
An extra 300 euros per month for every household? This calculation shows what Germany would have to give up for that – a creative image on the topic, created with AI: Xpert.Digital
148 billion euros per year: What a 300-euro household allowance would really cost
Germany could provide relief to households – but a 300-euro plan would come at a price
An extra €300 per month could significantly improve the financial situation of many households. However, such a payment to all private households would be no small relief package: with approximately 41.1 million households, the annual costs would amount to around €148 billion – and that's without even considering additional administrative expenses. Development aid, NGO funding, and a few controversial subsidies alone could by no means cover this sum. What savings would actually be possible? Who would have to forgo benefits or discounts – and what form of relief would most effectively improve people's living standards? A detailed calculation shows why implementing €300 per month would require fundamental decisions about spending, taxes, and government responsibilities.
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Those who want to distribute wealth must cut more than just a few subsidized projects
A permanent tax relief payment of €300 net per month for every household living in Germany is, in principle, possible. However, it would not be a small-scale austerity program that could be financed on the side by reducing development aid, cutting NGO funding, and foregoing individual controversial subsidies. With approximately 41.1 million private households with their primary residence in Germany, such a measure would cost roughly €148 billion annually. This figure does not even include additional administrative costs. This represents a fiscal policy magnitude that necessitates fundamental decisions regarding the responsibilities, services, and financing of the state.
This highlights the crucial distinction: Germany could provide its residents with more disposable income. However, a flat-rate payment of €300 per household per month is quite different from average relief through lower taxes, reduced energy costs, more affordable housing, or more efficient public services. Both approaches can boost purchasing power, but they differ significantly in terms of their costs, social impact, and economic consequences.
Equally important is a second clarification: Inefficient expenditures should be discontinued regardless of whether they subsequently finance a relief program. However, the fact that a particular project has little impact does not justify the assumption that €148 billion can be freed up annually in the overall state budget without major drawbacks.
A viable answer must therefore address three questions: How expensive would the relief actually be? Which expenditures could be eliminated without triggering similarly high burdens elsewhere? And which model would most effectively improve people's living standards?
A manageable monthly amount becomes a fundamental household decision
€300 per month equates to €3,600 per year. Multiplied by 41.1 million households, this results in a calculated annual requirement of €147.96 billion. Therefore, €148 billion is a reasonable rounded figure. This household figure refers to private households with their primary residence in 2025; the actual costs of a program introduced later would depend on the number of eligible households at that time.
This scale can be illustrated by the federal budget. For 2026, approximately €524.5 billion is available in the core budget. A budget fund of €148 billion annually, financed solely by the federal government, would thus correspond to roughly 28 percent of its current total expenditures. If this were introduced without offsetting funding, the federal government would theoretically have to increase its budget by more than a quarter.
The project is also significant in relation to tax revenues. With federal tax revenues projected at around €387 billion for 2026, the financing requirement would amount to approximately 38 percent of this revenue. This is not proof that the measure is impossible. However, it does show that it could not be financed through ordinary budget adjustments.
The federal budget should not be confused with the entire German state. States, municipalities, and social security institutions also have revenues and expenditures. However, this does not create a freely accessible common pool of funds. A savings measure at a municipality does not automatically finance a federal service. Relief in social security contributions cannot be permanently funded from a budget whose resources are already earmarked for other statutory responsibilities.
The cost comparison with the federal government therefore serves to provide context, not to assert that only the federal government could act. A nationwide model would have to define from the outset which level of government pays, what revenues it retains in return, and how potential revenue shortfalls at other levels would be compensated.
First, it must be determined who is to receive the 300 euros
The phrase "for citizens and families living in Germany" allows for several different models. A benefit for all households permanently residing in Germany would have a different group of recipients than a benefit exclusively for households of German citizens. A family allowance, in turn, would be different from a household allowance, because not every household is a family, and not every family constitutes exactly one household.
For a comprehensible initial calculation, a residence-based model is clearest: Every eligible private household with its primary residence in Germany receives €300 per month. The calculation of approximately €148 billion refers to this broad scenario. It is not a reliable cost estimate for a benefit exclusively for German citizens.
A narrower definition would raise additional questions. How would households with different nationalities be treated? Would a German citizen with a foreign spouse receive the full amount? What about children, separated parents, or temporary stays abroad? Such regulations would not only require administrative solutions but also legal review.
Furthermore, the term "household" determines the distribution. A single person would receive the same amount as a family of five. This would amount to €300 per person for a single person, but €60 per person per month for a household of five. While larger households can share certain costs, a uniform household amount would not automatically constitute family-friendly support.
This point already demonstrates that a politically appealing promise of relief contains distributional decisions that cannot be resolved by its simple formulation.
A true net relief is more than just a transfer
An additional payment will only improve someone's financial situation by the full €300 if it isn't offset by other benefits. If it were taxed or deducted from other payments, some recipients would end up with less. Similarly, if fees, contributions, or excise taxes were increased at the same time, the actual relief could be significantly reduced.
For a guaranteed net income model, it would therefore have to be stipulated that the payment itself is not taxed and that existing income-related benefits are not reduced accordingly. Otherwise, a household could formally receive 300 euros, but in reality only spend a portion of that amount.
Conversely, waiving all offsetting is not fiscally cost-effective. Especially for households whose basic living expenses are already partially state-funded, the household allowance would then constitute an additional benefit. Those who wish to replace existing payments, on the other hand, must disclose which households would gain less than €300 or potentially not benefit at all.
Even tax relief doesn't automatically benefit everyone. Those who pay little or no income tax can hardly be relieved by a mere reduction in this tax. A uniform net improvement then requires a cashable credit or a supplementary transfer.
The distinction between payout, tax savings, and actual increase in purchasing power is therefore not a technical detail. It determines whether the political promise applies to everyone or only to certain groups.
Development aid alone only finances a small part
The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development will have approximately €10.06 billion at its disposal in 2026. This corresponds to about 1.92 percent of the federal budget. If this entire budget were theoretically distributed among 41.1 million households, it would amount to roughly €20 per household per month.
Even the complete abolition of this ministry budget would therefore only cover just under seven percent of the funding requirement of a general budget allowance of 300 euros. This would leave an annual shortfall of approximately 138 billion euros.
This calculation does not yet assess which development projects are worthwhile and which are not. It merely illustrates the relative sizes of the projects. Those who consider development spending too high may derive a political demand for cuts from this. However, it does not follow that these cuts could finance a comprehensive domestic relief program.
Furthermore, even the aforementioned ten billion euros would not necessarily be immediately available in full. Ongoing contracts, international commitments, existing project obligations, and organizational follow-up costs would have to be reviewed. A purely theoretical reduction in the budget is not the same as a savings amount that can be achieved in the short and long term.
A systematic review of impact, strategic importance, and alternatives would therefore be more economically sensible than a blanket abolition. Projects without demonstrable benefit should be able to be terminated. Measures with proven impact, on the other hand, should not have to be justified simply because they take place outside of Germany.
Why the entire development statistics are not a freely available foreign budget
Germany's public development aid exceeds the budget of the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. Preliminary calculations indicate it will amount to approximately €26 billion in 2025. However, this figure includes not only payments from this ministry, nor solely funds flowing abroad.
Around €4.3 billion was spent in 2025 on the care and accommodation of refugees in Germany. According to international statistical rules, these costs are partially recorded as development aid in the first year after arrival. This figure also includes, among other things, Germany's share of the European Union's development cooperation and certain costs for university places in Germany. For example, around €2.2 billion was allocated for students from developing countries in 2025.
Anyone who treats the entire development statistics as a superfluous foreign transfer would therefore be conflating different issues. Changing the statistical classification does not reduce actual accommodation costs. Eliminating a calculated cost per university place does not automatically create an equivalent surplus.
Even if the approximately 26 billion euros were treated entirely as a distributable amount, this would only result in about 53 euros per household per month. Even this deliberately simplified calculation of the upper limit would still fall far short of 300 euros.
Furthermore, there is a significant risk of double counting: the development budget is already included in the total development aid. These two amounts must not be added together. Similarly, payments to non-governmental organizations may already be included in these sums. Therefore, a sound assessment of offsetting aid must track individual payment flows instead of simply adding up broad political slogans.
Development policy should neither be given a free pass nor dismissed outright
Development spending can be justified for various reasons: humanitarian goals, healthcare, economic cooperation, stabilization, or supporting functioning state institutions. These goals are not identical, and their results cannot be evaluated using a single metric.
