it reduces friction and makes the decision to cooperate more easily to justify the national ministries of defense. This enables the EU to achieve its strategic goal - promoting a common defense market by acting as an intermediary and sponsor instead of a direct buyer. It is a subsidy for "how" (the cooperation), not for the "what" (the weapon) - a subtle but decisive distinction that makes the instrument politically viable.

Which participation requirements must be fulfilled and what is the importance of the 65%component report rule in particular?

In order to gain access to Edirpa, the procurement project must meet strict criteria that aim to ensure the strategic goals of the EU. These conditions concern both the composition of the buyers and the origin of the suppliers and products.

Prerequisites for participation for the financing

• Consortium from Member States: A joint procurement must be carried out by a consortium at least three EU member states. Norway can also participate as an associated country.
• Location of the contractors: The main contractors and their essential subcontractors must be based in the EU or an associated country (Norway) and have their managing structures there.
• Control clause: A crucial criterion is that these companies may not be subject to the control of a non-associated third country or a non-associated third-country age. This clause is intended to ensure that the financial and strategic advantages of the program remain within the European defense base and not flow to companies, for example in the United States, the United Kingdom or China.

The 65%component edition rule

This rule is the industrial and security policy heart of Edirpa and has far-reaching implications.

• Requirement: In order for a defense product to be obtained as part of an EDIRPA-funded project, at least 65 % of the components of the end product, measured by the value, from the EU or associated countries (Norway) must come.
• Purpose: The rule is a clear commitment to the principle of "Buy European". It is intended to ensure that the increasing European defense spending contribute directly to strengthening the EDTIB. This promotes the strategic autonomy of the EU by reducing dependencies on external supply chains and strengthening the technological and industrial sovereignty of Europe.
• Context: This regulation is a direct reaction to the long-observed trend that European countries spend a significant part of their defense budgets for armaments from non-EU countries, especially from the USA. The rule is intended to redirect this center flow and invest in European industry.

The 65%impression rule is therefore much more than a technical regulation; It is a conscious act of industrial policy that crystallizes the tension between the aim of the strategic autonomy of the EU and the traditionally tight transatlantic defense cooperation. The strategic goal of the EU is to build up a self -sufficient and competitive defense industry (Edtib) in order to reduce dependencies. A main risk that has been identified is that an increase in European defense spending primarily benefits from the already dominant US defense industry and thus undermined the goal of the EU. The 65%rule is the primary political instrument within Edirpa to prevent this outflow and to steer the funds inwards. It acts as a protective barrier for the Edtib.

However, this creates a potential field of conflict. The rule could exclude first-class or more easily available systems from important NATO allies such as the USA or the United Kingdom from procurement. It can be perceived as protectionist in Washington and London and makes it difficult for the procurement for main European contractors who rely on global supply chains. This rule is therefore a policy declaration that prioritizes the long -term industrial goal of European autonomy, even at the risk of short -term procurement friction and political tensions with strategic partners.

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The Edirpa projects-concrete implementation

On November 14, 2024, the European Commission approved the financing of five cross-border projects that exploit the entire Edirpa budget of 300 million euros. Each project receives a funding of 60 million euros. These projects are the concrete manifestation of the Edirpa goals and cover the areas that are most urgently identified: air and rocket defense, armored platforms and ammunition. The following table gives an overview of the selected projects.

Overview of the projects funded by Edirpa

Overview of the projects funded by Edirpa - Image: Xpert.digital

As part of the Edirpa program, five significant defense projects are funded that strengthen military cooperation between different European countries. The projects include two air and rocket defense systems, two ammunition projects and a platform for armored vehicles. Each project receives EU funding of 60 million euros, with the estimated total value of the procurement of over 11 billion euros.

The Mistral project focuses on air defense very short range and combines nine countries, including France, Belgium and Denmark. The Jamie project complements this with average air defense and comprises six countries such as Germany and Austria. The CAVS project with the Patria 6 × 6 armored vehicle, in which Finland, Latvia, Sweden and Germany are involved.

The ammunition project CPOA 155mm and HE 155mm complete the project with the procurement of various and highly explosive 155 mm artillery ammunition, with countries such as the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark and Estonia. These coordinated procurement initiatives underline the growing military cooperation within Europe.

Source: Compilation based on data from the European Commission. The estimated total value refers to the combined value of all five projects.

