Between expectation and disillusionment: The global assessment (including the USA, EU and China) of the Trump presidency in November 2025

When promises meet reality – One world judges differently

Public opinion in the United States toward President Donald Trump plummeted to a historic low in November 2025. With an approval rating of just 41 percent and a disapproval rate of 58 percent, Trump reached the lowest levels of his second term. These figures reveal a fundamental problem: the economic promises made during his campaign are clashing with a reality characterized by rising living costs, uncertainty, and growing discontent. While Trump struggles with declining support in the US, global perceptions of his presidency present a more nuanced picture – ranging from deep rejection in Europe to pragmatic adaptation in Asia.

The American perspective: Economic concerns override political loyalty

In the United States, dissatisfaction with Trump is primarily manifested in his economic policies. A remarkable trend is evident in the polling data: 76 percent of voters view the economic situation negatively, a significant increase compared to the 70 percent at the end of Biden's term. This deterioration in economic perception hits Trump particularly hard, as he based his campaign largely on economic competence.

Inflation worries dominate daily life in America. According to recent surveys, 85 percent of voters report rising food prices, with 60 percent saying they have increased significantly. Utility costs have also risen for 78 percent of respondents, healthcare costs for 67 percent, and housing costs for 66 percent. This widespread inflation affects all social classes, but households with an income below $50,000 are particularly hard hit – 79 percent of them rate their financial situation negatively.

The attribution of responsibility is clear: By a ratio of two to one, Americans are more likely to blame Trump than Biden for the current economic situation. 62 percent see Trump as primarily responsible, while only 32 percent blame Biden. Surprisingly, even 42 percent of Republicans share this assessment, while only 53 percent of Republican voters blame Biden. This internal erosion of support within his own party base signals a profound crisis of confidence.

Trump's economic policies are increasingly perceived as detrimental by the public. Forty-six percent of voters say that Trump's economic measures have personally harmed them, while only 15 percent report a positive effect. These figures are strikingly similar to the assessments of the Biden administration in December 2024, when 47 percent complained of negative impacts. The crucial difference: While Biden reached these figures toward the end of his term, Trump is facing them less than a year into his second term.

Approval of Trump's economic policies reached a new low of 38 percent. The ratings are even more dramatic in specific policy areas: Trump receives only 34 percent approval for healthcare, 35 percent for tariffs, and a mere 28 percent for combating inflation. Even on border security, traditionally a strength of Republican presidents, approval stands at only 53 percent.

The political consequences of this development are already evident in concrete election results. In the November 2025 elections in Virginia and New Jersey, Democratic candidates achieved clear victories. These results are being interpreted as a warning signal for the 2026 midterm elections. Current polls on the generic ballot for Congress show a 14-percentage-point lead for the Democrats—55 percent would vote Democratic, while only 41 percent would vote Republican. Among independent voters, the Democratic lead is even higher, at 33 percentage points.

Particularly alarming for Republicans is the trend among core voter groups. Trump's approval ratings among male voters, white voters, and voters without a college degree reached record lows. Among Republicans, his approval rating fell from 92 percent in March to 86 percent in November, a drop of six percentage points in just eight months. This erosion of support within the party's own base points to structural problems that extend beyond short-term fluctuations.

The longest government shutdown in American history, lasting 43 days, further exacerbated the negative perception. Although 39 percent of Americans blame congressional Democrats for the shutdown, 34 percent blame Trump himself and 26 percent blame congressional Republicans. The economic cost is estimated by the Congressional Budget Office at $10 billion to $14 billion for the first month, with a 1.5 percent reduction in GDP growth in the fourth quarter.

Public sentiment toward both major parties has deteriorated. Only 39 percent have a positive opinion of the Democratic Party, and the same percentage of voters have a positive opinion of the Republican Party. Approximately 60 percent of voters say that neither the president nor members of Congress from either party care about people like them. This deep alienation between citizens and the political class shapes the political climate.

Trump's attempt to construct an alternate reality in which inflation is almost nonexistent and the economy is booming is met with widespread rejection. Only 20 percent of Republicans share Trump's assessment that prices are falling, while the majority acknowledge that they have risen. Fifty-two percent of all registered voters believe that inflation is not at all under control, including nearly two-thirds of independents. Only one-third of Republicans feel that inflation is at least largely under control.

