Crime, trust, economy: Berlin's power struggle – The price of intimidation and who governs when threats work?

Berlin's left wing under pressure: security issues, political contacts and the consequences for the city's location

Berlin's security debate: What the figures show about crime, antisemitism and trust

The debate surrounding Elif Eralp and controversial contacts within the Berlin Left Party is more than just a partisan dispute. It touches upon fundamental questions: Can political decisions be influenced by threats? How does the state protect those affected without hindering necessary investigations? And how can we prevent personal security concerns or internal party considerations from weakening the independent enforcement of democratic rules?

The security concerns raised by Eralp, which became public at the end of October 2026, deserve serious examination. However, they prove neither personal support for extremist organizations nor control of the party by criminal networks. Eralp has publicly announced his intention to take decisive action against organized crime, violence, and terrorism. The crucial question, therefore, is whether this announcement will be followed by comprehensible and verifiable measures.

The conflict is also economically relevant. Crime and a lack of trust in its prevention can burden businesses, hinder investment, and strain public resources. However, no concrete financial damage can be derived from this that could be attributed to Eralp, her party, or individual controversial contacts. A closer look at the facts, the security situation, and the potential consequences reveals what Berlin's political power struggle is truly about: protection from intimidation, the credibility of state institutions, and the question of whether democratic rules apply equally to everyone.

When intimidation influences politics: What's at stake in Berlin now

Berlin's controversy surrounding Elif Eralp and her problematic contacts within the Left Party extends beyond a purely partisan dispute. It touches upon a central prerequisite for economic prosperity: the reliable enforcement of democratic rules, regardless of which groups exert political pressure. The politician's security concerns, which became public at the end of October 2026, must therefore be taken seriously. However, they prove neither personal support for extremist organizations nor control of the party by criminal networks. At the same time, Eralp has publicly announced her intention to take decisive action against organized crime, violence, and terrorism.

The crucial question is not whether a politician is allowed to fear for her family. Of course she is. The crucial question is whether personal threats, considerations within her own party, or questionable alliances could influence political decisions. Where this possibility exists, institutional safeguards must be in place. Intimidation doesn't only cause societal harm when it escalates into physical violence. Even the credible expectation of repercussions can deter people from exercising their rights, reporting crimes, or assuming political responsibility.

From an economic perspective, this debate is therefore a discussion about the quality of state institutions. Crime and a lack of trust in its prevention can hinder investment, increase business costs, strain public budgets, and impair a location's attractiveness. However, no specific sum of money can be derived for Berlin that could be directly attributed to Eralp, her party, or individual controversial contacts. The economic causal relationships are plausible and have been scientifically studied; their precise magnitude must be demonstrated separately in each case.

What the case actually proves

The immediate cause of the controversy is internal notes to an interview that were accidentally leaked. According to multiple media reports, Eralp expressed concerns for her family and reservations about naming a specific activist. Her associates subsequently cited ongoing threats and security recommendations advising against attributing political problems to individuals. However, this does not constitute a publicly available, independent official confirmation of this specific advice.

The focus is on Ibrahim Ibrahim, described as a supporter of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and a leading figure in the United Palestinian National Committee. The PFLP is classified as a terrorist organization by the European Union. Ibrahim attended an election event of the Neukölln Left Party in September 2026.

These facts justify a critical examination of political contacts. However, they do not permit any further conclusions. In particular, a distinction must be made between supporting extremist positions, participating in a political network, criminal support of terrorism, and a concrete personal threat. The publicly available reports do not provide conclusive evidence that Ibrahim made any personal threats against Eralp. According to the information presented, there was also no indication of his involvement in violent actions or attack planning in Germany.

A rigorous analysis must respect these limits. Otherwise, it replaces the investigation of actual risks with a chain of suspicions. Political responsibility can extend further than criminal responsibility, but it must not be confused with it.