For the economic evaluation, the crucial question is whether a specific program generates additional impact. Does it permanently lift people out of poverty? Does the water supply actually improve? Do the financed facilities still function after several years? Does the project create sustainable economic structures or only temporary employment?
Equally important are the potential drawbacks. Subsidies can weaken local responsibility, stabilize existing power structures, or create dependencies. Therefore, more money invested does not necessarily mean more development.
This leads to a consistent, yet nuanced position: Development cooperation should not be judged by the amount of money spent, but by verifiable results and understandable interests. Bad projects should be terminated, even if they are well-intentioned. Good projects do not become bad simply because some of their benefits are realized outside of Germany.
However, the same limit remains in place for financing the €300 idea. Even a very strict reform of this area could only make a limited contribution. It does not replace decisions on the significantly larger budget items.
Even the definition of NGO expenditures is lacking in a uniform way
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) do not constitute a clearly defined area of government spending. The term is not uniformly defined in law. Consequently, federal spending is not consistently recorded according to a common NGO category. While a 2026 overview contains extensive information on funding recipients and funding, it explicitly points out the differing definitions used by various government departments.
Therefore, it is impossible to specify a reliable, fixed sum in the billions that would be guaranteed to become available through the elimination of "NGO funding." First, it would be necessary to clarify which organizations are meant and what services they provide.
Several types of funding must be distinguished. Institutional funding supports ongoing structures. Project funding finances a specific activity. Payment for a specific service rendered may, in turn, relate to a task that would have to be organized differently without the non-governmental organization.
For example, if a genuinely needed counseling, support, or assistance service is no longer provided by a non-profit organization, the need for it does not necessarily disappear. The state might be forced to create a replacement. The gross savings would then be higher than the actual net relief for the budget.
The situation is different for projects without demonstrable public benefit, unnecessary parallel structures, or permanently subsidized activities whose benefits are not plausibly proven. Such expenditures should be scrutinized. However, the decisive criterion should be the funded task, not merely the recipient's name.
Transparency must link payments and results
Effective reform of NGO funding and other grants begins with a complete and comparable data foundation. For each program, the funding objective, recipients, duration, payments, administrative costs, and verifiable results should be compiled.
A cross-organizational perspective would be particularly important. A recipient can receive funding from multiple departments, different levels of government, or European programs. Without consolidating this information, it is difficult to determine whether the same activity is being funded multiple times or whether different tasks are actually involved.
It is equally insufficient to simply document expenditures and events held. A high number of workshops does not prove social or economic benefit. What matters is what has changed as a result and whether a less expensive alternative would have achieved the same effect.
However, this does not mean that every impact must be immediately measurable in euros. Some services have a longer-term or difficult-to-quantify benefit. Even in these cases, objectives, plausibility, target groups, and results can be examined.
Such a reform could reduce unnecessary spending and strengthen confidence. However, a reliable savings figure will only emerge after the review. Anyone who has already factored in a large financial contribution beforehand is simply replacing a budget calculation with an expectation.
Subsidies involve more money – but not automatically more waste
The federal government's subsidy report indicates a planned volume of €77.8 billion for 2026. Of this, €59.5 billion is allocated to financial aid and approximately €18.3 billion to federal tax breaks. These figures are based on the government draft adopted in summer 2025 and should therefore be understood as projected figures at that time, not as final expenditures.
This scale makes subsidies a key area for reform. However, it is not a list of ineffective expenditures. It includes, among other things, aid for energy, buildings, housing, microelectronics, and hydrogen projects. A significant portion of the increase compared to previous years is also related to the initial inclusion of the financing requirements for the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG).
Anyone wanting to eliminate all subsidies would therefore not only have to end business support. They would also have to decide how previously subsidized activities would be financed in the future and what burdens would be placed on businesses and private households.
In purely mathematical terms, 77.8 billion euros would equate to approximately 158 euros per household per month. Even a complete elimination of the recorded subsidy volume would therefore only finance slightly more than half of the 300 euros. At the same time, this calculation is far too simplistic economically, as it fails to consider potential revenue shortfalls, follow-up costs, transitional obligations, and increased private spending.
Nevertheless, the potential for reform is considerable. Precisely because subsidies specifically favor individual activities or sectors, they should be justified in a particularly convincing manner.
The crucial question is: What would have happened without the funding?
A subsidy is particularly problematic from an economic perspective when it pays for behavior that would have occurred even without government support. This creates a windfall effect: the government spends money without achieving a corresponding additional impact.
