Global military technologies in the 21st century: Analysis of new weapon systems from blackout bombs, railguns to laser defense

Military technology: The new fronts of warfare

Which new military technologies from Asia are currently in focus?

In an era of increasing geopolitical tensions, the development of advanced military technologies is increasingly in public and strategic focus. The latest presentations from China, Japan and Turkey reveal specific technological vectors that could potentially change the nature of modern conflicts. China has presented a land-based rocket system to paralyze electricity networks using graphite submunition. Japan drives the development of a ship -supported electromagnetic railgun that uses kinetic energy as a main weapon. With Yildirim-100, Turkey has developed a laser-based rocket defense system for helicopters, which is known under the technical term Directed Infrared Countermeasures (Dircm). However, these three systems are not isolated technological curiosities. Rather, they are representative examples of broader, global trends in modern military development: focus on infrastructure warfare, the maturation of directed energy weapons and proliferation of highly developed electronic defense systems.

Why is the analysis of these systems crucial for understanding modern conflicts?

The profound analysis of these and other new weapon systems is of crucial importance for understanding the dynamics of modern and future conflicts. Technology is a primary driver of strategic change. Understanding the specific skills, the surgical limits and the strategic doctrines behind these new weapons enables a well -founded evaluation of geopolitical tensions and the stability of the global security architecture. The examination of these systems not only reveals what is technologically possible, but also, as states intend, to fight in future disputes. It illuminates the transition from traditional warfare, which is geared towards grueling to concepts that aim to system collapse, information dominance and asymmetrical advantages. Thus, the examination of these technologies is essential to recognize the contours of the battlefield of the 21st century and to understand the resulting implications for deterrent, defense and international security.

Analysis of the presented technologies

The graphite bomb – targeted paralysis of the infrastructure

What is the functionality and strategic purpose of the graphite bomb developed by China?

The weapon system presented by Chinese state media is a land -based rocket with a range of 290 kilometers and a 490 kilogram explosive head. Their purpose is not the destruction by conventional explosion, but the targeted paralysis of the electrical infrastructure of an opponent. The rocket releases 90 cylindrical submunitions that detonate in the air after the impact and distribute a cloud of fine, chemically treated carbon threads above a target area of an estimated 10,000 square meters. These high -conductive filaments lie on high -voltage infrastructure such as overhead lines, transformers and switching systems and cause massive short circuits.

The strategic purpose of this weapon, which is often referred to as “Blackout Bomb” or “Soft Bomb”, lies in the paralysis of an opponent's operational systems. Instead of destroying enemy troops directly, the weapon aims to paralyze command centers, communication networks and critical civilian infrastructure such as hospitals and airports by interrupting their power supply. In military analyzes, Taiwan is often mentioned as the primary potential goal for such a Chinese attack. Its power grid is considered to be outdated and in a conflict case. A Chinese military magazine estimated that a simultaneous attack on only three large substation in Taiwan could cause a 99.7 percent disruption of the network.

Is this a completely new technology?

The technology of the graphite bomb is by no means new. The United States and NATO developed and used such weapons decades ago. The innovation of the Chinese system seems to be in the specific carrier platform: a land -based rocket. This offers different tactical uses compared to the air -supported bombs or marching air bodies used by western armed forces, especially for a quick first strike without priority of air sovereignty. Other nations such as South Korea have also announced the development of graphite bombs in order to be able to paralyze the North Korean power grid in the event of a war.

What technical details characterize modern systems such as Blu-114/B and your carrier systems?

The standard submunition of the US armed forces is the Blu-114/B, a small, non-explosive aluminum canister, which is roughly the size of a beverage can. These submunitions are typically released from a larger scattering bomb, such as the CBU-94 “Blackout Bomb”. Such a SUU-66/B container can wear 202 Blu-114/B units. Each of these submunitions is equipped with a small parachute to stabilize and brake them, and contains coils with the fine, conductive fibers. In the past, tactical aircraft such as the Tarnkappenbomber F-117 Nighthawk, which winded the CBU-94, as well as sea-supported Tomahawk marching aircraft, which were also equipped with special battle heads (kit-2), served as carrier systems. The filaments themselves are treated extremely thin and chemically to float like a dense cloud in the air and thus maximize contact with unprotected electrical components.

What effectiveness and which limits have graphite bombs shown in practice?

The effectiveness of the weapon was impressively demonstrated in past conflicts. During the 1991 Gulf War, the United States successfully paralyzed 85 % of Iraqi power supply. In 1999, NATO attacks with graphite bombs in Serbia led to a failure of 70 % of the national power grid. The weapon is considered “soft” because it only causes minimal direct physical damage to the infrastructure and do not immediately kill people, which they appear as a comparatively “humane” option.

