South America's economic order is in flux and the strategic alliance with Europe through Mercosur

South America's new role in the global economy: Between radical change, resource power and historical rapprochement with Europe

December 2024 marks a geopolitical turning point in relations between Europe and Latin America. After a quarter-century of arduous negotiations, the EU-Mercosur agreement is nearing completion – a step that would create the world's largest free trade zone, encompassing over 700 million people, and reshape global trade flows. However, this historic alliance comes at a time when South America is in the midst of a profound and sometimes contradictory transformation. From the Argentine pampas to the Chilean mines, the region's economic map is being redrawn.

The political and economic strategies of South America's powerhouses could hardly be more different. In Argentina, libertarian President Javier Milei is conducting a radical market experiment with his "shock therapy," which has brought the country budget surpluses for the first time in over a decade, but demands enormous sacrifices from the population. Meanwhile, Brazil's President Lula da Silva is pursuing state-led reindustrialization and green energy, but is struggling with mounting national debt. Colombia, under Gustavo Petro, is making an ambitious attempt to break free from oil dependency, and Chile is consolidating its position as an indispensable supplier of copper and lithium to the world.

For Europe, turning to this heterogeneous yet promising continent is far more than just a matter of reducing tariffs on cars and machinery. It's about strategic autonomy. At a time when global competition for critical raw materials is escalating and dependence on China needs to be reduced, South America, as a powerhouse for green energy and battery metals, offers a vital alternative. Whether through the gigantic Vaca Muerta shale gas field, the sun-drenched hydrogen parks in northeastern Brazil, or the lithium salt lakes of the Andes – the synergies between European technology and South American resources could form the foundation for the energy transition on both continents.

This article examines the drastic reforms in the individual nation states, analyzes the opportunities and risks of the Mercosur deal, and shows why, despite protectionist hurdles and ecological concerns, the transatlantic alliance is probably Europe's last great chance to assert itself as a relevant partner to China in the global south.

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Between reform euphoria, hunger for raw materials and geopolitical calculation: Why Europe needs Latin America now more than ever before

The South American continent is currently undergoing one of the most profound economic and political transformations in decades. While Argentina, under President Javier Milei, is undergoing a radical shift towards a free-market economy, Brazil, under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, is pursuing a strategy of reindustrialization with a focus on renewable energies. Colombia, under Gustavo Petro, is striving for a fundamental restructuring of its economic model towards social and environmental sustainability, while Chile is attempting to consolidate its position as a global supplier of raw materials for its energy transition. Into this dynamic landscape falls the finalization of the EU-Mercosur agreement in December 2024, which would create the world's largest free trade zone encompassing over 700 million people. Given protectionist tendencies, geopolitical upheavals, and global competition for critical raw materials, the question of whether and how both economic areas can benefit from each other has become strategically important for the future of both regions.

Argentina's economic reinvention under Mileis' libertarian experiment

Argentina's economic development under President Javier Milei represents an unprecedented experiment, attracting attention far beyond the borders of Latin America. Since taking office in December 2023, the self-proclaimed anarcho-capitalist has implemented an austerity program unparalleled in its radicalism in the country's recent history. The central result of this policy is the elimination of the chronic budget deficit. After decades of deficit-ridden government budgets, Argentina has recorded a primary surplus for the first time since January 2024. The budget deficit fell from 6.3 percent of gross domestic product to zero within two years, marking the first balanced budget in 15 years.

The fight against inflation is also showing remarkable progress. When Milei took office, the monthly inflation rate was 25.5 percent; it has since fallen to about 1.6 percent per month, the lowest level in over a decade. The annual inflation rate, which at times exceeded 200 percent, is projected to reach 27.8 percent by the end of 2025, a sensational decline by Argentine standards. The difference between the official exchange rate and the black market rate, which stood at 153 percent when Milei took office, has largely disappeared.

The OECD forecasts economic growth of 5.7 percent for Argentina in 2025, while the International Monetary Fund expects 5.5 percent. In the second quarter of 2025, GDP increased by 6.3 percent, stronger than in China or the US. This recovery follows a deep recession in the first year of the Milei administration, which was part of the so-called shock therapy. The price of these macroeconomic successes is reflected in increased unemployment and persistently high living costs. Domestic demand in the middle and lower income segments remains hampered by low wages and high prices.