In addition, there are subsidies that do trigger additional investments, but at an unreasonably high price. A project can indeed create new jobs and still be a poor use of public funds if the same employment effect could be achieved much more cheaply in another way.
Conversely, government support can be beneficial when private investors fail to adequately consider societal benefits. Research, essential infrastructure, or new technological processes can be such cases. Even then, however, it is crucial to assess whether the chosen instrument is both necessary and effective.
A reliable assessment would therefore need to include comparative scenarios. What happens without subsidies? What additional private investments are made? How long do the benefits last? What side effects arise for competitors, consumers, and suppliers?
Large industrial policy programs face an additional risk: the government may be wrong about technology, demand, or location advantages. Therefore, funding should not be justified solely by strategic slogans. It requires measurable interim goals, verifiable conditions, and the possibility of termination in the event of persistent failure.
Reducing subsidies can both relieve and burden the same budget
A household allowance would increase private income. However, if certain benefits are cut to finance it, some recipients will have to bear part of the cost themselves.
This is not inherently contradictory. A reform package can deliberately place a heavier burden on high incomes or particularly privileged groups while providing relief to others. However, it must not then be described as a uniform increase of 300 euros for every household.
This is particularly evident with energy and mobility subsidies. If government aid or tax benefits are reduced, prices or individual tax burdens can change. A household might then receive the new payment but simultaneously lose previous benefits.
Frequently cited totals should also be treated with caution. The well-known estimate of €65.4 billion in environmentally harmful subsidies refers to the year 2018 and uses a different definition than the federal government's subsidy report. It is neither a current cash reserve nor readily available in addition to the overall subsidy volume. Furthermore, some of the subsidies included are those whose elimination would not have the same immediate impact on the budget.
For a truly honest tax relief program, it would therefore be necessary to present more than just the government's revenue and expenditure statements. A distribution analysis would also be required: Which household types will actually benefit, and how much, after all the changes?
Reliable counter-financing requires realistic figures
Since there is no verified catalog of immediately available savings of €148 billion, only scenarios can be reliably formulated at this stage. These are political calculation models, not forecasts and not based on already proven budget reserves.
A permanently cleared budget of ten billion euros would theoretically provide around 20 euros per month for 41.1 million households. 25 billion euros would correspond to approximately 51 euros. At 50 billion euros, it would be around 101 euros, and at 75 billion euros, approximately 152 euros.
These proportions are politically revealing. Even a very ambitious savings program of 50 billion euros would only finance roughly a third of the targeted amount. The remaining almost 100 billion euros would require additional cuts, higher revenues, or a restriction of the beneficiary group.
If a program were to cover only ten million households, €300 per month would cost €36 billion annually. For 15 million households, it would cost €54 billion, and for 20 million households, €72 billion.
This means that one of the most powerful levers lies not in a single spending category, but in the precision of targeting. Whether all households receive the same amount or whether support is concentrated on a segment of the population changes the financing requirements more significantly than many individually discussed cuts.
A general budget would require deep interventions in major spending categories
If an annual relief volume of 148 billion euros is to be financed primarily from existing expenditures, there is hardly any way around addressing the major areas of government responsibility.
In the federal budget, labor and social affairs is by far the largest departmental area. For 2026, this budget amounts to approximately 197 billion euros. Even a simple comparison shows that a general 300-euro allowance would be on a scale approaching that of central social welfare funding structures.
This does not mean that this area should be cut across the board. Rather, it means that savings of this magnitude would hardly be found solely in small funding programs. They would likely affect services, grants, public employment, investments, or other extensive responsibilities.
The shift in financing is particularly important for social security systems. A lower federal subsidy can relieve the federal budget, but at the same time trigger higher contribution pressures. For employees and employers, some of the supposed relief would then be lost again.
The situation is similar with infrastructure. Postponing maintenance work creates short-term flexibility. However, in the long run, this can lead to higher repair costs, more breakdowns, and economic losses. A relief program that distributes money today while weakening the country's economic capacity would not result in lasting prosperity.
Why new debt only postpones financing
Financing through additional loans would initially mitigate the necessary distributional conflicts. The state could make payments without immediately resorting to corresponding cuts or tax increases. However, it would have to finance a permanently recurring benefit with additional debt.