However, the decisive limitation is the temporality of its effect. In Serbia, the technicians managed to restore the power supply within 24 to 48 hours. Ultimately, NATO forced NATO to use conventional explosive bombs to permanently destroy power plants and lines. The effectiveness of the weapon also depends on the nature of the target infrastructure; The filaments only work for non -isolated overhead lines. In practice, however, a complete insulation of electricity networks is usually not implementable due to the enormous costs.

An often overlooked but critical aspect are the serious humanitarian consequences. The failure of the power supply also paralyzes water supply and wastewater treatment systems. In the past, this has led directly to outbreaks of cholera and other diseases transmitted by water, which demanded numerous civilian fatalities. This consequence is in a sharp contrast to the classification of the weapon as a “human”.

The resumption of this technology by China, despite its well -known restrictions, indicates a strategic focus on the so -called “system disorder warfare”. The weapon is not intended as the sole, war -decisive means, but as a pioneer for a first wave of attack. A short -term but nationwide power failure would have devastating effects on a modern, technologically dependent society and its military. The goal is not the permanent destruction, but the introduction of a systemic shock and paralysis. By interrupting the power supply, China could disrupt the command and control structures, air defense coordination and public communication in Taiwan in the most critical initial phase of an invasion. This temporary paralysis creates a time window in which subsequent forces, such as amphibian landing units or air landing forces, can operate with significantly reduced resistance. The land -based rocket system offers a quick and potentially surprising attack method that does not require a system that is dropped by a bomber, which requires the prior achievement of air sovereignty. This testifies to a mature understanding of multidimensional, sequenced operations. The graphite bomb is not the actual attack; It is the key that opens the door for the actual attack.

The Railgun – kinetic energy as a weapon of the future?

What are the technical features and goals of the Japanese Railgun program?

The Japanese Railgun program, which began in 2016 under the leadership of the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) of the Department of Defense, has made remarkable progress. The lake tests take place on board the test ship JS Asuka, on which a prototype of the weapon was installed. In tests, the system reached an muzzle speed of about Mach 6.5 (approx. 2,230 meters per second) with a loading energy of five megajoules (MJ). A long -term goal is to increase the energy to 20 MJ. One of the most important technical achievements is the lifespan of over 120 shots – a critical obstacle that failed other programs.

The strategic purpose of the program is the development of a cost -efficient defense against modern threats, especially against the hyper -shed missiles of China and Russia as well as against drone swarms. The cost efficiency is a central factor: the costs per projectile are estimated at around $ 25,000, compared to $ 500,000 to $ 1.5 million for a interceptual missile. This addresses the fundamental problems of the magazine depth and the costs per shot in an intensive conflict scenario.

What are the fundamental technical challenges in the development of railguns?

The development of railguns is associated with enormous technical hurdles that were considered insurmountable for decades.

Running or rail erosion: The immense electrical currents and magnetic forces that are required to accelerate the projectile generate extreme heat and pressure. This leads to a very quick physical wear or even melting the conductive rails, which is considered the greatest individual obstacle.

Energy generation and heat management: Railguns require massive, short -term current surges, which requires large condenser benches and powerful border generators. Only the most modern warships, such as the destroyers of the Zumwalt class of the US Navy, were considered sufficiently efficient. The system also generates an enormous waste heat that must be performed effectively to enable an acceptable fire rate.

Fire rate: The time required to recharge the capacitors between the shots can severely restrict the fire rate. This makes it difficult to use the weapon to defend several or rapidly approaching destinations such as rockets.

Why was the ambitious Railgun program of the US Navy set and how does it compare the Japanese advances?

The US Navy RailGun program ran for 15 years and cost $ 500 million before it was discontinued in 2021. The official reasons for the attitude were “fiscal constraints, challenges in integration into combat systems and the expected technological maturation of other weapons concepts”. The core of the technical failure was the lack of lifespan of the run. The US prototype, which aimed at a much higher energy level of 32-33 MJ, could not fire more than a dozen shots before the run was destroyed. In addition, the fire rate for the rocket defense was too low.

In comparison, Japan followed a more pragmatic approach. While the United States aimed at an offensive weapon with a large reach (over 100 nautical miles) and high energy and thus brought material science to its limits, Japan concentrated on a system with lower energy (5 MJ) that is probably intended for defensive purposes. This more modest approach enabled them to solve the problem of running life (over 120 shots) and to develop a functional prototype. Although the US program was more ambitious, Japan's pragmatism has enabled the country to take the lead in the commissioning of a functioning system. It is also known that China runs a marine-railgun program; A weapon was spotted on a test ship in 2018.

What strategic role should railguns play in modern nautical war management?

The strategic role of Railguns primarily lies in the cost -efficient defense and the solution of fundamental logistical problems of modern nautical war management.

Cost -efficient defense: Your main task is seen in the defense against saturation attacks by hyperschallrakets, marching missiles and drone swarms. The low costs per shot enable a sustainable defensive fire, where expensive interception missiles would quickly be used up.

Overcoming of magazine restrictions: A warship can carry thousands of solid railgun projectiles for the same place and the same weight as a few dozen large rockets. This solves the problem of “no longer having a ammunition” in a highly intensive conflict.

Flexibility: Railguns can fight goals in the air, at sea and on land. In contrast to lasers, they are not affected by atmospheric conditions and can fire beyond the horizon, which gives them a decisive advantage over pure visual line weapons.

The development of a functioning Marine-Railgun by Japan represents a potential paradigm shift in the defensive nautical war. This is a direct answer to the emerging doctrine of the saturation attacks. Modern maritime threats are increasingly based on overwhelming the defense of a ship with a large number of cheap drones or a highly developed, maneuverable hyper -sound missile. An Aegis class destroyer has 90 to 96 vertical starting system cells (VLS). Each interceptor is extremely expensive and can only be used once. In the event of a saturation attack, the ship's magazine can quickly be exhausted, which makes it defenseless. The Japanese Railgun with its $ 25,000 projectiles and the possibility of loading thousands of shot directly encounter this economic and logistical vulnerability. It changes the cost-benefit ratio dramatically in favor of the defender. The strategic value of the Railgun is not only at your speed, but in your sustainability. It enables a warship to ward off a massive attack that would otherwise not have to be warded off. This ability is particularly important for Japan, which is faced with a numerically superior Chinese navy and a growing arsenal of Chinese hyper -sound missiles.

Directed infrared countermeasures (Dircm) – as a protective shield

How does the Turkish Yildirim 100 system work and what is its purpose?

The Yildirim-100, developed by the Turkish armaments company Aselsan, is a directed infrared countermeasure system (Directed Infrared Countermeasure, DircM). Its functioning differs fundamentally from systems that destroy an approaching rocket through an explosion. Instead, it uses a high-performance, multi-spectral laser to “blind” or “blind” the infrared search head (thermal clothing head) of the rocket. As a result, the rocket loses the recording of the target aircraft and is distracted by the course.

The system consists of rocket warning sensors (it is compatible with both UV and IR-based warning systems), an electronic control unit and the laser towers. The Yildirim-100 uses a configuration with two towers to ensure a complete, spherical 360-degree protection to ensure the aircraft. His main purpose is the protection of aircraft, especially helicopter and other platforms, before attacks by infrared -driven rockets, especially by portable aircraft systems (manpads). The system was successfully tested in sharp shooting exercises, also in the context of NATO demonstrations. Aselsan also develops a more powerful system, the Yildirim-300, for faster aircraft such as fighter planes.

What are the basic advantages of DircM systems compared to traditional countermeasures such as Flares?

Dircm systems offer decisive advantages over traditional deception such as flares (light torches), which are due to the further development of rocket search head technology.

Precision and effectiveness: Flares are omnidirectional deception that try to present a hotter goal as the aircraft to distract the rocket. However, modern rocket search heads can often distinguish between the short, intensive burning of a torch and the constant, specific signature of an aircraft engine, which makes flares more unreliable. Dircm systems, on the other hand, focus on the search head of the rocket and actively interfere with its tax logic.

Unlimited magazine: Flares are a finite resource; As soon as an aircraft has used up its stock, it is defenseless. A DircM system is supplied with electricity by the on-board electrics of the aircraft and can in principle work indefinitely long as long as it has electricity. This enables the defense against several, simultaneous threats in a dense danger environment.

Hideability and security: The use of Flares creates a light, visible signal that can reveal the position of an aircraft. Dircm is a “still” electronic process. Flares Bergen also the risk of causing fires or collateral damage if they are used over inhabited areas – a concern that does not exist with DircM.

What different types of DircM systems are developed and used worldwide?

The technology is dominated by a small number of nations and companies. The main actors include Northrop Grumman (USA) with its AN/AAQ-24 Nemesis/Guardian system, Elbit Systems (Israel) with his music family (J-Music, C-Music, Mini-Music), Leonardo (Italy/UK) with his Miysis system and BAE Systems. The systems vary in size, weight and power consumption (SWAP), whereby specific versions for large transport aircraft (J-Music, Laircm), helicopter (mini-music, Miysis) and even commercial transport aircraft (C-Music) are optimized. The nuclear technology often includes advanced fiber laser and highly dynamic, precise mirror towers to pursue the threat and steer the laser beam.

What are the risks associated with the use of DircM systems?

