Despite warnings and knowing: The renewed failure of the new Bundeswehr digital radio devices

Too big, too complex, too power-hungry: The series of breakdowns with the new Bundeswehr radio

The Bundeswehr's new digital radio systems have failed again, and this failure has deeper structural and technical causes that have been known for years. The Digitalization of Land-Based Operations (D-LBO) project, with a total volume of several billion euros from the special fund, is one of the armed forces' most important modernization projects and is intended to replace outdated analog radio technology with modern, secure digital systems.

The problem manifests itself on two main levels: First, the new VR500 radios from Rohde & Schwarz fail in practical use due to serious software issues. Second, the devices prove to be physically and technically incompatible with existing Bundeswehr vehicles.

Software problems when operating VR500 radios

The most serious deficiency lies in the overly complex operating software of the digital radios. During a crucial system test in May 2025 at the Munster military training area, the trial had to be aborted prematurely because the devices were deemed unsuitable for military use. This assessment is particularly serious because it calls into question the fundamental operational capability of the systems.

The software problems manifest themselves in several critical areas. The user interface proved so complex that soldiers were only able to establish radio circuits with considerable difficulty and time-consuming processes. This is a fundamental flaw, as the rapid and intuitive establishment of communication links is vital to survival in military operations.

Particularly problematic is the failure of standard tests, where commanders must quickly switch between different radio networks. This functionality is essential for modern combat operations, as military leaders must coordinate flexibly between different communication levels and units. The complete failure of this test demonstrates that the software does not meet basic military requirements.

In addition, unstable radio connections occurred, impairing even the most basic communication functions. Experts describe the software as too complex for use in battle tanks and under combat conditions, where simple and reliable operation is required under stressful and time-critical situations.

Rohde & Schwarz is currently working intensively with the German Armed Forces on a comprehensive software update to address these fundamental deficiencies. However, the need for such an update after delivery demonstrates that the devices were entered into trials without sufficient practical testing.

Hardware integration problems in the vehicle fleet

In addition to the software issues, there are massive difficulties with the physical installation of the radios into the Bundeswehr's diverse vehicle fleet. These problems have been known since 2023 and affect approximately 200 different vehicle types, from minibuses to off-road vehicles to main battle tanks.

The physical incompatibility manifests itself in several dimensions. The new radios are simply too large and heavy for many of the intended vehicles. Suitable adapter plates for proper installation are completely missing, and the spatial constraints in the vehicles were clearly not sufficiently considered during device development.

More serious are the electrical incompatibilities. The battery capacities of many vehicles are insufficient to operate the power-hungry digital radio stations. The alternators are too weak to deliver the stable voltage required to operate the high-tech devices. In some vehicles, modifications to the cooling system are even necessary to cope with the additional heat generated by the digital systems.

The scope of the problem is considerable. Of the more than 200 different vehicle types, only about 30 have been successfully installed with the new radio systems. Conversion work is still underway for more than 80 vehicle types, while testing hasn't even begun for others. This means that the vast majority of Bundeswehr vehicles cannot currently be equipped with the new digital communications systems.

Systemic causes and organizational deficiencies

The root cause of these problems lies in a lack of coordination between various departments of the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support in Koblenz. Different departments did not communicate sufficiently with each other, which meant that the critical issue of integration was not resolved before the equipment was ordered.

The technical complexity of installing the radio stations was systematically underestimated. The Bundeswehr itself calls it open-heart surgery, as the conversion must be carried out parallel to regular operations, exercises, and training. This parallel implementation significantly increases the logistical complexity and makes precise coordination between all involved parties essential.

It was not possible to create a consistently consistent situational picture among all involved actors—neither in the Federal Ministry of Defense nor in the Bundeswehr nor in the participating industrial companies. The previous organizational integration of the project into the Bundeswehr's organizational structure proved inadequate. The comprehensive coordination and communication among the affected departments was not achieved to the required extent.

Impact on the D-LBO project and NATO commitments

These combined problems pose a fundamental threat to the entire multi-billion-euro D-LBO project. The original goal of equipping an entire Army division with the new, secure radio systems by the end of 2027 is acutely jeopardized by the delays. Since Germany has pledged to NATO that it will provide a fully equipped and operational Army division starting in 2025, the problems also have alliance-political dimensions.

