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Improving the world yesterday, advising companies today: This is how a green stance seamlessly becomes a business model

Improving the world yesterday, advising companies today: This is how a green stance seamlessly becomes a business model

Improving the world yesterday, advising companies today: This is how a green stance becomes a business model – a creative image on the topic, using AI: Xpert.Digital

Annalena Baerbock becomes an advisor: From ministerial post to advisor title – How political prominence becomes a commodity

What companies really buy from former politicians – and how performance can be measured

Annalena Baerbock isn't simply changing careers: After her time as Foreign Minister and at the helm of the UN General Assembly, she's becoming a Senior Advisor at the international strategy and communications consultancy FGS Global. There, she'll contribute her foreign policy and geostrategic experience to selected client projects. This isn't automatically a scandal, nor is it proof of exceptional suitability. It's an example of a growing market where companies buy political expertise – and where a well-known name can open doors without necessarily guaranteeing the quality of the advice.

The crucial question, therefore, is not whether a former minister is allowed to work after leaving office. Of course she is. The more interesting question is what companies actually gain from such an engagement: robust analysis, institutional knowledge, and better decision-making tools—or primarily name recognition and the hope of political influence. Baerbock's move makes this distinction particularly clear because her political career, in addition to international experience, also includes public debates about communication style and impact.

A fair assessment should neither ridicule the entire consulting industry nor confuse prestige with competence. It must look more closely: What specific performance is expected, how can its value be assessed, and where does expertise end and the commercial exploitation of a public career begin? This is precisely the revealing core of this personnel matter.

Those who explain the world to others should be able to offer more than just an impressive business card

If you can't do anything properly, you become a coach or consultant. This saying is crude, unfair, and useless as a general judgment on an entire industry. However, as a biting commentary on certain career patterns, it possesses remarkable staying power. This is especially true when people, after years in top political positions, suddenly appear as highly qualified advisors precisely where their own weaknesses were previously publicly discussed. Then the contradiction arises that almost automatically generates ridicule: Yesterday, their own communications apparatus had to explain what they actually meant. Today, the experience behind it is supposed to offer others special consulting value.

Annalena Baerbock's appointment as Senior Advisor at the international strategy and communications consultancy FGS Global provides a high-profile example of this. The former German Foreign Minister will contribute her foreign policy and geostrategic experience to selected client projects. This position complements her teaching role at Columbia University in New York. Following her time at the Foreign Ministry and her presidency of the UN General Assembly, this represents a professional combination of academic knowledge transfer and private sector consulting.

This is neither automatically a scandal nor proof of exceptional suitability. It is, first and foremost, a business model. And therein lies the more interesting core of this appointment. For the crucial question is not whether a former minister is allowed to work after leaving public office. Of course she is. The question is what companies are actually buying into with such appointments: verifiable judgment, institutional experience, personal reputation, political connections, or the hope that a big name will still impress even when concrete performance is difficult to measure.

Serious criticism must therefore be sharper than the knee-jerk accusation of personal incompetence. It must explain why a market for political experience exists, what services can be valuable there, and at what point expertise merely becomes the high-priced exploitation of a public career.

A career is not ended, but rather repackaged economically

Baerbock served as Germany's Foreign Minister from 2021 to 2025. From September 2025 to September 2026, she chaired the UN General Assembly. She then joined the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, where she is a Professor of Professional Practice and involved in leading the Master's program in Global Leadership. Her involvement with FGS Global is structured as an additional activity for specific projects. Which companies she will advise, the time commitment, and her compensation are not yet publicly known.

These distinctions are important. A project-based role as a senior advisor is not the same as the operational management of a communications agency. Likewise, being affiliated with a communications consultancy does not automatically mean that Baerbock will personally write advertising copy, develop Instagram strategies, or be responsible for the crisis communication of all clients. According to published information, her geostrategic experience is her primary focus. Anyone who simply interprets this as her full-time role as a communications trainer is criticizing an oversimplification, not the specific task described.

However, the precise description doesn't make the matter any less interesting. It simply shifts the perspective. Geostrategic consulting must be more than just the ability to summarize current conflicts in sophisticated language. It must help companies translate political developments into economic decisions. Which dependencies are sustainable? Which markets are becoming riskier? Which political signals are reliable? Which regulatory changes can be prepared for?

The title of consultant is therefore not proof of performance, but a promise of performance. This applies to Baerbock just as much as to any other former top politician. A familiar face can facilitate access to the meeting room. Whether it contributes anything of value there depends solely on the quality of its analysis.

