US shutdown – America's fatal weakness: Why Europe's security now hangs by a thread

$5 billion worth of weapons blocked: A US law becomes a deadly trap for Ukraine

While the noise of artillery and drones defines the war on the Ukrainian front, a far more subtle, but potentially decisive, threat is unfolding thousands of kilometers away: the American government shutdown. This domestic political deadlock in the US is developing into a silent weapon in Russia's geopolitical arsenal, exposing the deep structural cracks in the foundations of the Western security architecture. This is not a temporary administrative glitch, but a strategic paralysis that directly jeopardizes Ukraine's survival and shatters Europe's illusion of security.

The consequences are already dramatic and measurable: arms shipments worth over five billion dollars, including essential systems such as HIMARS rocket launchers and Aegis air defense systems, are blocked. The reason is not a lack of materials or money, but the collapse of administrative processes in the US Department of Defense, where a large number of the responsible officials are on unpaid leave. This bureaucratic catastrophe is hitting Ukraine at a moment of existential crisis, when ammunition consumption far exceeds Western production and the front lines threaten to collapse without constant resupplies.

At the same time, the crisis serves as a brutal wake-up call for Europe. Despite massively increased defense spending, the standstill reveals the continent's fatal dependence on the United States—not only as an arms supplier but also as an administrative gatekeeper. For the Baltic states and Poland, this is more than just a strategic problem; it is an existential threat. This text analyzes how America's internal dysfunction is recalibrating the front in Ukraine, Europe's defense capabilities, and the global balance of power, and why the true costs of this standstill will only become fully apparent in the coming months.

Update 10/11/2025 | More information here:

• Systemic crisis at the heart of the world power: Budget dispute in the USA, but now an end to the US shutdown is in sight.

Administrative collapse as a weapon of geopolitics

The fortieth day of the American government shutdown reveals a phenomenon whose subtle power overshadows the direct military conflict in significance: the use of domestic paralysis as an indirect geopolitical weapon. While fighting between artillery bases and front lines captures the immediate attention of the international community, a silent catastrophe is unfolding within the administrative apparatus of the United States, the effects of which will multiply over weeks and months. The blockade of arms shipments worth over five billion dollars is not merely a temporary delay, but a structural failure at the interface between American domestic and foreign policy, jeopardizing the foundations of the NATO alliance.

The Department of State is currently operating with only about a quarter of its normal staff in the critical Political-Military Affairs Division. This is not an administrative shortcoming, but a functional disintegration of a complex approval mechanism. United States arms export data laws require notification and critical review by Congress before any arms sales. These procedures, which function as robust institutional checks in peacetime, are proving virtually impossible to carry out with three-quarters of the staff missing. Department of State employees who normally brief congressional committees and oversee the approval processes are on unpaid leave. The result is not just a delay, but a complete standstill of the approval process.

The weapon systems in question are not peripheral military equipment, but strategically central capabilities. HIMARS rocket launchers, offering high-precision long-range capabilities, AMRAAM air-to-air missiles for air combat, and Aegis air defense systems for territorial air defense form the backbone of Europe's modern air defense architecture. The fact that these systems are nominally intended for NATO countries like Poland, Denmark, and Croatia obscures the political reality: a significant amount of this equipment is transferred to Ukraine immediately upon receipt, either through secondary purchases or direct delivery. The indirect channel via NATO countries is an administrative construct that de facto enables a continuous supply of American weapons to Kyiv without directly affecting the US aid program for Ukraine.

The shutdown situation embodies a paradigmatic shift in what could be called criticality analysis. In traditional analyses of arms supply chains, bottlenecks are defined by physical resource scarcity, production capacity, or logistical constraints. In this case, it is neither production nor materials that are lacking, but rather the administrative capacity to manage the system itself. The weapons exist, have been paid for, and are ready for shipment, yet a third of the necessary officials are sitting at home without pay. This is a lesson in institutional fragility that should be of paramount importance for Europe's strategic planning.

Europe under immediate pressure: Defense gaps and the illusion of strength

The current shutdown crisis is hitting Europe at a moment of extreme vulnerability. Europe's defense readiness, thoroughly examined by analysts and strategic institutes, reveals a fundamental deficit between nominal resources and actual military capabilities. The European Union, which officially operates with defense budgets of 2.1 percent of GDP, proves, upon closer inspection, to be unable to meet its stated security policy objectives.

