
A deliberate and secret plan for decline? High taxes, low growth: What's holding Germany back as a business location – a creative image on the topic, created with AI: Xpert.Digital
No secret plan for decline: Why Germany is still losing economic momentum
Welfare state, taxes, bureaucracy: Where Germany's prosperity is at stake
More work alone is not enough: What Germany needs to change to achieve new prosperity
Germany's economic weaknesses have been known for years: high burdens on employees and businesses, an aging population, insufficient investment, slow administrative processes, and increasing funding needs for social security. Despite this, policymakers are finding it difficult to develop a coherent reform strategy. The danger doesn't necessarily lie in a sudden economic collapse. More threatening is a gradual decline in which weak growth, rising costs, and postponed decisions increasingly restrict the available options.
This does not mean that the federal government is deliberately bringing about the country's decline. Such a claim does not explain the economic problems. Rather, many decisions, which individually seem understandable, can, in their totality, make investment more difficult, make additional work less attractive, and increasingly expensive the financing of existing entitlements. Rising social security contributions increase labor costs and burden net incomes. If the economy grows only slowly at the same time, the foundation from which pensions, long-term care, healthcare, and other public services are financed narrows.
At its core, this is a conflict between growing demands and limited value creation. A welfare state, efficient infrastructure, good education, and a reliable defense are essential prerequisites for prosperity. However, they can only be sustainably financed if economic output grows in tandem – or if priorities are set elsewhere. Additional loans can postpone the timing of a decision, but they do not automatically create more caregivers, engineers, construction capacity, or administrative services.
The debate therefore demands a sober look at labor, productivity, taxes, social spending, and public investment. Fewer working hours do not necessarily mean less prosperity, provided productivity increases. Lower contributions relieve the burden on employment but do not solve the financing question if benefits remain unchanged. And higher government spending only delivers lasting economic benefits if it leads to better outcomes and is actually implemented.
The crucial question is not whether Germany faces a choice between social security and a competitive economy. The crucial question is whether both can be organized on a sustainable economic foundation. This requires more productive investment, reliable framework conditions, more efficient administrative procedures, and ways to make additional work more attractive. The central question is: How can Germany once again enable more value creation instead of repeatedly bridging existing problems with higher burdens and new financing promises?
The greatest danger is not a major collapse, but politically managed mediocrity
Germany no longer has a problem of understanding its problems. The central weaknesses of its economic standing have been known for years: high labor costs, an aging population, sluggish investment, cumbersome administrative procedures, and a welfare state whose funding needs are growing faster than its economic foundation. The crucial question, therefore, is not whether action is needed. It is why a coherent reform strategy so rarely emerges from this comprehensive description of the problems.
The notion that a federal government is deliberately orchestrating the country's economic decline is understandable as a political exaggeration, but useless as an economic explanation. It presupposes an intention that cannot be derived from unfavorable economic results. A problematic development doesn't require a secret plan. It suffices if many individually understandable decisions combine to create a system that hinders investment, makes additional work unattractive, and preferentially finances rising demands through higher taxes.
This is precisely where Germany's challenge lies. The country's economic standing is not suffering from a single misjudgment, but rather from the interplay of several burdens. High social security contributions make employment more expensive. Weak growth narrows the financial base of social security. Additional contributions, in turn, dampen net incomes and increase labor costs. If, at the same time, investments to boost productivity are neglected, a cycle develops that can reinforce itself even without dramatic individual events.
A dispassionate analysis must avoid two errors. It must not downplay real structural problems by pointing to existing strengths. But it also must not automatically treat every social benefit, every reduction in working hours, or every instance of government borrowing as a destruction of prosperity. The crucial factor is the economic context: What increases productive capacity? What merely redistributes existing income? Which expenditures prevent greater subsequent costs? And where are burdens simply shifted into the future without generating additional revenue?
The real conflict lies between growing demands and limited value creation
The long-term material prosperity of an economy depends on how many people work, how many hours they work, and how much added value is generated per hour worked. This also includes income from assets held abroad and the question of at what prices a country can sell its products internationally and import necessary goods.
These interrelationships do not invalidate political promises, but they do limit their financing. Higher pensions, better care, high-performing schools, modern infrastructure, and greater defense capabilities may be desirable for society. However, they can only be sustainably reconciled if economic output increases accordingly or if resources are forgone elsewhere.
