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Surplus business magazine: Market criticism alone is not enough and why left-wing economic policy needs more than good intentions

Surplus business magazine: Market criticism alone is not enough and why left-wing economic policy needs more than good intentions

Surplus business magazine: Market criticism alone is not enough and why left-wing economic policy needs more than good intentions – creative image on the topic, with AI: Xpert.Digital

More government, less market? Where Surplus's economic critique falls short

Surplus is growing – but are his economic policy recipes convincing?

Inequality, wealth, socialization: What surplus ignores

The business magazine Surplus has quickly made a name for itself: with prominent authors, a distinctly left-wing perspective, and a growing readership. After roughly a year and a half, its circulation stands at approximately 12,000 copies – a remarkable success for a young publication. Surplus focuses on topics such as wealth concentration, inheritance, co-determination, and public services, thereby filling a noticeable gap in economic reporting. However, journalistic success is no guarantee that its economic policy proposals are convincing. Those who rightly criticize markets for their role in the concentration of power and inequality must also seriously address government failure, productivity, investment, and the limits of political control. Where does Surplus hit a nerve – and where does its own stance risk narrowing its analysis? A critical assessment.

Business magazine Surplus and the economics of certainty: Declaring the market the enemy does not automatically make the state a better entrepreneur

A publishing success with an unfinished bill

The business magazine Surplus has achieved in a short time what many new media ventures fail to do: it has a recognizable profile, prominent supporters, a growing readership, and a business model that doesn't rely solely on fleeting reach. After about a year and a half, its circulation is around 12,000 copies; within twelve months, it is said to have grown by approximately 70 percent. This is remarkable for a young, politically stanced business magazine. The bimonthly print publication is complemented by ongoing online content as well as video and podcast formats. Surplus thus combines the authority of a print magazine with the speed and distribution logic of digital media.

This success deserves recognition, but not yet economic support. Market success initially demonstrates that supply meets demand. It proves neither the accuracy of its analyses nor the superiority of its economic policy recommendations. A magazine that regularly and critically examines market mechanisms should not prematurely interpret its own sales figures as confirmation of its ideas. The increasing circulation primarily shows that there is an audience for progressive and left-leaning economic interpretations that does not feel adequately addressed by conventional economic media.

The crucial question, therefore, is not whether surplus is needed. A pluralistic public sphere benefits from a medium that challenges established ways of thinking and consistently puts issues of distribution on the agenda. Rather, the decisive factor is whether the magazine fulfills its own claim to better explain economic reality, or whether it merely provides an existing opinion base with sophisticated-sounding arguments. This is where the necessary counter-argument begins.

The market gap is real

Surplus truly fills a gap. A significant portion of traditional economic reporting focuses on stock markets, companies, economic indicators, monetary policy, and government budgets. While topics such as wealth concentration, power dynamics in labor markets, inheritances, public services, and the distribution of economic risks are also addressed, they are often treated separately. Surplus places these issues at the heart of a cohesive narrative. This is its journalistic strength.

This focus is not only legitimate but necessary. Wealth distribution in Germany is highly concentrated. Depending on the data source, the wealthiest ten percent of households own well over half of the total net wealth. The inflation-adjusted median net wealth fell between 2021 and 2023, even though the nominal average rose. Such findings contradict the convenient narrative that economic progress automatically and sufficiently reaches the broader segment of society. Equally valid is the observation that high earned incomes in Germany are heavily burdened with taxes and social security contributions, while certain transfers of wealth and capital gains are treated comparatively favorably.

However, a gap in the media system can be filled in two ways. A magazine can introduce neglected facts and theories into an open competition of explanations. Or it can simply reproduce the one-sidedness it accuses others of. Surplus is clearly at risk of taking the second path. When progressive economics becomes the dominant interpretive framework, market failure, inequality, and the concentration of power appear as the structural causes of almost every problem, while government failure, perverse incentives, bureaucracy, demographic burdens, weak productivity, and the limits of political control easily fade into the background.

Prominence is not proof

The magazine bases its credibility on well-known names. It is published by Maurice Höfgen, Isabella Weber, Martyna Linartas, and Adam Tooze. Columns and articles by Mariana Mazzucato, Thomas Piketty, Luisa Neubauer, and Aya Jaff increase its visibility and reach. The founder and editor-in-chief, Lukas Scholle, only 28 years old, has thus built a network in a short time that guarantees attention in the German-language business debate. This is a remarkable achievement in terms of organization and communication.

However, this poses an economic risk. A circle of high-caliber authors can ensure intellectual quality, but it can also create an echo chamber. If the participants share similar fundamental assumptions about capitalism, distribution, the state, and the market, reputation quickly replaces debate about mechanisms of action. A contribution then appears convincing because a well-known name is attached to it, not because counterarguments have been examined, data clearly contextualized, and conflicting objectives disclosed.

Economics thrives on competing models. The same development can be interpreted as a demand problem, a supply problem, a distribution problem, an institutional problem, or a combination thereof. For example, someone examining stagnant real wages can rightly point to the bargaining power of employees. However, they must also consider productivity growth, industry structure, the tax burden, qualifications, capital intensity, and international competitiveness. Anyone analyzing inflation cannot ignore corporate power and supply bottlenecks, but neither can they ignore expansionary demand, energy prices, wage trends, expectations, and monetary policy. Prominent authors do not absolve a magazine from this multidimensionality.

A credible counterweight to the economic mainstream would therefore not only have to gather other voices, but also systematically integrate the best objections to its own position. Only then would a left-wing stance truly become pluralistic economic journalism.

The surplus does not automatically belong to anyone

The term "surplus" refers to the economic surplus that remains after covering necessary expenses. This is a clever title because it touches on a fundamental question of every economic system: How does surplus arise, who controls it, and what is it used for? Marxist, classical, Keynesian, and neoclassical approaches answer these questions differently. This already contains an important clue: Surplus is not an ownerless mountain of money that simply needs to be distributed more fairly.

It arises from an interplay of labor, capital, knowledge, organization, technological risk, property rights, infrastructure, and social stability. Employees contribute through performance and experience. Entrepreneurs coordinate resources and assume uncertainty. Investors forgo immediate consumption and bear the risk of loss. The state provides legal security, education, transportation, and social order. A fair economic system must consider these contributions without declaring any one of them the sole source of all value creation.

Progressive debates tend to interpret profits primarily as a result of power, ownership, or exploitation. This is certainly true for monopoly rents, political privileges, land speculation, and some financial structures. However, it is wrong to derive a general judgment about profits from this. Profit also acts as a search signal. It indicates where demand exists, where processes become more efficient, or where innovation creates added value. Loss fulfills the opposite function. A policy that morally suspects profits and socializes losses weakens this selection mechanism.

The real question, therefore, is not whether surpluses should be private or public. What needs to be examined is which surpluses arise from competition and innovation, which are based on scarcity or politically protected pensions, and which societal contributions remain uncompensated. Only this distinction allows for sound tax, competition, and social policies.

Inequality is a problem, equality is not a business model

Surplus touches a nerve when it addresses the increasing importance of wealth and inheritance. In a society where educational pathways, homeownership, business start-ups, and retirement planning are heavily dependent on one's family background, the promise of merit loses credibility. Those who start with real estate, securities, and family networks face different risks than someone without savings. These differences in starting point affect not only consumption possibilities but also freedom, career choices, and political participation.

However, this diagnosis does not imply that striving for the greatest possible equality of outcomes would be economically or socially beneficial. Differences can arise from innovation, savings, qualifications, responsibility, working hours, risk, and luck. Some are productive, others accidental, and still others the result of power or privilege. A wise policy must differentiate, rather than categorically declaring inequality as proof of a flawed system.

The central goal should be fair participation: good education, functioning infrastructure, access to capital, affordable housing, protection from existential risks, and genuine opportunities for advancement. This requires redistribution, but also growth. Without increasing productivity, redistribution policy becomes a conflict over a barely growing stock. Germany's current situation makes this problem particularly clear. Estimated potential growth is low, investment is weak, the capital stock is aging, there is a shortage of skilled workers, and total factor productivity is developing only sluggishly. Anyone who, under these conditions, talks almost exclusively about distribution is treating symptoms and may even exacerbate the cause.

A progressive magazine should therefore answer two questions with equal priority: How can wealth be distributed more fairly, and how can enough new wealth be created in the future? Surplus is more convincing on the first question than on the second.

Inheritance tax: between fairness and substance

The demand for a reformed inheritance tax has a strong economic basis. In 2024, inheritances and gifts subject to taxation in Germany totaling more than €113 billion were assessed; the tax levied amounted to €13.3 billion. At the same time, large transfers sometimes benefit from extensive exemptions, particularly for business assets. This allows very large estates to be effectively taxed at a lower rate than significantly smaller taxable transfers. This contradicts the principle of equal taxation and weakens the principle of equal opportunity.

