Military Mobility Package: Military mobility as a crucial factor for defense readiness and enhanced deterrence

Europe's Mobilization Crisis: The Economic Architecture of a Continental Defense Transformation

When bureaucracy kills faster than tanks can roll – The 100-billion-euro dilemma of military mobility

The European Union faces a paradox of historic proportions. While defense spending by the 27 member states climbed to a record €343 billion in 2024 and is projected to reach a further €381 billion in 2025, a fundamental strategic weakness is revealed: Europe cannot move its military resources across its own borders. The Military Mobility Package, presented by the European Commission on November 19, 2025, is the most ambitious attempt to date to overcome this structural paralysis. It is more than a transport policy reform project. It is the economic blueprint for transforming a fragmented continent into a defensible economic area capable of responding within days rather than weeks in a crisis.

The urgency of this initiative stems from a sober geopolitical calculation: European intelligence agencies, including the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND), unanimously warn that Russia could be militarily capable of attacking another European state by the end of this decade. Current transport capacities stand in stark contrast to this threat scenario. Military equipment currently requires several weeks to months to be moved from Western European ports to NATO's eastern flank. Approval processes can take up to 45 days. Bridges collapse under the weight of modern battle tanks. Tunnels are too narrow for oversized military transports. Rail networks operate with incompatible track gauges. These infrastructural and regulatory bottlenecks combine to create a strategic risk that undermines the entire European security architecture.

The present package attempts to address these shortcomings through a three-pronged strategy: first, the harmonization of national approval procedures; second, the creation of an emergency mechanism for crisis situations; and third, massive infrastructure investments in identified bottlenecks. The economic dimensions of this transformation far exceed the proposed budgets. The estimated investment requirement for infrastructure alone amounts to around €100 billion by 2035. However, the proposed EU budget for the next financing cycle, 2028 to 2034, provides only €17.65 billion. This funding gap of more than €80 billion will shape the economic policy debate in the coming years and raise fundamental questions about fiscal sovereignty, the prioritization of public spending, and the role of private capital in strategic sectors.

More about it here:

• European Commission – Defense Industry and Space | Joint communication on military mobility

The anatomy of European immobility

The current situation can be described as a systemic market failure resulting from decades of neglect. After the end of the Cold War, Europe experienced a peace dividend, manifested in shrinking defense budgets and the dismantling of military infrastructure. Civilian transport policy focused on efficiency, environmental protection, and cost minimization. Military requirements played a subordinate role. While the enlargement rounds of the European Union integrated new member states, they did not create continuous military transport corridors. The result is a patchwork of national regulations that turns every cross-border troop movement into a bureaucratic marathon.

In February 2025, the European Court of Auditors published a damning special report on military mobility in the EU. The auditors concluded that the second EU Action Plan on Military Mobility suffered from conceptual weaknesses and had made insufficient progress. Despite the initial EU-wide allocation of €1.69 billion for the period 2021 to 2027, member states' armed forces remained unable to move rapidly across the Union. The third call for proposals for military mobility projects revealed the extent of the backlog: 112 applications from 22 member states, totaling €3.7 billion, competed for a mere €807 million in available funding. This 4.7-fold oversubscription not only signals a massive investment backlog but also reflects the growing awareness among member states of the strategic importance of this issue.

The operational consequences of these structural deficiencies are evident in concrete scenarios. Germany, as the geographical hub of Europe, plays a key role in East-West movements. The Federal Republic, together with the Netherlands and Poland, has already established a model military corridor, which eight other states recently joined. Nevertheless, exercises like DeployEx 2024 reveal persistent problems. Military convoys have to wait at borders. Special refueling stations for military vehicles exist only sporadically. Coordination between national authorities is ad hoc. During a NATO exercise, paratroopers reportedly had to show their passports mid-jump—an anecdote that illustrates the absurdity of over-regulated procedures.

The economic opportunity costs of this inefficiency cannot be precisely quantified, but they are considerable. Every delay in troop deployment increases the risk of strategic surprises. It undermines the credibility of NATO's mutual defense guarantee. It forces member states to maintain more expensive stationary troop presences instead of relying on flexible rotation models. Furthermore, the lack of interoperability between civilian and military logistics systems prevents synergies. Modern logistics concepts such as just-in-time deliveries, which have long been standard practice in the private sector, remain unattainable in the military sphere as long as border crossings take weeks instead of hours.