The main risk connected to the use of DircM systems lies in the lack of control where the distracted rocket ultimately hits. While a rocket, which is distracted above the open sea, hardly gives any reason to worry, a rocket that is distracted in an attack above an populated area could crash unpredictably and cause considerable collateral damage. This is a great concern in conflicts such as that in Ukraine. Another technological risk is the so-called “home-on-jam” phenomenon. Highly developed search heads could be able to overcome the interference signals or even use the interference laser as a target signal, which would make the defense system a burden. This drives up a constant technological arms between rocket search heads and countermeasures.

The spread of DircM technology, in particular by an up-and-coming arms exporter such as Turkey, signals “democratization” of advanced electronic combat skills. This undermines the technological superiority that was once reserved for a handful of western nations and changes the risk calculation for air operations worldwide. For decades, advanced systems such as Dircm have been the exclusive domain of leading military mights such as the USA and Israel. Now the Turkish company Aselsan successfully develops, tests, a competitive system. In view of the rapidly growing and aggressive Turkish arms export industry that sells high-tech products such as Bayraktar drones in dozens of countries, it is logical to assume that systems such as the Yildirim-100 are also offered for export. The wide availability of effective Dircm systems makes the air power, a traditional asymmetrical advantage of large powers, more vulnerable. A nation or even a non -state player who is equipped with modern manpads and airplanes equipped with modern manpads can create a much more competitive airspace. This means that every Air Force operated in a region in which Turkish (or other non-western) systems are present can no longer assume technological superiority in this specific area.

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More global military technologies

The age of hyperschall weapons

Which basic types of hyperschall weapons are there and how do they differ?

Hyperschall weapons are defined as a missile that move at more than five times the speed of sound (MACH 5) and are maneuverable within the atmosphere. There are two basic categories:

Hyperschall sliding aircraft (Hyperic Glide Vehicles, HGV): These are brought to a great height by a ballistic carrier rocket. There the glider separates and glides at a relatively flat, unpredictable trajectory to its destination. Examples of this are the Russian Avangard and the Chinese DF-ZF, which is worn by the DF-17 rocket.

Hyperschall marching aircraft (Hyperic Cruise Missiles, HCM): These are driven by advanced, air-shaped engines throughout their flight, typically of warrior engines (scramjets) that work in hyperschalling speeds. They fly at lower heights as HGVs. Examples are the Russian zircon and the US HACM program.

What are the level of development of the Hyper Schall programs of the United States, Russia and China?

The race for the development and commissioning of hyperschall weapons is a central feature of the strategic competition of the great powers.

Russia: indicates to have surgical systems. The HGV Avangard was declared ready for use in 2019 and is intended to reach speeds of up to Mach 20. The HCM Zircon was put into service in 2023, with a range of approx. 1,000 km and speeds of Mach 6-8. The kins scarf, an air -based ballistic rocket, which is often referred to as a hyper -shell weapon, was already used in the war in Ukraine.

China: The United States sees the United States as a leader in this area. The rocket DF-17 with its HGV DF-ZF was reportedly put into service in 2020. In 2021, China also carried out a pioneering test of a fractionated orbital bombing system (FOB) with a hyperschall glider, which demonstrated a potential global range via unpredictable airways (e.g. over the South Pole).

USA: Having caught up after a phase of the deficit. The United States is pursuing several programs in all partial forces that concentrate exclusively on conventional (non-nuclear) explosive heads. The key programs include the Long-Range Hyperic Weapon (LRHW) of the Army, the Conventional prompt Strike (CPS) of the Navy as well as the Hyperic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) and the Hyperson Air Lunched Offensive (Halo) of the Air Force. The United States had to deal with test returns, but strive for initial operational capacity for some systems around 2025.

What strategic shifts result from the introduction of these weapon systems?

The introduction of hyper -sound weapons leads to fundamental strategic shifts that endanger the stability of the deterrent.

Erosion of traditional rocket defense: Your combination of extreme speed and maneuverability makes it extremely difficult for conventional air and rocket defense systems (such as Patriot or Aegis) to pursue and intercept them. Due to visual line restrictions, ground -based radar systems only have a very short time window for recording.

Shortened decision time: The speed of these weapons reduces the time between recording and impact dramatically. This puts political and military guided tours under immense pressure to make decisions about countermeasures, which increases the risk of miscalculations and unintentional escalation.

Improved first -off capacity: They enable the destruction of high -quality, time -critical and heavily defended goals (e.g. aircraft carrier, command center, air defense positions) with a very short warning time, which increases the advantage of a surprising first strike.

What are the concepts of defending hyper -silence weapons?

The defense against hyperschall weapons is one of the greatest technological challenges for modern defense.