Argentina's investment landscape is changing under these altered conditions. Manufacturing is the most important sector, accounting for almost 39 percent of the $129 billion in foreign direct investment. Volkswagen announced investments of $580 million in its Buenos Aires plant in early April 2025. The new RIGI program for large-scale investments has already approved projects totaling over $11 billion in solar power, oil pipelines, LNG facilities, and lithium extraction.

Argentina's Achilles' heel, however, remains its national debt. With over US$63 billion, the country tops the list of the ten largest debtors at the International Monetary Fund, far ahead of Ukraine with nearly US$15 billion and Egypt with almost US$12 billion. In April 2025, the government concluded a new agreement with the IMF that could inject up to US$20 billion in fresh capital. The negotiated interest rate of 6.47 percent is almost five percentage points below the current market rate. This dependence on the IMF restricts economic policy freedom and makes Argentina vulnerable to external shocks.

Of strategic importance for Argentina's future is the development of the Vaca Muerta shale gas formation. In the first quarter of 2025, oil production increased by 26 percent and gas production by 16 percent compared to the previous year. The formation now supplies 65 percent of the country's total oil production and 67 percent of its national gas production. In August 2025, Argentine oil production reached a record high of 827,000 barrels per day. The government plans to export US$30 billion worth of oil and gas by 2030, which would double Argentina's current global exports. The Southern Energy LNG project is expected to create an export capacity of six million tons per year, with production starting at the end of 2027. Argentina also possesses the world's third-largest lithium reserves, giving the country a key position in the global energy transition.

Brazil's tightrope walk between growth ambitions and fiscal constraints

Latin America's largest economy, under President Lula da Silva, is navigating a complex landscape of solid growth figures and increasing fiscal risks. Brazil's gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 3.4 percent in 2024 compared to the previous year, driven by the services sector with 3.7 percent growth and industry with 3.3 percent. For 2025, the Ministry of Finance forecasts growth of 2.2 percent, having revised its initial estimate of 2.5 percent downward due to weaker economic data. Brazil's GDP is projected to reach approximately US$2.26 trillion in 2025.

Brazilian agriculture continues to form the backbone of the export economy. Between 22 and 31 percent of the gross domestic product comes from agriculture and agribusiness, and 42 percent of all export earnings flow from this sector. A record grain harvest of 354.7 million tons is projected for 2025, with soybeans remaining the dominant agricultural product at 177.6 million tons. Brazil is the world's largest exporter of soybeans, with China being the main buyer. This agricultural strength is reflected in the trade balance. In October 2025, Brazil recorded a trade surplus of US$6.96 billion, an increase of 70 percent compared to the previous year.

The downside of Brazil's economic development is manifested in its national debt problem. Public debt has risen to almost 78 percent of GDP, the highest among major Latin American economies. The Ministry of Finance estimates that by 2025, 62.1 percent of federal public debt will be volatile and subject to short-term interest rate fluctuations, the highest figure since data collection began in 2008. The central bank has raised its benchmark interest rate, Selic, to 14.25 percent in an attempt to curb persistent inflation of 5.5 to 6 percent, well above the official target of 3 percent. The budget deficit has widened to approximately 8 percent of GDP.

Under Lula, Brazil is pursuing a new industrial policy focused on green reindustrialization. The country already obtains over 90 percent of its electricity from renewable sources and is investing in expanding hydrogen production capacity. Northeast Brazil is among the regions with the world's best natural conditions for wind and solar energy. The EU is supporting the hydrogen ramp-up there through the Global Gateway Flagship "Green Energy Parks and Green Shipping Corridors in Northeast Brazil." From there, green ammonia, methanol, and other hydrogen derivatives are to be exported to Europe at low cost.

Within the EU, Germany is Brazil's most important import partner, and conversely, Brazil is the most important partner for German companies in South America. Approximately 1,300 companies with German capital are active in Brazil, generating around ten percent of the country's industrial value added. German companies export goods worth over 13 billion euros to Brazil, primarily chemical products, machinery, vehicles, and auto parts. In São Paulo alone, over 800 German companies have created more than 250,000 jobs.