The 2025 Division cannot fulfill its NATO missions without functional digital communications systems. With outdated analog communications technology, this division would be unable to conduct operations and operate interoperably with NATO partners. This significantly undermines Germany's credibility as a reliable alliance partner.

What's particularly problematic is that, despite the test failure, the systems continue to be installed in vehicles of NATO's rapid reaction force, Panzer Brigade 37. However, without functional digital radio, these state-of-the-art weapon systems are not operational, drastically reducing the availability of the German flagship unit.

Political responsibility and communication failures

The political dimension of the scandal is exacerbated by the fact that Defense Minister Boris Pistorius was allegedly not informed of the serious problems until the last week of September 2025. However, his administration had been informed of the disastrous results of the system test in Munster since June 10 at the latest. This raises serious questions about the effectiveness of the information chains within the ministry.

As recently as September 10, Pistorius assured the Bundestag that there were no problems with the project and that the project was on schedule. This statement came three months after the internal information about the test failure and is now leading to sharp criticism from parliamentarians who feel betrayed.

The minister has since instructed State Secretary for Armaments Jens Plötner and Inspector General Carsten Breuer to address the problems and submit proposals for necessary measures to resolve them quickly. The coordination office within the Procurement Office, which the minister set up after the initial problems and was supposed to inform him directly, has evidently failed in its task.

Technical standards and NATO interoperability

A further aspect of the problem lies in the complexity of NATO standardization. The new radios must not only function nationally but also be interoperable with the systems of allied partners. This requires compliance with complex technical standards such as Federated Mission Networking and various NATO protocols.

The integration of various communications technologies into a coherent system requires the highest technical precision. Modern military communications must support VHF and UHF transmissions with data rates of up to 10 megabits per second while simultaneously being encrypted to prevent eavesdropping. These technical requirements exponentially increase the complexity of the software.

Financial dimensions of the project

The financial implications of the D-LBO project are considerable. In December 2022, the Bundestag's Budget Committee had already approved €1.35 billion from the special fund for the initial procurement of 20,000 radio sets. The entire project could ultimately cost up to €5 billion.

At the same time, further contracts worth billions were awarded. Rheinmetall and KNDS Deutschland received a contract worth €1.98 billion for the vehicle integration of approximately 10,000 combat and support vehicles. A second contract with Rheinmetall and blackned, worth €1.2 billion, concerns IT systems integration.

Risk management and warning signals

As early as 2018, authors of a Defense Department report on defense matters explicitly warned of the risks of the D-LBO project. They identified the timely integration into the various platforms as the greatest challenge and risk of the entire project. This early warning demonstrates that the problems did not arise unexpectedly, but were foreseeable years in advance.

The risk management system established under State Secretary Suder aimed to identify risks associated with defense projects in a timely manner and to inform the strategic level at an early stage. This system evidently did not function as intended in D-LBO, as the problems were not communicated to the political leadership in a timely manner.

International experience and best practices

International experience shows that successful military communications projects require close coordination between all stakeholders from the outset. Best practices include regular training and realistic simulations, robust maintenance protocols, and ongoing technical support.

The early integration of practical tests under realistic conditions is particularly important. Continuous training and simulations that accurately replicate the operational environment are crucial to the success of complex communications systems. These testing phases must be considered during development, not just at delivery.

Preventive measures and avoidance strategies

The failure of the Bundeswehr's digital radio equipment could have been prevented through various preventive measures. A central coordination office should have coordinated all technical, logistical, and organizational aspects from the outset of the project.

Early and comprehensive system testing under realistic conditions would have uncovered the software issues during the development phase. Conducting integration tests in various vehicle types prior to the bulk order would have identified hardware incompatibilities in a timely manner.

Systematic risk management with regular reporting to the political leadership would have enabled timely intervention. Establishing clear communication channels between all stakeholders would have prevented information loss.