Regulatory revolution through Military Schengen

The core of the proposed package is an ambitious regulatory proposal aimed at creating an EU-wide Military Mobility Area by the end of 2027. The analogy to the Schengen Area is deliberate. Just as the abolition of border controls accelerated Europe's economic integration, a military Schengen Area is intended to strengthen the continent's defense capabilities. The proposed regulation is legally binding and would establish uniform standards for cross-border military transport for the first time.

The maximum approval period should normally be limited to three days, a reduction of 15 times compared to the current 45 days. Permanent permits would replace the current annual renewal requirement, freeing up administrative resources and creating planning certainty.

Standardized templates for permit applications and diplomatic clearances reduce transaction costs. Harmonizing rules for the transport of dangerous goods and oversized or overweight loads eliminates a major source of delays.

The increased use of standardized customs forms, namely EU Form 302 and NATO Form 302, speeds up border clearances. The development of a unified digital tool for all cross-border military mobility processes promises further efficiency gains through automation and real-time tracking.

The economic logic behind this harmonization follows classical theories of transaction cost economics. Every national regulation creates information asymmetries, negotiation costs, and enforcement costs. Fragmentation prevents economies of scale and hinders specialization. A uniform legal framework lowers market entry barriers for civilian logistics companies wishing to undertake military contracts. It enables cross-border tenders, which intensify competition and drive down prices. It creates legal certainty for investments in specialized transport equipment. Economic welfare gains arise from the internalization of externalities: Improved military mobility increases collective security, a public good from which all member states benefit.

The governance structure provides for the establishment of a Military Mobility Transport Group, a coordination body chaired by the Commission. Each Member State must appoint a National Coordinator for Military Transport, who will serve as the central point of contact. Annual readiness checks and stress tests will assess the system's operational readiness. This institutional architecture follows the principle of multi-level governance, which is typically used in the European Union to address complex coordination issues. The Commission sets the framework, and the Member States implement it under mutual observation. Peer pressure and benchmarking are intended to exert a disciplinary effect.

The actual enforceability of this regulation remains a critical point to examine. The proposed regulation explicitly emphasizes that member states remain free to decide whether to allow foreign armed forces to cross their territory. This sovereignty clause could become the weak point of the entire construct. In politically sensitive situations, individual states could invoke national security interests and refuse or delay permits. The regulation creates incentives for cooperation, but does not enforce it. From a game-theoretical perspective, this is a coordination game with multiple equilibria. The desired cooperative equilibrium requires credible self-commitment from the actors, which is not a given considering heterogeneous threat perceptions and differing strategic cultures.

EMERS: The emergency button for times of crisis

Perhaps the most innovative element of the package is the European Military Mobility Enhanced Response System, an EU-wide emergency system for times of crisis.

EMERS can be requested by a Member State or the Commission. The Council must decide within 48 hours.

Upon activation, the need for permits is largely eliminated; only a notification with a shortened lead time remains required. Military transports receive priority access to infrastructure, vehicles, and essential services. Cabotage rules, driving and rest time regulations, environmental restrictions, and holiday driving bans can be suspended. NATO is informed of activation, extension, or termination. EMERS is valid for up to one year.

This mechanism addresses a fundamental problem of collective action. In peacetime, particular interests dominate. Environmentalists demand nighttime driving bans. Trade unions insist on working time regulations. National freight forwarders defend themselves against foreign competition. EMERS temporarily suspends these conflicts of interest and establishes a clear primacy of military necessity. From an economic perspective, it is an institutionalized emergency mechanism that drastically reduces the costs of providing defense equipment in times of crisis.

Activating EMERS would have far-reaching consequences for the European economy. Prioritizing military transport would disrupt civilian logistics chains. Companies relying on just-in-time deliveries would face delays. Freight forwarders would be forced to make their vehicles and drivers available for military purposes, potentially at below-market rates. The suspension of environmental regulations would burden local communities with noise and emissions. The question of compensating for these externalities remains unresolved. The package is silent on compensation mechanisms for affected third parties.

At the same time, EMERS carries significant risks of abuse. The definition of a crisis remains vague. Theoretically, a member state could activate EMERS to pursue national economic interests, disguised as a security imperative. The Council's decision within 48 hours leaves little room for thorough scrutiny. Pressure to show solidarity could silence critical voices. The one-year duration is long enough to bring about lasting changes in market structures. Established logistics companies could be displaced if military clients become accustomed to new service providers. The political economy of emergency legislation teaches us that temporary measures often morph into permanent arrangements.