A counterargument to surplus taxation should not downplay this finding. However, it must insist on the question of structuring. Business assets are often not liquid. A high tax that is due in cash at short notice can jeopardize investments, ownership structures, and jobs. This does not justify a blanket exemption, but it does justify long payment terms, deferral models, and a valuation that takes into account the substance and actual earning power of the business.

A sensible reform would involve a broader tax base, fewer special rules, and more moderate, reliable tax rates. Very high tax allowances and loopholes could be reduced, while business assets should not be destabilized by a sudden outflow of liquidity. In return, earned income and business investments could be relieved of some of the burden. This shift would be more conducive to productivity than a system that heavily burdens employment and partially privileges large transfers of wealth.

A simple narrative of the wealthy heir against the working majority falls short. Family businesses differ from passively held financial assets. Succession planning, regional ties, liability, and investment needs are real. Sound tax policy assesses not the moral origin of an asset, but its performance, liquidity, and economic function.

The wealth tax needs more than outrage

A wealth tax can also be justified by the ability-to-pay principle. Very large fortunes offer security, influence, and opportunities for returns that are only partially reflected in current income tax data. At the same time, Germany has a particularly high tax burden on labor. A greater contribution from large fortunes could therefore be part of a more balanced tax structure.

However, practical implementation is challenging. Real estate, unlisted companies, patents, art, agricultural land, and investments must be regularly valued. This generates administrative costs, legal disputes, and opportunities for tax avoidance. If the tax is levied on the intrinsic value, it can drain liquidity in years with low earnings. Internationally mobile capital will find ways to avoid it. These problems do not fundamentally invalidate a wealth tax, but they do undermine simplistic narratives.

Crucially, the use of the revenue is also essential. Additional taxes are not an end in themselves. If they flow into inefficient administration or sustained consumption without any impact on productivity, the economic benefit remains limited. However, if they are used to reduce taxes on labor, for education, digital infrastructure, research, or targeted basic income support, the overall effect can be positive.

Surplus therefore needs to distinguish more precisely between symbolic burden and functional reform. The political left gains little by primarily selling a tax as a symbolic gesture against wealth. It gains by demonstrating how this leads to a simpler, more investment-friendly, and fairer overall system. The decisive metric is not how much wealth is taxed, but whether opportunities, productivity, and social stability increase.

Co-determination is not opposed to the market

The demand for greater employee participation is one of the stronger elements of a progressive economic agenda. Employees possess company-specific knowledge, bear the risks of transformation, and invest a significant portion of their lives in their companies. Their participation can improve information flows, identify conflicts early on, and stabilize long-term decisions. German co-determination demonstrates that employee representation and internationally successful companies are fundamentally compatible.

Empirically, the picture is more sobering than proponents and opponents often claim. Codetermination does not automatically lead to substantial wage increases and comprehensive redistribution, nor can a general detriment to investment and productivity be demonstrated. Its impact depends on the specific institutional design. A works council in a cooperative environment can strengthen trust; a politicized body with blocking power can hinder adjustments.

Greater co-determination should therefore be linked to responsibility. Those who help shape strategic decisions must also consider capital requirements, competitive pressure, technological risks, and restructuring needs. Employee representatives need access to information and economic training. Companies, in turn, should not treat participation as a bothersome formality, but as a tool for better implementing change.

Surplus is right to question the widespread equation of ownership with sole decision-making authority. However, it is wrong to conclude that more collective control always leads to better decisions. Employees, too, can pursue short-term interests, delay structural change, or protect insider positions. Effective co-determination expands knowledge and legitimacy without obscuring responsibility.

 

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Socialization as a solution: opportunities and limitations

Socialization does not solve scarcity

The weakness of an ideologically charged economics is most clearly evident in the demand for socialization. Article 15 of the Basic Law (Germany's constitution) fundamentally allows for the transfer of land, natural resources, and means of production into public ownership or other forms of public enterprise. While socialization is thus constitutionally enshrined, it is far from being economically viable. Constitutional permissibility does not replace an impact analysis.

In the housing market, a change of ownership initially does not alter the number of apartments. When large portfolios are taken over by the public sector, rent increases can be limited, occupancy rules can be changed, and modernization projects can be prioritized differently. This can relieve the burden on existing tenants and increase public influence on rent standards. However, no additional apartments are created. In a market where demand significantly exceeds supply, the shortage persists.

