The Milipol trade fair 2025 in Paris: Between technological upswing and strategic void

Europe's fatal mistake and what the security fair in Paris forgot: The alarming gap in our crisis preparedness

Paris, November 2025. In the sprawling halls of the Parc des Expositions Paris Nord Villepinte, a fascinating yet unsettling spectacle unfolded these past few days. Milipol 2025, the world's leading trade fair for internal security, opened its doors, showcasing the arsenal of the future: from artificial intelligence that predicts crimes before they happen, to silent drone hunters and digital fortresses against cyberattacks. Over 1,200 exhibitors and delegations from 160 countries celebrated an industry booming like never before in the face of global crises. But amidst the blinking server racks and armored vehicles, an abyss opened up, one that was conspicuously absent from the exhibitors' glossy brochures.

While Europe is upgrading its technology and the lines between police and military are becoming increasingly blurred, the events in Paris revealed a dangerous strategic void: the almost complete lack of plans for supplying the civilian population in a crisis. We are investing billions in defending against complex hybrid threats, yet the basic question of how to provide millions of people with water, food, and heat in the event of a collapse of critical infrastructure remains unanswered.

This year's trade fair was therefore not only a showcase of "homeland security" but also a reflection of a society that increasingly confuses security with technical surveillance and forgets fundamental resilience. The following analysis sheds light on this dangerous discrepancy. It shows why we can hack drones in flight, but risk failing at the logistics of a simple emergency supply – and why the true Achilles' heel of our security lies not at our borders, but in our supermarkets and power grids.

When security becomes an illusion: Europe's blind spot in crisis preparedness

This year's Milipol in Paris revealed a remarkable discrepancy between military-technological advancements and basic public services. While artificial intelligence, anti-drone systems, and biometric surveillance dominated the exhibition halls, crucial elements of modern security architecture remained virtually invisible: concepts for rapid deployment and the strategic security of supply for the civilian population in times of crisis.

The Milipol as a reflection of global security shifts

Milipol Paris, in its 24th edition from November 18-21, 2025, once again established itself as the world's leading trade fair for internal security and homeland security. Under the patronage of the French Ministry of the Interior, over 1,200 exhibitors and more than 30,000 trade visitors from 160 countries gathered at the Parc des Expositions Paris Nord Villepinte. The event impressively documented the fundamental transformation of the global security landscape, which is currently undergoing a period of strategic realignment.

The trade fair presented itself as a comprehensive showcase of technological innovations, covering the spectrum from police equipment and border protection systems to cyber defense and critical infrastructure protection. With 65 percent international exhibitors and 175 official delegations from all continents, Milipol 2025 underscored its status as a central hub for the global security industry. The thematic focus on artificial intelligence in the service of homeland security was reflected in an extensive conference program with over 40 specialist events, illustrating the shift from traditional security concepts to data-driven, algorithmic systems.

The economic dimension of this development is considerable. The global homeland security market, which reached a volume of US$546.86 billion in 2024, is projected to grow to US$800.1 billion by 2035, representing an average annual growth rate of 3.52 percent. Europe alone increased its defense spending from €343 billion in 2024 to a projected €381 billion in 2025, with defense equipment procurement rising by 39 percent to €88 billion. These figures reflect not only the geopolitical tensions exacerbated by Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, but also a fundamental reassessment of security as a holistic, societal good.

Artificial intelligence as a central paradigm of security architecture

Milipol 2025 marked a turning point in the integration of artificial intelligence into homeland security systems. What was considered a supporting technology just a few years ago has evolved into a core operational competency that permeates all levels of modern security infrastructure. The exhibited systems demonstrated the transition from reactive to predictive security models, in which algorithms no longer merely analyze data but actively anticipate threat scenarios and generate actionable recommendations.

The AI ​​applications presented included real-time facial recognition capable of identifying individuals in crowds and tracking their movement patterns across urban surveillance networks. Behavioral analysis systems detect anomalies in public spaces and trigger automated alerts. Predictive analytics processes multimodal data streams from social media, traffic sensors, communication networks, and IoT devices to identify potential security risks before they manifest. These systems represent a qualitative leap from surveillance to prediction, from documentation to prevention.

The emphasis on digital sovereignty was particularly significant in the discussions. European states have recognized that dependence on foreign algorithms and data infrastructures represents a strategic vulnerability. Accordingly, national governments are accelerating the development of their own AI capabilities, which are intended to guarantee both technological independence and compliance with European data protection and fundamental rights standards. This duality between operational efficiency and legal compliance shaped many expert discussions and revealed the areas of tension in modern security policy.