Cheap mockery doesn't automatically hit the mark

The appeal of the saying mentioned at the beginning lies in its simplicity. Those who can't accomplish anything themselves simply explain to others how it's done. This is a familiar caricature of the consulting industry: the practitioner bears the risk, while the consultant creates the presentation and then sends the bill.

This is nonsense as a description of all consulting services. A company can excel at building machines and still need support in establishing an international sales structure. A logistics provider can master its operational processes without being able to properly assess every external economic development. A board of directors doesn't need to maintain all specialized knowledge internally if it can be acquired temporarily.

The core of the criticism, therefore, does not lie in the existence of external consultants. It lies in the confusion between familiarity and competence. Someone who has held office possesses experience in that role. This does not necessarily mean that they have made particularly good decisions. Even less does it mean that they can pass on their experience to others in a comprehensible, methodologically sound, and economically viable way.

A former minister can be an excellent advisor. But he can also simply be a former minister. The entire question of performance lies somewhere in between these two possibilities.

This is precisely where a scathing commentary should begin. Not every subsequent job is a sinecure. But not every subsequent job automatically becomes an intellectual tour de force simply because it carries the word "expertise." An English title doesn't resolve any unanswered questions; it merely makes them sound more international.

Why companies pay for political experience at all

The market for political consulting can initially be explained in purely economic terms. Companies make decisions under uncertainty. They invest today, even though they don't reliably know what political, economic, and legal conditions will prevail tomorrow. The larger a project and the longer its duration, the more costly miscalculations can become.

A production site, a port project, a data center, or an international supply network is not built for a single news season. Companies must consider whether trade relations might deteriorate, export restrictions tighten, investment reviews expand, or political alliances shift. Political analysis can therefore be an economic production factor: at its best, it improves the basis for decision-making.

Institutional experience is indeed helpful in this regard. Those who have witnessed international negotiations are potentially better able to assess which public statements are primarily domestic political posturing and where a substantial shift in position is emerging. Those who understand the workings of large organizations can explain why a decision, despite public urgency, can take months, or why a seemingly insignificant phrase can pave the way for a diplomatic compromise.

However, even experienced political analysts are fallible. A former top position does not confer supernatural predictive ability. Political actors change their positions, governments lose elections, and conflicts escalate unexpectedly. Good advice is therefore characterized not by demonstrative certainty, but by comprehensible assumptions, alternative scenarios, and a clear understanding of the limits of one's own knowledge.

The valuable contribution lies not in denying uncertainty. It lies in structuring uncertainty in such a way that a company can act more rationally.

A billion-dollar market is not proof of quality

The economic relevance of consulting is also evident in the sheer size of the market. According to the German Association of Management Consultants (BDU), the German consulting market reached a turnover of €48.7 billion in 2024. Compared to the previous year, this represented nominal growth of 4.3 percent. This figure describes the broad consulting market and should not be equated with the narrower market for political communication or geostrategic consulting.

The sheer scale of the market demonstrates that this is not an exotic niche. Companies are spending considerable resources preparing for decisions, transforming organizations, and temporarily acquiring specialized expertise. However, the market volume only proves that demand exists. It doesn't prove that every single project is worthwhile or that every hour of consulting justifies its price.

The difference between nominal revenue growth and actual performance gains also deserves attention. Rising fees, changes in project mix, or additional external services can increase revenue without the industry becoming correspondingly more productive. Conversely, more demanding tasks can justify a higher price. A sound evaluation must therefore take a closer look instead of automatically treating rising revenues as an indicator of quality.

The available public data does not permit a reliable cost-benefit analysis of Baerbock's specific activities. Without information on fees, scope of work, clients, and results, it is impossible to claim an exceptionally good price-performance ratio or to prove inappropriate remuneration. Anyone who nevertheless suggests specific sums or returns is replacing analysis with fantasy.

The objective criticism, therefore, is not that their work is certainly overpaid. It is that a person's public standing should not be a shortcut around the question of what specific work is being paid for.

What a famous business card can achieve economically

Several economic motives can come into play when hiring prominent former officials. One is expertise. Another is the symbolic effect. A consultancy that attracts internationally renowned figures can thereby convey its close ties to political decision-making circles to potential clients.

This doesn't necessarily mean that actual political influence is promised. The perceived quality of a network alone can help in acquiring clients. A well-known name makes an event more attractive, increases awareness of an offer, and can lend a consulting firm additional credibility.

For economic evaluation, it is crucial to distinguish between these functions. A person can be valuable as a specialist advisor. They can generate economic benefits as a representative. They can combine both. Problems arise when a representative function is presented as a particularly in-depth analytical service, even though its true value lies primarily in public awareness and external impact.

That wouldn't necessarily be illegal, but it would require explanation. There's a significant difference between selling expertise and selling an aura. The former can be verified, at least in part, by examining work products. The latter relies on the customer's expectation of gaining prestige through proximity to a respected individual.

With regard to Baerbock, it remains unclear what weight these motives carry in her specific involvement. The publicly described task concerns geostrategic expertise. Further claims about hidden functions, concrete promises of influence, or specific economic interests would be speculative without additional evidence.

The real weakness of the consulting market is performance that is difficult to measure

Consulting has a structural evaluation problem. Often, it only becomes clear with the passage of time whether advice was useful. Sometimes it remains unclear indefinitely. If a company refrains from a risky investment and a crisis later actually occurs, the advice appears valuable. If the crisis doesn't materialize, that same caution could be seen as a missed opportunity.

Furthermore, there is the question of attribution. A company can fail despite good advice because it poorly implements recommendations or because unexpected events occur. It can also succeed despite weak advice because market conditions remain favorable. Therefore, the subsequent economic outcome is not a completely reliable measure of the quality of the initial analysis.

It is precisely this difficulty that makes well-known CVs attractive. When performance is hard to assess beforehand, clients resort to alternative indicators: previous employers, academic titles, public recognition, or high-ranking positions. This is understandable, but it creates a market where prestige is easier to sell than demonstrating methodological quality.

A sound purchasing decision therefore requires a deeper analysis. What deliverables are being provided? What assumptions underlie the decision? Which experts are involved? What perspectives are missing? Which forecasts have proven incorrect, and what lessons have been learned from them?

A senior advisor shouldn't be judged by how reverentially their resume is read aloud. What matters is whether their work leaves a better basis for decision-making than before. Anything else is just a very elaborate form of name tag.

The Russia sentence remains an example of avoidable vagueness

The criticism of Baerbock's own communication cannot simply be dismissed as trivial. On January 24, 2023, at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, she used a phrase that could be interpreted as suggesting a joint war against Russia. The context was the unity of European and transatlantic partners in supporting Ukraine and the need to avoid mutual recriminations. The German government subsequently clarified that Germany was not a party to the war.

This clarification is essential. To interpret this statement as a German declaration of war would be factually incorrect. The German government explicitly maintained that supporting Ukraine in exercising its right to self-defense does not make Germany a party to the conflict. The problematic wording did not alter this position.

Nevertheless, it remains a legitimate subject of critical evaluation. In a top foreign policy position, linguistic precision is part of the professional responsibility. Especially in matters of war and peace, it cannot be assumed that all listeners will offer a benevolent overall interpretation. Political opponents, foreign state media, and social networks frequently work with short excerpts. In this specific case, Russian state media used the statement to support their portrayal of the war.

This does not mean that all instrumentalization is avoidable, nor that the responsibility for propaganda lies with the person being attacked. It does mean, however, that an avoidably misleading statement creates additional work. A communication error ties up resources for clarifications that would otherwise be available for the actual political message.

The crucial point is therefore obvious: Anyone who later works in the field of professional strategy consulting must also be judged on the precision of their own strategic communication. This is not an unfair, special standard, but a natural question of professional credibility.

A video that appears unsuccessful is not yet a complete success

The Instagram video from 2025 is also part of the public debate about Baerbock's communication style. It depicted her life in New York in a staged, entertainment-oriented format and was met with some criticism. Baerbock justified the format by saying she wanted to reach younger people and make the work of the United Nations more understandable.

The underlying idea is not inherently wrong. Political institutions cannot expect every target group to listen to lengthy speeches or study institutional processes on their own initiative. A short presentation can generate interest and provide access to an otherwise unfamiliar topic.

The crucial question, however, is what this attention is subsequently directed towards. Does the format convey a public duty or primarily the personality of the officeholder? Are connections explained or are images of an international career primarily produced? Is the staging a means of information or does the institution become a backdrop for personal branding?

These questions cannot be answered based on taste alone. Some viewers find a casual presentation approachable, others inappropriate. A serious evaluation of effectiveness would have to differentiate between reach, target groups reached, and actual informational gain. A high number of views does not necessarily prove good political education. Conversely, public ridicule does not automatically prove the failure of a format.

For evaluating future consulting work, the video therefore remains a limited indicator, not a definitive judgment. It may raise doubts about the consultant's feel for tone and institutional impact. However, it does not replace an assessment of geostrategic expertise. Those who conflate the two are making things as easy for themselves as those who dismiss any criticism of the presentation as mere backwardness.

Only through processing and analyzing mistakes does usable expertise emerge

A common objection to criticism of former public officials is that their very mistakes made them valuable advisors. There's a grain of truth in that. People can learn from difficult situations. Those who have experienced a communications crisis may understand risks that remain abstract in a textbook.