The open flank of the left

The Berlin Left Party faces a credibility problem because the controversial contacts are not solely based on the chance appearance of an individual at an open event. As early as August 2025, the United Palestinian National Committee was listed as a participant or speaker on an event poster organized by the Neukölln branch of the Left Party. The then-chairwoman demanded clarification and declared that organizations affiliated with Hamas, as well as individuals who condoned its terrorism, were not alliance partners.

This is the real organizational test. A public demarcation is necessary, but not sufficient on its own. If a party leadership excludes certain collaborations, it must ensure that district associations, working groups, and elected officials actually respect this boundary. Otherwise, a gap arises between formal policy decisions and practical coalition-building.

Another controversy involved Bundestag member Ferat Koçak. Following criticism of his contacts with members of the Remmo family, he resigned his seat on the Interior Committee at the end of September 2026. He admitted to mistakes in handling these contacts but denied being a criminal himself or supporting organized crime.

Here, too, a precise assessment is required. A single contact or a thoughtless message does not prove criminal involvement. However, such actions become politically relevant if they reveal a lack of distance, insufficient due diligence, or contradictory statements. For a party aspiring to government, it is not enough to be free of criminal records. It must also demonstrate, in a comprehensible way, how it identifies conflicts of interest and fends off unwanted influence.

Taking precautions is not surrender

The decision not to name specific individuals in an interview can have various reasons. It may be an expression of political evasion. However, it may also be based on a reasonable assessment of personal security risks. Without knowledge of the specific threat assessment, it would be irresponsible to automatically interpret any caution as submission.

A democratic public should demand decisiveness from public officials, but not demonstrative self-endangerment. Those who take action against organized crime do not need to make every operational assessment public. The same applies to the protection of family members. Political resolve is demonstrated above all by whether measures based on the rule of law are actually taken and independently enforced.

Conversely, citing security concerns must not lead to the permanent shielding of politically relevant relationships. It is possible to handle names with discretion for protection while simultaneously drawing clear organizational conclusions. These include verifiable prohibitions on cooperation, transparent responsibilities, and consistent responses to the glorification of terrorism.

A proper assessment therefore distinguishes three levels: the protection of the politician in question, the investigation of potential threats, and the monitoring of party-political contacts. None of these tasks replaces the others. A threatened politician deserves protection. Her party remains accountable nonetheless. And security authorities must investigate potential crimes regardless of whether their investigation is politically inconvenient.

The figures contradict simple narratives

The security situation in Berlin cannot be described as either a complete loss of control or largely unproblematic. A total of 502,743 crimes were registered in 2025. This was 36,306 cases, or 6.7 percent, fewer than in the previous year. The clearance rate was 44.9 percent. This development contradicts the blanket assertion that overall crime is growing unchecked.

Politically motivated crime developed differently. It rose to 8,645 cases in 2025, an increase of 3.4 percent. At the same time, the number of politically motivated violent crimes fell from 976 to 902. Thus, an overall increase in registered political crimes and a decrease in political violence can coexist.

Within the individual categories of crime, the trends differ considerably. Right-wing motivated offenses increased from 2,803 to 3,021; the associated violent offenses rose from 90 to 133. Left-wing motivated offenses increased from 696 to 960, and violent offenses from 137 to 237. In contrast, violent offenses motivated by foreign ideology decreased from 604 to 376.

For an economic analysis, this means that security policy must differentiate according to specific risks. The costs of a propaganda offense, a serious bodily harm attack, an arson attack, and a long-term intimidation campaign are not identical. A mere total figure can therefore neither fully reflect the societal burden nor justify a particular political strategy.

Antisemitism as an institutional stress test

The increase in antisemitic crimes is particularly alarming. Berlin police recorded a total of 2,268 cases in 2025, compared to 1,825 the previous year. This represents an increase of 24.3 percent. At the same time, the number of antisemitic violent crimes fell from 69 to 64. A significant portion of the statistical increase was attributable to propaganda offenses, which rose from 596 to 1,233.