Which five projects were approved by Edirpa and which Member States are involved?

The selection of the five projects reflects the most urgent ability gaps that were disclosed by the war in Ukraine. A total of 20 member states are involved in these projects, which underlines the broad acceptance of the instrument. For some countries, it is the first participation in a common European procurement project, which emphasizes the role of Edirpa as a catalyst for in -depth cooperation.

The projects in detail:

Air and rocket defense

• Mistral project: This project supports the joint procurement of Mistral 3 air defense systems with a very short range. Nine Member States are involved: France, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Spain, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Denmark.
• Jamie project (joint initiative for air and rocket defense in Europe): As part of this project, IRIS-T-SLM air defense systems are brought together together. The six participating states are Germany, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Austria, Estonia and Latvia.

Armored vehicles

CAVS project: This project promotes the procurement of the joint armored vehicle system (CAVS), a modern protected 6 × 6 team transporter based on the platform from the Finnish manufacturer Patria. The four nations involved are Finland, Latvia, Sweden and Germany.

ammunition

• CPOA 155mm project (joint procurement of ammunition): This is the joint procurement of various types of 155 mm artillery ammunition. Six countries cooperate in this project: the Netherlands, Italy, Poland, Lithuania, Denmark and Croatia.
• HE 155mm project: This project focuses specifically on the procurement of high-explosive 155 mm artillery ammunition. The four participants are Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and Estonia.

The portfolio of the Edirpa projects is a direct and pragmatic reaction to the military teachings that were drawn from the highly intensive conflict in Ukraine. The war is dominated by artillery and the constant threat from the air by rockets, drones and aircraft. As a result, the most urgent needs identified by military planners are multi -layered air defense and sustainable supply of artillery ammunition. The EDIRPA projects precisely depict these priorities: two projects for ammunition, two for air defense and one to replenish the stocks on armored vehicles, which were decimated by donations to Ukraine. This shows that Edirpa is not a theoretical industrial policy exercise prescribed above, but an initiative driven by the threat situation in which the project selection is dictated by the immediate and tangible realities of modern warfare on the eastern flank of Europe.

What are the technical specifications of the air and rocket defense systems Mistral 3 and Iris-T SLM procured as part of Edirpa?

The two air defense projects funded by Edirpa procure systems that play different but complementary roles in a modern, multi -layered air defense architecture. Mistral 3 is a system for close-range protection, while Iris-T SLM covers the middle distance range.

Technical comparison of the Mistral 3 and Iris-T SLM air defense systems

Technical comparison of the Mistral 3 and Iris-T SLM-Image: Xpert.digital

The technical comparison between the Mistral 3 and Iris-T SLM air defense systems shows interesting differences in their performance features. Mistral 3, manufactured by MBDA in Europe, is an air defense system of a very short range with a maximum range of about 8 km and a duty summit of around 6 km. It reaches a top speed of MACH 2.71 and has a passive infrared scene in the “Fire-and-Forsget” mode. His battle head weighs about 3 kg and contains highly explosive tungsten splinters.

In comparison, the Iris-T SLM from Diehl Defense is an air defense system medium range with significantly larger skills. It can fight goals up to 40 km away and at a height of 20 km, with a speed of round Mach 3. The system uses a GPS/index steering system with data link and a terminal iir search head. With 11.4 kg, his battle head is significantly heavier and also highly explosive.

While Mistral 3 is primarily designed for object protection and for defense mobile units against deeply flying threats such as helicopters, drones and combat aircraft, Iris-T SLM is suitable for defense area against aircraft, marching aircraft and drones at medium distance.

Source: Compilation based on manufacturer information and specialist analyzes.

The Mistral-3 system, manufactured by the European MBDA consortium, is designed for the immediate protection of troops and important facilities. As a “Fire-and-Forsget” system, the shooter can change position immediately after firing, which increases the survival ability in battle. His advanced infrared scene of the image enables him to grasp goals with a low thermal signature such as small drones or approaching rockets and is very resistant to known countermeasures.

The Iris T-SLM system from Diehl Defense offers protection in a significantly larger space. It can defend an entire region or a strategic location such as a city or an air force base. In contrast to the purely passive Mistral 3, the Iris-T-SL steering aircraft uses a combination of GPS navigation and data link updates from the ground radar during the approach phase before its own iir search head autonomously records the destination. This enables the attack on goals far outside the visibility of the starting device and a high accuracy of accuracy also against fast and agile goals.