But experience is not an automatic learning process. You can make the same mistake multiple times and increasingly consider yourself experienced. Learning only occurs when causes are examined, one's own contributions are acknowledged, and future actions are changed.

For professional consulting, it would therefore be interesting to know whether transferable insights have emerged from specific difficulties. Was a problem recognized in time? Which warning signs were overlooked? Which coordination would have been helpful? Where was the message unclear, and where was it merely unpopular? Which criticism was justified, and which was based on bias?

Such questions are more demanding than the usual self-narrative of a career. They require distance from one's public image. Those who attribute every failed attempt solely to malicious opponents learn little about communication. Conversely, those who accept every outrage as proof of their own failure are also learning the wrong thing.

The crucial qualification lies in the ability to discern. A former minister doesn't need to claim to have always been right. A more credible approach would be a comprehensible explanation of when and why her judgment changed. This is precisely where a truly valuable contribution for businesses and students could lie.

Political experience is not the same as entrepreneurial judgment

There are overlaps between foreign policy and corporate management, but also significant differences. A state pursues security interests, legal obligations, and political goals. A company, on the other hand, must also know very specifically how a decision will affect liquidity, investments, delivery capacity, personnel, and profitability.

A geopolitical situation report may be accurate but still of little help to the client. A reference to growing tensions between economic regions doesn't answer the question of whether a company should establish a second supplier, increase inventory, or relocate. This requires information about costs, technical dependencies, contractual obligations, and alternatives.

Good political advice must therefore be compatible with business management principles. It should be combined with industry knowledge, legal review, and operational experience. A foreign policy overview does not replace export control audits, investment appraisals, or technical supply chain assessments.

This also highlights a limitation of prominent individuals. Even an exceptionally well-connected person cannot be equally adept at mastering all industries, regions, and regulatory systems. A well-placed senior advisor complements a team; they do not replace it.

For Baerbock's work, therefore, the crucial question is not whether she has an opinion on every international issue. More interesting is how her experience is integrated into concrete work processes. Does she provide an additional perspective, examine assumptions, explain institutional procedures? Or does it remain merely an impressive appearance at the beginning of a project? The publicly available job description does not yet answer these detailed questions.

Public office should not be confused with a private seal of approval

Political experience does not arise outside of society. Top positions are made possible by public institutions. Ministries provide expertise, personnel, and organizational structures. International encounters occur because of the office held, not solely due to personal interest in the individual.

This does not mean that former public officials would be prohibited from subsequently using the skills they acquired during their time in office professionally. Such a requirement would be neither reasonable nor practical. It would unnecessarily complicate the transition between public service, academia, and the private sector.

However, it creates a special responsibility in dealing with the former office. Publicly acquired reputation should not give the impression that a private company now has some kind of outsourced state access. Likewise, general experiential knowledge must not be confused with non-public information.

A clear separation of services is not just a moral issue. It also protects the quality of the consulting market. Companies should know whether they are purchasing analysis or hoping for supposed special treatment. Public institutions must be able to trust that discussions will not be subsequently reinterpreted as privately exploitable information.

In this specific case, no impermissible disclosure of information or undue influence can be inferred from the available data. A critical analysis should explicitly acknowledge this distinction. The need for clear boundaries is not proof that they have been violated.

Between legitimate career advancement and problematic incentives

The debate about transitioning from politics to consulting doesn't just concern behavior after leaving office. It also touches on potential incentives during a term in office. A society must be able to ask itself whether the prospect of future private activities could influence political decisions.

This question can be asked without attributing such influence to any specific individual. General rules are particularly useful for this purpose: they should foster trust without requiring the public to constantly guess individual intentions.

From an economic perspective, it's about separating different roles. A public official is supposed to act in the public interest. A consultant works for a client within legal and contractual boundaries. Both roles can be legitimate. Problems arise when it remains unclear when one ends and the other begins, or which obligations continue.

Transparency cannot completely eliminate this tension, but it can reduce it. Verifiable information about responsibilities, potential conflicts of interest, and internal audit procedures would be more helpful than mere declarations of trust. Not every customer detail needs to be made public. But confidentiality should also not be a universal answer as soon as legitimate questions become uncomfortable.

Information regarding Baerbock's clients, scope of work, and compensation is currently limited. This initially leads to uncertainty, not guilt. Those who fill this uncertainty with suspicion are arguing sloppily. Those who dismiss it as completely irrelevant are equally so.

