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Immigration and housing shortage: Migration and rents – What studies from Germany, Spain and the USA show

Immigration and housing shortage: Migration and rents – What studies from Germany, Spain and the USA show

Immigration and housing shortage: Migration and rents – What studies from Germany, Spain and the USA show – Creative image on the topic, with AI: Xpert.Digital

Rising rents: How much does immigration actually contribute to this?

More people, too few apartments: This is how the distribution conflict arises in the housing market

Housing shortage in Germany: Why additional demand meets a limited supply

When more people move to a region, the demand for housing also increases. If new construction lags behind, this can drive up rents and property prices – especially where housing is already scarce. Studies from Spain, the USA, and Germany provide evidence of such correlations. However, their findings cannot be summarized into a single, universally applicable figure: they refer to different time periods, regions, and groups, and measure different trends.

The central question, therefore, is not whether immigration creates additional housing demand, but rather how strongly this demand affects prices when supply grows only slowly. Household size, regional distribution, construction costs, and the number of actually available apartments also play a role. A look at the research shows why both the blanket assertion that migration has no impact on housing costs and the explanation of the entire housing shortage solely through immigration are too simplistic. The crucial factor is the interplay of supply and demand – and the question of whether enough affordable housing is built in time.

How scarce housing becomes an economic distribution conflict

Those who expect more people but build too little will create rising rents

Immigration increases the demand for housing. If the housing supply does not keep pace, rents and property prices can rise. This connection is economically understandable, politically controversial, and empirically more difficult to quantify than sensationalist headlines might suggest. Studies from Spain, the USA, and Germany show that immigration can, under certain conditions, significantly contribute to rising housing costs. However, they do not provide a universal indicator that can be applied regardless of the time period, region, and housing market structure.

For Spain, a key estimate puts the migration-related share of inflation-adjusted rent increases between 2018 and 2025 at around 41 percent. An American study attributes approximately 20 percent of rent increases in the regional housing markets studied between 2021 and 2024 to additional immigration, which was recorded as unauthorized. For Germany, data shows that an influx of one percent of the original regional population is associated with roughly one percent higher rents and up to three percent higher purchase prices in the short term. These figures describe different situations. Together, they point to a crucial interaction: Additional demand becomes a price driver particularly when supply is barely able to respond.

The objective perspective, therefore, lies neither in the assertion that migration has nothing to do with rising housing costs, nor in the notion that it explains the entire housing market crisis. What is crucial is the relationship between population growth, household formation, regional demand, and available housing. Those who treat these factors separately underestimate the economic and social consequences of their interaction.

Why additional demand doesn't have the same price consequences everywhere

Housing differs from many other goods in its long production time, its location-specific nature, and its high capital intensity. If demand for a standard industrial product increases, companies can, under favorable conditions, introduce additional shifts, reduce inventory, or relocate production. This is only possible to a very limited extent with housing. A building must be planned, financed, approved, and constructed. Furthermore, a vacant apartment in an economically disadvantaged region is of little help to a household that depends on a job in a distant metropolis.

This makes the responsiveness of supply key to price developments. Economists refer to this as supply elasticity. It describes how strongly the available supply reacts to higher prices or increased demand. If this responsiveness is low, additional demand initially has a greater impact on prices. If it is high, a larger portion of the adjustment pressure can be absorbed by additional housing. The American research findings explicitly align with a surge in demand when the housing supply is not very adaptable in the short term.

It's not just the total number of apartments a country owns that matters. Their location, size, quality, availability, and affordability are crucial. A statistically sufficient supply can be accompanied by a significant housing shortage if the available apartments are not located where people find work, study, or receive family support.

In this context, migration acts as an additional stimulus for demand. The strength of this stimulus depends, among other things, on whether people move alone or with their families, initially live together, or immediately establish their own households. Equally important is whether the destination region already had a tight housing market before the influx. Therefore, identical population growth can have very different consequences in two different regions.