The most critical bottleneck lies in ammunition production. European production capacity for 155mm artillery ammunition increased from approximately 300,000 rounds annually to a projected 2 million rounds between 2022 and 2025. This increase, however dramatic it may appear on paper, masks an inconvenient reality: Russia produces roughly three to four times more artillery ammunition than Europe and its allies combined. The strategic imbalance in this fundamental area of ​​warfare is not a matter of technological backwardness, but rather of the structural configuration of European arms industries during three decades of peace dividends.

Poland, as the most prominent European provider of military spending, with projected defense budgets of four to four-five percent of GDP, has made massive investments in strategic systems. The purchase of 486 HIMARS launchers, 250 M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams tanks, and Patriot air defense systems undoubtedly transforms Poland into a significantly stronger military power in terms of sheer numbers. However, this modernization is coupled with a critical dependence on American supply chains. The United States is not only the primary arms supplier but, through its control over approval processes, export licenses, and components, the critical bottleneck through which all of Europe's strategic modernization programs must flow.

The shutdown demonstrates a subtle but fatal reality: While Europe may be solvent and have signed supply contracts, the United States' administrative capacity to fulfill those contracts is not automatically stable. The fallacy lies in assuming that money and contracts guarantee deliveries. They do not if the political processes in the supplying country collapse. This is especially true for weapons, where congressional review is mandated by law.

The Baltic states are in a particularly precarious situation. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania together share approximately 1,064 kilometers of border with Russia and Belarus. The Suwałki Gap, a corridor only 70 kilometers wide between Belarus and Russia's Kaliningrad exclave, is the only land connection between the Baltic states and the rest of NATO territory. War games conducted by NATO strategists have shown that Estonia could potentially be penetrated by a conventional Russian invasion in less than 48 hours. The necessary reinforcements would have to be transported across this precarious gap or take the more dangerous sea route through the Baltic Sea, where Russian air and naval capabilities operating from Kaliningrad pose a significant threat.

For the Baltic states, dependence on the flow of American arms is therefore not merely an element of their overall strategy, but their very foundation. Any delay in the delivery of critical systems diminishes the buffer time in which reinforcements can arrive to repel a Soviet surprise attack. The current shutdown, even if presumably temporary, sends an unmistakable message: the United States' institutional capacity to support its smaller allies is fragmented and vulnerable to domestic crises that bear no direct relation to its foreign policy engagement.

Research on European defense readiness by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and similar institutions shows that Europe's critical capability gaps lie not primarily in high-tech systems, but in basic material resources such as ammunition, fuel, and rapidly consumable logistics supplies. A high-intensity war would deplete these reserves within days. European arms factories can reproduce these resources, but this reproduction is delayed and collapses if external components fail. The American industrial apparatus, precisely because of its advanced state, is deeply integrated into European supply chains. Many European systems rely on American electronics, sensors, and other critical components. A collapse of the American administrative apparatus, even if lasting only weeks, could cripple European production within a timeframe that is critical for warfare.

Ukraine on the verge of material exhaustion

While Europe suffers from latent weakness, Ukraine operates under an immediate material crisis. The country is consuming 155-millimeter artillery ammunition at a rate that is exceeding even the swelling American production capacity. According to Pentagon analyses, the Ukrainian military fires more rounds of artillery in a matter of days than the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant produces in a month. This is the central mathematical problem of the current conflict: the rate of consumption permanently exceeds the West's production rate.

The American strategy for alleviating this crisis focuses on a three-pronged effort: first, the construction of new production facilities; second, increasing the capacity of existing factories; and third, coordinating European production. The Pentagon has announced plans to increase American ammunition production to 100 kilograms of 155-millimeter rounds per month by the end of 2025. This would be made possible primarily by a new factory from General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems, the first significant new American ammunition factory since the start of the war.

These figures, however, are illusory when compared to actual consumption. According to expert estimates, Ukraine needs approximately one million 155-millimeter rounds for just ninety days of high-intensity warfare. This is a baseline for continuity, not for offensive operations. One hundred kilograms per month translates to 1.2 million rounds annually. This quantity is the absolute minimum standard for a country that is not reconquering new territory but merely defending existing positions against a superior enemy.

Ukraine has therefore massively expanded its own ammunition production program. In July 2023, Ukraine produced more ammunition than in the entire twelve months of the previous year. However, this national effort can only partially fill the deficit. The country is therefore completely dependent on Western supplies. The European Union has pledged one million 155mm rounds, but only about half of that has actually been delivered. This is a recurring pattern: pledges consistently exceed delivery.