Space -based sensors: The key to defense lies in early recording and persecution. The United States is developing a multi -layered satellite constellation to enable this. These include the proliferated throats Space Architecture (PWSA) of the Space Development Agency (SDA) with its tracking layer from wide-angle satellites (WFOV) and the Hypertic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), which delivers more detailed persecution data. These systems are necessary because hyperformal destinations are 10 to 20 times darker than traditional ballistic rockets and are difficult for existing sensors.

Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI): In cooperation with Japan, the USA is developing the GPI, a new catch -up aircraft, which is specially designed to combat hyperschall threats during its “sliding phase” – the longest and most vulnerable part of its trajectory – This is a large and complex undertaking, the use of which is not expected from the mid-2030s due to financing and technical challenges.

Directed energy: In the long term, directed energy weapons such as high -energy or railgases are regarded as potential defense solutions due to their ability to combat goals at the speed of light.

The hyperschall betting between Russia, China and the USA has achieved a new dimension of military technology development in recent years. Each of these countries is massively investing in hyperschall rocket technologies, which are characterized by extreme speeds and difficult to defend them.

Russia is currently leading several operational systems in this area. The Avangard Hyperschall sliding aircraft can be used globally and reaches speeds of over Mach 20. The kin shape rocket, which is launched by MIG-31K aircraft and reaches speeds of MACH 10, is particularly remarkable.

China has also made significant progress. The DF-17 with the DF-ZF sliding aircraft can cover distances of 1,800 to 2,500 kilometers and reach speeds via Mach 5. Another project, the FOB HGV, is in the test phase.

The United States is currently developing several hyperschall systems, including the LRHW/CPS sliding aircraft, which can use mobile platforms and seagoing ships, as well as air-supported systems such as HACM and HALO. These projects are still in the development and test phase.

The race for hyperschall technologies shows the strategic importance of these weapon systems, which can challenge traditional defense systems and potentially change the global military balance.

Energy weapons – from defense to destruction

Which high-energy laser systems (Hel) are developed by the USA and Germany and what are their primary areas of application?

The United States and Germany invest considerably in the development of high-energy laser systems (Hel) in order to create inexpensive solutions against a growing number of threats.

USA: Development extends over all sub -forces.

Navy: After the test of the Laser Weapon System (LAWS) on the USS Ponce, the Helios (High Energy Laser With Integrated Optical Dazzler and Surveillance) is now integrated with 60 kW performance on destroyers of the Arleigh-Burke class in order to ward off drones and small boats. An even more powerful 300 kW system called Helcap is under development to combat anti-ship marching aircraft.

Army: The focus is on mobile air defense. 5 kW lasers were tested on Stryker wheel armor, which are now upgraded to 50 kW. The truck-supported system IFPC-Hel (Indirect Fire Protection Capability – High Energy Laser) is said to ward off rockets, artillery and mortar (C-RAM) and drones with 300 kW performance.

Air Force: It is examined to assemble lasers on airplanes such as the AC-1330J ghostrider for soil attacks and for self-defense.

Germany: The main actors are Rheinmetall and MBDA. Rheinmetall has successfully tested systems from 10 kW to 50 kW and demonstrated the ability to cut steel and shoot drones. A 20 kW laser demonstrator was successfully used in 2022 on the “Saxony” frigate under real conditions for drones.

The primary areas of application for Hel systems are the defense against inexpensive and numerous threats such as drones (C-UAS), rockets, artillery and mortar (C-RAM) and small boats. The decisive advantage is the extremely low costs per shot, which are estimated for LAWs at 59 US cent, in contrast to expensive interceptors.

What are high -performance microwave weapons (HPM) and what role do you play when defending drone swarms?

High -performance microwave weapons (HPM) are a form of directed energy that emits strong impulses of microwave radiation. They do not destroy goals physically, but are designed to overload and deactivate or destroy the sensitive electronic circuits in them. Their main application is the defense against drone swarms. A single HPM impulse can potentially put several drones out of action in a wide range at the same time, which makes it an ideal defense against saturation attacks. A leading example is the Leonidas system of Epirus, which is procured by the US army for air defense at a low level (LAAD) to protect bases and formations.

What physical and operational boundaries have directed energy weapons?

Despite their potential, targeted energy weapons are subject to significant restrictions.

Atmospheric conditions: Laser rays are weakened by clouds, rain, fog and dust, as these absorb and spread the light. This significantly reduces their effective reach and performance at the goal. HPM weapons are less affected by weather conditions.

Visual connection: Energy weapons need a clear, unimpeded visual connection to the goal. You cannot shoot over hills or the horizon.

Deverage time (“DWELL TIME”): Laser must remain focused on one point for a certain time in order to penetrate it. This can be a challenge for quickly moving or maneuvering goals.

Performance and cooling: These systems need immense electrical power and generate considerable waste heat, which represents great challenges in integration on mobile platforms such as vehicles, ships and aircraft.