Coordination with NATO is another sensitive aspect. EMERS is an EU instrument, but the military defense of Europe primarily takes place within the NATO framework. The proposed notification of NATO regarding activation, extension, or termination does not constitute consultation. NATO has no veto power. This could become problematic in scenarios where EU member states and NATO members are not identical or where strategic priorities diverge. Mutual invitations to working group meetings and tabletop exercises are welcome steps, but they do not replace a binding strategic agreement. The fact that the regulations are also intended to benefit non-EU NATO allies if this is relevant to EU security leaves considerable room for interpretation.

The infrastructure gap: €100 billion investment backlog

The 500 identified hotspot projects form the physical backbone of the Military Mobility Package. These bottlenecks include bridges that need strengthening, tunnels that need widening, ports and airports whose capacities need expanding, and rail infrastructure that needs to be converted to European standard gauge. The estimated investment requirement of €100 billion by 2035 represents a significant economic challenge that can only be met by mobilizing multiple sources of funding.

The proposed budget for the Connecting Europe Facility in the next multiannual financial framework (2028-2034) is €17.65 billion, a tenfold increase over the current €1.69 billion. This increase reflects the growing political priority of the issue. Nevertheless, a funding gap of more than €80 billion remains. This gap must be closed through national budgets, reallocation of cohesion fund resources, use of the SAFE loan instrument, loans from the European Investment Bank, and private capital participation.

The economic rationale of these investments lies in their dual-use nature. Infrastructure that meets military requirements typically exhibits higher load-bearing capacity, larger dimensions, and better redundancy. It also benefits the civilian economy. Reinforced bridges support not only tanks but also heavy industrial transport. Widened tunnels facilitate the transport of oversized industrial components. Capacity expansion in ports and airports increases the logistical competitiveness of entire regions. The conversion to standard European gauge, already implemented on the first 22 kilometers in Ukraine in September 2025, eliminates costly gauge-changing operations and accelerates the movement of goods.

The macroeconomic return on these investments can be estimated using a cost-benefit analysis. In September 2025, the European Parliament Think Tank published a study quantifying the added value of collective investments in military mobility. The analysis shows that a coordinated investment approach of €75 to €100 billion by 2035 could generate an additional annual contribution to GDP of €21 billion in 2035. This figure exceeds the effects of uncoordinated national investments by a factor of three. The study identifies several channels through which these welfare gains arise: reduction of transport times and costs, access to new markets through improved connectivity, productivity increases through the elimination of logistical bottlenecks, and technology transfer between military and civilian applications.

The distribution of investments follows the four priority military mobility corridors adopted by the Council in March 2025. The precise geographical routes are not disclosed in detail for security reasons, but it is known that they include west-east and north-south connections. The northern corridor, which connects the Netherlands with Germany, Poland, and further on to Ukraine, is the most advanced. Four corridors already extend into Ukraine, and one into Moldova. This prioritization underscores the strategic importance of the eastern flank and the determination to integrate Ukraine into European security structures, regardless of the progress of its accession.

Financing through the Cohesion Fund raises distributional policy questions. The Cohesion Fund has traditionally been designed to reduce economic inequalities between regions. Its reallocation for defense purposes means that funds originally intended for social projects, environmental protection, or regional development are now flowing into military infrastructure. This could create internal societal tensions, particularly in member states that depend on cohesion funds. In April 2025, the European Commission presented a mid-term review of the Cohesion Fund, which for the first time opened up the possibility of using funds for the defense industry and military infrastructure. This realignment is politically controversial. Critics argue that the conflation of cohesion and defense objectives dilutes the Fund's original mission and sacrifices social cohesion in favor of military imperatives.

The SAFE credit instrument, which provides up to €150 billion in low-interest loans for joint defense procurement, could be used in part for military mobility projects. Poland leads with an indicative request of €43.7 billion, followed by Romania, France, Hungary, and Italy. The loans are subject to strict conditions: at least 65 percent of the components must originate from the EU, the EEA/EFTA area, or Ukraine. Particularly sensitive equipment is subject to even stricter sovereignty requirements. Repayment is made over 45 years. SAFE leverages the EU's strong credit rating to provide member states with access to capital on favorable terms. This mechanism is economically efficient but carries the risk of a gradual mutualization of debt, a political minefield in a Union that agreed on strict fiscal rules after the euro crisis.