The current shutdown, in this context, is not merely a delay, but a crisis. If deliveries fail to arrive in the coming weeks, Ukrainian artillery will be forced to stand still. This means not only reduced firepower, but also diminished defenses and a complete inability to launch counterattacks. Such a scenario would provide Russian forces, who already enjoy a surplus of ammunition, with an opportunity for territorial gains. Even if the shutdown were to end within weeks, the tactical conditions on the front will have shifted.

Ukraine's shortage of ammunition is a well-known problem, but it is becoming even more pressing under pressure. Analysts describe the situation as a transition from a war of maneuvers to a war of attrition, in which the side with better ammunition supplies has a structural advantage. Russia, despite sanctions and industrial inefficiencies, holds this advantage. Ukraine's dependence on Western supplies means that any disruption, whether administrative or physical, has immediate operational consequences.

An additional factor is the quality versus quantity of artillery. While Russia uses fast, mass-produced ammunition, often with questionable quality control mechanisms, Ukraine strategically employs more precise, Western ammunition against high-value targets. A shortage of Western ammunition forces Ukraine to operate at lower levels, reducing its effectiveness. This is a qualitative aspect of material warfare that is often overlooked in statistical analyses.

The immediate consequence is accelerated physical attrition of the Ukrainian armed forces. Field commanders are already reporting that ammunition availability is a deciding factor in tactical planning. The shortage is leading to a psychological paralysis, with commanders hesitant to use artillery for fear that local reserves will be depleted during critical moments. This puts them at a disadvantage compared to Russian commanders, who, while firing inefficiently, at least have the privilege of using sheer numbers to compensate for a lack of accuracy.

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The European arms industry catastrophe: Structural paralysis instead of dynamism

Europe's response to the munitions crisis reveals fundamental weaknesses in the European arms industry that can only be partially addressed through financial means. The European defense technology and industrial base was designed for a 30-year peace dividend. Most European arms companies operate on a contract manufacturing model: production only after an order is placed, not for stock. This results in long supply chains and lead times of several months.

This made economic sense during peacetime. It reduced tied-up capital and storage costs. But in wartime, this is a fatal design. By the time an order is placed, supply chains are already strained. Raw materials like explosives, propellants, and metals are scarce and expensive. Specialized suppliers that manufacture components such as detonators or sensors cannot suddenly ramp up production from peacetime to wartime levels without massive investments and recruiting skilled personnel.

The European munitions industry has identified approximately fifteen producers in eleven member states. Many of these companies are already bound by legacy contracts and export commitments. The available additional capacity is therefore less than the nominal total capacity. This is a frequently overlooked point: a company with a total capacity of ten thousand rounds per month cannot immediately allocate all ten thousand to new orders if eight thousand are already committed to long-term contracts.

Rheinmetall, Europe's largest munitions producer, has made significant investments in capacity expansion, including the acquisition and relocation of facilities to Ukraine. While these investments make sense in the long term, in the short term they tie up capital and skilled personnel in buildings and organizations that are not yet productive. The production cycle for new plants is at least two years, from planning to full capacity.

The bigger problem is the fragmented European procurement strategy. While the United States can purchase centrally, with a single order directing hundreds of millions to a factory, European states negotiate separately. Poland buys differently than Germany, France differently than the Baltic states. This leads to inefficiencies. Economies of scale are lost. Supply chains are not built to support European volumes, but rather to serve individual national niches.

The European Commission has launched several coordination initiatives, including the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA). These are symbolically significant but operationally limited. EDIRPA provides €500 million. This is, in the words of European analysts, a “drop in the ocean” compared to the overall defence budget and the necessary investments. Furthermore, the funds are often tied to political negotiations and EU procedures, which slows down the disbursement.

An additional structural problem is the lack of coordination between government defense ministries and the private arms industry. European arms companies often lack knowledge of medium-term demand, which prevents them from reliably investing in capacity expansion. The first step toward resolving this problem is for governments to make written commitments to purchase specific quantities over several years. However, European states, bound by the European Union's Stability and Growth Pact, are less able to withdraw from such long-term commitments than the United States.

The result is a vicious cycle. Without demand guarantees, companies invest less, thus limiting capacity. Limited capacity leads to high prices. High prices make procurement more difficult for governments. Limited procurement leads to less investment. This cycle has been entrenched for three decades. It cannot be solved by short-term monetary stimulus, but requires structural, long-term reform.