Furthermore, there is a distribution problem. Affordable existing rents help those who already own such apartments. Those searching for housing, immigrants, young households, and families with growing space needs do not automatically benefit. If tenants are less likely to give up their affordable apartments, the turnover rate decreases. The market becomes more divided into protected insiders and disadvantaged outsiders. A social measure can thus create new inequalities.

Proponents argue that transferring large housing stocks could be viable with appropriate financing and could also dampen general rent increases through rent indices. Critics, on the other hand, anticipate high compensation costs, a decline in investment, and burdens on the public budget. Both sides indirectly confirm the same core point: the housing shortage cannot be solved without massive new construction. Socialization can, at best, be a supplementary instrument to existing housing policy. Those who elevate it to the central housing policy project tie up political capital and billions without eliminating the physical scarcity.

The state is indispensable but not infallible

Progressive economics often makes compelling arguments against the notion that markets stabilize themselves and produce socially optimal outcomes. External costs, natural monopolies, information asymmetries, economic crises, and public goods necessitate government intervention. The energy transition, modern grids, fundamental research, and resilience cannot be managed solely based on short-term profit signals.

However, market failure does not automatically equate to government competence. Germany also suffers from slow approval processes, complicated jurisdictions, a lack of digitalization, and high bureaucratic costs. Federal reporting requirements alone, according to widespread estimates, cost around €65 billion annually and consume a significant portion of working time. Public construction projects, IT projects, and procurements regularly demonstrate that good intentions do not guarantee efficient implementation.

Those who demand greater state responsibility must therefore simultaneously provide a theory of effective administration. This includes clear objectives, transparent costs, digital processes, competition for solutions, independent evaluation, and the ability to terminate failed programs. In progressive debates, however, the state is often described as a counterweight to capital, not as an organization with its own incentive problems. Public authorities can defend their powers, spend resources without measurable benefit, and shift responsibility between levels of government. Political decision-makers prioritize visible short-term gains while deferring costs to the future.

A credible left-wing economic policy would have to prioritize state capacity over state expansion. Not every additional task strengthens the common good. When an overburdened administration takes on further regulatory demands, its ability to fulfill its core tasks diminishes. The strong state is not the state that does everything, but the one that can reliably do what's important.

Germany also has a supply problem

Surplus economics focuses primarily on demand, distribution, and power. In doing so, it corrects a long period in which economic policy debates were heavily influenced by wage restraint, fiscal discipline, and supply-side reforms. However, this correction becomes a new one-sidedness if structural supply-side problems are treated merely as a pretext for cuts.

Germany faces a combination of challenges: demographic change, a shortage of skilled workers, high energy prices, weak business investment, infrastructure in need of repair, and low productivity growth. Since 2019, price-adjusted gross fixed capital formation has declined; after depreciation, net fixed capital formation was recently negative at times. The country is thus partly living off its existing capital stock. At the same time, research spending is heavily concentrated on established industrial technologies, while investments in particularly dynamic high-tech sectors lag behind leading locations.

These problems cannot simply be shifted away. Increased government spending can strengthen infrastructure and demand, but it cannot immediately compensate for a lack of engineers, lengthy procedures, network bottlenecks, and insufficient land availability. When additional funds are channeled into an economy with limited real capacity, prices, imports, or displacement effects will rise. The crucial factor is not just the amount of money available, but also the existence of planning capabilities, personnel, materials, and competition.

An economic counterargument to surplus must therefore be based on the real side of the economy. Money is a claim on resources, not the resource itself. Prosperity is not created by budget line items, but by productive labor, capital, knowledge, and functioning institutions. Distributional policies without supply-side policies risk increasing demands faster than the quantity of goods.

Fiscal freedom has real limits

In the context of surplus, a post-Keynesian perspective, influenced in part by Modern Monetary Theory, plays an important role. Its merit lies in correcting widespread misconceptions about public finance. A state is not a private household. Public deficits can enable private surpluses, stabilize demand during crises, and finance long-term investments. Debt is not automatically a burden when it is offset by productive assets and higher future incomes.

Problems arise when this necessary correction leads to an overly generous view of fiscal leeway. Germany is also subject to the institutional conditions of the monetary union. The federal government does not issue its own national currency over which it could have sole control. The European Central Bank pursues a common price stability mandate for the euro area. Fiscal decisions made by a member state affect interest rates, risk premiums, trade, and political negotiations.

