Layed out? Lock-in effects are not only so dangerous for the economy-a look at the military sector

Published on: March 25, 2025 / update from: March 25, 2025 - Author: Konrad Wolfenstein

Layed out? Lock-in effects are so dangerous not only for the economy-a look at the military sector-Image: Xpert.digital

National sovereignty in danger: the risks of foreign military technology

The strategic risks using the example of US arms exports and the F-35 debate

The dependence on military technology of foreign providers represents an existential risk of national security and operational sovereignty. This phenomenon is not limited to purely technological aspects, but includes contractual, logistical and political dimensions, which are analyzed in detail below.

Suitable for:

From “Star Wars” (SDI) to “Stargate”: Can the United States finally break the Mega projects' curse? AI race like in the Cold War?

Control over weapons systems as a political means of pressure: the Ukraine case

Restrictions on US weapon use through political guidelines

In November 2024, the US government under Joe Biden loosened restrictions for the use of Atacms rockets in the Russian region of Kursk, after strict geographical borders for attacks on Russian territory. This decision was made against the background of North Korean troop reinforcements on the Russian side and under the time pressure of bidens for the end of the office. However, temporary approval also illustrates how the USA as a supplier control the operational autonomy of Ukraine:

Geographical restrictions: Until November 2024, US delivered HIMARS systems were only allowed to be used within a radius of 80 km around the front line at KharkiW.
Political conditionality: The release of the ATACMS rockets was bound to the stationing of North Korean units in Kursk, not to the Ukrainian defense needs.
Temporary limitation: Biden's decision was made in his last phase of office, which underlines the dependence of Ukraine on domestic US cycles.

The abrupt stop of the US military aid under Trump

The suspension of all US arms deliveries by President Donald Trump in March 2025 revealed the vulnerability of Ukraine:

Immediate consequences: The failure of patriot and nasams air defense missiles left critical infrastructure unprotected. Artillery ammunition for Himars and 155 mm floors were missing, which made offensive operations impossible.
Indirect control mechanisms: it remained unclear whether satellite information data and access to Starlink communication systems were also affected-both decisive for the operational management.
Historical parallels: As early as 2023, a six -month delivery stop led to the improvisation of Ukrainian drone technology, which today is responsible for 80 % of the direct hit. Nevertheless, the dependence on US systems remains structurally.

Geopolitical effects

US politics demonstrated how suppliers pursue strategic goals through selective shares and delivery interruptions:

Escalation control: Bidens initial reluctance to long -distance weapons aimed to avoid direct confrontation with Russia.
Negotiation lever: Ex-Nato commander-in-chief Wesley Clark considered the late release as a means of giving Ukraine more weight in future peace talks.
Dependency as a pressure instrument: Trump's demand for “sufficient will to peace” of Ukraine illustrated how military aid can be linked to political conditions.

The F-35 controversy: technological dependency and its consequences

Contractual lock-in mechanisms in the F-35 program

The purchase contract for the German F-35 reveals structural dependencies:

One -sided termination clauses: The United States reserves the right to stop deliveries to “national interests”.
Technological control: Modifications on the jets are prohibited, spare parts require US permits.
Sovereignty: Aircraft data is stored in a US-managed Amazon cloud, which limits operational transparency.

The debate about the “Kill Switch”

Although the Pentagon denies rumors about a direct deactivation mechanism, indirect control options exist:

Software addiction: The F-35 requires regular updates via the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS), which is controlled by US servers. A demolition of this support would degrade the ability to fight within a few months.
Logistics chain: 80 % of spare parts and maintenance technologies are concentrated in the USA. A delivery stop would paralyze brisk within weeks.
Mission Planning Systems: Joachim Schranzhofer von Hensoldt pointed out that Mission Planning systems from the USA could block fluid routes or weapon inserts.

Reactions of the buyer states

Several countries reacted with purchase returns or reviews:

Portugal: His F-35 ordering explicitly canceled due to “US unpredictability”.
Canada: Check its order against the background of diplomatic tensions with the Trump administration.
Germany: Parliamentary inquiries about contractual exit clauses and alternative European fighter jets such as the Eurofighter.

Strategic teachings and alternative approaches

Risk terminimization through diversification

The Bundeswehr relies on a multi-cloud strategy in the IT area to avoid lock-in effects. Transferred to arms projects this means:

Hybrid fleets: combination of F-35 with European models such as the Eurofighter to sprinkle dependencies.
Open source development: Initiatives such as the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) promote interoperable technology standards.

Contractual security

Exit clauses: Legally binding regulations for data migration and technology transfer when termination of the contract.
Source code-Eescow: Stop critical software components in neutral third parties to ensure access in the event of conflict.

European sovereign efforts

The F-35 dispute accelerates initiatives on European armaments autonomy:

EPAF (European Participating Air Forces): Cooperation for maintaining Eurofighter tornado fleets regardless of US logistics.
Edidp (European Defense Industrial Development Program): Promotion of joint armaments projects for reducing extraterritorial dependencies.

Suitable for:

200 billion euros for the promotion of AI gigafactors and AI-related projects in Europe

Lock-in effects as a threat to strategic resilience

The examples Ukraine and F-35 clarify that military lock-in models go far beyond financial risks. They endanger the operational freedom of action, undermine political sovereignty and expose states to geostrategic blackmail. While the United States uses its technology leadership to bind alliance partners, the growing skepticism compared to the F-35 program shows that customers are increasingly recognizing the costs of this dependency. The solution lies in a balance between technological interoperability and the preservation of autonomous decision structures - a challenge that can only be mastered through European coordination and investment research.

Suitable for: