Google's advertising monopoly in court: The end of the advertising monopoly? Why Google now faces being broken up.

“Goldman Sachs and the stock market at the same time”: How Google manipulated the advertising market

In November 2025, the entire digital economy will be looking to Alexandria, Virginia. There, in the courtroom of Federal Judge Leonie Brinkema, the decisive act will take place in one of the most significant economic trials in modern history. It's no longer just about fines or reprimands—it's about the very existence of Google's advertising monopoly. After the US Department of Justice had already established that the tech giant maintained illegal monopolies in the areas of ad servers and ad exchanges, the crucial question now looms: How can a market be repaired that has been systematically distorted for over a decade?

The evidence is overwhelming. With a market share of over 90 percent in publisher ad servers, Google practically controls the infrastructure on which the free internet is financed. The Justice Department paints a picture of a corporation that has infiltrated every level of commerce like an octopus: Google represents advertisers and publishers while simultaneously operating the marketplace in between – a concentration of power that has been aptly compared internally to "Goldman Sachs simultaneously owning the New York Stock Exchange."

But as the court deliberates on a possible breakup of the advertising empire and the forced sale of its cash cow, AdX, a legal dilemma is revealed: Time is working against justice. Judge Brinkema knows that Google will delay any ruling through years of appeals, while the affected publishers and the competition continue to bleed dry. This article examines the deep-seated mechanisms of market manipulation, the judiciary's desperate search for effective sanctions, and the question of whether this ruling can save the open internet as we know it—or whether technological reality has already overtaken the justice system.

When judges want to break up the data giant – but time is running out for everyone.

The United States is at a crossroads in one of the most significant antitrust battles of the modern digital economy. In November 2025, Federal Judge Leonie Brinkema is hearing a case in Alexandria, Virginia, concerning the fate of Google's advertising technology business. The courts have already ruled that the company operates two illegal monopolies. Now the question is how to rectify this injustice without years of Google appealing every decision. The Justice Department is demanding a radical breakup of the advertising empire, while Google maintains that legally acquired monopoly power is the foundation of the American economy. A judge must decide between these extreme positions, and she openly admits that time is running out. Because while the courts deliberate, Google's dominance continues to solidify, and the affected publishers and advertisers are paying the daily price for a distorted market.

The cartel in antitrust law

The economic dimension of this case surpasses all previous technology trials. According to the court's findings, Google controlled between 91 and 93.5 percent of the global market for publisher ad servers between 2018 and 2022. Its market share in the ad exchange AdX was roughly nine times higher than that of its next largest competitor. These figures are not abstract statistics, but rather reflect a systematic diversion of advertising revenue that should rightfully belong to publishers and content producers. The Department of Justice estimates the annual damages at over $20 billion. Google charges publishers a 20 percent fee for using AdX, while competing platforms charge less than half that. The fact that publishers are not switching to cheaper alternatives despite this price difference is, for economists, the clearest evidence of monopoly power.

The roots of this dominance reach back to 2008, when Google acquired the advertising technology provider DoubleClick for $3.1 billion. This acquisition, which was pushed through against fierce resistance from Microsoft at the time, proved to be a strategic coup in retrospect. DoubleClick had already developed a crucial competitive advantage: dynamic allocation, which allowed the platform to compete in real time against ad space sold directly by publishers. Google seamlessly integrated this technology into its existing business model and systematically began to control the three central pillars of the digital advertising infrastructure: the advertiser side, the publisher side, and the intermediary exchange where transactions are processed.

This vertical integration has been described internally by Google itself using the analogy of Goldman Sachs simultaneously owning the New York Stock Exchange. The conflict of interest is obvious. Google operates tools that publishers use to sell advertising space, controls the stock exchange where these transactions take place, and has enormous demand from advertisers. In a functioning market, independent players would assume these roles and regulate each other. At Google, all functions are consolidated, allowing the corporation to collect fees at every stage of the value chain while simultaneously shaping the market rules to its advantage.

The mechanisms of market distortion

The court documented in detail how Google abused its market power. One of the key anti-competitive practices was the bundling of DoubleClick for Publishers (DFP), the ad server for publishers, with AdX, Google's ad exchange. Publishers who wanted access to real-time bidding via AdX were effectively forced to also use DFP. This technical and contractual linkage prevented competitors from gaining a foothold in the ad server market, even if they offered better or cheaper services.

In addition, Google implemented a number of mechanisms that systematically favored AdX. The First Look feature gave AdX the right to purchase every ad placement before competing exchanges even had a chance to bid. Last Look allowed AdX to view the bids of competing exchanges and subsequently outbid them, even if the original bid was lower. These practices were not the result of superior technology or better services, but rather an expression of raw market power.

When publishers attempted to circumvent this dominance in the 2010s through header bidding, a technology that allows multiple exchanges to bid on ad space simultaneously, Google did not respond by participating in fair competition. Instead, it introduced new mechanisms that further cemented AdX's advantage. The Unified Pricing Rule, for example, prevented publishers from setting higher minimum prices for competing exchanges. While this measure may appear market-neutral at first glance, it actually served to protect AdX's structural advantages.