Private equity investment in military infrastructure is conceptually challenging. Classic public-private partnership models are based on generating cash flows through usage fees. Military infrastructure rarely generates direct revenue. Its value lies in the option of using it in an emergency. This problem of optionality complicates valuation and financing. Possible approaches include availability payments, where the state pays for the provision of infrastructure regardless of its actual use, or hybrid models, where civilian use in peacetime generates revenue that ensures military availability in times of crisis. In 2025, the European Investment Bank increased its financing limit to €100 billion and, for the first time, reserved 3.5 percent of this for security and defense. It has already approved projects such as the construction of a military base in Lithuania. This development signals a paradigm shift in the financing landscape.

Solidarity mechanisms: Pooling of transport capacities

The proposed Military Mobility Solidarity Pool represents an attempt to overcome the classic free-rider problem in defense cooperation through institutionalized burden-sharing. Member States can voluntarily register their own military transport capacities or contracted civilian capacities, which are then made available to all Member States. A Strategic Lift Reserve complements this pool by reserving civilian capacities for EU use in emergencies. A Military Mobility Catalogue serves as an online platform where European companies offer military-related transport and logistics services.

The economic logic of pooling rests on two mechanisms: diversification and economies of scale. Diversification reduces risks. No single member state has to maintain what all might need collectively. This reduces redundancy and tied-up capital. Economies of scale arise from joint procurement and use. Specialized transport equipment such as heavy-duty trains, roll-on/roll-off ferries, or strategic air freight capacity is expensive and only needed occasionally. Shared use increases utilization and profitability. The challenge lies in incentive compatibility. Member states must be convinced that the benefits of pooling outweigh the costs of the loss of sovereignty.

The package offers several incentives: EU support for the procurement of new transport equipment, cost-sharing for deployment, maintenance, and staff training. These financial incentives reduce the opportunity costs of participation. Nevertheless, the fundamental problem of strategic uncertainty remains. A Member State that makes its capacity available to the pool cannot be certain that it will have access to equivalent resources when it needs them. Availability depends on the demand of others. In a symmetrical crisis scenario, where several Member States require support simultaneously, the pool could be exhausted. This availability problem necessitates careful allocation mechanisms and prioritization rules, which have not yet been specified.

The Military Mobility Catalogue, as a marketplace for civilian services, promises efficiency gains through competition and transparency. Transaction costs decrease when supply and demand are brought together on a central platform. Military clients can compare prices and identify specialized providers. Civilian companies gain access to a new customer segment. The International Road Transport Union, the global umbrella organization for the road transport industry, expressly welcomed the Military Mobility Package but called for supplementary measures. It demanded full harmonization of driver's licenses, training, driving and rest time regulations, and posting rules for civilian drivers serving in the military. It called for clearer guidelines on the weights and dimensions of special military transports. It urged an EU-wide approach to contractual agreements and liability between civilian operators and the military. These demands illustrate that the devil is in the details. Without clarification of these operational issues, the catalogue remains a theoretical construct without practical use.

The integration of civilian actors into military logistics also raises security policy questions. Civilian companies are subject to different accountability requirements than government agencies. They are profit-oriented and could decline contracts if the conditions are unattractive. They are vulnerable to corruption and external influence. Foreign investors could gain access to sensitive information about military movements through stakes in European logistics companies. While the package mentions cybersecurity and supply chain resilience, it remains vague regarding concrete safeguards. The NIS2 Directive, which tightens cybersecurity requirements for critical infrastructure operators, must be consistently applied to all actors in the military mobility catalog. The proposed review of the Cybersecurity Act to strengthen supply chain resilience is a step in the right direction, but it must be underpinned by clear sector standards and enforcement mechanisms.

The hub for security and defense offers well-founded advice and current information in order to effectively support companies and organizations in strengthening their role in European security and defense policy. In close connection to the SME Connect working group, he promotes small and medium -sized companies (SMEs) in particular that want to further expand their innovative strength and competitiveness in the field of defense. As a central point of contact, the hub creates a decisive bridge between SME and European defense strategy.

Suitable for:

• The Working Group Defense of the SME Connect - Strengthening SMEs in European defense

Resilience against hybrid threats

The Military Mobility Package addresses not only conventional logistical bottlenecks but also vulnerabilities to hybrid attacks. The document explicitly refers to specific incidents: hybrid attacks on key airports in Germany and Denmark, attacks on the French rail system, power outages in Spain, and cyberattacks on railway control systems and maritime ports. These threats have intensified in recent years. Drones spy on military installations. Acts of sabotage cripple critical infrastructure. Disinformation campaigns undermine public support for defense measures. Western intelligence agencies unanimously identify Russia as the primary actor behind these activities.