A state can temporarily shift this limit through debt. It can distribute burdens among population groups or assign them to future taxpayers. However, it cannot create arbitrarily large additional real services simply by enacting higher financial demands. If there is a lack of caregivers, engineers, construction capacity, or efficient administrative structures, a larger budget will not automatically translate into a correspondingly larger supply.
The German distribution conflict is therefore also a productivity conflict. When economic output increases only slowly, every additional expenditure is perceived more strongly as competing with other priorities. Social policy, infrastructure, climate protection, and security then clash, even though they could be more easily financed jointly with higher growth.
The most important economic policy task, therefore, is to place greater emphasis on the creation of additional value. This does not mean ignoring distributional issues. It means taking their material prerequisites seriously.
When employment becomes more expensive without employees receiving a corresponding increase in pay
The burden on labor is a key factor in determining a company's attractiveness as a business location. Social security contributions are particularly relevant because they are directly linked to employment and the earnings subject to contributions. Employers must calculate their total personnel costs. Employees, on the other hand, primarily assess what additional net income they receive for their work.
There is a significant difference between these two amounts. This difference arises from income tax as well as employee and employer contributions. A wage increase can therefore be considerably more expensive for a company than the amount that ultimately ends up in the employee's bank account.
A long-term comparison with the early 1970s highlights a real development: Financing social security now claims a significantly larger share of earnings subject to contributions. However, a single historical total contribution rate should not be compared with current values without examining the insurance branches, benefit entitlements, and calculation rules in place at that time. The social security system has changed; among other things, additional tasks and benefit areas have been added.
Even today's financial burden cannot be precisely described for all employees with a single figure. In health insurance, supplementary contributions vary between providers. In long-term care insurance, personal characteristics play a role. Contribution assessment ceilings limit the income subject to contributions, while other employer costs are not fully captured in a simple addition of the major insurance branches.
The economic impact remains clear: if contributions increase while productivity remains unchanged, the pressure on the distribution between net wages, company profits, and employment grows. This effect is particularly pronounced in labor-intensive businesses. A home care service, a craft business, or a logistics provider can often find it more difficult to replace personnel costs with additional machinery than a highly automated industrial plant.
A distinction must be made between the legal and economic burdens. The fact that employers and employees formally share a contribution does not mean that its long-term costs will be split exactly equally between both groups. Depending on the labor market situation, higher employer contributions can reduce the scope for future gross wage increases. Conversely, companies facing a shortage of skilled workers may have to bear a larger share of rising costs themselves.
Why a reduction in contributions alone does not provide sustainable relief
The demand for lower non-wage labor costs is economically understandable. However, it remains incomplete as long as it is not clarified how the benefits currently financed through these costs are to be paid for.
If contributions are merely replaced by additional federal subsidies, the funding requirement doesn't disappear. It shifts to the state budget, where it must be covered by other taxes, savings, or additional debt. Such a shift can be sensible, for example, if societal tasks have previously been financed solely by employees subject to social security contributions. However, it is not a cost-free relief.
A viable reform must therefore address several levels. First, it is necessary to examine which benefits truly have an insurance character and which would be better financed from general tax revenue. Next, the question of the efficiency of service delivery arises. Only then can a sound decision be made as to which contribution rates are compatible with which benefit promises.
The employment base is particularly important. If more people are employed in jobs subject to social security contributions and existing employees can extend their desired working hours, the financial burden is distributed across more incomes. This doesn't automatically provide permanent relief for every system, but it does improve its starting point.
A strategy of simply increasing contribution rates is risky. It addresses the growing funding gap without adequately addressing its underlying causes. The greater the burden on regular employment, the stronger the incentives become to automate, outsource, reorganize, or, in the worst-case scenario, cease offering certain jobs altogether.
Fewer working hours do not automatically mean a loss of prosperity
The reference to reduced working hours makes an important point, but is misleading without considering productivity. A modern economy can work fewer hours and still produce more if the value added per hour increases sufficiently.
This is precisely where a key aspect of technological progress lies. Machines, improved organization, higher qualifications, and digital tools make it possible to achieve more or higher-quality results with less time. Part of this progress can be used as higher income, another part as additional leisure time.
A reduction in working hours is not problematic simply because it occurs. It becomes problematic when labor costs per unit produced increase without being offset by higher productivity, better quality, or higher achievable prices.
