Donald Trump | The true consequences of the 2026 US midterms: The 2026 American midterm election and its global repercussions

Reckoning in November: Will the Republicans lose control of the US Congress? – Plunging polls: Is Donald Trump facing political ruin?

In November 2026, the world's eyes are glued to the United States: the American midterm elections are upon us, marking a historic turning point. After nearly two years of a second term characterized by radical economic policies and geopolitical unilateralism, President Donald Trump is in political freefall. Driven by persistent inflation, the consequences of aggressive tariff policies, and deep frustration among the American middle class, Republicans are threatened with the loss of their congressional majorities. For Trump, this could mean the end of his unchecked rule and reduce him to a powerless "lame duck." But far more than just American domestic politics is at stake: the outcome of this election will determine the future of US support for Ukraine, the preservation of the European security architecture, and the survival of the global trading order. A profound look at a pivotal year for America that will also significantly shape the future of Europe.

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When the people settle the score – Trump's crossroads between maintaining power and losing democracy

On November 3, 2026, the United States will hold elections – and this election is no ordinary vote for congressional seats. It is a referendum on the state of American democracy, on the consequences of radical economic policies, and on whether the US's global leadership role is still accompanied by institutional checks and balances. The midterm elections – known in American parlance as "midterm elections" – represent, like few other domestic political events, the inherent capacity of a democracy for self-correction. And this time, they could seal the political fate of a president who considers himself untouchable.

The Nature of the American Midterm Election

Midway through each four-year term of a US president, all 435 seats in the House of Representatives and one-third of the 100 Senate seats are up for election. This is supplemented by gubernatorial elections in the majority of states and numerous local elections. The system is deliberately designed to give the American people the opportunity every two years to either adjust—or confirm—the country's political course. No other democratic system in the world has a comparable, institutionalized mechanism for evaluating a government midterm.

Historically, the outcome of midterm elections is almost always sobering for the incumbent president's party. The Brookings Institution has determined that the president's party has lost seats in 20 of the 22 midterm elections since 1938. Only twice has a governing party managed to break this trend: in 2002, when President George W. Bush enjoyed a 63 percent approval rating after the September 11 attacks, and in 1998, when Bill Clinton, despite scandal, enjoyed 66 percent support. Both exceptions demonstrate what confirms the rule: only exceptional popularity can overcome this structural headwind.

The 2026 midterm elections will take place under fundamentally different circumstances. The Republican Party currently controls the Senate with 53 to 47 seats and holds a razor-thin majority of 219 to 213 seats in the House of Representatives. This dominance over both chambers has allowed Donald Trump to push his legislative agenda forward almost unhindered since January 2025 – without serious parliamentary oversight. This period could end in just under six months.

Trump's political erosion: The free fall in the polls

The situation is worrying for Republicans. When Donald Trump began his second term in January 2025, his approval rating, according to the aggregator RealClearPolling, was still over 50 percent. Since then, there has been a steady, then increasingly accelerated decline. By the end of April 2026, his approval rating had fallen to around 40 percent, while his disapproval rating rose from 44 to 57 percent – ​​an increase of 13 percentage points in just over a year.

The most recent measurements are even more drastic. A Reuters/Ipsos poll from March 2026 showed only 36 percent approval. An NPR/PBS News/Marist poll from May 2026 found just 37 percent approval, with 59 percent disapproval. A Reuters/Ipsos survey published at the end of April 2026 recorded a staggering 34 percent – ​​the lowest level of his entire second term. Disapproval ratings are also rising among previously loyal voter groups: 23 percent of Republicans now disapprove of Trump's economic policies, up from 17 percent in January.

The mood within the party is correspondingly gloomy. More than a dozen Republican strategists, members of Congress, and White House staffers have expressed similar sentiments to the media: "The mood is such that we know we're already finished in the midterms." This isn't pessimism from the opposition—it's the verdict from within their own ranks.

Economic frustration as a trigger for dissatisfaction

When voters punish the president's party in midterm elections, they rarely do so for abstract reasons of democratic theory. They do it because they perceive their everyday lives as worse than promised. And for many Americans in 2026, that everyday life has indeed become more difficult.