The joint procurement of both systems by various country groups as part of Edirpa is strategically sensible because it promotes the establishment of a robust, multi -layered air defense, which is essential for the defense against the broad spectrum of modern air threats.

What are the technical features of the common armored vehicle system (CAVS) and what role does it play in European defense?

The joint armored vehicle system (CAVS) is a prime example of successful European cooperation in the field of land systems and one of the five projects funded by Edirpa. The program is based on the 6 × 6 platform of the Finnish company Patria.

Technical specifications of the Patria 6 × 6 (CAVS)

Technical specifications of the Patria 6 × 6 (CAVS) - Image: Xpert.digital

The Patria 6 × 6 is a modern bike rifle tank made of Finnish production that was designed for versatile military missions. The vehicle is manufactured by Patria and can be manufactured together in partner countries. It offers space for a crew of two to three men and eight to ten resistant infantry. Equipped with a maximum mass of 24 tons and a hydropneumatic suspension, the tank measures 7.5 meters in length, 2.9 meters in width and 2.5 meters in height.

The tank has a Stanag 4569 Level 2 tank protection, which can be upgraded to level 4 if necessary. It is powered by a Scania diesel engine with 294 kW (394 hp), which enables the vehicle a top speed of over 100 km/h on the road and 8 km/h in water. The range is approximately 700 kilometers.

A special feature of the Patria 6 × 6 is its high modularity. The vehicle can be configured flexibly for different roles, including team transport, mortar carrier and management vehicle. This versatility makes it a valuable resource for modern armed forces.

Source: Compilation based on manufacturer information and specialist analyzes.

The strategic role of the CAVS program goes beyond the technical data of the vehicle. It was initiated by Finland and Latvia and later expanded by Sweden and Germany. This makes it a prime example of a gradual growing, needs -oriented European armaments cooperation. The goal is to develop and procure a common, modern and high -mobile armored vehicle system, which can replace various outdated systems in the national armed forces, such as the German TPZ Fuchs.

The advantages of such a common program are varied:

• Cost efficiency: Larger order quantities lead to lower unit costs.
• Interoperability: The nations involved use the same platform, which significantly simplifies the joint training, maintenance and logistics as well as the use in the alliance.
• Industrial cooperation: The program includes the establishment of production and maintenance capacities in partner countries (e.g. in Latvia), which promotes the technology transfer and strengthening the national defense industries.

The funding by Edirpa underlines the political importance of this cooperation model as a model for future European armaments projects in the area.

Which types of 155 mm artillery ammunition are procured in the CPOA and HE 155mm projects and why is this ammunition so critical?

In the Ukraine War, the 155 mm artillery has proven to be the decisive weapons system on the battlefield. The conflict is characterized by intensive artillery lines that lead to an unimaginable ammunition consumption. It is estimated that both sides shoot tens of thousands of grenades a day. This immense consumption has rapidly emptied the inventory across Europe and the USA and revealed a massive gap between needs and production capacity. The refilling of these stocks and the ride of production are therefore of great priority for all NATO and EU countries. Edirpa addresses this critical need with two projects.

The two projects are complementary to cover the need comprehensive:

CPOA 155mm (joint procurement of ammunition): This project, in which the Netherlands, Italy, Poland, Lithuania, Denmark and Croatia are involved, aims at the "common procurement of different types of 155 mm artilleryemunition". This broad approach indicates that an entire portfolio of ammunition types is procured. This probably includes:

• Standard high-explosive floors (HE): The most frequently used ammunition type for general purposes.
• Righ-wide floors (extended range): variants with a special floor (Boat Tail, BT) or a gas generator (base bleed, BB), which reduces the air resistance and increases the range of approx. 25-30 km to over 40 km.
• Smoke and light floors: for camouflage your own troop movements or for nightly battle lighting.

He 155mm: This project under the leadership of Germany, in which Denmark, the Netherlands and Estonia also take part, is more specific. It focuses on the procurement of "highly explosive 155 mm artilleryemunition". This addresses the greatest and most urgent need, namely the re-filling of the stocks of standard explosive grenades that make up the main part of consumption.