The integration of AI has extended across the entire spectrum of internal security. In urban areas, intelligent sensor networks enable the continuous monitoring of critical infrastructure, while at borders, biometric systems perform automated identity checks. In forensic analysis, AI tools exponentially accelerate the evaluation of digital evidence. In cybersecurity, autonomous systems detect attack patterns and initiate countermeasures in milliseconds. This pervasive penetration makes it clear that artificial intelligence is no longer an optional add-on, but rather the central nervous system of modern security architectures.

The drone threat and the fight for low-altitude airspace

A second focus of Milipol 2025 was the rapid escalation of the drone problem, which has evolved from a peripheral threat to a central security risk. The proliferation of inexpensive commercial drones, which can be misused by non-state actors for surveillance, logistics, or as weapons, has opened up a new dimension of asymmetric warfare. Conflict scenarios in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa have demonstrated the operational reality that drones can be used as precise, inexpensive, and difficult-to-defend weapons.

The exhibited counter-UAS systems reflected this threat landscape through multi-layered defense concepts. Modern C-UAS architectures combine passive sensors for detection, electronic warfare for jamming, and kinetic effectors for physical neutralization. Radio frequency scanners identify communication signals between drone and operator, electro-optical and infrared systems enable visual detection, acoustic sensors register characteristic engine sounds, and short-range radars provide precise positional data. These multimodal systems must be able to distinguish between legitimate and threatening drones and operate in urban environments without causing collateral damage.

Particular attention was drawn to the Cyber-over-RF technology from the Israeli company Sentrycs, which allows drones to be intercepted, their communication protocols intercepted, and a controlled landing enforced, rather than destroyed. This system detects intruders within a ten-kilometer radius, identifies the drone type, tracks its flight path, and locates the operator. The collected data is transmitted to security authorities in real time and forms the basis for legal proceedings. The technology is available in three configurations: as a stationary installation on masts, as a portable unit in transport cases for rapid deployment, and as a vehicle-mounted variant for protecting mobile convoys.

Alongside defensive drone use, the offensive deployment of drones by security forces has become a standard tool. The concept of drones as first responders envisions the automatic deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles to assess situations in emergency situations, even before police or rescue services arrive. These systems enable real-time reconnaissance in difficult-to-access terrain, reduce risks for emergency personnel, and accelerate tactical decision-making. The integration of drones into standardized operational concepts fundamentally transforms operational procedures and necessitates new training concepts, legal frameworks, and technical standards.

The strategic implications of this development are far-reaching. Low-altitude airspace has become a primary frontier of homeland security, requiring constant monitoring, rapid response capabilities, and international coordination. The challenge lies in enabling legitimate drone use while simultaneously preventing illegal use. This necessitates regulatory frameworks that balance flexibility with security, as well as technical standards that ensure interoperability between national systems.

Cybersecurity as an existential pillar of national defense

Milipol 2025 underscored the complete integration of cybersecurity into the framework of national security architectures. What was once considered a technical problem for IT departments has become an existential threat to state functions, critical infrastructure, and democratic processes. The frequency and sophistication of cyberattacks on government institutions, energy providers, healthcare systems, and financial institutions has reached a level that renders conventional defense concepts obsolete.

The presented cybersecurity solutions reflected this threat landscape through multi-layered defense architectures. Anomaly detection systems analyze network traffic in real time and identify suspicious patterns. AI-powered threat intelligence platforms aggregate global threat data and generate proactive alerts. Automated response systems isolate compromised network segments and initiate recovery procedures. Forensic tools enable the reconstruction of attack scenarios and the attribution of attacks to perpetrator groups. These systems operate increasingly autonomously, as human analysts are unable to keep pace with the speed and volume of modern cyberattacks.

A key theme was the importance of digital sovereignty for national security. European states are investing heavily in the development of their own encryption technologies, secure communication networks, and sovereign cloud infrastructures. These efforts aim to reduce strategic dependencies on non-European technology providers and ensure control over critical data flows. The French sovereign cloud initiative, presented by Thales in partnership with Google Cloud, exemplifies this strategy by combining international technological expertise with national control and compliance.

The international dimension of cybersecurity has manifested itself in strengthened cooperation mechanisms. Joint early warning systems enable the real-time exchange of threat information between national CERTs. Coordinated response protocols ensure operational capability in the face of transnational attacks. Joint research programs develop defense strategies against emerging threats. This cooperation is essential because cyberattacks do not respect national borders, and effective defense can only be achieved through collective efforts.

Armored vehicles for police operations and the militarization of internal security

The presentation of tactical armored vehicles for police and special forces marked a significant shift in the conceptualization of internal security. Vehicles originally developed for military operations are increasingly being used in urban security scenarios. This development reflects the growing threat posed by heavily armed terrorist cells, organized crime with military equipment, and asymmetric attacks on civilian targets.

The vehicles on display integrated hybrid drive systems for increased mobility and a reduced acoustic signature, active protection systems against projectiles and improvised explosive devices, and integrated command centers with real-time data processing. Ballistic armor provides protection against fire from large-caliber weapons, while modular interiors allow for flexible configurations for different operational scenarios. Communication systems connect the vehicles with command centers and other emergency services, creating an integrated situational awareness picture.

These vehicles represent more than technological upgrades. They symbolize a conceptual convergence of military and police operations, blurring traditional distinctions between external and internal security. While proponents argue that modern threat scenarios necessitate such capabilities, critics warn of a creeping militarization of public space that undermines fundamental principles of democratic policing. This debate touches upon fundamental questions about the role of security forces in democratic societies and the balance between protection and freedom.

However, operational reality shows that police forces in several European metropolises are already facing threat scenarios that exceed the capabilities of conventional equipment. Terrorist attacks with automatic weapons, hostage situations in urban environments, and organized crime with a paramilitary structure require operational capabilities that go beyond traditional policing. The challenge lies in providing these capabilities without compromising the fundamental principles of lawful policing.

Biometrics and digital forensics as instruments of total surveillance

The advances in biometric identification and digital forensics presented at Milipol open up unprecedented possibilities for identifying and tracking individuals. Modern biometric systems operate with multimodal approaches that combine facial recognition, fingerprints, iris scans, gait patterns, and vein structures to enable virtually error-free identification. These systems are being implemented in airports, train stations, public squares, and border crossings, creating a seamless network of digital identity verification.

The finger vein technology presented by mofiria, developed in partnership with VSTech Sensors, exemplifies the next generation of biometric systems. Unlike surface-based methods such as fingerprints, which can be forged, this technology utilizes subcutaneous vein patterns that are virtually impossible to replicate. A newly developed film-based sensor enables integration into mobile devices and access control systems with a minimal footprint. The error rate is in the per mille range, while the processing speed allows for real-time authentication in high-throughput scenarios.

In parallel, advances in digital forensics are revolutionizing investigative work. Modern tools, such as the solutions presented by Detego Global and MSAB, enable the simultaneous extraction and analysis of data from smartphones, computers, removable media, drones, and IoT devices. AI-powered analysis modules identify relevant evidence within terabytes of data in minutes, reconstruct deleted information, and create networks of relationships between suspects. These capabilities are particularly important in counterterrorism and organized crime investigations, where digital traces often represent the only available evidence.

The ethical and legal implications of these technologies were the subject of heated debate at Milipol. While their effectiveness in combating crime is undeniable, they raise fundamental questions about privacy, data protection, and the limits of state surveillance. The danger of the creeping normalization of total surveillance stands in contrast to the legitimate need for security. Finding a balance between these two poles is one of the central challenges facing modern democracies.

The hub for security and defense offers well-founded advice and current information in order to effectively support companies and organizations in strengthening their role in European security and defense policy. In close connection to the SME Connect working group, he promotes small and medium -sized companies (SMEs) in particular that want to further expand their innovative strength and competitiveness in the field of defense. As a central point of contact, the hub creates a decisive bridge between SME and European defense strategy.

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The economic logic of the security industry

The economic dimension of Milipol revealed an industry undergoing structural change. Despite impressive visitor numbers and the presence of leading companies, observers reported a subdued atmosphere characterized by restraint and consolidation. The number of truly innovative new products fell short of expectations. Many exhibitors presented enhancements to existing systems rather than disruptive innovations. This situation reflects the complex market conditions of an industry navigating between escalating threat scenarios and restrictive procurement budgets.

The global homeland security industry generated $546.86 billion in revenue in 2024 and is projected to grow to $800.1 billion by 2035. North America dominates with a 34.8 percent share, followed by Europe and the rapidly growing Asia-Pacific region. Border security accounts for the largest segment share at 33.9 percent, followed by cybersecurity, which is the fastest-growing segment. These figures illustrate the enormous economic weight of an industry driven by both geopolitical crises and technological change.

Procurement structures are undergoing fundamental transformations. Traditional acquisition cycles, which took years from concept to delivery, are being replaced by agile procurement models that enable rapid adaptation to changing threat landscapes. The European Defence Industrial Strategy aims to allocate fifty percent of all procurement budgets to collaborative projects by 2030 and to overcome the fragmentation of national markets. A €1.5 billion budget for the readiness of the European defence industry is intended to expand production capacities and secure supply chains.

The role of the private sector in homeland security has fundamentally changed. Eighty-five percent of critical infrastructure is privately owned, making public-private partnerships an indispensable element of national security strategies. Companies invest in proprietary security systems, while governments develop regulatory frameworks and incentive structures that channel private investment in socially desirable directions. This entanglement of public responsibility and private ownership creates complex governance structures that require ongoing negotiation and coordination.