According to a CBS News poll, about 70 percent of Americans are struggling with the cost of food, housing, and healthcare. Inflation, which rose to 3.3 percent year-over-year in March 2026, remains above the Federal Reserve's target of 2 percent. The cost of living continues to be a dominant theme in political discourse. In the May 2026 Marist poll, 61 percent of respondents disapprove of Trump's handling of the economy, 76 percent are dissatisfied with his management of the cost of living, and 72 percent are dissatisfied with his inflation policy.

The cause lies to a significant extent in Trump's "Liberation Day" tariff policy of April 2025. Trump imposed blanket tariffs on imports from approximately 60 countries, which led to a severe short-term shock in the financial markets – the DAX, for example, lost more than ten percent within a few days. Economists at one point saw the probability of a US recession within the next twelve months at 45 percent – ​​the highest level since December 2023. ING's chief economist, James Knightley, put it succinctly: "Prices, jobs, and prosperity are all working against consumers. That's a pretty toxic combination for future growth in consumer spending."

The US trade deficit, which Trump aimed to combat with his tariff policies, barely shrank: In 2025, it stood at approximately $901 billion – hardly less than the previous year. In fact, the deficit in goods trade has continued to widen. The stated goal of balancing the American trade balance and bringing back manufacturing jobs was not achieved. Instead, consumer prices rose because imported goods became more expensive – and American consumers, who account for roughly two-thirds of US economic output, reacted with restraint.

Added to this is a profound sense of inequality. Stock markets have recovered, with the S&P 500 rising by almost 18 percent – ​​but these gains primarily benefit wealthy households. Only 28 percent of families with an income below $50,000 per year own stocks, while 87 percent of households with an annual income above $100,000 are invested in the capital market. Economic sentiment is thus divided: figures and reality diverge – and voters perceive reality, not statistics.

The political starting point: A mathematically close race

The Democrats enter the midterms with structural advantages stemming from a historical pattern and further amplified by the current political climate. They need a net gain of five seats to take control of the House of Representatives; a net gain of four seats is required for a Senate majority.

Recent polls paint a clear picture. In a big data poll conducted at the end of April 2026, Democrats lead among the most likely voters with 50.4 percent compared to 39.4 percent for Republicans. The Polymarket betting exchange gives a Democratic majority in the House of Representatives nearly an 80 percent probability. The Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) observes that the US population is "fed up" with the Republicans.

Also noteworthy is the shift among white voters – traditionally a core Republican group. In the aforementioned poll, Democrats garnered 41.5 percent of white voters compared to 41.0 percent for Republicans. This near-equal distribution within a historically Republican-dominated demographic is a strong indicator of the extent of the change in public opinion.

The optimistic scenario for the Democrats involves a net four- to five-seat Senate majority plus a net five- to ten-seat majority in the House of Representatives—a result that would effectively make Trump a lame duck. The realistic scenario, according to most analysts, sees a Senate majority as possible (50-50 or a narrow Democratic majority), while the House of Representatives could remain narrowly Republican. However, the structural conditions clearly favor the Democrats.

The redraws of electoral districts that Republicans have made in states governed by Texas and North Carolina could secure some seats for the GOP. But these defensive gerrymandering measures are unlikely to prevent a wave of national significance if the shift in public opinion is deep enough.

What's at stake: The legislative consequences of a change of power

The question of what losing a congressional majority would mean for Donald Trump can be reduced to one basic formula: the end of unfettered legislative power. All laws must be approved by both the House of Representatives and the Senate. A Democratic majority in even just one of the two chambers is enough to completely block the Republican legislative agenda.

Specifically, this would mean: no further tax cuts under projects like the "One Big, Beautiful Bill." No tightening of immigration policy through new legislation. No expansion of tariffs through legislative backing. Democrats would have the power to withhold funding, thereby forcing government shutdowns. They could convene investigative committees, subpoena witnesses, and demand internal government documents. And—as a last resort—they could initiate impeachment proceedings in the House of Representatives.

Trump himself seems to understand this danger. In a warning to Republican members of Congress, he stated bluntly: “You have to win the midterms, because if we don’t win the midterms, it’s going to be easy—I mean—they’re going to find a reason to remove me from office.” This is not rhetorical exaggeration—it is a sober assessment of the institutional mechanisms that would come into play in Washington.

Reports from the White House indicate that staff are already being intensively prepared for the potential simultaneous loss of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. The IPG Journal summarizes the situation as follows: In such a scenario, Trump would be a "lame duck"—a president facing his final years in office without legislative power.