The Pentagon will now attempt to test a new approach. Under the new Secretary of Defense, the United States will provide private defense contractors with direct financial incentives to accelerate their production. The Pentagon will also increase risk-taking to enable companies to scale up more quickly. This could work, as the American government has the financial resources and has demonstrated the will to enforce them. However, there is a risk that such direct intervention could stifle innovation. Companies that focus primarily on government contracts might invest less in cutting-edge technologies, since short-term profits are guaranteed through government production.

Europe, on the other hand, lacks both the financial resources and the institutional coherence to implement such rapid reforms. The result will be that the US will be able to increase its arms production faster than Europe, creating greater European dependence on the flow of American arms, precisely at a time when America appears more politically unstable domestically.

Geopolitical implications: The decline of the reliable partner

The shutdown and its implications for arms deliveries have significant geopolitical dimensions that extend beyond the immediate military situation. It signals a shift in the international order, in which the reliability of the United States as a constant force can no longer be assumed. This is not new for countries like China or Russia, which have long understood that American security guarantees are subject to complex domestic and foreign policy calculations. But for European countries, which since 1945 have relied on the notion that American engagement is virtually automatic, this is an uncomfortable reality.

Russia will be watching this development very closely. The Kremlin has long identified NATO's lack of cohesion as its Achilles' heel. An America internally divided and failing to manage arms deliveries is less credible than a major power operating without domestic paralysis. This does not necessarily mean that Russia will immediately resort to military action. However, it could lower the threshold for provocation. Border provocations, coupled with hybrid operations, could be intensified to test European nerves and deepen internal divisions.

China will likely adopt a similarly cautious approach. The fact that America could jeopardize its ability to deliver weapons in a timely manner suggests that a conflict in Taiwan could lead to a scenario where American support would not be automatic or immediate. This could alter Beijing's calculations regarding the use of military force, as the potential cost of American intervention would be reduced by the possibility that America might be unable to respond quickly due to domestic political constraints.

The primary phenomenon, however, is a centripetal force pulling Europe from the outside: an America that was necessary, reliable, and trendsetting. The shutdown reveals that this centrality is lacking. Europe must therefore accelerate the development of its strategic autonomy. The European Union's White Paper on Defence Preparedness 2030 and the associated strategy documents are attempts to create this autonomy. But their implementation will take years. And the security crisis could arrive sooner than the pace of European reform allows.

Another geopolitical factor is trade capability. Arms sales are not merely military transactions, but instruments of political power and economic influence. Countries dependent on American weapons systems are forced to consider American interests in their foreign policy. An America that fails to deliver reliably sees the binding force of its arms sales diminished. Paradoxically, this could prompt European states to turn more to other sources of supply, further fragmenting the geopolitical sphere.

Economic repercussions for the US defense industry

The internal consequences of the shutdown on the American defense industry are also significant. Major defense contractors like Lockheed Martin, Raytheon Technologies (RTX), Northrop Grumman, and Boeing are cogs in a complex supply chain that can break down if regulatory functions are not met. The Department of Defense holds the reins of approved export licenses. Companies cannot ship without these licenses. During the shutdown, these licenses are in limbo.

This has several economic consequences. First, these companies' cash flow is delayed. A Lockheed Martin contract worth hundreds of millions might not be paid out if shipments are delayed and approvals are not granted. This affects quarterly reports and potentially share prices. Market analysts who look at shipments as performance indicators will have to adjust their expectations.

Secondly, it puts suppliers under pressure. Small and medium-sized enterprises that supply components to large defense contractors often operate with tight cash flow. If the main customer fails to pay due to regulatory delays, these suppliers are forced to slow production or even lay off workers. This creates a ripple effect of inefficiencies throughout the supply chain.

Third, the shutdown creates uncertainty regarding utilization. Companies considering investing in defense production now see a system that does not function reliably. This signal could discourage future private investment, ironically preventing the Pentagon from achieving its goal of increasing capacity through private investment.

The Pentagon is attempting to reverse this dynamic through direct financial incentives. It will encourage private investment and invest more directly in corporate structures. This could work in the medium term, but in the short term, the shutdown will have already sown seeds of uncertainty. The Pentagon's decision to potentially acquire equity stakes in major defense companies is symptomatic of this uncertainty. A trusting market economy would not require such government ownership, as private profits would provide sufficient incentive.

The Ukrainian collapse: Scenarios of medium-term collapse

The worst-case scenario for Ukraine resulting from the shutdown is a gradual military collapse. If the ceasefire lasts longer than four to six weeks, Ukraine's ammunition reserves will be depleted. This would lead to a situation where Ukrainian artillery is practically limited to "emergency scenarios," in which only shots of the highest strategic importance are authorized.