The conference program as a space for reflecting on strategic challenges

The extensive conference program of Milipol 2025, featuring over forty events, provided a platform for strategic reflection beyond product presentations. The thematic focus on artificial intelligence in the service of homeland security permeated all discussions and underscored the central importance of this technology for future security architectures. The conferences addressed ethical dimensions of AI-supported surveillance, legal frameworks for algorithmic decision-making, and operational challenges in implementing autonomous systems.

Events focusing on border and maritime security, which addressed the complexities of modern migration management and transnational crime, garnered particular attention. Experts discussed multilateral security approaches that combine national sovereignty with international cooperation. The role of open-source intelligence in combating financial crime was addressed, as was the use of AI in post-disaster forensics. These discussions highlighted the increasing interconnectedness of traditionally separate security domains and the need for holistic approaches.

The Milipol Innovation Awards recognized outstanding developments in five categories: crisis management, cybersecurity and AI, drones and anti-drone systems, personal equipment, and large-scale event security. The nominated solutions represented the technological avant-garde of their respective fields and set standards for future developments. The Innov Arena in the startup area provided young companies with a platform to present disruptive innovations to a professional audience and highlighted the dynamics of an industry that fluctuates between established corporations and agile newcomers.

The international dimension was manifested in the presence of 175 official delegations from 68 countries, who held bilateral talks, negotiated cooperation agreements, and exchanged best practices. This diplomatic level of Milipol underscores its function as a global hub not only for commercial transactions but also for shaping international security architectures. The networking of national authorities, international organizations, and private actors creates informal governance structures that complement and accelerate formal intergovernmental processes.

The strategic gap: Lack of concepts for rapid deployment and civilian supply logistics

Despite the comprehensive presentation of military and police capabilities, Milipol 2025 revealed a fundamental gap: the almost complete absence of concepts, technologies, and strategies for rapid deployment in the context of ensuring the supply security of the civilian population during crises. While drone defense, cyber warfare, and biometric surveillance were meticulously presented, questions of logistical support for millions of civilians in war or disaster scenarios remained virtually unaddressed. This omission is all the more remarkable given that, concurrently with the trade fair, European governments are issuing urgent warnings about the need to prepare for extreme scenarios.

In March 2025, the European Commission published its Preparedness Union Strategy, urging citizens to stockpile supplies for at least 72 hours. Germany updated its civil defense guidelines for the first time in 35 years, explicitly naming war as a possible scenario. The Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Relief recommends food supplies for three to ten days. At the 2025 summit in The Hague, NATO member states committed to spending five percent of their gross domestic product on defense and security-related expenditures by 2035, with 1.5 percent explicitly earmarked for non-military areas such as cyber defense and critical infrastructure.

These initiatives reflect the understanding that modern security extends far beyond military defense capabilities. A society's resilience is measured by its ability to maintain essential life functions in extreme situations. This includes the supply of food, water, energy, and medical care, as well as the maintenance of communication networks, transportation infrastructure, and public order. While military rapid deployment capabilities are continuously expanding, their civilian counterparts remain underdeveloped.

The challenges of civilian supply logistics in crises differ fundamentally from those of military operations. While military logistics focuses on supplying relatively small, mobile, and disciplined units, civilian systems must reach millions of immobile, vulnerable individuals with diverse needs. The population includes the sick, the elderly, children, and people with disabilities who require specialized care. Infrastructure is decentralized, often privately operated, and not designed for emergency situations. Coordination between local, regional, and national levels, as well as between public and private actors, is complex and prone to errors.

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed glaring weaknesses in these systems. Supply chains for medical equipment collapsed, food supplies came under pressure, and coordination between levels of government did not function smoothly. This was a relatively slowly escalating scenario without direct physical infrastructure destruction. A large-scale military conflict or natural disaster would create far more drastic challenges. The destruction of critical infrastructure, mass displacement, the collapse of communication networks, and panic behavior would push civilian supply systems to their absolute limits.

Military logistics concepts and their limited transferability

Military organizations have developed highly efficient rapid deployment systems over decades. The US Strategic Army Corps, NATO Rapid Deployable Corps, and the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity demonstrate the ability to deploy thousands of fully equipped soldiers to any location within hours. These systems rely on pre-positioned supplies, standardized procedures, a centralized command structure, and continuous training. They function because military units are hierarchically organized, homogeneously equipped, and prepared for such scenarios.

Applying these principles to civilian contexts encounters fundamental limitations. Civilians are not soldiers who follow orders. They have individual needs, fears, and plans. Infrastructure is fragmented across municipal, regional, and national jurisdictions, as well as countless private actors. Standardization, common communication protocols, and clear chains of command are lacking. The privatization of critical infrastructure since the end of the Cold War has reduced state control. While during the Cold War, railways, ports, airports, and energy networks were often state-owned and could be placed under NATO control in a crisis, today they are predominantly privately operated.