The frequently cited claim that a full-time employee today works exactly 344 hours less than in 1970 requires a clearly defined statistical basis. Crucially, it must be clarified whether the figure refers to collectively agreed or actual working hours, whether absences are taken into account, and whether the figures pertain to full-time employees or to all employed persons. Without this distinction, a precise number appears more reliable than it actually is.
Official macroeconomic data shows a significant decline in the average annual working hours per employee. A published calculation indicates approximately 1,745 hours actually worked in 1980 and about 1,334 hours in 2024. However, these figures refer to all employed persons and therefore do not prove that the working hours of a comparable full-time position have decreased to the same extent. Part-time work and changes in the employment structure significantly influence the average.
The crucial difference is therefore this: Fewer hours per employed person are not the same as less work in the economy as a whole. If additional people take up employment, the total volume of work can remain stable or even increase despite a decrease in average working hours.
More paid employment does not arise from moral pressure alone
A debate that categorically attributes shorter working hours to a lack of motivation ignores the diverse life circumstances of people. People work part-time because they are caring for children, looking after relatives, have health limitations, cannot find a suitable full-time position, or consciously desire more free time.
These reasons require different economic policy approaches. Those who voluntarily forgo income are initially making a personal decision. Those who want to work more, however, but are thwarted by a lack of childcare or inflexible work schedules, are facing an avoidable economic obstacle.
This is precisely where an important reform approach lies. Reliable childcare services can enable additional working hours without diminishing the quality of life for families. Better organization of care can relieve the burden on family members and facilitate employment. Flexible work arrangements can help older employees remain in the workforce longer.
The design of taxes and transfers is also relevant. If little remains of additional gross income after deductions and the elimination of income-related benefits, the financial incentive to increase working hours decreases. This effect cannot be explained by regular income tax alone. The interplay of all relevant regulations is crucial.
The relevant question, therefore, is not how to encourage the population as a whole to work more. It is where additional work can be made socially desirable, individually feasible, and financially attractive.
Longer working hours can contribute to stabilizing economic performance. However, they do not replace a productivity strategy. Additional hours in poorly organized processes are less valuable than additional hours in companies and administrations that use their resources effectively.
The welfare state grows primarily in areas where society is aging
The scale of German social spending is considerable. Preliminary figures for 2025 show approximately €1.431 trillion. This puts the social spending ratio at 32 percent of gross domestic product. Spending increased by around 5.7 percent compared to the previous year, while nominal economic output rose by 3.3 percent. Thus, the need for social financing once again grew faster than its overall economic benchmark.
These figures warrant a serious discussion about reform. However, they do not justify equating the entire social budget with benefits for people who do not want to work. The social budget encompasses a broad spectrum of social security. This includes, in particular, old-age security, healthcare, long-term care, and other benefits for various life situations.
Furthermore, the social spending ratio is not identical to the share of the federal budget allocated to social policy. It encompasses a more comprehensive system of diverse providers and funding mechanisms. This is another reason why simple comparisons with individual budget items often lead to incorrect conclusions.
The historical comparison, with a scale of roughly one-fifth of the economic output around 1970, illustrates the direction of long-term expansion. However, it must take into account German reunification, altered benefit definitions, and societal structural changes. A contemporary, unified German welfare state cannot simply be equated with the West German economic and demographic structure of that era.
Demographic change is particularly important. As more people reach an advanced age and, at the same time, the baby boomer generation retires from the workforce, the pressure on pension, healthcare, and long-term care systems increases. This is not solely a consequence of political generosity. It is also a change in the number and needs of people claiming benefits.
However, this declaration does not absolve policymakers of their responsibility. Precisely because the aging population is foreseeable in the long term, benefit promises, financing rules, and employment histories must be adjusted in a timely manner.
Why the level of social spending says nothing about the quality of the welfare state
A rising social welfare benefit ratio can have various causes. It can be due to new benefits, higher benefit amounts, rising treatment costs, or more people receiving benefits. However, it can also rise because of weak economic growth.
This denominator effect is crucial for the assessment. If the gross domestic product stagnates, even relatively moderate increases in spending represent a larger share of economic output. The social spending ratio is therefore both an indicator of spending trends and economic dynamism.
Statistical revisions also play a role. For 2024, a social welfare expenditure rate of 31.2 percent was initially published. A subsequent revision of the underlying economic output resulted in a figure of 31.0 percent. Such differences do not alter the structural diagnosis, but they do illustrate why tenths of a percentage point should not be overinterpreted.