Spain's 41 percent figure is an explanatory share, not a general rental formula

The Spanish study examines the development of rents and property prices in the provinces over the period from 2014 to 2025. The focus of the findings is the wave of immigration between 2018 and 2025. According to the central estimate, approximately 41 percent of the inflation-adjusted rent increases during these years can be attributed to immigration. Depending on the calculation method, the estimated share ranges between approximately 33 and 60 percent. For apartment purchase prices, around 60 percent of the real increase is linked to the additional immigration.

These figures must be interpreted carefully. A 41 percent share of the rent increase does not mean that 41 percent of the total rent is attributable to migration. Nor does it mean that rents would be 41 percent lower without immigration.

A simplified calculation illustrates the difference: If a monthly rent, already adjusted for general inflation, rises from €800 to €1,000, the real increase is €200. An estimated migration-related share of 41 percent would correspond to €82 of the increase in this example. Relative to the initial rent, that would be just over ten percent. These are different reference points, and combining them can lead to significant exaggerations.

The range between 33 and 60 percent is also relevant. It shows that the magnitude of the result depends on the model used. This range should not simply be interpreted as a statistical confidence interval. It primarily illustrates that different calculation approaches yield different attributions.

The study thus provides an indication of a significant demand effect in the Spanish market environment under consideration. However, it establishes neither a globally valid quota nor a mechanical relationship between a specific number of immigrants and a fixed rent increase.

Why the distinction between real and nominal prices is crucial

The Spanish figures refer to inflation-adjusted developments. This examines how much housing has become more expensive relative to the general price level. This is more economically meaningful than an isolated consideration of nominal euro amounts, but it does not answer every question about the actual burden on a household.

Nominal rents can rise while real rents stagnate or fall if other consumer prices increase even more sharply. For a household with barely growing income, a nominal rent increase still remains a burden. Conversely, a real increase in housing costs can be more manageable if disposable household income grows at an above-average rate.

For a comprehensive assessment, at least three developments must therefore be distinguished: the actual rent payable, its relationship to the general price level, and its share of disposable income. These factors can fluctuate.

Furthermore, there is the distinction between existing and new leases. Those who have lived in an apartment for many years are often exposed to different price trends than a household currently looking for a new place. Additional demand pressure can therefore initially be particularly strong for vacant and newly offered apartments, while the average rent across the entire existing housing stock reacts more slowly.

The Spanish quota and the American declaration shares should therefore not be compared side-by-side without careful consideration, due to differing price definitions. Only when the time period, price index, geographical coverage, and types of contracts examined are comparable can it be assessed whether there are actually differences in the economic impact.

The US demonstrates the short-term limitations of new construction

The American study analyzes the sharp increase in unauthorized immigration from the beginning of 2021 to the beginning of 2024. It uses newly available administrative microdata and examines differences between local labor and housing markets. The group of people considered is therefore more narrowly and differently defined than overall international migration. The results should not be attributed to all forms of immigration in general.

For the employment-weighted average of the regional housing markets studied, house prices rose by a total of 22.4 percent and rents by 22.6 percent between March 2021 and March 2024. Additional immigration is attributed to approximately 6.6 percentage points of the house price increase and 4.3 percentage points of the rent increase. This results in rounded explanatory shares of 30 percent for house prices and 20 percent for rents. These figures refer to the markets studied and weighted accordingly, not to an arbitrarily transferable national constant.

The finding regarding supply is particularly important. The additional demand did not translate into a statistically significant increase in the housing supply in the short term. The analysis of the supply response considers factors such as building permits. Therefore, this result should not be interpreted as suggesting that immigration can never, in principle, trigger additional construction activity. Rather, it demonstrates that no sufficiently clear and identifiable short-term response was observed during the period under review.

This is precisely where the economic policy implications lie. Housing demand arises with immigration, but additional housing often only becomes available years later. Even if a market adjusts in the long term, considerable strain can occur during the transition phase. For households currently searching for housing, a possible easing of the situation in the distant future is no substitute for housing available today.