This distinction does not downplay the problem, but rather describes its structure more precisely. More registered offenses can reflect both an actual tightening of the law and changes in legal assessments, more consistent reporting of crimes, or improved data collection. Regarding developments in Berlin, the importance of reporting crimes and the criminal assessment of symbols of terrorist organizations was explicitly emphasized.

The economic impact of antisemitic intimidation extends beyond directly measurable material damage. When people avoid events, sever professional ties, or conceal their identity for security reasons, their social and economic participation is restricted. Such burdens can manifest as increased security costs, missed opportunities, and a loss of trust. General research on the economic consequences of crime describes precisely these indirect channels of impact.

However, the protection of Jewish life should not be justified primarily by locational interests. It is an independent state obligation. The economic perspective merely adds another insight to this obligation: A city also weakens its development opportunities if it effectively hinders certain people from participating equally in public life.

Why political categories can be misleading

Of the 2,268 registered antisemitic crimes in 2025, 1,485 were attributed to foreign ideology, 348 to religious ideology, 327 to the right-wing spectrum, and 49 to the left-wing spectrum. A further 59 cases fell under other categories.

These figures do not imply that the left-wing political milieu could only be held responsible for cases explicitly categorized as left-wing. Likewise, not every act motivated by foreign or religious ideology can be attributed to a democratic party. Police categories of crime serve to classify motives. They are not statistics on party membership or political complicity. Furthermore, official data collection uses different thematic classifications and can be modified during the course of an investigation.

Particularly in the Middle East conflict, overlaps are emerging. The Berlin Office for the Protection of the Constitution describes an intensified networking between left-wing extremist groups and those involved in foreign-related extremism. Common elements identified include, in particular, the rejection of Israel's right to exist and the trivialization or glorification of Hamas terrorism.

This leads to a more demanding political task: It is not the label of an alliance partner that matters, but its actual behavior. Humanitarian engagement with the Palestinian population is legitimate. Criticism of the Israeli government is also legitimate. However, this does not create a license for antisemitic stereotypes, the justification of terrorism, or the intimidation of political opponents. A sound alliance policy must be able to draw this line in practice.

Criminal networks are not a family trait

In 2025, a total of 952 offenses related to clan-related crime were registered in Berlin, perpetrated by 342 suspects. As of the beginning of January 2026, police attributed 685 individuals to this category. Compared to the previous year, the number of registered offenses increased by approximately twelve percent. The main areas of focus were violent crimes, traffic offenses, and theft.

These figures describe a specific segment. They do not represent all organized crime, nor the crime of any particular population group. In particular, family affiliation is not proof of guilt. Criticism of the term "clan crime" is directed, among other things, at the risk of placing people under general suspicion based on their name or origin.

For economic evaluation, a behavioral perspective is therefore superior. Crucial factors are proven extortion, money laundering, fraud, illegal market foreclosure, or other concrete criminal offenses. Combating these activities also protects the law-abiding members of affected families and the many businesses operating legally in the same neighborhoods.

A government must do both: consistently prosecute criminal structures and prevent blanket accusations. This is not a contradiction. Arbitrary accusations can hinder cooperation with witnesses and victims. Conversely, inadequate prosecution can lead to law-abiding citizens in troubled neighborhoods paying a particularly high price. Precision is therefore not the opposite of toughness, but rather a prerequisite for effective law enforcement.

The invisible burden on legal companies

Organized crime is particularly dangerous economically because it can alter the conditions of competition. A company that complies with taxes, labor laws, and financing regulations operates under different conditions than an actor who can employ illegal means. Where criminal proceeds flow into legitimate business models, there is a risk of distorting entrepreneurial decisions. International economic research therefore explicitly treats money laundering and complex financial crime as macroeconomic risks.

Not every suspicious business is necessarily involved in money laundering. Unusual business models, low prices, or specific industry affiliations do not, in themselves, constitute proof of a crime. A sound analysis distinguishes between risk indicators and proven criminal offenses.