Nevertheless, military concepts offer valuable insights. The principle of pre-positioning strategic reserves can be applied to civilian supply. Germany already maintains secret stockpiles of shelf-stable foodstuffs such as powdered milk and pulses. However, these reserves must be massively expanded, decentralized, and optimized for rapid access. The military concept of redundancy, which establishes multiple supply routes for critical goods, is essential for civilian supply security. Dependence on a few, highly optimized supply chains makes systems fragile. Creating alternative routes, suppliers, and means of transport increases resilience but comes at the cost of efficiency.

The principle of modularity, where standardized components can be flexibly combined, offers potential for civilian crisis logistics. Mobile decontamination units, transportable power generators, modular accommodations, and standardized emergency kits could be prepared and rapidly deployed when needed. The military emphasis on continuous training can be adapted for civilian structures. Regular exercises involving local authorities, aid organizations, businesses, and the general public would identify weaknesses and improve response capabilities.

Humanitarian logistics as a reference model and its limitations

Humanitarian logistics, operating in conflict zones and after natural disasters, offers further points of reference. The Logistics Cluster, coordinated by the World Food Programme, has provided aid to millions of people in crises such as those in Gaza, Ukraine, and Syria. The Logistics Emergency Team, a partnership between the World Economic Forum and logistics companies like Maersk, DP World, UPS, and Agility, provides pro bono transport capacity, warehousing space, and expertise. These systems function through close coordination between UN organizations, NGOs, national governments, and private companies.

Humanitarian logistics mechanisms include rapid needs assessment, flexible procurement, multimodal transport chains, and last-mile delivery under the most adverse conditions. UN Humanitarian Response Depots in strategic locations maintain pre-assembled kits for various emergency scenarios. Mobile storage units can be deployed within days. Local partners handle the final distribution, as they possess knowledge of the language, culture, and geography. However, these systems typically operate in regions with already collapsed infrastructure and require international coordination.

Transferring this approach to a European context requires adjustments. Europe has significantly better starting conditions: intact infrastructure, functioning administrations, and developed markets. The challenge lies in mobilizing and coordinating these resources in crisis scenarios. Public-private partnerships are essential, as private logistics companies possess vehicle fleets, warehouses, and personnel that are needed in a crisis. Legal frameworks must be in place to allow the state to requisition or coordinate these resources in an emergency without disrupting economic functioning.

The integration of local stakeholders is crucial. Local governments, businesses, associations, and informal networks are familiar with the specific needs and resources on the ground. Bottom-up approaches that enable and support local self-organization are often more effective than purely top-down systems. The challenge lies in combining local flexibility with overarching coordination to avoid duplication and ensure efficient resource allocation.

Critical infrastructure as the nervous system of societal resilience

While the protection of critical infrastructure was a topic at Milipol, it was primarily addressed from the perspectives of physical security and cyber defense. The functional dimension – how critical infrastructure actually provides essential services during crises – remained under-represented. In Germany, critical infrastructure encompasses thirteen sectors: energy, water, food, information technology and telecommunications, health, finance and insurance, transport and traffic, media and culture, as well as state and municipal administration. Similar categorizations exist in other European countries.

The fundamental problem is that these sectors are highly interdependent. The failure of one sector has cascading effects on others. Without electricity, water pumps, telecommunications, ATMs, and hospitals do not function. Without fuel, food cannot be transported, emergency generators cannot be operated, and evacuations cannot be carried out. Without functioning communication networks, coordination is impossible. These interdependencies create vulnerabilities: A targeted attack on critical nodes can trigger far-reaching cascading effects.

The privatization and internationalization of critical infrastructure since the 1990s has exacerbated these vulnerabilities. Just-in-time supply chains minimize storage costs but eliminate buffers. Concentration on a few highly efficient production sites reduces redundancy. Dependence on global supply chains makes local systems vulnerable to external shocks. The COVID pandemic demonstrated this through shortages of semiconductors, pharmaceutical ingredients, and medical protective equipment. The Russian war of aggression revealed the vulnerability of European energy supplies.

Strategic autonomy, a key term in European security policy, aims to reduce critical dependencies. The EU's European Defence Industrial Strategy, the €800 billion ReArm Europe program, and national initiatives such as Germany's €100 billion special fund reflect this priority. However, these investments primarily flow into military capabilities and arms production. The civilian dimension of strategic autonomy—the ability to provide for one's own population in times of crisis—remains underfunded.

Civil protection: between individual precaution and state responsibility

The latest recommendations for individual crisis preparedness mark a significant shift in government communication. For decades, Western European policymakers avoided explicit warnings about war scenarios so as not to alarm the population. The new directness with which citizens are urged to stockpile food, water, cash, medicine, and emergency equipment reflects a fundamental reassessment of the security situation. The European Commission's assertion that the aim is not to frighten people but to provide them with security seems hardly convincing in light of these explicit scenarios.