Assuming an unchanged annual budget of €148 billion, this would result in an additional €1.48 trillion in borrowing over ten years, not including interest payments and without any changes to the budget. This would not be a limited bridging measure, but rather a structural shift of financing into the future.
Furthermore, there are legal limits. The debt rule generally restricts the federal government's regular structural borrowing to 0.35 percent of nominal gross domestic product. Since the 2025 reform, additional leeway exists for certain defense and security-related expenditures. However, a general budget allowance does not fall under these exceptions simply because its financing is politically desirable.
Economically, a distinction should also be made between time-limited crisis aid and a permanent standard benefit. A temporary transfer can cushion an exceptional income shock. A permanently recurring payment, on the other hand, requires financing that is sustainable even without constantly increasing new debt.
Debt can change the timing of the burden. However, it does not automatically create additional real goods, housing, energy, or productive capacity.
Growth helps, but it doesn't replace counter-financing
Higher disposable income can support consumption. Some of the additional spending would flow back to the state through taxes and economic activity. However, this does not mean that a household budget is largely self-financing.
Part of the payment would be saved, part used to reduce debt, and another part spent on imported goods. Furthermore, previously financed government spending also has economic effects. If it is cut, demand will be lost elsewhere.
The composition of the entire package is therefore crucial. Ending ineffective spending and reducing high burdens on productive activity can improve economic performance. Conversely, cutting public investment and effective services to finance higher current consumption can have an adverse long-term effect.
Particular caution is advised regarding expected growth dividends. Future additional income is uncertain and should not be fully earmarked for sustained payments from the outset.
A sound reform would therefore initially be based on conservative assumptions. Additional revenue from improved economic performance could later enable further tax relief or stabilize public finances.
More money doesn't solve every bottleneck – and can even increase some prices
Whether additional purchasing power improves living standards also depends on how flexibly supply reacts. If companies can produce more and expand services, higher demand can trigger additional economic activity.
The effect is different when supply is tight. Where housing, construction capacity, or certain services are limited, increased purchasing power can sometimes lead to higher prices. This doesn't mean that every transfer payment necessarily causes an equally large price increase. However, it illustrates why income and supply must be considered together.
For a tenant facing financial hardship, a monthly subsidy can be very helpful in the short term. However, permanently more affordable housing also requires more suitable living space, functioning infrastructure, and economically viable construction and management conditions.
The same applies to energy. Government subsidies can cushion the impact of higher costs. However, permanently lower system costs do not arise solely from a different distribution of the bill, but from efficient provision and financing.
A convincing relief policy should therefore differentiate between situations where households lack funds and where fundamental supply-side problems exist. Otherwise, the state will permanently finance the consequences of shortages without addressing their root causes.
Accuracy reduces costs, but raises new borderline issues
Focusing on low and middle incomes would significantly reduce the need for funding. With the same budget, it could make a greater contribution to the financial stability of particularly burdened households.
However, this raises the question of how the subsidy should be phased out as income increases. A hard cutoff could lead to unfair jumps in the benefit payments. Those earning just below the threshold would receive the full benefit, while those earning slightly more might lose a significant amount.
A gradual phase-out avoids such abrupt changes, but increases the effective burden of additional income during the phase-out period. Part of the higher earnings would be offset by the reduction in support. This can negatively impact work incentives.
A good model would therefore have to take taxes, social security contributions, and existing benefits into account together. Viewed in isolation, each individual rule might seem plausible. However, together they can lead to a surprisingly small amount remaining from an additional gross income.
Precision does not automatically equate to simplicity. Nevertheless, it is crucial for affordability. A limited state budget can either distribute the same sum broadly or concentrate it where it will have the greatest noticeable impact.
Tax relief and transfers should complement each other
For employed individuals, a lower tax burden on earned income can be attractive because it not only enables consumption but can also make additional work more worthwhile. However, a general income tax cut only has a limited impact on households with low tax payments.
An integrated model could therefore include a tax credit that can be paid out. Those who pay enough taxes will receive a tax credit via their tax bill. Those who pay less will receive a supplementary payment.
A reduction in social security contributions would also be conceivable. However, it would have to be reliably financed if insurance benefits are to be maintained. Simply shifting the contribution burden to a higher federal subsidy will not reduce overall government costs.
For families, the number and age of children could also be taken into account. This would be more needs-based than a fixed amount per household, but would make the system more differentiated.