The parallel development of high -energy fibers (Hel) and high -performance microwaves (HPM) reveals a highly developed, multi -layer approach to defend the drone threat. This is not a “either-or” decision, but a “both-as-sch” strategy that is tailored to different application scenarios. Lasers offer surgical precision, ideal for switching off individual, high -quality drones or for use in confusing environments in which the indiscriminately nature of HPM would be a problem. HPM weapons, on the other hand, offer an area of area that is perfect to combat a large, technologically simple swarm in which individual target fighting is impractical. This staggered defense model shows the complexity of modern warfare. There is no single “miracle weapon”. Instead, an effective defense requires the integration of several, different sensor and active systems into a single management network.

The militarization of new domains: space, AI and quanta

What skills for satellite fighting (Asat) do the leading space powers have?

The ability to attack and eliminate the satellites of an opponent is seen as a decisive factor in future conflicts. There are different types of anti-satellite weapons (Asat):

Directly ascending kinetic weapons: a rocket is started from the earth, from the air or from the sea to destroy a satellite by a direct hit.

Ko-orbital weapons: a “weapon satellite” is brought to orbit, maneuvered close to a target satellite and then destroys it.

Non-kinetic weapons: Methods that disturb or deactivate a satellite without physically destroying it. This includes blinding with lasers, attacks with high-energy migrowaves, the disturbance of GPS or communication signals (jamming) or cyber attacks.

The USA (1985, 2008), Russia (last 2021), China (2007) and India (2019) have tested all successfully direct cinematic Asat weapons by destroying their own satellites. The main risk of such kinetic tests is the formation of huge amounts of durable space waste, which threatens all satellites, including civilian and commercial ones. The Russian test of 2021 generated over 1,500 tracked parts of the debris. This increases the risk of “Kessler syndrome”, a cascading chain reaction of collisions that could make the near-earth orbit unusable.

The invisible warfare in space is shown in a number of remarkable events in which nations target satellites. The first documented incident occurred on September 13, 1985, when the United States successfully destroyed a satellite with the ASM-135 Asat weapon system at a height of 555 kilometers during the Cold War. A particularly sensational moment was the Chinese test on January 11, 2007, in which the Fengyun-1c satellite was destroyed at 865 kilometers and left a massive rubble field that was considered a wake-up call for the international community.

On February 21, 2008, the United States carried out a similar use, officially to protect against falling toxic fuel. India demonstrated its Asat skills on March 27, 2019 with the Shakti mission and destroyed the Microsate-R-SATELLITEN at a height of 283 kilometers. The latest significant incident occurred on November 15, 2021, when Russia with the A-235 system (Nudol) destroyed the satellite Kosmos in 1408 at a height of around 465 kilometers and generated over 1,500 debris parts, which even endangered the international space station.

These incidents illustrate the growing importance of space as a potential area of conflict and the increasing militarization of space travel through various nations.

What is the concept of the common command and control system of all domains (JADC2) and what role does AI play in it?

Command and control system of all domains (JADC2) is the vision of the Pentagon, all sensors of all military sub-forces (army, marine, air force, etc.) and all domains (air, land, lake, space, cyber) in a single, uniform network. The goal is to give the commanders a complete position and to enable each sensor to pass on target data on the most suitable “protect”, regardless of the partial dispute he belongs to. This is intended to drastically accelerate the decision -making and response time, which is essential for dealing with equal opponents such as China and Russia.

The role of artificial intelligence (AI) is fundamental. People cannot process the sheer amount of data from thousands of sensors in real time. AI and machine learning are essential to merge this data, identify goals, recognize threats and to recommend options for action to the human commanders. AI is the “brain” that will make the JADC2 network functional. The Pentagon carries out global experiments (GIDE) to bring this technology to maturity.

What military potential do quantum technologies do in the areas of sensors and communication?

Quantity technologies promise revolutionary military skills, even if many of them are still in an early stage of development.

Quantum sensors: This is the most developed area of quantum technology. He uses the principles of quantum mechanics to build sensors from previously unmatched precision.

Navigation: quantum gyroscopes and accelerometers could enable high-precision navigation for submarines, ships and aircraft without relying on the vulnerable GPS system.

Location: Quantum magnetometers could potentially recognize the tiny magnetic disorders caused by submarines. This could make the ocean “transparent” and threaten the survival of strategic rocket submarines, a cornerstone of the nuclear deterrence.

Quantum communication: Use the quantum fright to theoretically create “interrogated” communication channels. Any attempt to eavesdrop on communication would disturb the system and be discovered immediately. This would be invaluable for safe military and state communication, but still faces significant practical challenges.

How do autonomous weapon systems and drone swarms change tactical and strategic warfare?

The concept of the drone swarm contains the use of a large number of networked autonomous drones that operate as a coordinated whole.