The recommendation to be able to survive self-sufficiently for 72 hours is based on the assumption that emergency services and government agencies can organize assistance within that timeframe. This assumption may hold true for local crises such as floods or power outages. However, it is questionable in the case of large-scale disasters or military attacks. Experience shows that in severe crises, government agencies often require significantly longer than 72 hours to provide effective aid. The German recommendation of three to ten days appears more realistic, but may still be insufficient.

Shifting responsibility to individuals raises social questions. Not all households have the financial means to build up extensive stockpiles. Not everyone has sufficient storage space. People in precarious housing situations, the homeless, and already vulnerable groups are not reached by such recommendations or cannot implement them. There is a risk that individual preparedness will become a privilege of the middle class, while socially disadvantaged groups are left unprotected in a crisis. Government strategies must therefore go beyond appeals to individual responsibility and develop collective mechanisms that leave no one behind.

The psychological dimension of such warnings is ambivalent. On the one hand, realistic information and practical preparation can reduce anxiety by conveying a sense of agency. Resilience research shows that people who have taken concrete precautions feel more secure and react more rationally in crises. On the other hand, the sudden confrontation with existential threats that have been considered unlikely for decades can generate fear and mistrust. Finding the balance between realistic warnings and avoiding panic is difficult.

The global economy is currently experiencing a fundamental change, a broken epoch that shakes the cornerstones of global logistics. The era of hyper-globalization, which was characterized by the unshakable striving for maximum efficiency and the “just-in-time” principle, gives way to a new reality. This is characterized by profound structural breaks, geopolitical shifts and progressive economic political fragmentation. The planning of international markets and supply chains, which was once assumed as a matter of course, dissolves and is replaced by a phase of growing uncertainty.

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• Strategic resilience in a fragmented world through intelligent infrastructure and automation - The requirements profile of the dual-use logistics expert

NATO and EU between collective defense and civilian preparation and supply

NATO and the European Union have substantially expanded their resilience concepts in recent years. In 2016, NATO adopted seven Baseline Requirements for Civil Preparedness, encompassing continuity of government, energy supply resilience, the ability to manage uncontrolled population movements, food and water supply resilience, the ability to cope with mass casualties, communications systems resilience, and transportation systems resilience. These requirements recognize that collective defense, as enshrined in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, only functions if national societies are resilient.

The 2022 EU Critical Entities Resilience Directive extended the protection of critical infrastructure beyond energy and transport to include banking, financial market infrastructure, health, drinking water, wastewater, and digital infrastructure. The EU-NATO Task Force on Critical Infrastructure Resilience coordinates the efforts of both organizations. Following the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines in 2022, NATO intensified the protection of critical underwater infrastructure. Operation Baltic Sentry patrols the Baltic Sea region to protect against hybrid threats.

These initiatives reflect the recognition that modern conflicts operate below the threshold of overt military aggression. Hybrid warfare combines conventional military means with cyberattacks, disinformation, sabotage, economic pressure, and the use of irregular forces. The line between war and peace is blurring. Critical infrastructure becomes the primary target, as its disruption allows for massive effects with a relatively low risk of escalation. Protecting this infrastructure and the ability to rapidly recover after attacks are therefore central elements of modern defense.

The challenge lies in integrating military and civilian preparedness. Traditionally, these two areas operated separately. Military planning focused on combat capability, while civil defense was geared towards disaster management. However, modern threat scenarios require comprehensive approaches that combine both dimensions. NATO's target of five percent of GDP for defense and security, of which 1.5 percent is for non-military sectors, aims to finance this integration. However, its practical implementation is still in its early stages.

Economic realities and the limits of what is feasible

The financial dimensions of comprehensive crisis preparedness are immense. The EU's ReArm Europe program, with €800 billion over four years, national rearmament programs such as Germany's €100 billion special fund, and NATO targets add up to trillions. These sums compete with other societal priorities: climate protection, social security, education, health, and infrastructure investment. Democratic societies must negotiate these priorities, with short-term political cycles often hindering long-term investments in resilience.

However, the economic costs of inadequate preparedness can be significantly higher. The COVID-19 pandemic caused trillions of euros in economic damage. The 2021 floods in the Ahr Valley claimed over 200 lives and caused over 30 billion euros in damage. A widespread power outage lasting several days would, according to estimates, cause hundreds of billions of euros in damage. A military conflict on European soil would dwarf all previous scenarios. From this perspective, investments in preparedness appear not as costs, but as insurance against existential risks.