California Governor Gavin Newsom, who is considered a possible Democratic presidential candidate for 2028, stated the goal openly: "We can de facto end Trump's presidency as we know it."

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Institutional change: Checks and balances under pressure

Beyond the specific legislation, the midterm elections touch upon a more fundamental question: whether the American system of institutional checks and balances can still fulfill its corrective function. Legal scholar Ulf Buermeyer put it succinctly: "Currently, Trump can essentially rule without restraint. The transformation of the political system into a state in which the office of the president is all-powerful is progressing unchecked."

A loss of congressional majorities would not reverse this process—because Trump, in the first year and a half of his second term, created far-reaching facts through executive orders and institutional restructuring. However, it would slow it down and give the opposition back the tools a parliamentary democracy needs to limit abuse of power: parliamentary inquiries, budget oversight, Senate confirmation of federal judges, and the institutional capacity to hold the executive branch accountable.

This is the deeper theoretical implications of the 2026 midterms – not just the question of which party wins more seats, but whether the American constitutional system returns to a kind of institutional normality or whether the erosion of the separation of powers continues.

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The geopolitical dimension: When Washington paralyzes itself

The domestic political crisis in Washington would have far-reaching foreign policy consequences – for Europe, for NATO, for the war in Ukraine, and for the global order as a whole. In the US, foreign policy is primarily the responsibility of the executive branch; the president sets foreign policy priorities and conducts diplomacy. But Congress has considerable powers of oversight: it must ratify international treaties, approve declarations of war, budget for military operations, and confirm the appointment of high-ranking State Department officials.

A divided or Democratic-dominated Congress could deliberately restrict Trump's foreign policy options. Democrats could try to secure arms aid for Ukraine or at least make it more difficult to reduce it. They could block the ratification of new trade agreements. And they could—as has happened in the past—strengthen legal safeguards to prevent an uncontrolled withdrawal from NATO.

This has already begun to happen: At the end of 2023, the US Congress passed the "National Defense Authorization Act," which requires explicit approval by a two-thirds majority in the Senate for a NATO withdrawal. When Trump again threatened to withdraw from NATO in March 2026—in response to the refusal of European allies to participate in the conflict over the Strait of Hormuz—this legal mechanism presented a de facto obstacle.

Under a divided Congress, this safeguard would be further strengthened. Prominent Republicans have already opposed Trump's National Security Strategy and voted by a majority in both houses of Congress for a bill that would significantly restrict a partial withdrawal of US troops from Europe. A Democratic-controlled Congress would continue and intensify this course.

The Ukraine Dilemma and the European Security Architecture

According to the IPG Journal, Trump's foreign policy is clearly biased: He has effectively sided with Moscow in Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, allowed his negotiator Steve Witkoff to incorporate Russian demands into a so-called "peace plan" that would amount to a complete surrender of Ukraine, and simultaneously denigrated America's closest allies. Hopes for a swift end to the war have dwindled: Only one in seven Germans now believes that the war in Ukraine will end in 2026.

A Democratic-controlled Congress would significantly complicate Trump's Ukraine policy. Democrats would have the budgetary power to maintain or even expand arms deliveries and aid packages to Ukraine—against the president's wishes. They could block the ratification of a ceasefire agreement that would force Ukraine to make unacceptable territorial concessions. And they could force public hearings on Ukraine policy, which would politically expose Trump's close ties to Moscow.

This would have significant strategic consequences for Europe. Under Trump, the US security umbrella can no longer be blindly relied upon – this has become an established political fact. NATO states across Europe have accelerated their rearmament plans in light of Russian aggression and dwindling trust in America. A Congress that sets institutional limits on Trump's foreign policy excesses would at least signal to European allies that the American security guarantee is not entirely dependent on the whims of a single president.

Wellington Management summarizes the geopolitical situation: The combined pressures of the superpower rivalry between the US and China, a rapidly fragmenting world order, and the longer-term consequences of climate change paint a structurally negative geopolitical picture. The 2026 midterm elections cannot fundamentally alter this picture – but they can determine whether the US remains a predictable or an uncontrollable factor in world politics during the remaining two years of Trump's term.