Employment gains and higher housing costs can occur simultaneously

The American findings also demonstrate why an assessment of migration focused solely on rents remains incomplete. The influx of immigrants studied increased local employment by roughly the same amount, without any statistically significant decrease in local wages. At the same time, housing costs rose. Both developments can coexist and must be considered together.

A growing labor supply can enable companies to accept additional orders, expand services, or fill vacancies. However, this does not automatically mean that all existing households will benefit economically. Those who do not gain additional income but have to pay higher rent when moving may be worse off.

Conversely, rising rents alone are not proof that the overall economic impact of immigration is negative. For that, production, income, public revenues and expenditures, infrastructure costs, and long-term adjustment processes would also need to be considered.

Another methodological point concerns averages. Average per capita earned income can decrease if newly hired workers initially earn below-average wages, even if no existing employee experiences a pay cut. The American study explicitly describes such a composition effect.

For political evaluation, this presents a more complex task than simply finding a single gain or loss figure. The crucial questions are who benefits from additional economic activity, who bears the burden of higher housing costs, and whether the state and the market can facilitate the necessary adjustments. Economic growth and social relief are interconnected, but not identical.

Germany has regional findings, but no reliable national percentage

For Germany, the study of 382 districts and independent cities is particularly relevant. It covers the period from 2004 to 2020 and concludes that immigration amounting to one percent of the original regional population is associated in the short term with approximately one percent higher rents and up to three percent higher purchase prices. Purchase prices in the lower market segment react particularly strongly.

These results confirm that the additional housing demand due to immigration can be economically significant even under German conditions. However, they do not directly account for the overall nationwide increase in rents.

This would require an additional calculation. It would have to take into account the extent of immigration in the individual regions, how the regional composition of the population changed, what other demand drivers emerged, and how the housing supply reacted in each case. Furthermore, it would have to be examined whether the relationships determined for 2004 to 2020 still hold true under subsequently changed financing and construction conditions.

Therefore, a regional effect of approximately one percent higher rents with an influx of one percent does not reliably allow us to deduce what proportion of all German rent increases since a freely chosen starting year was due to migration.

Nor can the figure simply be added up over many years. Short-term effects can change when new construction begins, households relocate to other regions, or incomes and housing types adjust. Especially for Germany, the open research question is therefore not whether additional population actually needs housing, but rather how large the independent price contribution actually is in different regions and time periods.

Why cause and relationship are not the same

Empirical investigation of this relationship is challenging because people do not migrate randomly across a country. Economically successful regions attract both domestic and foreign workers. At the same time, employment, income, and demand for real estate can increase in these regions.

Simply observing that regions with high immigration also experience high rent increases does not necessarily determine the independent influence of migration. It is possible that both developments are partly influenced by the same economic dynamics.

Scientific methods attempt to differentiate such relationships. Differences between regions, past settlement patterns, and additional control variables can be used for this purpose. However, the validity of such approaches depends on whether their prerequisites are met. Even a methodologically sophisticated estimate remains dependent on the quality of the data and the plausibility of the identification strategy.

Another German study on refugee immigration from 2015 illustrates how significantly results can vary depending on the time period and the mechanism examined. For the short period from October 2015 to March 2016, a correlation is described between a higher proportion of refugees and weaker rent growth. However, this does not allow for the conclusion of a general long-term relief effect. Rather, it highlights that short-term accommodation arrangements, spatial distribution, and the reactions of other households must be distinguished from longer-term effects on demand.

A sound analysis must contextualize such divergent findings, rather than ignoring them. Economic relationships do not lose their significance simply because their strength and temporal manifestation vary. Rather, they are described more precisely as a result.

The flawed population assumptions behind housing planning

At the end of 2025, approximately 83.5 million people lived in Germany. Compared to the previous year, the population decreased by about 110,000. Net immigration of around 235,000 people was insufficient to offset the birth deficit of approximately 352,000. This current population balance already demonstrates that international migration and overall population change cannot be equated.