Involving users from the armed forces early in the development phase would have ensured practical requirements. Prototyping and iterative development cycles would have enabled gradual improvement of the systems.

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Structural reforms in procurement

The D-LBO issue reveals fundamental weaknesses in the Bundeswehr's procurement system. The Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BfE) in Koblenz has been criticized for years for excessively lengthy tendering procedures and excessive bureaucracy.

Modern risk management systems must be implemented during the analysis phase of the procurement process. Strategic risk management with rolling costing and full cost estimation can avoid costly surprises.

Professionalizing contract design with the defense industry is essential. This includes contractual incentives and stronger enforcement of sanctions for non-compliance. Transparent performance indicators and regular milestone checks can identify deviations at an early stage.

Technological challenges of modern communication systems

The development of military communications systems faces unique challenges. Software-defined radios must support various waveforms and protocols while maintaining the highest security standards. Integrating diverse communications technologies into a coherent system requires exceptional technical expertise.

Modern military communications must be secure, interference-resistant, and interoperable with NATO partners. Encryption and authentication requirements significantly increase software complexity. At the same time, the systems must function reliably under extreme conditions.

Impact on Networked Operations Management

The D-LBO project is a core component of the Bundeswehr's networked operations management. The delays are impacting not only communications but the entire digital warfare capability of the German armed forces. Modern military operations require the seamless networking of sensors, platforms, and effectors.

The integration of various information systems enables real-time exchange of situational information and coordinated responses. Without functioning digital communications, modern weapons systems cannot achieve their full potential. This significantly reduces the combat effectiveness and survivability of the armed forces.

Industrial responsibility and quality assurance

The defense industry's role in the D-LBO problems cannot be ignored. Rohde & Schwarz, as the main supplier, bears responsibility for the inadequate software quality and the inadequate pre-delivery testing. The need for subsequent software updates demonstrates deficiencies in quality management.

Modern defense companies must conduct comprehensive system tests under realistic conditions right from the development phase. Integrating user feedback and iterative development cycles are essential for successful military systems. Quality assurance must not begin until delivery.

International cooperation and standards

NATO interoperability requires compliance with complex international standards. Federated Mission Networking enables the interconnection of different nations within a shared information network. German systems must work seamlessly with American, British, and French communications networks.

The standardization of military communications is a lengthy process that can take years. National unilateral efforts jeopardize interoperability and reduce the effectiveness of multinational operations. The Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exercise serves to test and validate these standards.

Long-term consequences and need for reform

The D-LBO problem highlights the urgent need for reform in German armaments management. Structural changes are necessary to avoid future failures. This includes organizational reforms, improved coordination, and more modern project management methods.

Procurement must become more agile and user-centric. Rigid bureaucratic processes are unsuitable for modern technology development. Rapid adaptation cycles and continuous improvements are essential in the digital world.

The Bundeswehr must strengthen its innovative capabilities and collaborate more closely with startups and technology companies. Traditional procurement procedures are often unsuitable for fast-moving IT systems. New cooperation models and procurement strategies are required.

The German Arms Control Board (D-LBO) crisis is more than a technical problem—it reveals systemic weaknesses in the German defense organization. Only through fundamental reforms can future billion-dollar losses be avoided and the Bundeswehr's operational readiness sustainably strengthened. The time for superficial corrections is over; Germany needs a fundamental modernization of its armaments management.

How did this come to this? The origins of the D-LBO debacle

The failure of the Bundeswehr's new digital radios is not a problem that suddenly arose, but the result of years of systemic deficiencies and ignored warning signals. The question "How did this come to this?" can only be understood by considering the deeper structural deficiencies in the German procurement system and the history of warning signals that have gone unheeded for years.

The early warning signals – risks already known in 2018

Contrary to current reports, the integration problems with D-LBO were by no means surprising. As early as 2018, experts explicitly warned of the risks of the D-LBO project in a Defense Ministry report on armament matters. They identified the timely integration of the radios into the various vehicle platforms as the greatest challenge and the main risk of the entire project.

This early warning clearly demonstrates that the current problems did not arise unexpectedly, but were foreseeable years in advance. The fact that these warnings did not lead to consistent preventive measures reveals a fundamental failure of risk management.