Colombia's ambitious transformation of the economic model under Petro

Under President Gustavo Petro, Colombia is undergoing a profound transformation that goes far beyond conventional economic reforms. The country's first left-wing president is attempting to restructure the entire economic model from an extractive one to a decarbonized economy with social and environmental justice. In the first quarter of 2025, Colombia's GDP grew by 2.7 percent year-on-year and 0.8 percent month-on-month. In the third quarter of 2025, the country recorded growth of 3.6 percent compared to the same period of the previous year, exceeding expectations. The IMF forecasts growth of 2.4 percent for 2025 and 2.6 percent for 2026.

The strongest economic activities were agriculture, livestock farming, and fishing, both at 7.1 percent, followed by trade, transportation, and hospitality at 3.9 percent. The central bank expects Colombia to end 2025 with inflation of 4.4 percent, compared to 5.2 percent the previous year. Private consumption is considered the main driver of economic growth, with projected growth of 3 percent.

The Petro administration implemented sweeping social reforms, including labor market and pension reforms. The pension reform introduces a basic pension for 2.5 million elderly people living in poverty and makes the pension system more inclusive. In November 2025, Petro submitted a second tax reform proposal to Congress, aiming to raise $6.6 billion to secure the 2026 federal budget. However, its chances of passage are considered slim.

Colombia's export structure is heavily reliant on fossil fuels. Petroleum and petroleum products accounted for the largest share of total exports in 2024, followed by coal at 12.1 percent. Colombia is among the world's leading exporters of coffee, bananas, palm oil, and cut flowers. In June 2025, exports rose by 2.6 percent to US$3.96 billion, driven by a 35.6 percent increase in agricultural products. Coffee exports increased by 45.8 percent, and cut flower exports by 32.2 percent.

The energy transition is at the heart of Petro's economic policy vision. Colombia aims to increase the share of renewable energies in its domestic energy production from the current four to five percent to 25 percent by 2029. Under Petro's administration, 23 new environmental permits for wind and solar energy projects have been issued. A draft law proposes transforming the state-owned oil company Ecopetrol into a renewable energy producer. The country plans to invest US$40 billion in the energy transition, including US$14.5 billion in renewable energies and US$16 billion in grid expansion. Colombia possesses very high potential for renewable energy from solar and wind power.

Chile's stable development as a raw materials giant in the energy transition

Chile occupies a special position among South American economies. The country is considered one of the most stable economies in Latin America, with average GDP growth of 0.85 percent between 1996 and 2025. The Chilean central bank forecasts growth of between 1.75 and 2.75 percent for 2025, an upward revision of previous estimates. In the third quarter of 2025, the economy grew by 1.6 percent year-on-year, following a 3.3 percent increase in the previous quarter. Inflation was last reported at 4.4 percent, and the central bank is aiming for a target of 3 percent by 2026.

Chilean foreign trade reached a record high of US$10.4 billion in January 2025, a 10.4 percent increase year-on-year. The mining sector recorded exports worth US$4.8 billion, led by copper at US$4.05 billion, a 15.8 percent rise. Chile is the world's largest copper producer and exporter, accounting for 27 percent of global production, and possesses by far the largest reserves of this metal, representing 40 percent of the world's total.

Chile's strategic importance for the global energy transition extends far beyond copper. After Australia, Chile is the world's second-largest lithium producer. In 2023, national production reached 270,947 tonnes of lithium carbonate equivalent, an increase of 4.3 percent compared to 2022 and 120.5 percent compared to 2020. Production is projected to reach 275,000 tonnes in 2025. 79 percent of the EU's refined lithium supplies originate from Chile. Lithium production capacity is expected to increase from 42,000 tonnes in 2024 to 64,000 tonnes in 2030 and 79,000 tonnes in 2035. Lithium export revenues are projected to reach US$7.3 billion in 2030 and US$8.9 billion in 2035, representing 2.2 and 2.7 percent of GDP, respectively, in 2024.

Chile has the potential to expand its value chain beyond raw material extraction. The production of cathode materials alone could generate up to US$1.1 billion in annual revenue by 2030 and US$2.2 billion by 2035. Establishing cathode production could create 900 to 1,700 jobs by 2030 and 2,100 to 3,700 jobs by 2035.