The question is how to best allocate these investments. The current focus on military buildup while civilian supply logistics remains underfunded appears unbalanced. A comprehensive security strategy must integrate both dimensions. Military capabilities without resilient civilian structures are fragile. At the same time, resilient civilian structures are of little use if military defense fails. Finding the optimal balance requires systematic risk analysis that assesses various threat scenarios in terms of their probability and potential impact.

The role of private sector actors is crucial. Eighty-five percent of critical infrastructure is privately owned. Logistics companies control transport capacity. Retailers manage food supply chains. Energy companies operate power plants and grids. Telecommunications providers control communications infrastructure. These companies operate under market logic that prioritizes efficiency and profitability. Redundancy and resilience cost money and reduce competitiveness. Public-private partnerships must develop mechanisms that incentivize private investment in socially desirable resilience without distorting markets or undermining competition.

Scenarios of future crises and their logistical requirements

The range of potential crisis scenarios for which modern societies must be prepared is broad. Natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, droughts, or pandemics differ fundamentally from technological failures such as widespread power outages, the collapse of communication networks, or cyberattacks on critical infrastructure. Military conflicts, whether conventional warfare, hybrid threats, or terrorist attacks, present yet other challenges. Each scenario requires specific preparations, while simultaneously leveraging synergies to limit costs.

A widespread power outage lasting several days would trigger cascading effects. Water supplies would collapse within hours, as pumps cannot function without electricity. Food in refrigerators would spoil. ATMs and electronic payment systems would fail, making cash reserves critical. Gas stations would be unable to pump fuel. Mobile and internet communication would collapse once emergency power supplies were exhausted. Hospitals would rely on emergency generators, which have limited fuel capacity. The population would depend on battery-powered radios for information. The logistical challenge would be to provide millions of people with water, food, and information without a functioning power grid and with limited communication.

A military conflict would introduce additional dimensions. Physical destruction of infrastructure through bombing or sabotage would cause not only temporary disruptions but also long-term damage. Mass displacement from threatened areas would overwhelm transportation systems and necessitate shelters. The need to prioritize civilian and military resource requirements would force difficult ethical choices. The psychological strain of direct threat would increase the likelihood of panic and irrational behavior. The logistical challenge would be heightened by the need to operate under enemy fire or threat.

A pandemic, as demonstrated by COVID, presents different challenges. Infrastructure generally remains intact, but human resources are depleted by illness. Supply chains are disrupted by international restrictions. The need to maintain social distancing complicates distribution. Medical care systems become overwhelmed. The psychological strain of prolonged uncertainty erodes social cohesion. The logistical challenge lies in maintaining care with reduced staffing levels, disrupted supply chains, and overburdened healthcare systems.

Education and training as underestimated pillars of resilience

The EU Preparedness Union Strategy emphasizes the need to integrate crisis preparedness into school curricula. This insight is fundamental, but its implementation is underestimated. Modern education systems focus on academic achievement and labor market qualifications. Practical skills for crisis situations play a negligible role. Yet, basic knowledge of first aid, emergency communication, navigation without GPS, food preparation without electricity, and psychological stress management in crises is essential.

Scandinavian countries with long traditions of civil defense have already integrated such elements. Sweden sends the brochure "Om krisen eller kriget kommer" (When Crisis or War Comes), containing practical guidance for crisis scenarios, to every household. Finland maintains extensive bunker systems and regularly trains its population. These cultures of preparedness result from historical experience and geographical proximity to potential threats. Western European countries, which have experienced decades of relative security, have largely abandoned such traditions. They now need to be revived.

Training should not be limited to students. Local authorities, businesses, aid organizations, and the general public must be regularly involved in crisis simulations. Such exercises identify vulnerabilities, establish communication channels, and build trust between stakeholders. They empower the public and reduce the risk of panic. The challenge lies in designing these exercises realistically without fueling unnecessary fear and achieving participation that extends beyond those who are intrinsically motivated.

The role of digital media and social networks in crises is ambivalent. They enable rapid information dissemination and coordination, but are also susceptible to disinformation and manipulation. The ability to distinguish trustworthy from false information is a critical skill. Media literacy, which teaches critical thinking and source evaluation, is therefore an integral part of crisis preparedness. At the same time, government agencies must establish trustworthy information channels and actively utilize them during crises to counteract rumors and misinformation.

International cooperation as a necessity and a challenge

Modern crises do not respect national borders. Pandemics, cyberattacks, climate disasters, and military conflicts have transnational dimensions. Effective crisis preparedness therefore requires international cooperation. The EU, with its supranational structures, provides a framework for this that is unique worldwide. The Preparedness Union Strategy aims to coordinate national efforts, establish common standards, and pool resources.