Demographic analysis shows that economic dissatisfaction is particularly pronounced among voters without a college degree, Hispanics, Blacks, Independents, and voters under 45. For households with an income below $50,000, 79 percent rate their financial situation negatively. These groups partly formed the basis of Trump's 2024 election victory; their shift away from the Republican Party could have devastating consequences for the party in the 2026 midterm elections.

Another critical issue is the crisis of confidence in democratic institutions. Two-thirds of Americans are concerned that Congress and the Supreme Court are failing to fulfill their constitutional checks and balances and are granting the president too much constitutional authority. At the same time, roughly half are concerned that the judiciary is hindering Trump's constitutional authority to implement his agenda.

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The European perspective: Between concern and strategic realignment

European perceptions of the Trump presidency have deteriorated dramatically since his return to the White House. Within a few months, positive sentiment toward the United States collapsed in several European countries. In Denmark, approval ratings fell from 47 percent in October 2024 to just 13 percent in the spring of 2025, an unprecedented drop of 34 percentage points. This drastic change is directly attributable to Trump's aggressive rhetoric regarding Greenland, which is considered an autonomous Danish territory.

On average, positive perceptions of the US in the European Union fell from 47 percent to 29 percent, a decline of 18 percentage points within just a few months. More than half of those surveyed in Great Britain, Germany, Sweden, and Denmark now have an unfavorable opinion of the United States. Even in Italy, traditionally a partner with a positive view of America, opinions are now evenly split, with 42 percent holding positive and 42 percent negative views.

The rejection of Trump personally is even more pronounced. 58 percent of Britons, French, Italians, and Spaniards have a very unfavorable opinion of Trump, and another 16 percent have a somewhat unfavorable one. Only 19 percent hold a positive opinion. On a trust scale of zero to ten, Trump achieves an average score of 2.6 among Europeans, only slightly above Russian President Putin with 1.5 points. This ranking is remarkable: The American president enjoys hardly more trust in Europe than the leader of a nation considered the main threat to European security.

Three-quarters of Europeans, 73 percent, view Trump as a threat to peace and security in Europe, only nine percentage points less than Putin at 82 percent. This perception reflects deep concern about Trump's foreign policy. 51 percent of Europeans consider Trump an enemy of Europe, and 63 percent believe his election will make the world less safe.

The crisis of confidence is manifesting itself concretely in security policy. Seventy percent of Europeans believe that the EU must rely on its own armed forces to guarantee security and defense. Only ten percent trust the United States under Trump to assume defense responsibilities. This fundamental questioning of the transatlantic security architecture marks a historic turning point.

Trump's trade policies have further strained European-American relations. The introduction of tariffs, starting with a 10 percent base tariff on virtually all imports and an additional 20 percent on European goods, triggered strong reactions in the EU. After intensive negotiations, the EU reached an agreement with the US at the end of July 2025, but it is widely criticized as unequal: The US retains 15 percent tariffs on most European products, while the EU removes all tariffs on American industrial goods.

The economic impact is significant. Studies predict that EU GDP could fall by up to 0.5 percent in the medium term. Different sectors are affected to varying degrees: In the worst-case scenario, the pharmaceutical industry could experience a decline in value added of 10.4 percent. Other vulnerable sectors include the manufacture of transport equipment and basic metals.

The impact varies considerably from country to country. Ireland faces a potential GDP loss of 2.7 percent in the worst-case scenario, mainly due to its reliance on pharmaceutical exports to the US. Denmark would lose 1.0 percent, Belgium 0.7 percent, and Germany 0.5 percent. These figures may seem moderate, but for economies already struggling with stagnation, they could mean the difference between growth and recession.

Germany, as Europe's largest economy, is particularly exposed. The German government revised its growth forecast for 2025 to zero percent, after having predicted modest growth of 0.3 percent in January. Federal Economics Minister Robert Habeck stated bluntly: "The main reason for this situation is Donald Trump's trade policy and its consequences for Germany." The US is Germany's most important trading partner, and Trump's tariffs are hitting the export-oriented German economy especially hard.

German exports to the US fell to a four-year low. In August, deliveries dropped by 20 percent compared to the previous year. Analysts estimate that new US tariffs could lead to an economic downturn of one to 1.5 percent in Germany. A recession would then be unavoidable. Germany has experienced no significant economic growth in the last five years and is now facing a third consecutive year of stagnation or contraction.

The political consequences for Germany are far-reaching. Months of political instability, a change of government after the February election, and the challenge of forming a new coalition have limited its ability to act. Its dependence on the US for security and the economy is being reassessed. Vice President JD Vance's February speech at the Munich Security Conference marked a turning point in German strategic thinking, as he accused European governments of suppressing freedom of expression and claimed that internal problems such as EU immigration and alleged censorship policies posed greater threats to democracy than external adversaries like Russia or China.

The European reaction to Trump's policies oscillates between appeasement and resistance. Sixty-nine percent of Danes, French, Germans, Italians, Spaniards, Swedes, and Britons support retaliatory tariffs against the United States. At the same time, the EU has temporarily suspended its own retaliatory measures to ease tensions through negotiations. This ambivalent stance reflects Europe's internal divisions: between the desire to resist American pressure and the recognition that escalation would harm both sides.

The erosion of trust also affects shared values. Europeans increasingly perceive that the US is moving away from democratic principles. 43 percent believe Trump has authoritarian tendencies, and 39 percent consider him a veritable dictator. Only 13 percent believe that Trump respects democratic principles. This perception undermines the idea of ​​a values-based transatlantic community.

Of particular concern for Europe is Trump's stance on the Ukraine conflict. 57 percent of Europeans believe that a peace agreement negotiated by Trump and Putin would be better for Russia. Since 65 percent of Europeans support Ukraine, US actions that favor Russia are perceived as a source of widespread European disapproval of the United States. Trump's efforts in March to broker a temporary ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia were met with skepticism.

Europe's strategic realignment is manifesting itself in concrete steps. The EU is considering dismantling trade barriers within its own single market to offset the impact of American tariffs. There are increased efforts to sign free trade agreements with third countries and to deepen the integration of the single market. At the same time, there is a growing awareness that Europe must significantly increase its defense spending and expand its own military capabilities.

The paradoxical situation is that Trump's policies may force Europe toward precisely the integration that has developed slowly over decades. This external pressure could serve as a catalyst for closer European cooperation in defense, economic, and foreign policy. However, it remains questionable whether deeply entrenched national interests and institutional weaknesses can be overcome.

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The German perspective: Economic vulnerability and strategic paradigm shift

Germany occupies a special position within Europe, as it is directly affected by both Trump's trade and security policies. The German perception of the Trump presidency is characterized by deep concern, combined with the realization that fundamental assumptions of German foreign and economic policy no longer hold true.

Germany faces multifaceted economic challenges. As an export-oriented economy, Germany is particularly vulnerable to protectionist measures. Exports to the US account for roughly four percent of German GDP. The automotive industry, a cornerstone of the German economy, is under enormous pressure. Trump's 25 percent tariffs on vehicles, aluminum, and steel are hitting German manufacturers especially hard. Added to this is growing competition from China in key industries such as automotive and mechanical engineering.

The ifo Institute's calculations predict that the new tariffs could reduce German GDP by 0.3 percent in 2025. Some key industries, such as automotive and mechanical engineering, would be particularly hard hit. Since Germany's economy is already stagnating, the US tariffs could push economic growth below zero, warns ifo President Clemens Fuest. "If the US sticks to the announced tariffs, this will be the biggest attack on free trade since the Second World War."

The German economy is suffering in three ways: First, Germany can export less to the US. Second, due to China's reduced competitiveness, Germany can export less to China. Third, countries like China will be forced to shift their focus to other export markets, putting additional pressure on German companies. This multiple burden exacerbates the structural problems of the German economy.

Germany has experienced no economic expansion for two years now. In 2023, the economy shrank by 0.3 percent, and by a further 0.2 percent in 2024. The zero-growth forecast for 2025 means a third year without expansion. This persistent weakness has several causes: the energy crisis following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, structural problems such as bureaucracy and a shortage of skilled workers, and now American trade policy.