The economic costs of hybrid warfare are difficult to quantify, but substantial. The temporary shutdown of a major airport not only causes direct revenue losses for airlines and airport operators, but also indirect damage through disrupted supply chains, missed business meetings, and reputational damage. Uncertainty about future attacks increases risk premiums and insurance costs. Companies may postpone investments in affected regions. The psychological effects—the feeling of vulnerability and powerlessness—erode confidence in state defense capabilities. Hybrid warfare is cost-efficient from the attacker's perspective, as it achieves strategic effects with limited resources. Defending against such attacks, however, is resource-intensive, requiring comprehensive surveillance, redundancy, and rapid response capabilities.

The package proposes several countermeasures. Member States must identify strategically important transport, energy, and communications infrastructure beyond the scope of the Critical Entities Resilience Directive. This significantly expands the range of protected assets. The possibility for Member States to temporarily control critical infrastructure, equipment, and assets creates a legal basis for emergency measures. The revision of the Cybersecurity Act to strengthen supply chain resilience addresses vulnerabilities in complex value networks. Coordinated stress tests from 2029 onward are intended to identify weaknesses before they are exploited. The assessment of the need to update EU legislation against radio interference, particularly for air traffic systems, responds to new technological threats. The consistent application of the NIS2 Directive to strategic dual-use infrastructure entails clear compliance requirements.

Implementing these measures requires significant investment in cybersecurity, physical protection, and personnel training. The economic analysis of security investments is notoriously difficult, as the benefits primarily consist of avoided damage, which is counterfactual and therefore not directly observable. Underinvestment in security is a typical market failure, since the costs of a successful attack often exceed the investment costs in prevention, yet remain invisible ex ante. Government regulation and financial incentives are therefore justified. The question remains whether the proposed measures are sufficiently ambitious. The NIS2 Directive sets minimum standards but allows for national exemptions and transitional periods. The majority of Member States missed the transposition deadline of October 17, 2024, indicating implementation problems. The European Commission opened infringement proceedings against 23 Member States. This enforcement weakness undermines the credibility of the entire regulatory framework.

Energy security for military mobility is another critical aspect. The package acknowledges that the decline in civilian demand for fossil fuels and refinery closures create new risks. The military is heavily dependent on liquid fuels. Reviewing the Oil Stock Directive to adapt it to sustainable fuels, promoting sustainable aviation fuels and sustainable maritime fuels, and ensuring access to fuel reserves in emergencies are sensible approaches. Nevertheless, there is a tension between climate goals and military requirements. The transition to renewable energies and electromobility is fundamentally changing the energy infrastructure. Charging stations for electric vehicles are replacing gas stations. Hydrogen technology requires new storage and distribution systems. This transformation must anticipate military needs, otherwise new vulnerabilities will emerge. EU-NATO cooperation to identify future fuel trajectories is an important step, but it must translate into concrete investment plans.

The NATO dimension and strategic autonomy

The Military Mobility Package is emerging from the tension between European aspirations for autonomy and transatlantic alliance responsibilities. NATO remains the central framework for the collective defense of Europe. However, the political shifts in the United States, particularly the threats by the Trump administration to question the mutual defense pact, have created an awareness in Europe of the need for independent defense capabilities. The package is being developed in close coordination with NATO, which is manifested in reciprocal invitations to working group meetings, joint tabletop exercises, and the updating of guidelines for EU and NATO forms.

The proposed regulations are also intended to benefit non-EU NATO allies if this is relevant to EU security. This wording is deliberately vague and leaves room for interpretation. It could mean that states such as the United Kingdom, Norway, or Turkey benefit from simplified transit procedures. However, it could also be interpreted restrictively if political tensions exist. Practice will show how this clause is handled. From an economic perspective, inclusivity is advantageous. It maximizes network effects and promotes interoperability. It avoids costly duplication of structures and incompatibilities. It strengthens transatlantic burden-sharing by making European contributions to common defense visible and credible.

Ukraine plays a special role in this framework. Four of the priority TEN-T corridors already extend into Ukraine, and one into Moldova. The regulation is intended to be applied in all candidate countries, regardless of their progress in the accession process. Ukraine can be invited to participate as an observer in the Military Mobility Transport Group. The first 22-kilometer railway line built to European standard gauge was opened in September 2025 between Uzhhorod and Chop, financed by a loan from the European Investment Bank and a grant from the Connecting Europe Facility. This integration of Ukraine into European mobility structures is strategically motivated: it accelerates the transport of military aid, facilitates the training of Ukrainian armed forces in Europe, and lays the groundwork for future EU membership. Economically, it represents a massive infrastructure transfer that brings the Ukrainian economy closer to European standards.