In this scenario, Russia would launch an offensive operation exploiting its current front lines. With the Ukrainian artillery protection reduced, Russian infantry units would be able to advance, initially facing limited counter-fire. This would translate into territorial gains for Russia that would be difficult to regain, even after the flow of ammunition resumes.

Such a scenario would have several paths to escalation. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy could be pressured by the United States or European countries to begin negotiations to minimize wartime destruction. This would de facto constitute a Russian victory scenario in which Putin retains territorial gains and dictates a ceasefire. This would be politically unacceptable for the West, but militarily it could be the logical consequence if ammunition supplies are not replenished.

A second potential escalation is the nuclear threat. If Ukraine reaches a military stalemate, forces within Ukraine or the Western alliance could advocate for more drastic scenarios. This could lead to conventional escalation, with the West directly intervening in the conflict, or to nuclear threats. While such scenarios may seem exaggerated, they are quite real in military-strategic planning.

The more likely scenario, however, is one of trench warfare, in which both sides are equally impoverished. Russia has less ammunition than it would like, but more than Ukraine. Ukraine, forced to accept delays in its ammunition supply, is drawn into a war of attrition, which becomes increasingly unfavorable for the demographically weaker side (Ukraine has a smaller population). This leads to a slow, gradual weakening of the Ukrainian position over weeks and months. Territorial losses in this scenario would be gradual, not dramatic, but cumulatively significant.

European options and their limits

European countries have limited options in the face of the American shutdown. They can increase their own ammunition production, but this takes time. They can acquire American stockpiles of ammunition, but these exist in limited quantities and are also subject to approval processes. They can integrate their defense industries more closely, but institutional and national resistance makes this difficult.

Germany, traditionally hesitant with defense spending, has committed to investing more. However, German industry is also subject to capacity constraints. France has a domestic defense industry, but it is dependent on American components in many areas. Poland is investing most aggressively, but its industry is too small to supply Europe on its own.

The European response will likely be multidirectional. First, European states will try to pressure the Pentagon to end the shutdown quickly. This is a political process that Europe does not directly control, so it will involve a form of begging. Second, European countries will further increase their defense budgets, particularly for munitions and rapidly consumed goods. Third, they will try to consolidate their defense industries more quickly. Fourth, and implicitly, they will begin to develop strategic plans that are less dependent on American supplies. In the longer term, this means a more independent European defense industry, but in the short term, a more defensive European strategy.

The Baltic Defence Line, a project for the integrated defense infrastructure of the Baltic states, will gain in urgency. Investments in local production capacity and stockpiling will be encouraged. Countries like Denmark and Croatia, suffering from the shutdown, will reassess their rearmament plans. This could mean focusing less on quickly delivered weapons and instead on long-term procurement planning with European suppliers.

From guarantor to gap: How US instability is harming Europe's defense capabilities

The American government shutdown and its impact on arms deliveries is not merely an administrative glitch. It reveals deeper structural fractures in the West. The NATO system, built on the assumption of coherent, reliable American leadership, is being fragmented by domestic discord. Europe has relied on a security order it could not create on its own and now finds itself in a state of insecurity where the guarantor is fragile.

Ukraine is under direct, existential pressure. A shortage of ammunition means military weakness. Military weakness could lead to territorial losses that fundamentally alter the geopolitical map and implicitly legitimize the Russian model of “new Tsarist imperialism.”

The European defense industry, already suboptimal due to its peacetime configuration, is now forced to rapidly and massively build up capacity. This will succeed, but the price will be high, in the form of inflation in defense budgets, supply chain inefficiencies, and economic opportunity costs due to diverted investments.

And America faces the reality that internal political fragmentation undermines its global power projection. The Pentagon can make plans for arms production, but if the Department of Defense doesn't function, those plans are just plans.

The shutdown is temporary, but its consequences will be lasting. Europe will not return to a state of naive trust in America. Ukraine will develop a deeper skepticism toward Western promises. And the international order will be weakened, as the hegemonic guarantor has proven itself unreliable.

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The global economy is currently experiencing a fundamental change, a broken epoch that shakes the cornerstones of global logistics. The era of hyper-globalization, which was characterized by the unshakable striving for maximum efficiency and the “just-in-time” principle, gives way to a new reality. This is characterized by profound structural breaks, geopolitical shifts and progressive economic political fragmentation. The planning of international markets and supply chains, which was once assumed as a matter of course, dissolves and is replaced by a phase of growing uncertainty.

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