A comparison with a population projection from 2003 reveals an upward deviation of approximately 4.3 million people for 2025. This magnitude is significant as a planning finding. It highlights how strongly long-term infrastructure decisions can depend on the underlying assumptions.

However, population projections are fundamentally conditional scenarios. They describe how a population would develop under certain assumptions regarding births, deaths, and migration. Therefore, any subsequent discrepancy with the actual population cannot be attributed solely to a single cause without further investigation. Furthermore, differing statistical foundations must be considered in long-term comparisons.

For the housing industry, the practical consequence remains important: If a significantly smaller population is expected over a longer period, too little land can be prepared, too little infrastructure capacity can be created, and construction targets can be set too low.

It is insufficient to simply divide the difference of 4.3 million people by an average household size and present the result as the exact number of missing housing units. Regional distribution, age structure, housing types, and available reserves vary too significantly for this approach. The discrepancy indicates a need for adjustment but does not replace a detailed needs assessment.

Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg illustrate the spatial forecasting risk

Previous forecasts also underestimated population growth in Berlin, Bremen, and Hamburg. This is particularly relevant for the housing market because additional demand in densely populated urban areas often encounters limited space and lengthy expansion possibilities.

International immigration and internal migration within Germany interact in this process. People move to Germany for jobs, training opportunities, universities, family ties, or urban infrastructure. For the actual housing needs, the origin of the demand is initially less important than its size, duration, and spatial concentration.

City-states and large metropolitan areas also demonstrate why national averages can be misleading. Even if Germany's overall population stagnates or declines slightly, the number of people seeking housing in individual cities can continue to rise. Conversely, vacancy rates can exist elsewhere without significantly alleviating the housing shortage in growth regions.

This leads to an important requirement for planning: not only the number of people must be predicted, but also their likely regional distribution and household structure. In addition, transport connections between workplaces and potential residential locations must be considered.

An economically viable solution must therefore extend beyond the administrative boundaries of individual cities. If living in the surrounding area is truly to be an alternative, accessibility, public services, and available building land must be aligned. A dwelling only becomes an effective solution when it can be integrated into the daily lives of the households concerned.

The gap in German construction is larger than a missed year

For the years 2021 to 2025, an annual housing demand of 372,600 units was calculated. In reality, only an average of 294,400 apartments per year were built between 2021 and 2023. This means that, theoretically, only about 79 percent of the calculated annual demand was met. The annual shortfall amounts to 78,200 apartments. Over the three years of completion considered, this corresponds to a calculated gap of approximately 234,600 units compared to the projected demand trajectory.

This calculation illustrates the scale of the problem, but it needs to be put into perspective. It is neither a complete count of all missing apartments nor an exact measurement of available vacancy rates. Most importantly, the average completion rate from 2021 to 2023 should not be treated as the actual construction result for 2024 and 2025 without additional data.

The calculated need also includes more than just additional housing for people moving in. A detailed breakdown shows that approximately 323,800 units are needed annually due to demographic factors and about 48,800 to replace existing housing. Therefore, it is wrong to attribute the entire housing gap solely to migration.

However, the opposite conclusion would be equally problematic: that a general shortage of new housing renders additional demand meaningless. If fewer apartments are being built than needed anyway, every additional, sustained demand intensifies competition for the existing housing stock.

The housing shortage thus arises from the interplay of demand and a supply deficit. Which side is emphasized more in a political debate does not change the fact that both have economic effects. A sound strategy must therefore simultaneously realistically assess demand trends and improve the capacity to provide additional housing.

Population and household numbers do not develop in tandem

For housing demand, the number of households is often more meaningful than the raw population figure. Two additional people can move into one apartment together, require two separate apartments, or initially find accommodation in an existing household.

Even without population growth, the demand for housing can increase. This can happen, for example, if more people live alone, couples separate, or older people remain in their existing homes after their children have moved out. Conversely, a population increase can be partially offset by higher occupancy rates in existing housing.