Both projects pursue a double goal. On the one hand, the immediate needs of the armed forces should be covered by the procurement of large amounts of grenades. On the other hand, and this is strategically as important, the bundling of demand should send a strong and long -term signal to the European defense industry. Companies such as Rheinmetall, BAE Systems or the Czechoslovak Group (CSG) are given the necessary planning security in order to invest in the expansion of existing and building new production facilities and thus permanently increase the manufacturing capacities.

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Evaluation, criticism and future prospects

How is Edirpa's effectiveness assessed by experts, politicians and think tanks? What are the main criticisms?

Edirpa's evaluation is an ambivalent in specialist circles. On the one hand, the instrument for its design and conceptual success is praised, on the other hand, its actual effect is assessed as marginal due to its limited scope.

Positive aspects

The remarkable lever effect of the program is undisputed. With a deployment of 300 million euros from the EU budget, a joint procurement worth over 11 billion euros could be initiated. In addition, Edirpa successfully moved 20 Member States for cooperation, some of whom take part in such a project for the first time. In this regard, Edirpa fulfilled its purpose as an incentive and coordination tool and as a "proof of concept".

Main criticism

However, the overarching consensus among experts is that Edirpa is not a "game-change" for European defense ability. The criticism focuses on several key points:

• A mismatch of the order of magnitude: The main criticism is the insufficient budget. 300 million euros in incentives are considered "sparse" or "symbolic" if you are compared with the annual national defense spending of over 300 billion euros and the estimated investment backlog of over a trillion. Such a small amount is not sufficient to fundamentally change the procurement behavior of the large Member States or to solve the massive structural problems.
• A lack of political will of the Member States: Critics such as the Green MEP Hannah Neumann see the problem less in the design of the EU instruments than in the "lack of commitment" of the Member States for real cooperation. Defense policy often remains a domain of "national narcissism" in which the Member States continue to compete on the armaments market instead of obtaining together.
• Continuous structural fragmentation: Leading Think tanks such as the Center for European Reform (CER) and Bruegel indicate that initiatives like Edirpa do not solve the fundamental problems. The European defense market remains fragmented, national protectionism is rampant, and there is still no real internal market for defense goods. Edirpa sets incentives, but does not change the basic structures.

In summary, it can be said that Edirpa as an instrument is in principle well designed, but its effect is severely limited by its short -term and above all by its tiny budget in relation to the extent of the problem. It is a successful pilot project, but not a structural solution.

The primary value of Edirpa may not lie in its direct material contribution to European defense ability, but rather in its political and symbolic role as a successful "proof of concept". The material effect of 300 million euros in incentives on a market of over 300 billion euros per year, as critics rightly emphasize, is marginal. However, Edirpa has successfully shown that the EU is able to act in this area that the Member States are willing to use such an instrument (which proves the participation of 20 countries) and that the lever mechanism works (with a multiplier of over 36). This success creates political momentum. It provides the European Commission a concrete, positive case study to justify a much larger and permanent successor program. Edirpa can therefore be seen as a strategic springboard. His most important achievement is to politically demy the concept of EU-funded joint procurement and validate what it makes politically easier to argue for the much larger and structurally created European defense industry program (Edip).

How does Edirpa integrate into the landscape of other EU defense initiatives such as the European Defense Fund (EVF/EDF) and ASAP?

In order to fully understand the role of Edirpa, it must be considered in the context of the other central defense policy instruments of the EU: the European Defense Fund (EDF) and the law to support the ammunition production (ASAP). These three instruments are complementary and cover different phases of the defense industrial value chain.

Comparison of EU defense instruments: EDF, ASAP and Edirpa

Comparison of EU defense instruments: EDF, ASAP and Edirpa-Image: Xpert.digital

The European Defense Fund (EDF), the Law to support ammunition production (ASAP) and Edirpa are three significant initiatives in the area of the European defense industry, each pursuing different but complementary goals. The EDF focuses primarily on the promotion of collaborative research and development for future skills and positions itself in the upstream area. With a budget of around 8 billion euros for the period 2021-2027, he is part of the multi-year financial framework and can be compared analogously to the design of a blueprint.

The ASAP law, on the other hand, aims to start up the industrial production of ammunition and rockets. Equipped with 500 million euros, it focuses on the midstream area of the value chain and can be understood metaphorically as the construction of a factory. It is limited as a short -term emergency measure by mid -2025.

Edirpa, in turn, focuses on downstream activities and creates incentives for the common procurement of urgently needed goods. With a budget of 300 million euros and a term until December 2025, it is like a bulk order. The mechanism provides for the reimbursement of administrative costs at consortia of Member States.