Tactical effects: Traces can overwhelm traditional defense systems through sheer mass. You can carry out distributed clarification, serve as a resistant communication network and carry out complex attacks from several directions at the same time.

Strategic effects: The low costs of individual drones, which often consist of commercial components, make it possible to create “mass” on the battlefield at an affordable price. This enables smaller nations or even non -state actors to challenge larger, more technologically more progressive military – a key feature of asymmetrical warfare.

The technologies in this section are not just individual weapons systems; They are basic skills that will define the entire architecture of future warfare. They represent a change from the focus on “platforms” (tank, ships, aircraft) to focus on “networks” and “information”. A future conflict between great powers could not begin with a traditional invasion, but with a struggle for information dominance. The first shots could be cyber attacks and asat attacks that aim to paralyze the opponent's JADC2 network. The page whose network survives or can effectively operate in a degraded mode (e.g. through quantum navigation) will be able to effectively steer your strength while the other side is deaf and blind. This increases the importance of domains such as space and cyber from supportive roles to the primary, decisive battlefields.

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Doctrines and strategies of the great powers

How do the national defense strategy of the United States and the modernization goals of China shape technological armor?

The national strategies of the United States and China are in direct technological competition and significantly shape the global armaments dynamics.

USA: The National Defense Strategy (NDS) of 2022 identifies China as the “pacemaker challenge” (Pacing Challenge). The strategy focuses on “integrated deterrence”, “campaigning” and “building up permanent advantages”. Technologically, this means the prioritization of 14 critical technology areas, including AI, hyperschall, directed energy and space technology. A strong focus is on the networking of the partial forces (“jointness” in the context of JADC2), accelerating the transition from the prototype to the operational ability and the use of partnerships with allies and the commercial technology sector in order to obtain an “asymmetrical advantage”.

China: China's goals are explicitly determined in terms of time: the military modernization until 2027 (the hundredth anniversary of the People's Liberation Army, with a focus on the operational readiness for a Taiwan conflict), the completion of the conversion into an "intelligent" force until 2035 and the achievement of the status of a "world class" military meal with the USA 2049. This strategy drives massive investments in the same key technologies as the USA – AI, hyperschall, maritime and space – with the aim of achieving technological parity or superiority in order to counteract the US military power, especially in the Indopazacific area.

What hides behind the “Gerasimow doctrine” and how is the concept of the hybrid war interpreted?

The “Gerasimow doctrine” is a term characterized by western analysts, not an official Russian doctrine. It is based on an article by the Russian general Waleri Gerasimow from 2013. The concept describes a perspective of modern warfare, in which the boundaries between war and peace blur and a wide range of non-military instruments (politically, economical, informational, diplomatic) is used in harmony with military violence in order to achieve strategic goals. The doctrine is often interpreted in such a way that it demands a ratio of 4: 1 from non-military to military actions.

However, the interpretation of this concept is controversial. Many experts, including the author of the term, Mark Galeotti, argue that it is a misinterpretation. They believe that Gerasimow describes the tactics of the West (e.g. “color volutions”)) and demanded that Russia develop countermeasures instead of outlining a new Russian offensive doctrine. The concept is considered more precisely as an operational approach within the broader foreign policy framework of Russia (the “Primakow doctrine”), in which military power enables and underpins this “hybrid” or “gray zone” activities.

Legal and ethical limits of automation

What challenges does the use of lethal autonomous weapon systems (laws) put on humanitarian international law?

Lethal autonomous weapon systems (laws) are weapons systems that can independently search for, identify, target and kill people after activating people without direct human control. Their potential use presents humanitarian international law (IHL) with fundamental challenges.

Differentiation principle: How can a machine reliably differentiate between a combatant and a civilian or a combatant who is or is wounded (Hors de Combat)? This often requires a nuanced, context -dependent human judgment that is difficult to codify in an algorithm.

Proportionality principle: How can a machine make the complex, subjective weighing whether the expected collateral damage to civilians is excessive in relation to the expected military advantage? This is a unique human assessment.

Martens' clause: This clause demands that new weapons correspond to the “principles of humanity” and the “demands of public conscience”. The transfer of decisions about life and death to a machine without compassion or understanding of the value of human life is viewed by many as a violation of this principle.

Responsibility gap: If a laws makes a mistake and a war crime commits, who is responsible? The programmer, the manufacturer, the commander who used it? It could be legally difficult to assign criminal responsibility for the unpredictable actions of a complex autonomous system.

What are the central arguments of the campaign to end the killer robots?

The “Campaign for the end of the killer robots” is a global coalition of non -governmental organizations, which is committed to a preventive ban. Their main arguments are:

Digital dehumanization: The campaign argues that permission to have machines made killing decisions is the ultimate step of digital dehumanization, which reduces people to data points that are processed and eliminated. This creates a dangerous precedent for using AI in other areas of life.