The underlying mechanism is nonetheless understandable: if illegal financing methods or intimidation create economic advantages, performance as a selection criterion is weakened. Then, the decision is no longer solely based on who works more productively, offers better services, or serves customers more convincingly.

For small businesses, even the expectation of inadequate protection can be problematic. They typically have less financial flexibility to finance additional security measures, legal advice, or lengthy disputes. Therefore, a credible fight against white-collar crime is also a matter of policy for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Its goal should not be maximum publicity, but rather the restoration of fair market conditions and the reliable safeguarding of legitimate business activities.

Why damage amounts can be easily misleading

The Berlin situation report on organized crime for 2023 identified a total of 66 investigations and 485 suspects. The recorded financial damage amounted to €57.1 million, while the identified criminal proceeds totaled €86.3 million. Assets worth €9.9 million were seized.

These amounts cannot simply be added together. Damage, criminal proceeds, and seized assets describe different quantities. Proceeds from illegal trade are not automatically identical to financial losses recorded according to statistical rules. Furthermore, a preliminary seizure does not necessarily mean that the amount has been definitively confiscated.

In addition, there is the impact of individual large-scale investigations. In the year in question, a single break-in at a safe alone accounted for €45.5 million of the total damage. Such an event can significantly influence the annual figure. A subsequent decline would therefore not automatically be proof that criminal networks have lost influence overall.

Similarly, damage statistics do not capture all societal consequences. For example, the Berlin situation report points out that no corresponding monetary damage is generally recorded in cases of illegal drug trafficking. This, of course, does not mean that such markets do not cause economic or social costs.

Therefore, several indicators are necessary for political assessment. Presenting only a large sum of damage can be just as misleading as interpreting a low figure as an all-clear.

A growing location remains vulnerable

Berlin is by no means an economically failed metropolis. According to initial calculations, its price-adjusted gross domestic product grew by 1.1 percent in 2025, while the German economy as a whole expanded by 0.2 percent. In nominal terms, Berlin's economic output reached 218.3 billion euros.

This scale is important for context. It demonstrates how implausible it would be to attempt to explain the entire economic development of the capital based solely on isolated political scandals. Growth, employment, and investment are influenced by numerous factors, including demand, financing, the availability of skilled workers, infrastructure, and the quality of governance.

At the same time, a growing city can develop institutional weaknesses. Good overall economic figures do not preclude the possibility that certain neighborhoods, professional groups, or minorities suffer from significant security problems. The outlook for an international organization can differ considerably from that of a small business whose owner is repeatedly threatened.

A differentiated location analysis therefore considers both overall economic performance and the distribution of burdens. The central question is not simply whether Berlin is growing. It is equally important whether the conditions for economic participation remain reliable and accessible to all. A location can be successful in the short term and yet still lose institutional substance in the long term. Conversely, a well-considered reform policy can reduce existing problems without first rendering the entire city ungovernable.

Trust reduces economic friction

Trust is not a secondary, less important issue in economic policy. It influences how many additional safeguards people need before doing business with each other. Where rules are reliably in place, companies are more likely to expect contracts to be honored, property rights to be protected, and conflicts to be resolved according to transparent procedures. The economic consequences of crime therefore also include damage to institutional trust and the investment climate.

The reverse mechanism is easy to understand. If companies fear they will not be adequately protected if they file a complaint, or if they suspect political favoritism, the effort required for safeguarding and verification increases. Not every single fear is objectively justified. Nevertheless, it can have an economic impact as soon as it influences decisions.

For the Berlin controversy, this means: A party shouldn't just declare that it's against crime. It must make it comprehensible why public institutions would act independently under its leadership. This includes distancing itself from problematic networks and a willingness to allow investigations into events within its own sphere of influence.

The opposing viewpoint is equally important. Political opponents should not create the impression, without evidence, that an entire city is already controlled by criminal forces. Exaggerated doomsday scenarios can also damage trust. Responsible politicians must identify risks without conflating facts and speculation. Credibility is built through verifiable achievements, not through maximum volume.