The estimated cost of fully integrating Ukraine's TEN-T rail network into European standards is around €110 billion, according to a 2019 study by the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting. Implementation would take until 2047 or 2050. These figures are pre-pandemic and pre-war; the actual costs are likely to be considerably higher due to war damage. The European Commission has provided €110 million in non-repayable support for the integration of Ukrainian and EU rail systems along the extended TEN-T corridors, including €76 million for a European standard-gauge link between Poland and Lviv. These amounts represent initial investments but will fall far short of covering the overall needs. Financing Ukraine's infrastructure modernization will be a key issue for the next decade, with significant implications for the EU budget debate.

The question of Europe's strategic autonomy remains controversial. France and some southern European states are pushing for an independent European defense union that is less dependent on the US. Germany and eastern European states emphasize NATO's irreplaceable role and fear that unilateral European actions could weaken the transatlantic alliance. The Military Mobility Package navigates cautiously between these positions. It strengthens European capabilities without duplicating NATO. It creates complementarity, not competition. Nevertheless, the logic of the initiative implies a gradual shift. If Europe is able to move its troops rapidly across the continent, if it possesses comprehensive dual-use infrastructure, if it has integrated civilian and military logistics, then its capacity for autonomous action also grows. This capability alters negotiation dynamics within NATO and with third countries. It increases European negotiating power but also carries the risk of strategic divergence.

The political economy of implementation

The adoption of the Military Mobility Package is only the first step. The legislative phase, which begins at the end of 2025 and is scheduled to last until the end of 2026, will be characterized by intensive negotiations between the European Parliament and the Council. Member States have heterogeneous interests. Transit states such as Germany, Poland, and Belgium stand to benefit disproportionately from infrastructure investments and simplified transit procedures. Peripheral states see less direct benefit and may resist financial participation. States with strong pacifist traditions or neutral status, such as Austria and Ireland, may have reservations about the militarization of EU policy. Eastern European states that feel directly threatened by Russia will advocate for maximum ambition. Southern European states that prioritize other threats such as migration or terrorism may attempt to redirect funds.

The European Parliament will insist on democratic legitimacy and parliamentary oversight. Activating EMERS, which has far-reaching implications for fundamental rights and economic freedoms, requires clear accountability. Parliamentary participation in decisions regarding activation, extension, or termination is not foreseen, which is problematic from a democratic perspective. The role of national parliaments remains unclear. Will they be informed about EMERS activations? Do they have any participatory rights? Subsidiarity, a fundamental principle of the EU, requires that decisions be made at the lowest possible level. EMERS centralizes decision-making power in Brussels, which could raise constitutional questions.

The various interest groups will lobby intensively. The transport sector, represented by the International Road Transport Union and national freight forwarding associations, is pushing for predictable framework conditions and fair compensation. The rail industry is hoping for large contracts for rolling stock and infrastructure modernization. Environmental groups will criticize the suspension of environmental regulations under EMERS. Local communities fear noise pollution and traffic chaos caused by military convoys. Farmers could oppose expropriations for infrastructure projects. These conflicting interests require careful consideration and potentially compensation mechanisms, which will incur additional costs.

The timeline is ambitious. The EU-wide Military Mobility Area is intended to be operational by the end of 2027, in just over two years. This assumes that legislative negotiations are concluded swiftly, national implementation is rapid, administrative capacities are built up, and infrastructure projects are launched. Given the complexity of the subject matter and its political sensitivity, this timeframe seems optimistic. Delays are likely. The NIS2 Directive, adopted in December 2022, was supposed to be transposed into national law by October 2024, but only four Member States managed to do so on time. If a comparatively technical issue like cybersecurity presents such implementation problems, how much more difficult will it be with a cross-cutting issue like military mobility, which touches on transport, defense, foreign policy, and regional development?

The first military mobility exercise is scheduled for 2026. These exercises, which include EU Military Exercises, Command Post Exercises, and Live Exercises, as well as participation in multinational exercises with NATO, are essential for practical testing. They uncover shortcomings before a real-world scenario occurs. They foster familiarity between national coordinators and military planners. They test the resilience of digital systems. From an economic perspective, exercises are investments in organizational learning. They generate experiential knowledge that cannot be replaced by theoretical planning. The costs of such exercises are substantial, encompassing personnel, equipment, infrastructure use, and the opportunity costs of participants. Nevertheless, they are indispensable for validating the operational capability of the system.