Together, these three initiatives form a comprehensive strategy for strengthening European defense skills, from research to production to targeted procurement.

Source: Compilation based on documents of the European Commission and Analyzes.

European Defense Fund (EDF)

The EDF is the long -term strategic instrument of the EU to promote innovation. He was launched in 2021, before the Ukraine War escalation, and aims to develop the next generation of defense technologies through the financing of joint research and development projects. It is anchored in the EU's multi -year financial framework (MFR) and has a term of seven years.

Law to support ammunition production (ASAP)

As Edirpa, ASAP is a direct reaction to war. It is a short -term emergency instrument that solves a specific problem on the offer page: the lack of production capacities for ammunition and rockets. ASAP grants manufacturers direct financial support to expand their production lines and to eliminate bottlenecks in critical components such as explosives and propellant powder.

Edirpa

Edirpa complements ASAP by concerning the problem on the demand side. While ASAP boost production, Edirpa ensures that the Member States are bundling their orders. This not only creates efficiency, but also gives industry the planning security necessary for investments through large, predictable orders.

The trio of EDF, ASAP and Edirpa represents an evolutionary learning process for the EU. It shows the transition from a pre -war focus to long -term research and development (EDF) to a war logic that addresses the entire defense value chain: Develop (EDF) (ASAP) and procure (Edirpa). The EDF was launched in 2021 with the long -term goal of developing the next generation of defense technology. However, the war created an immediate need for existing technology in huge quantities for which the EDF was not designed. The EU then quickly developed two new, targeted emergency instruments: ASAP to remedy the industrial bottleneck on the offer page and Edirpa to solve the problem of fragmented demand. This sequence shows how the EU adjusts its political instruments in real time. It moved from a f & e-focused approach to a crisis-controlled, holistic approach that covers the entire industrial cycle. This development laid the foundation for a single, integrated program like Edip.

What is the European Defense Industry Program (Edip) and how should it continue and expand Edirpa's logic after 2025?

The European Defense Industry Program (EDIP) is the proposed long -term successor solution for short -term emergency instruments Edirpa and ASAP. It was presented in March 2024 by the European Commission as part of the more comprehensive European Defense Industry Strategy (EDIS) and is intended to close the gap that arises when emergency measures expired in 2025.

A structural approach for the future

In contrast to the reactive emergency instruments, Edip aims to permanently anchor support for the European defense industry in the EU framework. The logic of the offer side (as with ASAP) and the demand -side incentives (as with Edirpa) should bring together and expand and expand under a single, more coherent roof. The aim is to move from the crisis reaction to a structural, forward -looking policy.

Budget and time frame

The original proposal for Edip provides for a budget of 1.5 billion euros from the EU budget for the period 2025 to 2027. This is considered as a bridge financing until the beginning of the next multi -year financial framework (MFR) in 2028, in which a significantly higher budget for defense is expected.

Core destinations of Edip

Edip builds on the experience with his predecessors and expands their goals:

• Strengthening the competitiveness and responsiveness of the EDTIB.
• Ensuring the availability and supply of defense goods by building production capacities.
• Continuation of the promotion of cooperation and the joint procurement between the Member States.
• A new, important element is the targeted promotion of cooperation with Ukraine to support the reconstruction and modernization of your own defense industry.

Edip is an attempt by the EU to institutionalize its newly found role in the defense industry. It is intended to convert the ad hoc emergency measures from 2023 into a permanent feature of the institutional and budgetary architecture of the Union. While Edirpa and ASAP were created as temporary reactions to an unforeseen crisis, the proposal for Edip signals the commission that the security environment has changed permanently and that the problems of industrial capacity and procurement fragmentation require permanent, structural solution, not only temporary corrections. By proposing its own program with its own budget line, it tries to transfer the EU defense industry to the "EU Kernet business" from the field of "crisis management". This transition from Edirpa/ASAP to Edip is therefore of great importance: it marks the intended shift from a reactive to a proactive and strategic long -term role of the EU in the design of the European defense landscape.

Markus Becker

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Head of Business Development

Chairman SME Connect Defense Working Group

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Konrad Wolfenstein

I would be happy to serve as your personal advisor.

contact me under Wolfenstein ∂ Xpert.digital

call me under +49 89 674 804 (Munich)

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