Security is also social policy

The costs of insecurity are unequally distributed. A large company can hire additional security services or relocate to other sites. A small shop, a counseling center, or a family with limited income has fewer options. Economically, it is therefore to be expected that inadequate public protection will disproportionately burden those who cannot afford private alternatives.

This presents a particular challenge for a left-wing party. Those who elevate social justice to their core political agenda cannot treat individual security as a secondary concern. Protection from violence, extortion, and intimidation is a prerequisite for actually being able to access educational opportunities, career prospects, and public services.

This does not mean addressing every social problem through the lens of security policy. Poverty is not proof of criminality. Likewise, social disadvantage does not explain every extremist decision. What is needed is a policy that consistently prosecutes criminal behavior while simultaneously addressing the long-term conditions that give rise to problematic developments.

Economic policy research therefore advocates for integrated approaches comprising targeted law enforcement, prevention, rehabilitation, and reintegration. Neither pure repression nor exclusively social programs cover all relevant mechanisms.

The alternative between a functioning state and a socially just city is therefore wrongly framed. A high-performing welfare state requires a reliable rule of law. And a sustainable security policy requires more than police presence: it needs functioning schools, accessible support services, and realistic legal prospects.

Science needs open spaces

For knowledge-intensive cities, the freedom of exchange is an economic advantage. New ideas emerge through encounters, controversial discussions, and collaborations between diverse individuals. Intimidation can hinder these processes if it dictates who is allowed to speak, which events take place, or which collaborations are deemed personally risky.

It is important to note an important distinction. Not every protest against an event constitutes intimidation. Not every sharp criticism endangers academic freedom. Problems arise when threats, violence, or targeted personal harassment replace reasoned debate.

Developments in Berlin demonstrate that conflicts over antisemitism and the Middle East war can escalate significantly even within left-wing circles. Reports have surfaced of violent clashes at a youth center in Hellersdorf, as well as repeated threats against the owners of a pro-Israel restaurant in Neukölln. The differing accounts of individual participants could not always be independently verified.

This does not imply a mandate for politics and administration to prescribe a specific political opinion. Rather, their task is to safeguard the conditions for free debate. This is economically relevant because an attractive center of knowledge requires more than just buildings and funding. It needs people who can trust that they can pursue their professional and academic work without political threat.

Tourism thrives on resilient openness

Berlin's international appeal remains considerable. For 2025, 29.4 million overnight stays by approximately 12.4 million guests were recorded. Around 41 percent of these overnight stays were by visitors from abroad. These figures contradict the notion that the city has fundamentally lost its tourist appeal.

At the same time, the tourism industry is an area where security and public perception can be closely intertwined. Event organizers, business travelers, and tourists don't make decisions solely based on statistical risks. Organizational reliability, security concepts, and the anticipated social climate can also play a role. Research on the economic consequences of crime explicitly identifies tourism as a potential channel of impact.

However, this does not allow for a concrete conclusion about a loss of bookings as a result of the current political controversy. Separate data would be required for that. Likewise, it would be inadmissible to attribute every change in guest numbers to security problems. Economic conditions, flight connections, prices, and international events also influence demand.

The right perspective is preventative. Berlin should not only market its openness but also guarantee it in everyday life. This includes protecting events, providing clear contact persons for threat situations, and maintaining a credible stance against antisemitic and other forms of intimidation. Location marketing can make institutional reliability visible, but it cannot replace it.

Public budgets need priorities

Security policy shortcomings strain public budgets on several levels. They can necessitate additional police operations, criminal proceedings, protective measures, and administrative work. At the same time, these expenditures compete with other public tasks. International economic policy analyses therefore also address the consequences of crime as a question of efficient public resource allocation.

However, this does not mean that every additional expenditure is automatically worthwhile. The crucial factor is which measure actually reduces which problem. More staff without proper organization can be less effective than targeted improvements in data access, investigative support, or case management. Conversely, structural staff shortages cannot be arbitrarily compensated for through digitization.