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The overall economic dynamics of the Mercosur area

The Mercosur economic region, comprising Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, has a population of over 260 million and is the fifth largest economic region in the world. The combined gross domestic product (GDP) of the Mercosur countries amounted to approximately US$2.9 trillion in 2024, with Brazil accounting for the lion's share at US$2.18 trillion, followed by Argentina with around US$604 billion, Uruguay with US$82.5 billion, and Paraguay with US$44.9 billion. In 2024, the Mercosur countries together generated approximately 3.3 percent of global GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP).

Forecasts for the near future indicate a continuous, albeit slow, decline in Mercosur's importance in the global context. Its share of global GDP is projected to reach approximately 3.2 percent by 2030. In a ranking of countries by their share of purchasing power parity-adjusted global GDP, Mercosur would be positioned between Germany and Russia.

The overall outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean is mixed for 2025. The IMF lowered its growth forecast for the region to 2 percent, down from 2.4 percent in 2024, with the decline primarily attributable to Mexico. Mexico is even expected to contract by 0.3 percent, due to the impact of US tariffs and geopolitical tensions. The IMF cites weaker-than-expected activity, tariff measures, uncertainty, and a tighter financing environment as reasons for the subdued outlook.

Foreign direct investment in Latin America reached US$184 billion in 2024, a 30 percent increase compared to pre-pandemic levels. Investment flows are concentrated in Brazil (38 percent), Mexico (24 percent), Chile (9 percent), Colombia (7 percent), and Peru (4 percent). The European Union and the United States remain leading investors, while China, Japan, and South Korea are increasing their involvement in the energy, mining, and logistics sectors.

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The EU-Mercosur agreement as a strategic milestone

The negotiations on the EU-Mercosur agreement, concluded on December 6, 2024, mark the end, after 25 years, of one of the longest negotiation processes in the history of European trade agreements. The agreement would create a free trade area encompassing over 700 million people and a common market of approximately 715 million consumers.

In 2024, EU countries exported goods worth approximately €55.6 billion to the Mercosur region, while imports from South America amounted to around €56.7 billion. The resulting EU trade deficit was €1.1 billion, following years of consistent trade surpluses. The European Commission estimates that the agreement could increase annual EU exports to South America by up to 39 percent, equivalent to an increase of €49 billion per year.

The core of the agreement lies in the gradual reduction of approximately 90 percent of tariffs on bilateral trade. The Mercosur countries currently levy some of the world's highest tariffs: 35 percent on cars, 14 to 20 percent on machinery, and up to 18 percent on chemicals. The agreement would eliminate around 90 percent of these tariffs, potentially saving European companies approximately four billion euros annually.

The agreement is of particular importance to the German economy. Around 12,500 German companies export to the Mercosur region, 72 percent of which are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). According to EU figures, these exports secure approximately 244,000 jobs in Germany and 855,000 across the EU. The agreement could create over 440,000 new jobs in Europe.

The ratification process is complex. On September 9, 2025, the European Commission presented its proposals for signature to the Council of the EU and the European Parliament. To facilitate adoption, the Commission divided the Association Agreement into a political and a trade section. The trade section therefore does not require the approval of all national parliaments, but only a qualified majority in the Council and the consent of the European Parliament. Some member states, including France, Italy, and Poland, have expressed concerns regarding the protection of their agricultural sectors.

The complementary trade structure as the foundation of mutual benefit

Trade relations between the EU and Mercosur are based on a complementary structure, with both sides contributing their respective comparative advantages. Europe supplies industrial goods, machinery, chemicals, and high-quality consumer goods, while South America exports agricultural commodities, raw materials for the energy transition, and increasingly, energy carriers.

The automotive industry is among the biggest beneficiaries of the agreement on the European side. With annual sales exceeding €2.1 billion, Germany is already the largest EU exporter of cars and car parts to Mercosur. Its current European market share is 14 percent, and the agreement offers considerable growth potential. In 2023, only 20,700 passenger cars were exported from Germany to Argentina and Brazil, primarily due to the prohibitive 35 percent tariffs. The removal of this barrier opens up entirely new perspectives.

Current tariffs in the mechanical engineering sector range from 14 to 20 percent, while for chemical and pharmaceutical products they are between 15 and 20 percent. The agreement grants German companies access to public tenders in the Mercosur countries. German engineering firms and technology companies could drive the modernization of infrastructure.