However, this does not mean that the additional demand disappears. It may initially manifest itself in overcrowding, lower living standards, and longer-term temporary solutions. If several adults are forced to live together in close quarters due to a lack of alternatives, the number of additional apartments in demand may be lower in the short term. Nevertheless, the desire for independent living persists.

For immigrant households, housing needs can change with the length of their stay. Initially temporary accommodation may later be replaced by a regular rental apartment. Family reunification, starting a career, and changes in income can further influence household composition.

A forward-looking needs assessment must therefore take transitions over time into account. Those who solely count how many people sign a lease immediately upon arrival may underestimate future demand. Conversely, those who assume every newcomer needs their own additional apartment immediately overestimate it. The real planning challenge lies somewhere between these extremes.

The housing shortage does not affect all households equally

Higher rents act as a distribution shock. Households with low incomes, limited financial reserves, and an immediate need to relocate are particularly affected. This includes young adults, trainees, students, single parents, and employees who have to move for a new job.

Established households with favorable long-term leases are often less affected in the short term than those searching for housing. Owners, on the other hand, can benefit from rising property values, provided these increases are not offset by other burdens. The dividing line between winners and losers, therefore, does not simply run between people with and without migration experience.

Immigrant households can be particularly hard hit by the consequences of housing shortages. A study on migration and housing concludes that, under comparable conditions, households with a direct migration background spend about one to two percentage points more of their income on housing costs and are more likely to live in cramped conditions.

This explains why describing immigrants as the sole winners of a demand-driven development would be factually incorrect. People can create additional housing demand and simultaneously be among those who suffer most from the resulting scarcity.

The political challenge is therefore twofold: Additional demand must be acknowledged without deriving a blanket judgment of individual population groups. At the same time, the burdens placed on existing residents seeking housing must be taken seriously. Effective housing policy must not pit these groups against each other, but rather recognize their often similar interests in more available and affordable housing.

Why purchase prices can react more strongly than rents

In the studies examined, the estimated effects on purchase prices are sometimes stronger than those on rents. For Spain, immigration is attributed a larger share of the real increase in purchase prices than of the real increase in rents. The German study also shows stronger short-term reactions for apartment purchase prices than for rents.

This is economically plausible because real estate prices don't just reflect current use. Buyers also consider expectations of future rental income, later owner-occupancy, and potential resale value. If additional population growth is considered permanent, this expectation can already be reflected in the purchase price today.

Furthermore, leases and purchase prices are subject to different adjustment conditions. Existing leases can delay changes. Purchase prices, on the other hand, react immediately to new expectations, financing options, and the number of competing buyers.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to interpret every sharp increase in purchase prices as a direct reflection of a current housing shortage. Interest rates, credit availability, expected returns, and land prices also influence valuations. A decline in purchase prices can therefore coincide with continued increases in rents for new leases.

This distinction is important for investors, municipalities, and private households. A lower purchase price does not automatically mean that housing has become more affordable if financing costs are rising at the same time. Likewise, a high property value does not prove that sufficient housing is available. Asset valuation and the ongoing provision of housing are linked, but they do not follow the same logic.

High housing costs also hinder the economic opportunities of immigration

The housing question is not only a social problem, but also a location factor. If employees in economically strong regions cannot find affordable housing, filling vacancies becomes more difficult. Companies may then have to offer higher wages, accept longer search times, or forgo growth.

This mechanism affects both international workers and people who want to move within Germany. A region can have attractive jobs and simultaneously struggle with an inadequate housing supply. Economic strength then generates additional demand, the consequences of which in turn limit further growth.

This is particularly important for evaluating immigration. Additional workers can only contribute sustainably to economic performance if their integration into housing, transportation, and public infrastructure is successful. Simply considering the availability of employment contracts is therefore insufficient.

Conversely, housing costs cannot be stabilized simply by reducing immigration. Such a development could decrease demand pressure but simultaneously exacerbate certain labor shortages. Whether the overall economic balance is more favorable depends on the composition and extent of migration, as well as the economy's capacity to adapt.