The connection between the police and the judiciary is particularly important. If reports are filed, but proceedings remain without discernible progress for a long time, the deterrent effect can be weak. Therefore, for an economic evaluation, not only the resources used count, but also the result: Are victims protected, crimes solved, and criminal business models actually disrupted?

Prevention must meet the same standards. Its effectiveness should not be judged solely on the number of funded projects or events held. What is needed are comprehensible goals, appropriate benchmarks, and an honest evaluation of successes and failures. A government that provides verifiable justifications for its expenditures simultaneously strengthens confidence in its ability to act.

The rule of law requires precise standards to ensure its strictness

The demand for decisive action is only convincing when it is clear how success will be measured. In the fight against organized crime, for example, relevant factors would be the investigation of economic structures, the legally enforced confiscation of assets, and the protection of endangered witnesses. In the case of political violence, the prevention of further attacks and the reliable support of victims are additional considerations.

A high number of registered cases is not necessarily conclusive. It can indicate a worsening situation. However, it can also suggest that previously hidden crimes are being reported more frequently or prosecuted more intensively. Furthermore, Berlin's statistics on politically motivated crime are initial statistics, and their classifications can change based on subsequent findings.

Clearance rates must also be interpreted carefully. They are not conviction rates and, on their own, say little about how quickly a case is concluded or whether a harmed company can be financially compensated. A meaningful picture of the situation therefore requires several coordinated indicators.

The same applies to the feeling of security. It is politically relevant, but not identical to objective threat. A good government should examine both. If declining case numbers are accompanied by growing fear, it must understand the causes instead of dismissing the population as irrational. If risks are perceived as exaggerated, it should provide factual information. If concrete dangers are underestimated, it must act.

Governability requires verifiable limits

The Berlin Left Party won the state elections in September 2026 with 25.7 percent of the vote, becoming the strongest party. Eralp is aiming for a coalition government with the Greens and the SPD. This means the debate is not just an internal party dispute, but also touches upon the potential leadership of the state government.

Electoral success establishes political legitimacy. However, it does not automatically answer every question about organizational reliability. Anyone who wants to govern must demonstrate that internal party loyalties take a back seat to the independent application of the law. This applies to the Left Party just as much as to any other party.

In practical terms, this means a clear separation between legitimate advocacy and problematic influence. Dialogue with societal groups is an integral part of democratic politics. However, it must not lead to extremist positions being tolerated for tactical reasons or concrete suspicions being downplayed. Likewise, the blanket rejection of a population group must not replace careful examination.

For Eralp, the political test therefore does not consist of appearing fearless in public. It consists of representing credible rules and enabling their application within one's own sphere. This includes the willingness to accept protection without creating political dependency. It also includes answering critical questions, insofar as this can be done without jeopardizing personal safety.

The decisive criterion is independence

The current controversy presents different possible developments. In the worst-case scenario, contradictory explanations will persist, problematic contacts will be addressed solely through communication, and the underlying organizational weaknesses will remain untouched. This could reinforce the impression that political considerations are more important than comprehensible rules.

A more favorable outcome would be a thorough institutional investigation. The politician in question would receive appropriate protection, potential threats would be independently investigated, and the party would effectively enforce its boundaries against glorification of terrorism and criminal influence. Such a response could strengthen trust, rather than merely limiting short-term reputational damage.

The decisive factor here is the line of reasoning. A politician's fear does not automatically mean she is unfit for office. However, distancing herself from the situation does not mean the problem is solved. Both must be assessed based on subsequent behavior and verifiable decisions.

The economically grounded perspective is therefore neither a blanket condemnation nor a placating defense. Berlin needs a government that treats individual security, open markets, and democratic freedom as interconnected responsibilities. Political power remains legitimate and economically productive only if it does not depend on the ability of specific social groups to exert pressure. The decisive indicator of governability is not the volume of a security promise, but the demonstrable independence of its implementation.