Above all, the real capacity limit remains. If the government orders more construction work than companies with available skilled workers can provide, prices rise. If additional purchasing power meets a limited energy supply, import bills increase. If inflation is later to be curbed by tax increases, this is politically slow and unpopular. A central bank can change interest rates in the short term; a parliament cannot pass and implement a finely tuned tax package at the same pace.

The sensible conclusion, therefore, is neither austerity nor unlimited debt. Germany should use fiscal leeway for additional, productive investments, while simultaneously setting priorities, evaluating projects, and addressing real bottlenecks. Debt finances time; it does not replace reforms.

Moral clarity can be economically blind

Surplus gains attention because it clearly identifies conflicts: rich versus poor, capital versus labor, market versus the common good, austerity versus investment. Such contrasts are not arbitrary. Economic policy distributes income, wealth, risks, and power. Anyone who pretends that all decisions are purely technical is obscuring political interests.

This moral polarization, however, comes at a price. It fosters a language in which one's own side represents the majority and the opposing side represents privilege. Disagreement is thus no longer interpreted as a professional difference, but rather as an expression of ulterior motives. An entrepreneur who warns against a wealth tax then appears primarily as a defender of their own possessions. An economist who points to inflation or investment incentives is easily labeled as belonging to the neoliberal camp. Conversely, progressive proposals can gain an appearance of moral superiority before their side effects have been examined.

Good business journalism must resist precisely this. It should expose interests without reducing arguments to mere interests. An association can act in its own self-interest and still be factually correct. A non-profit initiative can pursue noble goals and choose economically damaging methods. Scientific reputation also does not protect against political bias.

Surplus would gain in quality if every central demand were confronted with a counter-model: What side effects can be expected? Who bears the costs? Which assumption is particularly uncertain? Under what conditions would the opposing side be right? A magazine with a clear stance doesn't have to be neutral in the sense of being colorless. However, it should be fair in its handling of evidence and open about uncertainty.

One's own bubble remains a bubble

Lukas Scholle refers to his own circle as an "Econ bubble." This sounds self-deprecating, but it describes a real problem. Every academic community develops its own terminology, key figures, and accepted assumptions. In a progressive network, Piketty, Mazzucato, Weber, Tooze, or Höfgen are considered natural authorities. In market-liberal circles, other institutes and economists dominate. Both milieus tend to disseminate the strongest arguments of their own side and the weakest of the opposing side.

This danger is particularly relevant for Surplus because the magazine aims not merely to report but to fill a political gap. Activist proximity can increase topic knowledge and motivation, but it can also diminish journalistic distance. When columnists simultaneously shape political campaigns, analysis, mobilization, and brand building become blurred. This is legitimate as long as readers can recognize the perspective from which a column is written. It becomes problematic, however, when normative demands are presented as the inevitable consequence of economic science.

A robust editorial team would therefore have to institutionalize ideological diversity. Not through an artificial balance on every issue, but through regular counter-arguments, methodological transparency, and a strict separation of findings and evaluation. An issue on socialization should include not only constitutional lawyers and proponents of public ownership, but also housing economists, municipal practitioners, construction companies, prospective tenants, and representatives of affected businesses. A debate on inheritance tax should include not only inequality researchers but also representatives of small and medium-sized enterprises, tax practitioners, and entrepreneurial economists.

Plurality is not proven by how many schools one criticizes, but by whether one's own school remains open to criticism.

A magazine aimed at the majority does not automatically reach the majority

Surplus claims to prioritize the interests of the vast majority over those of the wealthiest. This claim is strong in its communication, but difficult to implement empirically. The majority is not a homogeneous economic class. Employees are simultaneously savers, renters, homeowners, taxpayers, consumers, and sometimes entrepreneurs. Retirees may have low current incomes but considerable real estate assets. Workers in export-oriented industries have different interests than those employed in public services or young people looking for housing.

The magazine's format also limits its reach. Technically sophisticated essays, academic authors, and a price of several euros per issue appeal more to a politically engaged, educated audience than to employees with little time and low incomes. Reports on the daily work lives of caregivers, drivers, salespeople, tradespeople, or freelancers could ground the theoretical perspective. Those who discuss workers should not portray them merely as statistical losers of the system, but as active individuals with conflicting interests and their own knowledge.