During the spring meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in Washington, Bundesbank President Joachim Nagel suggested that stagnation might be the best-case scenario. He did not rule out “a mild recession in 2025” and emphasized that the current period of uncertainty remains unresolved. These gloomy prospects are weighing on the political mood in Germany.

The security policy dimension is equally worrying. Germany hosts the largest contingent of American troops on the European continent and stations American nuclear weapons on its territory. Germany's security and defense policy is primarily structured around NATO and the continued US presence in Europe. Trump's initial months in office have cast doubt on the future of these arrangements.

The challenges for Germany are particularly acute: Trump's antagonism towards Ukraine, his willingness to negotiate with Russia without consulting European or Ukrainian partners, and his expansionist aspirations towards Greenland have heightened concerns that the United States is not only apathetic but increasingly antagonistic towards European security interests.

Germany is undergoing a second “turning point,” following the first, which reoriented its defense policy after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. With this second paradigm shift, Berlin could become a global counterweight to Washington. Discussions about increased defense spending, the development of its own military capabilities, and stronger European defense integration are gaining momentum.

German public opinion reflects these concerns. 81 percent of Germans have little or no confidence in Trump's ability to do the right thing in global affairs. This rejection transcends party lines and reflects a broad consensus that Trump's presidency is detrimental to German interests. The perception that the US is no longer a reliable partner is leading to intense debates about strategic autonomy and alternative security architectures.

At the same time, there is a recognition that Germany and Europe must do their own homework. Germany's dependence on American security guarantees and American markets has made it vulnerable. Diversifying trade relations, investing in domestic defense capabilities, and strengthening European cooperation are seen as necessary steps.

The political implications are complex. The federal election in February led to a change of government, with Friedrich Merz as chancellor-designate at the head of a conservative coalition. This new government faces the challenge of putting together a massive financial package worth hundreds of billions of euros to stimulate the economy while simultaneously increasing defense spending. Fiscal constraints and constitutional debt limits complicate this task.

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Asian perceptions: Between adaptation and insecurity

The Asian reaction to Trump's presidency is more nuanced and pragmatic than the European one. While Europe primarily reacts with rejection, Asian countries demonstrate a mixture of adaptation, negotiation, and strategic repositioning. This stance reflects both their geographical proximity to China and their economic dependence on the US.

Japan and South Korea, the two most important Asian allies of the United States, find themselves in a particularly precarious situation. Both countries have been experiencing their most fragile political conditions for decades, just as Trump's return to the White House is introducing serious disruptions into an already shifting global order. The question is not if, but when Trump might treat his Indo-Pacific allies similarly to how he has treated Europe.

In Japan, a poll shows that about 45 percent of respondents believe Japanese-American relations will deteriorate. Seventy percent have a negative impression of Trump, and there is resistance to his tariff policies. At the same time, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba is forced to walk a tightrope. His meeting with Trump in Washington in February was hailed as the beginning of a “new golden age” in bilateral relations, but behind this lies the need to assess whether Tokyo still has any room to maneuver.

In July 2025, Japan signed a trade agreement with a reciprocal tariff of 15 percent and committed to investing $550 billion in the US energy and transportation sectors. This massive pledge reflects Japan's attempt to appease Trump and secure an exemption from the harshest tariffs. At the same time, Japan committed to purchasing record amounts of LNG to meet Trump's demands for more balanced trade relations.

The challenge for Japan is to safeguard its security interests while making economic concessions. The threat from North Korea remains, and the need to deal with China requires American support. If Japan does not receive an exemption from US steel tariffs and Japanese investments continue to be subject to heightened scrutiny, Tokyo could initiate further dialogues with Beijing to offset potential losses with Washington.

South Korea faces similar dilemmas. The political uncertainty following the suspension of President Yoon Suk-yeol, and the question of whether he will be reinstated or replaced by a new president in a snap election, complicates policy coordination with the Trump administration. How South Korea can manage policy coordination with the Trump administration amidst this political uncertainty remains an open question.