Strategic implications for Germany

Germany occupies a key position in the European military mobility network. Its central geographic location makes it the main transit route for east-west movements. Approximately 80 percent of all military deployments from Western European deep-sea ports to NATO's eastern flank cross German territory. The efficiency of Germany's infrastructure is therefore of pan-European importance. However, the condition of this infrastructure is cause for concern. Decades of underinvestment have led to a significant backlog of repairs. Bridges are dilapidated. Roads are riddled with potholes. The rail system suffers from delays and capacity bottlenecks. The transport infrastructure modernization announced by the German government is progressing only slowly.

The Military Mobility Package offers Germany the opportunity to address these shortcomings and mobilize EU co-financing for this purpose. German projects could benefit from the proposed €17.65 billion of the Connecting Europe Facility. The reallocation of Cohesion Fund resources, although Germany is not a primary recipient country, could nevertheless be used for cross-border projects. SAFE loans could finance investments in military infrastructure that also has civilian uses. The European Investment Bank has signaled its interest in supporting infrastructure projects that serve both economic and security policy purposes.

The industrial policy dimension should not be underestimated. German companies are global leaders in rail technology, bridge construction, tunneling, and logistics services. They could benefit considerably from Europe-wide infrastructure investments. The requirement for dual-use standards for transport equipment, which is enshrined in the package, plays into the hands of German engineering capabilities. The establishment of an EU network of civil-military drone testing centers could strengthen Germany as a technology hub. The German government should actively support consortia bidding on EU tenders and reduce regulatory hurdles for dual-use projects.

Politically, Germany is divided. The social democratic tradition emphasizes civilian conflict resolution and is skeptical of militarization. The Green coalition partners struggle with the tension between pacifist roots and realpolitik responsibilities. The liberal FDP focuses on budget consolidation and is hesitant about new spending commitments. The conservative CDU/CSU alliance is pushing for increased defense spending. These domestic differences make it difficult for Germany to adopt a coherent position in European negotiations. Chancellor Scholz proclaimed a new era after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but implementation lags behind the rhetoric. The €100 billion special fund for the Bundeswehr is being accessed only sluggishly. Bureaucratic hurdles and staff shortages in procurement offices are delaying projects.

Public acceptance of military mobility in Germany is mixed. While surveys show increased support for higher defense spending in light of the Russian threat, specific measures meet with resistance. Military convoys on highways are perceived as an obstruction. Low-level flight exercises provoke noise complaints. The stationing of foreign troops stirs up historical anxieties. Successful implementation of the Military Mobility Package requires a public debate about the necessity of these measures and transparent communication about their benefits and costs. Emphasizing the dual-use nature of military infrastructure—its civilian value—could help foster acceptance.

Critical appraisal and outlook

The Military Mobility Package represents the most comprehensive attempt to date to modernize Europe's defense logistics. It addresses real and urgent shortcomings. It mobilizes substantial resources. It creates institutional structures for coordination and monitoring. It skillfully links civilian and military objectives to maximize political support. These strengths deserve recognition.

Nevertheless, serious weaknesses and open questions remain. The funding gap of over €80 billion for infrastructure has not been closed. The proposed mechanisms for mobilizing national budgets, private capital, and EU structural funds are not sufficiently specified. There is a risk that member states will rely on EU funds and reduce their own investments, leading to crowding-out rather than additional engagement. Using cohesion policy as a source of funding undermines its original mission and could exacerbate regional disparities rather than reduce them.

Regulatory harmonization is necessary but not sufficient. Laws on paper do not guarantee implementation in practice. Experience with the NIS2 Directive shows that transposition into national law and actual compliance are two different things. The planned readiness checks and stress tests are important, but they must not degenerate into bureaucratic formalities. They must be linked to clear consequences for non-compliance. The governance structure with national coordinators and a central Transport Group is sensible, but the Commission's enforcement power remains limited. Military affairs are a core competence of the member states. Brussels can, at best, coordinate, not command.

The emergency mechanism EMERS is innovative, but also risky. The activation threshold is low: a member state or the Commission can request activation, and the Council must decide within 48 hours. This accelerated procedure minimizes deliberative processes and maximizes pressure to make a decision. There is a risk of the logic of emergency being instrumentalized. A state could use EMERS to pursue national economic interests, disguised as a security imperative. The one-year validity period allows for far-reaching de facto changes that cannot be easily reversed after deactivation. The suspended environmental and occupational safety regulations are not trivial. They were fought for to protect people and the environment. Their suspension should be a last resort, not a routine use.