The impact of expenditures is economically crucial. Successful rehabilitation can preserve employability. Effective training can increase employment opportunities. Reliable social security can prevent households from abruptly reducing their consumption during crises.
Conversely, poorly coordinated services, unnecessary bureaucracy, and perverse incentives can cause high costs without achieving the intended benefits. An expensive welfare state is not automatically effective. A cheap welfare state is not automatically efficient.
The question of reform is therefore not solely how much Germany spends on social security. It is also about what results are achieved for this money, which benefits are targeted effectively, and which institutional structures hinder necessary changes.
Combating abuse without confusing the scale of the problem
Benefit fraud and avoidable mispayments must be prosecuted rigorously. They not only damage public finances but also the trust of those who pay contributions and taxes or are entitled to receive support.
Outrage alone is not enough for an economic analysis. A distinction must be made between proven abuse, legitimate benefit receipt, and politically controversial entitlement rules. Mixing these categories makes targeted reform more difficult.
This also applies to payments with an international element. A child's residence outside of Germany, in itself, does not prove either an unjustified claim or a case of fraud. What matters are the applicable eligibility requirements and a proper examination of the individual case.
Even successful measures to combat abuse do not replace reform of major spending categories. An aging country cannot solve its long-term pension, healthcare, and long-term care problems by focusing solely on high-profile individual cases.
Credible politics must achieve both: it must enforce rules while simultaneously addressing the structural financial burdens. Those who only talk about abuse underestimate demographics. Those who fundamentally relegate abuse to a secondary issue underestimate its significance for the social acceptance of solidarity-based financing.
Government debt is neither automatically an investment in the future nor automatically a waste of money
Even when it comes to debt, simply comparing two historical debt ratios only provides limited insight. A ratio of approximately 30 percent around 1980 and a current value above 60 percent indicate a long-term expansion of debt relative to economic output. However, they explain neither its causes nor its economic quality.
For 2025, Germany's Maastricht debt-to-GDP ratio was projected to be 63.5 percent. The fiscal progress report published in spring 2026 anticipated an increase to around 66.5 percent for 2026. This latter figure is a projection, not a final annual result.
The crucial question is what offsets these additional liabilities. A functioning transportation network, efficient power grids, or a modern digital administration can increase productivity and generate future revenue. Conversely, if current expenditures are permanently financed with loans without strengthening economic performance, the burden is simply shifted to future budgets.
Labeling an expenditure as an investment in the future is not sufficient proof. A publicly funded project can be expensive, delayed, or economically unsound. Conversely, certain ongoing expenditures, such as for better education or a more efficient justice system, can generate significant long-term returns.
Therefore, an evaluation based on economic impact, rather than political labels, is necessary. What improves production potential? What are the subsequent costs? What are the ongoing operating and personnel expenses? And what alternative uses of the same funds would be possible?
It's not just the amount of debt, but also the ability to implement it that matters
A low debt ratio does not protect against economic weakness if public infrastructure deteriorates. Conversely, a higher debt ratio does not guarantee an economic upswing if additional funds are thwarted by planning bottlenecks and inefficient procedures.
Germany must therefore distinguish between financial and real economic limits. A higher investment budget is initially just permission to finance. Only when projects are planned, approved, built, and operated does actual economic benefit arise.
If construction capacity is limited or permits are slow, additional funds may be partially absorbed by higher prices. A lack of qualified personnel in public administrations delays implementation. If funding programs are overly complex, they tie up some of the available resources in application processes instead of productive work.
Added to this is the development of interest rates. Debts must be refinanced. Rising interest payments reduce the scope for other tasks, even if they do not directly lead to a financing crisis.
Responsible fiscal policy therefore combines investment capacity with prioritization and implementation monitoring. It assesses not only borrowing but also the condition of public assets. Neglected maintenance can create a significant future economic burden, even if it does not initially appear as an additional liability in current debt statistics.
The tax debate needs more precise language
The criticism that the top tax rate no longer exclusively affects exceptionally high incomes identifies an important problem. However, it is often weakened by imprecise terminology.
In the 2026 income tax schedule, the marginal tax rate of 42 percent begins at a taxable annual income of €69,879. A marginal tax rate of 45 percent applies to income above €277,826. The basic tax-free allowance is €12,348. These limits refer to taxable income, not directly to gross salary.