The agreement also offers export opportunities for the European agricultural and food sector. European products such as wine, cheese, olive oil, and chocolate could gain easier access to Mercosur markets, as tariffs on these products will be reduced or eliminated, in some cases by 20 to 35 percent. Agricultural and food exports to the Mercosur countries could increase by almost 50 percent. The agreement protects 344 EU geographical indications from imitation and misuse.

On the other side is the South American agricultural industry. Soybeans are the most important commodity the EU imports from South America. In 2019/2020, Brazil was the main supplier of soybean meal to the EU, accounting for 46 percent of its imports. The agreement includes safeguard measures for European producers of beef, poultry, sugar, bioethanol, honey, and rice. Only 99,000 tons of beef may be imported annually at a reduced tariff of 7.5 percent. The EU can immediately open 82 percent of its agricultural sector to products from Mercosur.

The strategic dimension of critical raw materials

The supply of critical raw materials for the energy and digital transitions gives the EU-Mercosur agreement a strategic dimension that extends far beyond traditional trade interests. Of the 34 critical raw materials on the EU list, 25 are mined in Latin America. The agreement will make a substantial contribution to securing the supply of these raw materials, as the Mercosur countries are major producers of many of them.

Brazil is a key supplier of several critical raw materials to the EU. The country provides 82 percent of the niobium needed in the EU, which is used for high-strength steel and superalloys, and dominates 88.8 percent of global processing. For natural graphite, required for batteries and steel production, 13 percent of the EU's procurement comes from Brazil, representing 7.5 percent of global extraction. Brazil is also a significant supplier of aluminum/bauxite (12 percent), manganese (8 percent), silicon (9 percent), vanadium (7 percent), and tantalum (16 percent).

Argentina contributes 6 percent to the EU's lithium supply, accounting for 11 percent of global processing. With the world's third-largest lithium reserves, Argentina has the potential to significantly expand this position. Chile, as an associated partner in EU trade relations, already supplies 79 percent of the refined lithium for the EU.

The EU regulation on critical raw materials (CRMA) defines ambitious targets: By 2030, at least 10 percent of the annual consumption of strategic raw materials should be sourced domestically, 40 percent should come from domestic processing capacities, and 25 percent should be recycled. No more than 65 percent of any strategic raw material should originate from a single third country. Since the EU is heavily dependent on China for key raw materials such as rare earth elements, diversifying supply sources is of strategic importance.

Europe's Global Gateway investment initiative in Latin America

The EU is pursuing a comprehensive investment strategy for partner countries through its Global Gateway initiative, which plays a central role in Latin America. At the EU-Latin America Summit in July 2023, the EU announced an investment target of €45 billion by 2027. Latin America and the Caribbean became the second most important target region for Global Gateway in 2024. A total of 53 flagship projects were selected for the years 2023 to 2025.

The Global Gateway strategy aims to close infrastructure gaps and sustainably expand partnerships. According to G20 estimates, approximately €13 trillion will be needed by 2040 to close global infrastructure gaps. Global Gateway presents itself as a fair and sustainable offering without hidden dependencies, distinguishing itself from China's Belt and Road Initiative.

In the energy sector, the EU is promoting the development of hydrogen capacities in Latin America. According to the Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems, by 2030 Germany will be able to source Power-to-X products more cheaply from Brazil, Australia, and northern Colombia than from anywhere else in the world. Based on announced projects, Latin America could produce over 7 million tons of low-emission hydrogen per year by 2030. Chile, Colombia, and Brazil are among the pioneers in developing a hydrogen economy.

The European Investment Bank (EIB) Global is a key partner in Global Gateway and aims to mobilize €100 billion in investments by the end of 2027. The Global Gateway strategy has mobilized more than €306 billion in just four years.

Synergies and value chains between the two economic areas

The potential synergies between the EU and Mercosur extend beyond mere trade and include the development of joint value chains. In the energy sector, the combination of European technological expertise and South America's wealth of resources offers considerable potential.

Argentina's Vaca Muerta formation could contribute to Europe's supply of liquefied natural gas (LNG), further reducing its dependence on Russian gas. The Southern Energy LNG project, with a capacity of 6 million tons per year, and the YPF-Shell partnership, with a planned capacity of 10 million tons, could make Argentina a significant gas exporter. Argentina's natural gas imports have already declined by approximately 60 percent.