Freelancers and small businesses, in particular, don't fit neatly into a simple capital-labor dichotomy. They bear entrepreneurial risks, often work long hours, but possess neither market power nor substantial wealth. Higher taxes, documentation requirements, and rigid regulations affect them differently than large corporations. Left-leaning economic journalism that neglects this group cedes an important segment of the political center to other political agendas.

The vast majority cannot be represented through self-description. They must be made visible in their diversity.

Independence requires a viable business

Surplus's reliance on paying subscribers is fundamentally positive. Business journalism costs money, especially when it involves verifying data, attracting expert authors, and covering long-term topics. A subscription model can make the publication less dependent on advertisers and platform algorithms. The growing circulation suggests that a segment of the audience is willing to pay for a clear editorial perspective.

At the same time, new dependencies are emerging. A strongly positioned media outlet cannot arbitrarily alienate its core readership without risking subscriber cancellations. The closer the political identity of the product and its audience is intertwined, the greater the economic incentive to reinforce that identity. This problem affects not only surplus media but also conservative, liberal, and activist outlets. Polarization can be a business model because agreement fosters loyalty and outrage generates reach.

The editorial challenge lies in distinguishing between integrity and pandering. Surplus shouldn't retain its readers by always agreeing with them, but by asking better questions than others. This also includes rejecting popular demands within its own ranks when costs and side effects outweigh the benefits. A magazine that promotes economic literacy must present its audience with challenges.

In the long run, success is not solely determined by circulation figures, but by the ability to build trust beyond one's own circle. For this, Surplus needs comprehensible corrections, transparent methods, and a visible willingness to admit mistakes.

A productive progressive agenda

The strongest argument against this is not a return to an uncritical belief in the market. Germany needs a policy that considers distribution and growth together. This includes an inheritance tax with a broader tax base, fewer exemptions, and longer payment terms for productive business assets. Conversely, earned income should be relieved of some of its tax burden. A wealth tax would only be convincing if valuation, liquidity protection, and international coordination function effectively, and if the revenue is used productively.

Regarding housing, the state should mobilize building land, expedite permitting processes, facilitate serial construction, pre-finance municipal infrastructure, and provide targeted support for social housing. Public and cooperative housing stock can have a stabilizing effect. Socialization should only be discussed as a narrowly defined instrument against demonstrable abuse, not as a substitute for new construction.

Co-determination can be expanded if it includes responsibility, training, and rapid decision-making processes. Labor markets need more advanced training, better childcare, controlled immigration, and lower taxes on additional employment. Climate policy should combine reliable CO2 pricing, infrastructure, and social compensation, rather than politically selecting each technology in detail.

The state must invest, but it must also reform its capacities. Digital processes, clear responsibilities, standardized permits, better data, and independent impact assessment are not neoliberal side issues, but prerequisites for social policy. An administration that delays housing construction, power grids, or business start-ups for years does not protect the vulnerable. It protects existing privileges and makes change more expensive.

This agenda would be progressive because it broadens opportunities and limits power. It would be free-market because it uses competition, prices, and entrepreneurship as tools. And it would be pragmatic because it judges institutions by results rather than by form of ownership.

Surplus is necessary, but not sufficient

Surplus is a journalistic success because the magazine takes seriously topics that have been marginalized for too long in parts of the business press. The combination of print, online, podcast, and prominent voices creates reach. The growing circulation shows that progressive economics is not a niche interest without a paying audience. The young team has identified a real market gap and filled it professionally.

Precisely for this reason, criticism should be demanding. Surplus risks seeing market failures more precisely than state failures, addressing distributional issues more thoroughly than productivity, and prioritizing political intentions over institutional implementation. Demands for inheritance tax and co-determination possess viable economic cores, but require a nuanced approach. Nationalization, on the other hand, remains a risky instrument that alters ownership structures without automatically eliminating scarcity.

The crucial weakness lies not in the left-wing perspective, but in the temptation to confuse perspective with truth. A magazine is entitled to take a stance. However, it should subject its stance to the same rigorous tests it demands of market liberals, corporations, and governments. These include counterarguments, reliable data, institutional details, and a willingness to distinguish between morally appealing goals and economically effective means.

Surplus can become a permanently important medium if it not only fills a gap but also improves economic policy debate. To achieve this, it must open up its own economic bubble, take the diversity of the supposedly represented majority seriously, and understand growth as a social issue. Because without productive companies, innovation, investment, and a functioning state, there is no surplus to distribute. And without fair distribution, even a growing economy loses its political legitimacy.

 

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