South Korea signed an agreement in October 2025 that included a 15 percent reciprocal tariff and a $350 billion technology and shipbuilding program. However, President Lee Jae-myung's government is firmly resisting the enormous investment requirement that Trump has linked to a reduction in US tariffs on Korean imports. Trump's demands are testing Seoul's patience, and there is a widespread perception that the alliance is being leveraged for unilateral economic gain.

Southeast Asia is experiencing a particularly volatile relationship with the US. ASEAN countries were hit hard by “Liberation Day” tariffs in April, with Cambodia facing a 49 percent tariff, Laos 48 percent, and Vietnam 46 percent. Even US allies like Thailand and the Philippines were initially hit with tariffs of 36 and 17 percent, respectively. After individual negotiations, regional tariffs fell to between 10 and 20 percent for most ASEAN countries, but Myanmar and Laos continue to struggle with elevated rates of 40 percent.

Trump's visit to the ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur in October demonstrated the transactional nature of his Asia policy. He signed trade agreements with Malaysia and Cambodia, as well as framework agreements with Vietnam and Thailand. Malaysia and Cambodia received assurances that their tariffs would remain at 19 percent, providing them with at least temporary relief. These countries believe the agreements allow them to avoid immediate economic stress and create opportunities for cooperation.

At the same time, these countries are aware that the US could decide at any time to unilaterally raise tariffs, whether due to a perceived implementation violation or to target imports of a product it declares a threat to national security. Furthermore, subsequent US agreements with other countries, including China, could not only undermine the competitive advantage they hoped to maintain through their bilateral agreements, but could actually put them at a competitive disadvantage.

The fear of transshipment tariffs of up to 40 percent, imposed if the US believes countries are diverting Chinese goods, is impacting the planning certainty of Southeast Asian companies. The Asian Development Bank revised its 2025 growth forecast for Southeast Asia from 4.7 percent to 4.3 percent, citing a “new global trade environment characterized by tariffs and revised trade agreements.”

India finds itself in a particularly complex position. Geopolitical experts had predicted a comfortable relationship between the US and India, with the expectation that the Trump administration would turn to India to counter China's global manufacturing dominance. A historically warm relationship between Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, two strongmen who rode to power on nativist populism, was expected to further strengthen the relationship.

The reality is different. India is subject to a 26 percent tariff, and negotiations are ongoing. Trump signaled that he would skip the Quad summit in India, a decision that seems to have derailed the summit as a whole. Meanwhile, Russian President Putin plans to visit India in December—just months after Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted Modi for a high-level meeting. Despite recent signs of easing tensions—Indian companies signed a major deal for US liquefied natural gas, the US removed tariffs on Indian coffee and other products, and India cutting Russian oil imports—the relationship remains strained.

US Asian allies share this uncertainty about American reliability. In Japan and South Korea, the dependability of US security assistance is being questioned, much like in Europe. The priorities and future direction of US-China policy remain unclear. Given President Trump's preference for unilateralism and bilateralism, questions arise regarding the sustainability of regional multilateral initiatives and US support for Asian partners.

Despite these challenges, there are also opportunistic elements in the Asian response. Some Southeast Asian countries see the US-China rivalry as an opportunity to extract concessions from both sides. The US decision to focus on critical minerals and supply chain resilience offers Southeast Asian countries opportunities to position themselves as alternative manufacturing hubs. Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam are attempting to capitalize on this “China Plus One” strategy.

At the same time, economic integration with China is deepening. During the 28th ASEAN-China Summit, China issued a warning about “economic coercion” and “bullying,” which experts interpreted as a dig at the tariff-driven policies of the United States. China’s role as ASEAN’s largest external partner remains, and many Southeast Asian countries are trying to find a balance between the US and China.

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The Chinese perspective: Strategic patience and tactical adaptation

China's response to Trump's presidency has been characterized by strategic patience and tactical adjustment. Beijing was prepared for a continuation of the strained and fragile bilateral relationship, regardless of who won the election. The bipartisan consensus in the US for an aggressive stance toward China—a rare constant over the past eight years—meant that Beijing was well-positioned to maintain this course under the second Trump administration, albeit with a more transactional and less predictable approach.