The central design challenge lies in avoiding the attempt to solve different life situations with a single instrument. Employment incentives, poverty prevention, family support, and mitigating high housing costs are interconnected, but not identical objectives.
Reducing bureaucracy strengthens the economy, but it is not an immediate cash injection fund
Less bureaucracy can relieve the burden on businesses and citizens without the government having to pay out a corresponding amount of money. Simpler procedures save time, facilitate investment, and can improve economic activity.
However, these advantages cannot be fully attributed to freed-up budget funds. If a company requires fewer hours for documentation, this represents a real economic gain. However, the federal budget does not automatically receive the same amount as additional revenue.
Even within public administration, savings often only materialize after a transition period. Digital processes need to be developed, data sets consolidated, and responsibilities adjusted. New software offers little in the way of savings if old processes continue unchanged.
Therefore, lasting relief requires organizational changes. Not only forms, but also superfluous checks, duplicate responsibilities, and tasks that are no longer necessary must be eliminated.
Reducing bureaucracy is therefore an important component of a productivity-oriented tax relief policy. However, it would be unsuitable as a blanket offsetting measure for an immediately launched multi-billion-euro program as long as concrete savings and timelines are lacking.
A credible program needs a binding expenditure check
A sensible starting point would not be an arbitrary cut rate for each ministry. A flat-rate deduction treats effective and ineffective expenditures equally. It could disproportionately affect areas where funds are used most productively.
A systematic review of tasks and expenditures would be better. Every grant should have a comprehensible objective, a limited review period, and a sound justification for its continuation.
Programs with unclear objectives, overlapping responsibilities, high administrative costs, and weak performance monitoring deserve particular attention. Tax breaks should also be reviewed regularly. Forgoing revenue is also a form of political favoritism and not inherently a less complex form of government support that requires explanation.
A distinction must be made between immediately available savings and long-term reform effects. Expiring funding can free up resources relatively quickly. A comprehensive reorganization of a social benefit or administrative structure, on the other hand, requires preparation.
Only once the legal feasibility, availability in terms of time, and subsequent costs have been clarified should any savings be considered a fixed form of offsetting financing. This discipline prevents basing long-term benefits on non-binding hopes.
The more realistic approach combines targeted assistance with lower living costs
A more economically viable alternative to a universal household allowance would be a multi-stage relief program.
Initially, financial leeway could be created from demonstrably ineffective subsidies, unnecessary tax breaks, and genuine efficiency improvements. These funds should only be distributed when they are actually available.
Part of the funds could then be used to provide targeted relief for low and middle-income earners. Another part could be used to reduce the burden of additional work. In addition, measures that make housing, energy, mobility, and public services structurally more affordable or efficient would be beneficial.
Such an approach would not guarantee the same amount to every household. However, it could achieve a significantly better impact per euro spent for particularly disadvantaged groups.
Communication should remain honest. Tax savings, lower contributions, a cheaper electricity tariff, and avoided fee increases are all different forms of relief. They should not be arbitrarily added together and presented as an identical, guaranteed net payment.
Success would be measured by how available income, actual cost of living, work incentives, and government capacity develop together.
Germany can provide relief – but not without making decisions about winners and losers
A permanent tax relief of €300 per month for every private household would require a fiscal policy overhaul with an annual volume of approximately €148 billion. It is mathematically feasible, but not as a cost-cutting program without consequences.
Development aid alone is far from sufficient. Without precise definitions and individual assessments, reliable, general savings figures for NGO funding are lacking. There is significantly greater potential for reform in the area of subsidies, but even there, not all funds are ineffective, nor are all cuts possible without additional burdens on households and the economy.
The logical conclusion, therefore, is not that relief is impossible. It is that its financing must be as concrete as its promise. Anyone announcing €300 for everyone must specify which services will be eliminated, which benefits will disappear, who will be burdened as a result, and when the funds will actually be available.
Targeted relief for a smaller group of recipients is considerably easier to finance. It becomes even more sustainable when combined with higher economic performance and lower structural costs.
The decisive factor is not how much money the state visibly transfers. What matters is how much prosperity people retain in the long term after taxes, contributions, prices, and necessary expenditures. For this to happen, ineffective spending must actually be eliminated. At the same time, however, it must be ensured that short-term relief is not negated by deteriorating infrastructure, higher contributions, or new burdens elsewhere.