The American results, where job growth and rising housing costs occur simultaneously, illustrate this trade-off. The productive benefits of additional labor and the costs of inadequate housing are not opposites, but rather two sides of the same coin.

Why additional money alone won't eliminate the shortage

When rents rise sharply, it makes sense to support households through subsidies. Such support can mitigate social hardship and prevent people from losing their homes. However, it does not initially create any additional living space.

With short-term fixed supply, there is a risk that some of the additional purchasing power will be absorbed into higher rents. The extent of this effect depends on market conditions, the design of the subsidy, and its target group. This does not mean that support is unnecessary. Rather, it means that social security and supply expansion fulfill different functions.

Rent regulation must be assessed with similar nuance. It can protect existing tenants from short-term financial hardship. However, it does not automatically eliminate competition for available apartments. If prices are only allowed to fluctuate to a limited extent, problems of scarcity may manifest themselves more strongly in search duration, selection processes, or tenants resorting to alternative housing options.

Even subsidies for new construction are not a guaranteed success. Their effectiveness should be measured by whether additional housing is actually created, whether it is located in the right place, and whether the public funding is proportionate to the benefit achieved. Subsidies that primarily fund projects already planned have a different impact than those that enable projects that were previously unprofitable but are socially necessary.

The central economic policy question is therefore not which single instrument will completely solve the crisis. The crucial question is whether the instruments are compatible: short-term protection for struggling households, better utilization of existing buildings, and reliable conditions for additional housing.

A viable strategy must react faster than before

The relationships examined lead to a fundamental requirement: population, labor market, infrastructure, and housing policies must be more closely linked. If an increase in population is expected, the corresponding housing needs must be incorporated into land-use planning, financing, and municipal infrastructure at an early stage.

Robust scenarios are more useful than focusing on a single forecast value. Regions should know how their needs develop under low, medium, and high immigration levels. Equally important are assumptions about household sizes, internal migration, and replacement needs. This doesn't make planning infallible, but it does make it more adaptable.

On the supply side, measures should be assessed based on how much additional usable living space they actually create. New construction, adding stories, densification, and suitable conversions can complement each other. Not every option is economically or structurally feasible everywhere. This is precisely why local assessments are needed instead of blanket promises.

Another task is improving the data situation. Approved apartments, started projects, and completed units are different metrics. Even a high number of permits is of little help in the short term if projects are not implemented due to financing difficulties.

Furthermore, a clear distinction should be made between short-term accommodation and long-term housing provision when assessing migration-related demand. A temporary solution may be necessary, but it does not replace long-term capacity planning. The crucial question is whether short-term crisis management leads to a reliable adjustment of the regular housing market.

What can be reasonably deduced from the figures

The present findings argue against two convenient simplifications. The first is to ignore additional housing demand due to migration for political reasons. The second is to attribute all rent increases to immigration, thereby neglecting supply problems, financing issues, and regional imbalances.

Spain shows a significant estimated contribution of immigration to the real increase in rents and purchase prices over a specific period. The USA illustrates how additional demand can quickly meet a barely responding supply. Germany provides regional indications of relevant price effects and, at the same time, a considerable gap between calculated housing demand and actual completions. A uniform national percentage for the migration-related share of the German rent increase cannot be derived from this.

The reliable perspective is therefore this: Migration is a significant demand factor, the price impact of which depends on the conditions of the respective housing market. An inadequate supply response transforms additional demand into rising prices, longer search times, and social distribution conflicts.

The politically crucial question is not so much the search for a single culprit group, but rather why identifiable trends in demand are not translated into sufficient housing in a timely manner. A society can benefit economically from immigration while simultaneously making significant housing policy errors. However, it cannot permanently compensate for these errors by either denying the additional demand or declaring it the sole explanation for all problems.

Affordable housing arises where demand is realistically assessed, existing housing stock is used effectively, and additional housing is actually provided. Those who neglect this connection will primarily cause the market to react through higher prices and reduced access. This is precisely the economic core of the current housing question.

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