NATO-EU coordination functions well at the working level, but strategic differences persist. NATO focuses on collective defense in accordance with Article 5. The EU is increasingly pursuing independent security policy ambitions, for example within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy. This ambivalence between complementarity and autonomy will intensify as European structures become more effective. The US views this development with suspicion. Washington fears that a strong European defense union will render American troops redundant and weaken transatlantic ties. Europeans, in turn, fear that excessive dependence on the US will make Europe vulnerable to American unpredictability. This fundamental strategic conflict can be mitigated, but not resolved, through institutional cooperation.

The Ukraine dimension lends the package additional urgency, but also presents complications. Integrating Ukraine into European mobility networks is politically motivated and strategically sound. However, it creates de facto irreversible ties even before Ukraine is formally an EU member. Infrastructure investments in Ukraine are long-term commitments that will require financing over decades. The security situation in Ukraine is precarious. Investments could be destroyed by military action. Ultimately, the EU bears the risk. This risk-reward calculation must be made transparent and democratically legitimized.

The dimension of societal acceptance is underestimated. Militarization, even when justified as a defense necessity, encounters reservations in many European societies. The post-1990 peace dividend is deeply ingrained in the public consciousness. The redirection of resources from social purposes to defense must be politically sold. Emphasizing the dual-use nature of military equipment helps, but it doesn't disguise the fact that military imperatives primarily dictate the terms. An honest debate about priorities, about the relationship between resources and resources, is unavoidable. This debate has not yet taken place in many member states.

The long-term strategic implications of the Military Mobility Package extend far beyond logistics. It is a building block in the establishment of a European defense union. This union will increase Europe's geopolitical weight and strengthen its negotiating position vis-à-vis external actors. However, it will also create new dependencies, namely between member states. Smaller states will become even more reliant on larger ones for transport capacity and infrastructure. This asymmetry can be politically exploited. Governance structures must ensure that all member states, regardless of size and economic strength, can participate on an equal footing and safeguard their interests.

The economic impact of the package is ambivalent. On the one hand, it promises significant efficiency gains through harmonization, infrastructure investments, and dual-use synergies. Studies predict additional economic growth in the tens of billions. Improved defense capabilities create security, a prerequisite for economic prosperity. On the other hand, it causes massive public expenditure at a time when European budgets are already strained by pandemic costs, climate change transformation, and social welfare systems. The opportunity costs are real: every euro spent on military infrastructure is a euro not spent on education, research, or social security. Making these trade-offs transparent is a democratic duty.

The Military Mobility Package is ultimately a stress test for European integration. It requires cross-border cooperation in a highly sensitive area. It demands trust between member states that have historically often been adversaries. It calls for solidarity that transcends short-term national interests. Whether Europe passes this test will become clear in the coming years. The signs are mixed. The shared perception of threats has sharpened. The willingness to increase spending has grown. The institutional foundations are being laid. But fragmentation, nationalism, and particular interests have not disappeared. They will manifest themselves in every detailed negotiation, every budget debate, and every implementation crisis. The success of the Military Mobility Package depends less on technical details than on political will. The question is not whether Europe can. The question is whether Europe wants to. The answer remains to be seen.

I would be happy to serve as your personal advisor.

Head of Business Development

Chairman SME Connect Defense Working Group

LinkedIn

 

 

I would be happy to serve as your personal advisor.

contact me under Wolfenstein ∂ Xpert.digital

call me under +49 89 674 804 (Munich)

LinkedIn
 

 

The global economy is currently experiencing a fundamental change, a broken epoch that shakes the cornerstones of global logistics. The era of hyper-globalization, which was characterized by the unshakable striving for maximum efficiency and the “just-in-time” principle, gives way to a new reality. This is characterized by profound structural breaks, geopolitical shifts and progressive economic political fragmentation. The planning of international markets and supply chains, which was once assumed as a matter of course, dissolves and is replaced by a phase of growing uncertainty.

Suitable for:

• Strategic resilience in a fragmented world through intelligent infrastructure and automation - The requirements profile of the dual-use logistics expert

Industry focus: B2B, digitalization (from AI to XR), mechanical engineering, logistics, renewable energies and industry

More about it here:

• Xpert Business Hub

A topic hub with insights and expertise:

• Knowledge platform on the global and regional economy, innovation and industry-specific trends
• Collection of analyses, impulses and background information from our focus areas
• A place for expertise and information on current developments in business and technology
• Topic hub for companies that want to learn about markets, digitalization and industry innovations