The Chinese intelligentsia largely believes that the US political elite is determined to pursue its dual goals: stifling China's economic growth and forcing regime change. However, given Trump's apparent disdain for traditional pillars of US foreign policy, a massive shift in China policy is not out of the question.

Two perspectives explain why Beijing isn't necessarily happy about Trump's return. First, the Biden administration stabilized the US-China relationship by focusing on guidelines to reduce uncertainty. President Trump's return to the White House means everything will become uncertain again. Second, during his first term, Trump increased tensions over trade and technology issues, making these two topics a very sensitive part of the relationship. The Biden administration was more or less a continuation of Trump's policies.

The market reaction to Trump's team and policies has been muted so far. The market doesn't seem overly concerned. Based on Beijing's understanding of how Trump measures the effectiveness of his policies—namely, stock market performance—Beijing sees no reason to overreact from this perspective for now. Chinese policymakers recognize that Trump appears to be someone who enjoys the personal and theatrical aspects of foreign policy and is reluctant to share the limelight. If Beijing were able to establish a direct channel, a direct conversation with President Trump, the political appointees he has placed in the Cabinet and various government agencies might appear less important.

Trade tensions remain a central issue. Even before his inauguration, Trump announced his intention to impose a 10 percent tariff on all additional tariffs on imports from China unless China took action regarding fentanyl and immigration. This threat was later replaced by more comprehensive tariff measures. China is currently subject to a 47 percent tariff, reduced from 57 percent following the Trump-Xi summit in Busan on October 30, 2025.

The meeting between Trump and Xi at the APEC talks in South Korea marked a significant moment. The two leaders reached a trade truce, with the biggest highlight being an agreement for China to lift its ban on rare mineral exports to the US for one year, which Trump said he expected to be extended annually. According to the US government, China also agreed to begin purchasing oil and gas from the US.

Starting November 10, 2025, China removed tariffs that had been imposed in March in retaliation for tariffs on American goods by the Trump administration. This included the 15 percent tariff on US chicken, wheat, corn, and cotton, as well as the 10 percent tariff on US sorghum, soybeans, pork, beef, seafood, fruits, vegetables, and dairy products. These measures demonstrate China's willingness to make concessions to avoid further escalation.

At the same time, China is using the situation strategically. Trump's heavy-handed tactics have inadvertently legitimized, at least temporarily, China's long-standing, hollow claims about Western democratic failures. For decades, one of the most prominent themes in what the Chinese Communist Party calls "external propaganda"—designed to mobilize narratives that support China's core interests and deflect criticism of its poor human rights record—has centered on the dangers posed by a hegemonic United States that adopts a self-serving and hypocritical view of rights and freedoms.

The fatal weakness of this strategy has thus far been its rhetorical emptiness. Since Trump took office in January, however, China's empty propaganda about American despotism has gained factual weight. The serious actions of the Trump administration—from dismantling USAID, Voice of America, and Radio Free Asia to launching nationwide investigations into Harvard and Columbia universities, and now deploying the US military against civilians—have provided an endless stream of factual evidence for what Chinese state media have long claimed.

China's strategic position also benefits from the American estrangement from allies. The deterioration of US relations with Vietnam and India, similar to the tensions with Europe, creates opportunities for China to deepen its ties with these countries. China will be the primary beneficiary of this distancing between the US and countries that could complicate its defense plans.

The economic dimension is complex. The astronomical tariffs on China could lead to a rerouting of Chinese goods from the US to the EU, a pattern observed during the US-China trade war of 2017-2019. This could put significant pressure on domestic industries. However, even before Trump's latest tariff announcements, there were already relatively high US tariffs on many Chinese products, and only 13.5 percent of Chinese exports go to the US.

China pursues a coherent and consistent strategy—defending Beijing's core principles and maximizing its wealth, power, and influence relative to those of the United States. This contrasts sharply with Trump's improvisational and uncoordinated approach. The recent Trump-Xi meeting resolved none of the underlying tensions between Beijing and Washington; it merely postponed the problem.