Academic titles and consulting mandates must be assessed separately

Combining academic work with practical consulting can be beneficial. Practical knowledge can make teaching more engaging. Conversely, scientific methods can help to examine political experiences more systematically. Ideally, both areas benefit from each other.

However, this connection must not become a closed cycle of mutual validation. The university's name lends prestige to the consulting profile, while international consulting experience, in turn, appears as proof of particular practical relevance. If no one checks the individual achievements anymore, eventually it will primarily be the titles that reinforce each other.

Baerbock's position as Professor of Professional Practice and her involvement in the Master's program for Global Leadership must therefore be precisely defined. The title alone should not be used to infer any specific research achievement, nor should her teaching activities be categorically devalued. What matters are the quality of teaching, the subject matter expertise, and the concrete contribution to the students.

The same applies to parallel consulting activities. Several tasks can complement each other, but they can also compete for time and attention. Without reliable information about the scope of work and organization, it is impossible to assess how this relationship is specifically structured.

The appropriate demand, therefore, is not that a person should only have one professional role. It is that each role must be evaluated based on its own specific requirements. A prominent résumé is not a universal currency that can simultaneously satisfy all quality criteria.

Why the blanket hatred of consultants obscures the real problem

The ridicule directed at coaches and consultants conflates very different activities. Personal coaching, organizational development, technical consulting, political analysis, and international communications work do not follow the same methods and do not serve the same needs.

Lumping everything together means encountering not only questionable self-promoters but also people whose performance is directly verifiable. Consulting can help prevent production downtime, improve processes, or identify legal risks early on. However, it can also consist of interchangeable buzzwords and ineffective recommendations.

The dividing line isn't between doers and consultants. It's between demonstrable benefit and insufficiently substantiated benefit. Even within a company, people can avoid responsibility and yet excel at portraying their importance. External consultants don't have a monopoly on this.

That's precisely why it would be too convenient to simply dismiss Baerbock's move with the old taunt. The statement provides short-term satisfaction, but it doesn't explain why renowned companies pay well-known personalities. Even less does it explain how clients are supposed to distinguish good advice from bad.

The harsher criticism targets the mechanism of self-enhancement: If a political office is considered sufficient proof of competence, a university education enhances prestige, and a consulting firm crafts a marketable profile from it, then an independent performance review must take place somewhere. Otherwise, an impressive edifice of mutually borrowed reputation is created.

A useful benchmark begins with the concrete decision

How can the value of geostrategic advice be meaningfully assessed? Not by demanding infallible predictions. Such a standard would be unrealistic and would disadvantage cautious analysis in favor of sweeping certainty.

A better approach would be to examine the quality of the decision-making process. Were significant risks identified? Were different development scenarios considered? Are assumptions explicitly stated? Is the potential impact on the company clear? Was a distinction made between established knowledge, plausible assessments, and mere speculation?

Practical application is also crucial. An analysis should explain which decisions are needed immediately, which can be prepared in advance, and which signals necessitate a reassessment. General warnings about an uncertain world are not a particularly valuable consulting service. The world wasn't risk-free even before the next presentation.

The same standards must apply to prominent consultants as to lesser-known experts. Those who charge a high price should deliver a correspondingly clear contribution. Fame can generate attention, but it doesn't absolve one of responsibility for performance.

That is also a fair perspective on Baerbock. Neither her critics nor her supporters can derive the economic benefit of an activity whose impact is not yet transparently assessable solely from sympathy. The decisive factor will be whether her political experience translates into precise, useful, and responsibly justified work.

The justified provocation is different

If you can't do anything properly, become a coach or consultant: The statement works as a punchline. As a judgment on Annalena Baerbock, it goes further than the available facts support. Her previous positions demonstrate considerable political experience. The documented criticism of individual communication situations also raises legitimate questions about linguistic precision, effectiveness, and her handling of her own public image. Both can be true simultaneously.

The more convincing provocation, therefore, is this: those who have been important for a long time apparently feel compelled to explain particularly clearly what their specific achievements consist of. Not because a previous office is worthless, but because their prestige so easily overshadows objective scrutiny.

Baerbock's move is therefore less a definitive answer to the question of personal competence than a vivid test case for the market of political career advancement. This market can mobilize valuable knowledge. But it can also lead to public recognition being valued more highly in private life than verifiable achievement.

The line isn't drawn at the title of Senior Advisor. It's drawn at whether there's more to it than just a prestigious business card. Anyone who wants to advise companies shouldn't just be able to explain how complicated the world is. They should be able to demonstrate which decisions their work will make clearer, more robust, and more economically sound.

Anything else would not be a geostrategic masterstroke. It would be the elegant art of simply recalculating one's own career path.

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