NATO as a test case: Between threat of withdrawal and institutional barriers

Trump's rhetoric toward NATO took on a new dimension during 2026. He denounced member states as "cowards" and ridiculed the alliance without US participation as a "paper tiger." He threatened to withdraw if European partners were unwilling to participate militarily in US operations in the Middle East. He undermined Article 5—the heart of the collective defense pledge—through its "protection money" logic: aid becomes a transaction, not an obligation.

From a purely formal standpoint, a NATO withdrawal is difficult for Trump to implement, as Congress requires a two-thirds majority in the Senate. However, Trump could effectively paralyze NATO without formally leaving: by refusing to allocate budget funds for NATO commitments, by withdrawing US troops from Europe by executive order, by refusing interoperability, or by realigning American defense planning to give lower priority to European scenarios.

A congress that limits these possibilities would therefore be of fundamental importance not only to domestic politics, but also to European security policy. Under the pressure of the Trump era, the European Union has begun to consider its own defense structures – a process that would be further accelerated by a renewed escalation of tensions between Trump and NATO. Anyone still demanding that Europe should not build parallel structures alongside NATO is ignoring reality.

The global trade conflict and its consequences

Trump's tariff policies have not only left their mark domestically, but have also shaken the international trade order. The United Nations forecasts global economic growth of only 2.7 percent for 2026 – a decline from 2.8 percent the previous year – and Trump's protectionist trade policies are considered the main culprit. For Germany, the consequences are threefold: lower US exports, weakened Chinese demand for German goods, and an increased Chinese redirection of exports to Europe, creating competition for domestic producers.

The EU and the US reached an agreement in the summer of 2025 that stipulates a 15 percent US tariff on most European products – but new tariff threats from Trump, linked to the Greenland demands, make a renewed escalation of the trade conflict seem possible. A Democratic-controlled Congress would not completely eliminate Trump's ability to unilaterally impose tariffs – as the president has considerable executive power in this area. However, he could tighten the legal framework for trade policy, limit negotiating mandates, and lay the foundation for a more stable trade policy after 2028.

The structural paradox: Trumpism without Trump?

One of the most interesting analytical questions surrounding the 2026 midterm elections is: Are they a referendum on Trump personally – or on a deeper shift in American politics? US expert Josef Braml argues that Trump is not the exception, but rather the expression of a profound change. The political coordinates of the US have shifted permanently; the midterms will not necessarily signify a return to the liberal mainstream.

This analysis carries weight. Even if the Democrats were to regain control of both houses of Congress, it would not change the social and economic discontent that brought Trump to power—and which his policies exacerbated rather than alleviated. The cost of living, the feeling of economic exclusion for the middle class, and distrust of elites and institutions: these factors will remain virulent, regardless of the election outcome in November 2026.

For the Democrats, this means that even a clear election victory in the fall is no guarantee for 2028. Despite their improved chances, the party is struggling to develop a clear leadership profile and a coherent political vision. The infrastructure of the Democratic countermovement is in place—candidates, financial resources, and increased political mobilization. But the substantive policy that would legitimize a counterforce not only parliamentaryly but also politically still needs to be convincingly formulated.

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The crucial question for the liberal world order

Ultimately, the analysis of the American midterm elections in 2026 inevitably leads to a question that goes far beyond American domestic politics: What role will the USA play in the world in the coming years – and under whose control are the decisions that define this role?

Trump has transformed America into an unpredictable superpower. An ally that simultaneously imposes tariffs on friendly nations, imposes a transactional character on NATO's Article 5, pursues a Ukraine policy that favors the aggressor, and undermines global institutions like the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund. This policy has damaged trust in the US as a reliable partner worldwide.

A Congress that limits Trump's executive power is not a panacea for this damage. But it is a necessary—though not sufficient—condition for the US to be perceived as a regulated, democratic state governed by the rule of law, where institutional checks and balances are still effective. The 2026 midterm elections are therefore not just an American affair. They are a global one: their outcome will help determine what kind of world order is formed in the remaining two years of the Trump era—and what legacy it leaves behind.

Six months before election day, one thing is certain: Republicans are facing the strongest headwinds in decades. History is against them, the polls are against them, and the economic climate in the country is against them. And yet: Elections are not decided by predictions, but by voter turnout, mobilization, and what happens in the final weeks before November 3, 2026. America has surprised many times before – in both directions.

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