However, practical implementation is complex. EU member states have differing threat perceptions, priorities, and capacities. There is a risk that cooperation will fail over the lowest common denominator or become bogged down in endless coordination processes. Finding the right balance between European coordination and national flexibility is difficult. Subsidiarity, the principle that decisions should be made at the lowest possible level, is in tension with the need for overarching coordination.

NATO offers a complementary structure for security policy cooperation. The Alliance comprises European and North American members and has established military command structures. NATO's resilience requirements and EU initiatives must be coordinated to avoid duplication and leverage synergies. The EU-NATO Task Force operates at this interface, but the differing memberships and mandates of both organizations create complexity.

Global cooperation beyond the EU and NATO is essential for addressing certain threats. Pandemics require worldwide coordination of health measures. Cybersecurity only functions through international cooperation in threat intelligence and standard-setting. Climate adaptation requires global mechanisms. The challenge lies in maintaining the capacity for cooperation in an increasingly fragmented and confrontational geopolitical landscape. There is a risk of blocs forming that cooperate internally, but lack coordination or even harbor antagonism between them.

The need for a realignment of strategic priorities

Milipol 2025 impressively documented the state of technological capabilities in surveillance, cyber defense, counter-terrorism operations, and border security. However, it also revealed a fundamental strategic gap: the lack of coherent concepts for the logistical support of the civilian population in extreme scenarios. This discrepancy between military-technical sophistication and civilian preparedness is dangerous. A society that possesses highly advanced drone defense systems but is incapable of supplying its population in the event of infrastructure failure is not resilient.

The necessary realignment requires several steps. First, civilian supply logistics must be understood as an integral component of national security strategies. It must not be treated as a subordinate issue, but rather on an equal footing with military defense capabilities. Second, substantial financial resources must be mobilized. The allocation of defense budgets must give greater consideration to civilian resilience. The NATO target of 1.5 percent of GDP for security-related non-military spending provides a framework, but it must be put into practice.

Third, concrete capabilities must be developed. This includes strategic stockpiles of food, water, medicine, and energy, stored decentrally and mobilizable quickly. It requires logistical capacity for rapid deployment: transport, storage, and distribution. It needs communication systems that function even when regular infrastructure fails. It requires clear command structures and prepared legal frameworks that enable swift action in crises.

Fourth, the population must be prepared and empowered. Information about crisis scenarios, practical guidance on preparedness, training in basic skills, and regular drills are essential. Civil society, with its aid organizations, associations, and informal networks, must be recognized and supported as a partner. Fifth, international cooperation must be intensified. Crises do not stop at borders, and the complexity of modern threats overwhelms unilateral national action.

Security as a holistic concept

Milipol 2025 was emblematic of a security industry in a state of transition. The technologies presented represented the state of the art in their respective domains. However, the subdued atmosphere and the lack of disruptive innovations reflected an industry searching for direction. The fundamental question that arises is whether current priorities are commensurate with the actual threats.

Focusing on highly specialized military-technical solutions while neglecting basic civilian supply capabilities appears to be a misallocation of strategic resources. A society that possesses artificial intelligence for facial recognition but is incapable of providing its citizens with water during a power outage has misplaced its priorities. Security must be understood holistically: as the interplay of military defense capabilities, internal police security, the protection of critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, and civilian supply resilience.

The coming years will show whether European societies are capable of translating this holistic perspective into concrete policies. The warnings have been issued, the threat scenarios are known, and the necessary measures have been identified. What is lacking is the political will and the societal readiness to make the necessary investments and accept the required changes. Milipol 2026 will reveal whether this gap has been recognized and addressed, or whether it will remain a blind spot in European security strategies.

The irony lies in the fact that the technological and organizational capabilities to address these challenges exist. Europe boasts developed logistics industries, efficient public administrations, robust legal systems, and innovative companies. What is lacking is the strategic vision and coordination to mobilize these resources for comprehensive resilience. Milipol, as the leading trade fair for the global security industry, could have provided the platform to initiate this discussion. Its failure to do so is symptomatic of an industry and a political landscape that still think in outdated categories, even as the threat landscape has fundamentally changed.

The central insight is this: True security does not arise solely from increasingly sophisticated surveillance technologies or advanced military technology, but from a society's ability to maintain its basic life functions and protect and provide for its citizens in existential crises. As long as this dimension remains inadequately addressed, all technological sophistication is merely an illusion of security. Milipol 2025 documented this illusion with impressive attention to detail – and simultaneously revealed its dangerous blind spot.

I would be happy to serve as your personal advisor.

Head of Business Development

Chairman SME Connect Defense Working Group

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I would be happy to serve as your personal advisor.

contact me under Wolfenstein ∂ Xpert.digital

call me under +49 89 674 804 (Munich)

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Industry focus: B2B, digitalization (from AI to XR), mechanical engineering, logistics, renewable energies and industry

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