Prefabricity and discrimination: AI systems are trained with data. If this data reflects existing social prejudices, the AI will replicate and solidify it. Face recognition has shown, for example, that it is less precise in women and non-white people, which could lead to discriminatory target acquisition.

Sensible human control: The core demand is a new international contract that ensures “sensible human control” about the use of violence. The campaign argues that machines lack the understanding, the context and the ethical ability for such complex decisions about life and death and that people must remain in the decision loop.

The economy of high technology armor

What costs are associated with the development and procurement of modern weapons systems?

The costs for the development and procurement of modern weapons systems are astronomical and represent a significant burden on defense budgets. The budget for research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT & E) of the USA alone for the financial year 2024 was $ 145 billion.

Hyperschall weapons: The US Navy's CPS rocket is estimated at over $ 50 million each. The Air Force Arrw is estimated at $ 15-18 million per rocket. This is contrary to a Tomahawk marching aircraft that costs around $ 2 million. The Pentagon has spent over $ 8 billion for hyper-sound research since 2019 and plans to invest another $ 13 billion by 2027.

AI and autonomous systems: Although the costs for individual programs are difficult to isolate, the total investments are massive. The JADC2 concept is a multi-billion dollar project.

How has the financing of research and development in the defense sector changed?

The landscape of research and development financing (F&E) has changed fundamentally.

Shifting from publicly to private: In 1960, the US government financed around 65 % of the total F&E in the country. By 2019, this proportion had dropped to only 21 %, while the proportion of the private sector had increased to 71 %.

Implications for the Ministry of Defense: The Ministry of Defense is no longer the primary engine of technological innovation. It has to rely on technologies and adapt them that are developed by the commercial sector. This creates challenges because the procurement process in the defense area is slow and bureaucratic, while the commercial sector moves quickly.

Consolidation of the industrial nation: The US defense industry has dramatically consolidated, from over 50 main buyers to less than 10. This reduces competition and can inhibit innovations. The NDS and related strategies explicitly demand more cooperation with smaller, non-traditional companies to counteract this trend.

There is a fundamental and growing voltage between the strategic desire for technologically superior, “exquisite” weapons (such as hyper -shall rockets) and the economic reality of their dizzying costs. This tension forces a strategic division of the arsenal: a small number of very expensive “silver balls” for high -quality destinations and a large number of cost -effective, “sufficiently good” systems (drones, lasers) for mass and wear. No country, not even the United States, can afford to buy thousands of $ 50 million rockets. This budget reality forces prioritization. Military implicitly create a two -stage arsenal. Level 1 consists of a limited number of very expensive, powerful systems that are reserved for the destruction of the most critical, most defended enemy goals. Level 2 consists of a large number of cheaper, often unnecessary or reusable systems that are designed to control the wider battle room, absorb losses and overwhelm less critical goals. The winner of a future conflict may not be the page with the most advanced single weapon, but the page that best dominates the economy of this high-low technology mix.

A new arms arm?

Which overarching trends can be seen in global military technology development?

The analysis of the presented and other global military technologies reveals several overarching trends that define the strategic environment of the 21st century. First, a clear change can be observed from the warfare geared towards the warfare to the system disabilities, in which the focus is on paralysis of the opposing infrastructure and command structures. Second, a classic offensive defensive set of bets takes place in new technological dimensions, as the development of hyperschall weapons and the associated defense systems shows. Thirdly, AI and autonomy lead to dramatic acceleration and automation of warfare, which sets human decision -making under extreme time pressure. Fourthly, non-kinetic and information-centered domains such as space and cyberspace gain a decisive, if not primary meaning. Fifthly, the “democratization” of advanced technologies, such as drones and electronic countermeasures, leads to the increase in asymmetrical threats that challenge the superiority of traditional military lights. Finally, the economy of the armor creates a tension between extremely expensive, highly specialized systems and the need to provide cost -effective mass for extensive conflicts.

Which implications arise for the future global security architecture?

These technological trends lead to a more complex and potentially unstable world. The erosion of traditional deterrence mechanisms through difficult to defend weapons, the extreme speed of potential conflicts and the blurring boundaries between war and peace increase the risk of miscalculations and unintentional escalation. The legal and ethical gray areas, especially in the area of autonomous weapon systems, create uncertainty and the risk of dehumanization of the conflict. Coping this new technological era requires more than just developing new weapons. It requires new, adaptable doctrines, the establishment of new international norms and rules of conduct, especially in space and in the cyber area, and a fundamentally new way of thinking about security and stability. The armed arms of the 21st century are not only decided by the quality of the technology, but also by the ability to master its strategic, ethical and economic implications.

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