In the field of green hydrogen, northeastern Brazil offers ideal conditions for supplying Europe. The EU is promoting Green Energy Parks there with the aim of securing power purchase agreements and announcing final investment decisions at the COP 30 climate summit in Brazil. Latin America's natural conditions are excellent for all renewable energies; already, more than 60 percent of the region's electricity comes from renewable sources.

The battery value chain offers particular potential for cooperation. Chile could go beyond mere lithium mining and take over the processing of lithium into cathode material, which would generate significant revenue and jobs. The EU has selected 13 strategic raw material projects in third countries, including nine for critical battery materials such as graphite, lithium, cobalt, nickel, and manganese.

Technology transfer from Europe to South America could contribute to the modernization of Latin American industry. German companies are technological leaders in digitalization, urban development, environmental and climate protection, as well as renewable energies and energy efficiency. In return, Europe gains access to markets and raw materials that are essential for its own industrial transformation.

Challenges and risks of the partnership

The EU-Mercosur agreement faces significant challenges that could jeopardize its full implementation. European farmers are opposed to the anticipated flood of cheap agricultural products from South America. The Mercosur countries possess vast agricultural lands and lower production costs, giving them a competitive advantage. European farmers, who are subject to higher environmental and social standards, could struggle to compete with these prices.

Environmental organizations criticize the potential impact on deforestation in South America. If tariff reductions lower the price of beef, demand and therefore production will inevitably increase. Deforestation in South America has already reached dramatic proportions, and the agreement could accelerate this destruction. According to the European Commission, EU beef imports from South America could increase by up to 64 percent.

The agreement includes sustainability commitments and provisions to combat deforestation, but environmentalists criticize its lack of enforceability. A mechanism allows trading partners to impose punitive tariffs if environmental regulations are perceived by the partner as harming their business interests. The EU deforestation regulation could burden Brazilian exporters and diminish the trade benefits.

Political volatility in South America poses a further risk. Argentina's success under Milei is heavily dependent on external factors: commodity prices, capital flows, and the US dollar exchange rate. A global economic slowdown or geopolitical tensions could quickly impede progress. Argentina's congressional elections in October 2025 are considered a stress test for the Milei government. Brazil's fiscal situation remains fragile, with a national debt of nearly 78 percent of GDP and a budget deficit of 8 percent of GDP.

Perspectives for economic cooperation until 2030

Economic cooperation between Europe and South America is entering a decade marked by profound changes. The transformation of global energy systems, increasing protectionism in other economic regions, and the need to diversify supply chains are creating conditions that favor closer partnership.

The European Commission estimates that the fully implemented Mercosur agreement would have the potential to create approximately 440,000 new jobs in Europe. The tariff savings for European companies, amounting to around four billion euros annually, would significantly increase the competitiveness of European products in South American markets.

For South America, the partnership with Europe offers an alternative to its growing dependence on China. Although China has now become Brazil's most important trading partner, Latin American governments complain that investments are announced but then not realized, and that China is not opening its markets to Latin American technology products. The EU-Mercosur agreement could serve as a counterweight and strengthen the negotiating position of the South American states.

The strategic raw materials partnership will gain in importance, as the EU expects a tenfold increase in lithium demand by 2030 and a twentyfold increase by 2050. The Mercosur countries, with their enormous reserves of lithium, copper, niobium, and other critical materials, are indispensable partners for the European energy transition. Developing local processing capacities would benefit both sides: South America through increased value creation, and Europe through shorter and more diversified supply chains.

Green hydrogen partnerships could become the foundation of a sustainable energy supply. Latin America, with its excellent natural conditions for renewable energies, could become the most important supplier of green hydrogen and its derivatives for Europe. Germany is actively promoting the hydrogen ramp-up with over 20 bilateral hydrogen partnerships, including one with Brazil.

The future of the partnership ultimately depends on whether it is possible to balance the interests of both sides. Europe needs raw materials, energy, and new markets. South America needs technology, investment, and market access. The EU-Mercosur agreement provides the framework for cooperation that goes beyond traditional North-South trade and could enable a genuine partnership on equal terms. Whether this potential is realized will be decided in the coming years by the concrete implementation steps and the political will on both sides of the Atlantic.

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