The failure of the risk management system

The risk management system established by State Secretary Katrin Suder was designed to prevent precisely such problems. It was designed to identify risks associated with armaments projects in a timely, structured, and targeted manner, and to inform the strategic level at an early stage.

However, this system did not function as intended in the D-LBO project. Although initial indications of delays were already expressed on January 19, 2023, and the D-LBO Working Group informed the Procurement Office on June 28, 2023, that there would be delays in the integration, this critical information did not reach the political leadership in a timely manner.

The coordination office, which was only established in October 2023, was a reaction to already known problems, not a preventative measure. It came too late and could no longer prevent the failures.

Structural deficiencies in the procurement office

The Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support in Koblenz has been exhibiting the same systemic problems for years. The parallels to the G36 affair are frightening. Even then, internal critics were pressured or sidelined when they pointed out deficiencies. Officials who presented internal evidence of the G36's accuracy problems as early as 2012 were systematically attacked.

This culture of problem-covering continues at D-LBO. The procurement office has a history of procurement errors and a lack of coordination between departments. Different departments fail to communicate adequately with each other, which already led to serious procedural errors in the G36 successor project.

Political leadership without control

The political dimension is exacerbated by the fact that Minister Pistorius assured the Bundestag on September 10, 2025, that there were no problems with D-LBO and that they were on schedule. This statement came three months after the internal information about the test failure in Munster.

The planning and command staff established by the minister was supposed to ensure that all activities served the strategic objectives and that decisions were implemented promptly. This system failed completely at D-LBO. The restructuring of risk control away from the State Secretary for Armaments and into other departments evidently led to a loss of information.

The micromanagement trap

A key problem, criticized by officials at the Procurement Office, is the micromanagement introduced since Katrin Suder's time. Employees no longer have freedom to make decisions; everything is controlled down to the last detail. This leads to paralysis rather than efficient procurement.

Decisions about procurement methods no longer take two days as they once did, but two months. The justification no longer fits on half a page, but spans more than a dozen sheets. This overregulation makes rapid adjustments impossible and leads to rigid processes.

Industrial responsibility ignored

The problems also arose because the industry failed to take responsibility. Rohde & Schwarz delivered software that failed practical tests without first conducting sufficient trials under realistic conditions. The ARGE D-LBO (German Association of Broadcasting Companies) announced delays as early as June 2023, but this did not lead to any decisive action.

The fact that retroactive software updates are now required demonstrates a failure of quality assurance in the industry. Modern defense companies are required to conduct comprehensive system testing during the development phase, which evidently didn't happen.

The pattern of repeated failures

D-LBO is just the latest example in a long line of procurement disasters. The G36 problems, the procurement errors with the G36 successor, the consulting scandal under von der Leyen – all reveal the same structural deficiencies.

The constant shifting of strategic and political responsibility onto employees in the ministry and the procurement office prevents an honest investigation. Without fundamental reforms, the pattern will repeat itself.

NATO commitments as time pressure

The additional time pressure imposed by NATO's commitment to deploy a full division by 2025 exacerbated the problem. Instead of careful planning, this pressure led to hasty decisions and the failure to conduct adequate pre-procurement testing.

Lack of user involvement

A serious mistake was the lack of involvement of actual users—the soldiers—in the development and testing phase. The complicated operating software could have been identified and corrected through early user testing under realistic conditions.

The failure of control institutions

External audit institutions also failed. The Federal Audit Office, which conducted critical audits of other projects, failed to intervene in a timely manner in the case of D-LBO. Parliamentary oversight failed because the ministry failed to inform members of parliament in a timely and complete manner.

The combination of ignored expertise, poor communication, structural deficiencies, and political time pressure created the perfect conditions for the D-LBO debacle. It is not a problem that suddenly emerged, but the predictable result of years of systemic deficiencies.

The question isn't whether the problems could have been foreseen—they were, in fact, predicted. The question is why these warnings were ignored and why those responsible didn't make timely corrections. This demonstrates a fundamental failure of the German defense organization at all levels—from operational execution to strategic leadership.

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