This difference is significant. Tax-deductible pension contributions and other deductions can be subtracted from gross income. Furthermore, individual tax circumstances play a role. Therefore, it is not possible to determine from gross annual income alone which portion of income will be taxed at which marginal tax rate.
Equally important is the distinction between marginal and average tax rates. Those who fall into the top tax bracket do not pay this rate on their entire income. It applies to the corresponding additional portion of their income. The average income tax burden is lower.
Well-paid specialists in large industrial companies can reach the 42 percent marginal tax rate. However, this does not mean that this applies to skilled workers in general. Job level, working hours, bonuses, special payments, and personal deductions vary considerably.
Objective criticism becomes more effective when it takes these differences into account. It doesn't need to exaggerate to highlight the burden on skilled labor as an economic policy problem.
The problem is not a general reduction in limits, but rather the burden of additional performance
The assertion that the state has consistently lowered the relevant tax thresholds is inaccurate as a general description. Nominal tax bracket thresholds can rise and still remain low relative to general income trends.
Different mechanisms are at play. In the case of bracket creep, nominal incomes rise due to higher prices, without a corresponding increase in real purchasing power. If tax brackets are not adjusted sufficiently, the tax burden still increases.
This must be distinguished from a longer-term shift relative to average incomes. Even when adjusted for inflation, a particular marginal tax rate can, over time, affect broader income groups if real incomes rise and the tax rate remains structurally unchanged.
Ultimately, the total additional burden is what matters when it comes to performance incentives. Employees are not only interested in the income tax rate, but also in what actually remains after an extra hour of work, a promotion, or a bonus payment.
For some households, the effects of taxes and social security contributions are compounded by the loss of transfer payments or increased income-related fees. This can lead to particularly high effective marginal tax rates. A reform that only changes the top tax rate would not completely resolve such problems.
From an economic policy perspective, it therefore makes sense to consider the entire transition from gross to net income. Additional benefits should demonstrably lead to additional disposable income. At the same time, any tax relief must be embedded in a financially viable overall concept.
The decisive benchmark is the cost per economic result
High wages, in themselves, are not evidence of a lack of competitiveness. They can be an expression of high productivity and high-quality products. A high-wage country therefore does not need to try to compete with low-wage locations by offering the cheapest possible labor.
The decisive factor is the cost in relation to the output achieved. A company can afford high hourly wages if its employees generate a correspondingly high level of added value through efficient technology, efficient processes, and high qualifications.
Problems arise when several costs rise simultaneously while productivity barely increases. Higher social security contributions, energy costs, financing costs, and regulatory requirements can then add up to a burden that can no longer be fully offset by price increases.
Industries differ considerably in this respect. A leading international manufacturer of specialized machinery has different pricing options than a generic supplier. A regional service provider cannot relocate production abroad in the same way as a company with standardized production processes.
Therefore, Germany doesn't need an undifferentiated debate about supposedly excessive demands from employees. What's needed is a strategy that more reliably secures high incomes through high productivity. This includes investment, competition, skills development, and reliable framework conditions.
Bureaucracy becomes expensive when it keeps scarce skilled workers from productive work
Bureaucracy not only incurs direct costs through forms and fees. It also ties up working time, delays decisions, and increases uncertainty about future projects.
Extensive documentation requirements are often easier for large companies to manage because they can maintain specialized departments. Small and medium-sized enterprises often have to perform the same tasks with staff who are also needed for sales, development, or operations.
The economic burden therefore also lies in missed opportunities. A management team that spends a significant portion of its time on documentation cannot use that time for acquiring new customers or improving processes. A delayed grid connection can make an investment less economically attractive, even if the project remains fundamentally approvable.
However, not every rule is superfluous. Reliable safety, environmental, and quality standards can build trust and stabilize competitive conditions. The crucial factor is whether the respective objective is achieved with a reasonable amount of effort.
A productive administrative reform therefore does not simply reduce individual forms. It simplifies responsibilities, avoids duplicate requests, and designs procedures so that existing information does not need to be resubmitted. Digitization unfolds its greatest benefits when processes are simplified beforehand.
Artificial intelligence can close the productivity gap, but it cannot replace political failures
Digital technologies and artificial intelligence offer significant opportunities to use working time more productively. This applies not only to software development and office communication, but also to maintenance, quality assurance, production planning, and logistics.
However, economic benefits do not arise solely from access to a high-performance model. Companies need suitable data, clear responsibilities, secure systems, and employees who can use new tools effectively.
Especially in medium-sized businesses, implementation can fail if expertise is lacking or existing systems are poorly integrated. An additional software license alone does not change a business process. Productivity gains only arise when work processes actually become faster, more reliable, or of higher quality.
Public administration must also apply this standard. Automated support can simplify routine tasks. However, it does not replace clear responsibilities or comprehensible legal frameworks. A complicated process remains complicated if only its interface is digitized.
The realistic perspective is therefore: Artificial intelligence is an important component of a productivity strategy, but no substitute for institutional reforms. It can relieve the burden on scarce labor if organization and skills adapt accordingly.
Political responsibility extends beyond individual terms of government
Germany's economic problems cannot be attributed solely to Angela Merkel, Olaf Scholz, or Friedrich Merz. Different governments have acted under different circumstances. At the same time, long-term challenges have not been adequately addressed over several legislative periods.
The Merkel government had to grapple with, among other things, the financial and euro crises as well as the pandemic. The Scholz government faced the Russian attack on Ukraine, a massive energy price shock, and the resulting adjustment problems. Such events explain some of the economic burdens, but not every failure to implement structural reforms.
The same standard applies to the Merz government as to its predecessors: What matters is not the announcement of an economic policy restart or the size of additional financing frameworks, but their measurable effect.
Politically, there is a fundamental incentive problem. New benefits and subsidies can be directly allocated. In contrast, the advantages of reduced bureaucracy, improved investment conditions, or more stable social security systems in the long term are often widely distributed and only become apparent later.
This can lead to a policy that protects existing claims and bridges additional conflicts with money, while structural problems persist. This is not evidence of a planned decline. It is an indication that short-term political rationality and long-term economic sense can diverge.
A sound reform strategy must take these interrelationships into account
A change in economic policy must not address problems in isolation. Reducing contributions without offsetting the costs merely shifts the burden. Cutting taxes without prioritizing spending can create new deficits. Increased labor force participation without support and training will fall short of its potential.
Policymakers must openly factor demographic changes into social security systems. This includes a realistic debate about working life, increased employment among older people, and healthy transitions into retirement. Different occupational demands must also be taken into account.
In healthcare, quality of care and resource allocation should be considered more closely together. Additional spending is only worthwhile where it demonstrably leads to better care or avoids future costs. Historically established structures should not remain untouched simply because changing them is politically inconvenient.
Obstacles to additional employment should be removed in the labor market. This includes reliable childcare, further training, better utilization of existing qualifications, and faster pathways to regular employment.
Public investments require clear priorities, realistic implementation capacity, and transparent evaluation of results. Economic success is not measured by the amount allocated, but by the actual improvement in infrastructure.
Reliable framework conditions are particularly important for companies. Investments become more attractive when regulatory requirements are predictable, procedures are swift, and long-term projects do not have to be reassessed economically due to constantly changing regulations.
The way out begins with an honest assessment
Germany is not faced with an inevitable choice between a high-performing welfare state and a competitive economy. Both can strengthen each other. A productive economy finances social security. Good education, healthcare, and reliable institutions, in turn, improve the conditions for productive work.
However, this relationship does not work automatically. It becomes fragile when performance promises grow faster than funding opportunities, when additional work places a heavy burden on resources, and when necessary investments fail due to organizational obstacles.
The valid criticism of German economic policy is therefore not that it is pursuing a secret plan for decline. It is that well-known conflicts of objectives are too frequently postponed and growing demands are too often bridged by higher burdens or additional financing.
The opposing view, that every demand for reform inevitably undermines social security, is equally unconvincing. A permanently overburdened financing system does not reliably protect its beneficiaries. Stability requires timely adjustments, not the persistent refusal to make difficult decisions.
The greater danger is not a sudden economic collapse. It is a gradual habituation to weak growth, limited investment, and a state that requires ever more resources without delivering correspondingly better results.
A successful change of course should be measured by whether private and public investments are more easily implemented, additional work becomes more attractive, productivity increases, and social security rests on a more reliable foundation. Germany's future does not depend on how emphatically politicians promise prosperity, but on whether they systematically facilitate its creation once again.