China's five-year plan and long-term strategic planning stand in stark contrast to the short-term, transactional approach of the Trump administration. While the US grapples with domestic turmoil and foreign policy unpredictability, China patiently pursues its goals of technological self-sufficiency, the expansion of the Belt and Road Initiative, and the deepening of economic ties with the Global South.

The four red lines China has articulated—Taiwan, democracy and human rights, the political path and system, and the right to development—signal areas where Beijing will not compromise. The Chinese embassy in the US hopes the American side will avoid crossing these lines and causing further trouble. The emphasis on these sensitive areas following the high-level meeting between Xi and Trump suggests that while Beijing is interested in de-escalation, it will defend its core interests.

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Global fragmentation and the future of the world order

The differing regional reactions to Trump's presidency reveal a deepening global fragmentation. The Atlantic community, once considered the foundation of the liberal international order, is experiencing an unprecedented crisis of confidence. Europeans increasingly see Trump as a threat rather than an ally, and the traditional bonds of shared values ​​and interests are eroding.

In Asia, a more complex picture of strategic adjustment emerges. Countries are attempting to balance between the US and China, protecting their economic interests while addressing security concerns. The transactional nature of Trump's policies forces Asian countries to negotiate bilateral agreements that offer short-term relief but create long-term uncertainty.

The American domestic perspective is characterized by economic discontent and political polarization. Trump's attempt to construct an alternative economic reality is encountering growing resistance, even within his own party. The upcoming 2026 midterm elections could become a referendum on his presidency, with potentially serious consequences for the Republican Party.

The economic repercussions of Trump's tariff policies are being felt globally. Estimates suggest they could reduce global GDP growth by 0.5 to 1 percent. The disruption of established supply chains, the uncertainty for investors, and the fragmentation of the international trading system have far-reaching consequences. The shift from a rules-based multilateral trading system to bilateral transactional agreements undermines the predictability and stability upon which the global economy depends.

The security policy implications are equally serious. The questioning of NATO's mutual defense guarantee, the unpredictability of the American position on conflicts such as the war in Ukraine, and the instrumentalization of security relations for economic goals are shaking the foundations of the post-war security architecture. Europe is forced to reconsider its strategic autonomy, while Asian allies are reassessing their own security.

The erosion of trust in American leadership has systemic consequences. The US's willingness to withdraw from or weaken multilateral institutions—from the Paris Climate Agreement to the World Health Organization and the World Trade Organization—creates a vacuum. China is cleverly positioning itself as a more reliable partner for many countries in the Global South, which perceive American unpredictability as a greater risk than Chinese authoritarianism.

The societal and democratic implications must not be overlooked. The perception in Europe that Trump exhibits authoritarian tendencies and does not respect democratic principles undermines the normative foundation of the transatlantic relationship. If the US is no longer seen as a defender of democratic values, the Western alliance loses a crucial cohesive factor.

The question of the future of the international order is becoming increasingly urgent. Are we in transition from an American-led unipolar order to a multipolar world? Or are we witnessing fragmentation into regional spheres of influence with minimal global coordination? The answers to these questions will be determined not only by Trump's policies but also by how other actors react.

Europe faces a choice between deeper integration and strategic autonomy or further fragmentation along national lines. Asian countries must decide whether to position themselves between the US and China or attempt to balance the two powers. China itself must calculate how aggressively it can pursue its interests without provoking a coalition against it.

Economic discontent in the US suggests that Trump's policies could become unsustainable domestically. Should Republicans suffer heavy losses in the 2026 midterm elections, this could lead to a realignment or at least a moderation of his policies. Alternatively, it could lead to further polarization and radicalization, with unpredictable consequences.

The global reaction to Trump's presidency shows that the world is adapting to a new reality of American foreign policy—one characterized by transactionalism, unilateralism, and unpredictability. This adaptation is not coordinated but fragmented and opportunistic. The result is a more unstable, less predictable international order in which traditional alliances are weakening while new power constellations are emerging.

The long-term consequences of these developments will shape international politics for decades. The question is not whether the world order is changing—it already is. The question is in which direction this change is leading and whether the emerging order can promote peace, prosperity, and stability, or whether it will result in increasing conflict, economic fragmentation, and political instability.

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