Global advertising flows in the digital age

To understand the significance of these market distortions, one must consider the scale of the global digital advertising market. In 2024, worldwide spending on digital advertising amounted to approximately US$600 billion. This figure is projected to reach US$650 billion by 2025, with an expected growth of US$1.48 trillion by 2034. These figures represent an annual growth rate of approximately 9.5 percent. North America is the largest single market, accounting for over 37 percent of the market, followed by Europe and Asia-Pacific.

Google dominates this market with impressive efficiency. In the third quarter of 2025, the company generated $74.18 billion in advertising revenue, a 13 percent increase year-over-year. Search advertising alone accounted for $56.57 billion, while YouTube contributed another $10.3 billion. These figures illustrate that Google's advertising business occupies a prominent position not only in absolute terms but also relative to other technology companies. For comparison, Meta, the second-largest player, has a market share of approximately 18 percent, and Amazon seven percent. According to various estimates, Google alone controls between 39 and 40 percent of the entire global digital advertising market.

This concentration has far-reaching consequences for how digital markets function. Advertising technology is not a neutral infrastructure, but an actively controlled ecosystem in which every millisecond, every data point, and every auction decision is controlled by algorithms developed and operated by Google. Publishers report that, despite being aware of the unfavorable conditions, they feel they have no choice but to use Google's services. This dependency is characteristic of markets with network effects, where the value of a platform increases exponentially with the number of its users.

The legal pincer movement

The legal basis for the action against Google is Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, the fundamental competition law of the United States. This section prohibits monopolization and attempts to monopolize. Crucially, it is not the possession of monopoly power per se that is illegal, but rather the deliberate acquisition or maintenance of such power through anti-competitive means. A company that achieves dominance through superior products, business acumen, or historical chance does not violate antitrust law. However, a company that secures its position by systematically hindering competitors and manipulating markets crosses the line into illegality.

In her April 2025 ruling, Judge Brinkema found that Google fulfilled both elements of monopolization: first, the possession of monopoly power in the markets for publisher ad servers and ad exchanges, and second, the deliberate maintenance of this power through anticompetitive behavior. The court specifically deemed the bundling of DFP and AdX a violation of antitrust law. This practice forced customers to purchase two separate products together, even though they might have only wanted one, and prevented competitors from competing on the basis of their respective services.

However, establishing an illegal monopoly is only the first step. The real challenge lies in developing effective remedies. The Department of Justice is calling for a structural separation, specifically the forced sale of AdX and potentially also the Google Ad Manager ad server. The argument is that only a physical separation of the business units can prevent Google from finding new ways to maintain its dominance. The fear is that behavior-based regulations would merely force Google to adapt its strategies without addressing the fundamental conflicts of interest.

Google defends itself by arguing that a breakup would be technically complex, economically damaging, and legally disproportionate. The company's lawyers point to the 2004 Supreme Court precedent that established lawfully acquired monopoly power as the foundation of the American economy. Furthermore, Google argues that a forced split would impair the quality of services, stifle innovation, and ultimately harm customers. The transition to a fragmented system would force publishers and advertisers to undertake complex new integrations with uncertain prospects of success.

Industry focus: B2B, digitalization (from AI to XR), mechanical engineering, logistics, renewable energies and industry

More about it here:

• Xpert Business Hub

A topic hub with insights and expertise:

• Knowledge platform on the global and regional economy, innovation and industry-specific trends
• Collection of analyses, impulses and background information from our focus areas
• A place for expertise and information on current developments in business and technology
• Topic hub for companies that want to learn about markets, digitalization and industry innovations

The time problem of the justice system

During her closing arguments in November 2025, Judge Brinkema raised a concern that reveals the core of the antitrust enforcement dilemma in the digital age: Time is working against justice. Google will almost certainly appeal any unfavorable ruling, a process that can drag on for years. During this time, the company finds itself in an impossible position, as the judge noted. On the one hand, it has already lost and faces penalties. On the other hand, it will continue to operate, and any breakup order is subject to the caveat that it may not be enforceable during the appeals process.

This situation is paradoxical. The court has ruled that Google operates illegal monopolies that harm publishers, advertisers, and ultimately consumers. However, years can pass between the verdict and the actual rectification of the damage. During this time, new lawsuits arise from publishers and competitors demanding compensation and basing their claims on the ruling. Google's legal position is becoming increasingly precarious, while at the same time the prospect of rapid change is dwindling.

The judge is therefore considering whether conduct-based conditions might be the more practical approach. Such measures could be implemented more quickly and would not be subject to the same legal hurdles as a structural breakup. Google could, for example, be required to grant competing exchanges equal access, make auction data transparent, or unlink DFP and AdX. These solutions would not bring about the same fundamental transformation of the market as a breakup, but could at least enable competition in the short term.

However, experience with conduct-based orders in previous antitrust cases is sobering. Following the landmark antitrust case of the 1990s, Microsoft was ordered to implement various behavioral changes without being broken up. In retrospect, many observers judge that while these orders had a short-term effect, they did not ultimately break Microsoft's dominance in certain areas. Technology companies are notoriously adept at demonstrating formal compliance with the letter of court rulings while mentally devising new ways to consolidate their market position.

The political dimension of the case

The antitrust dispute with Google is taking place in a politically charged environment. The case began during President Donald Trump's first term, was pushed forward under President Joe Biden, and now, with Trump's return to office, is nearing a decision. This bipartisan continuity is remarkable and demonstrates that skepticism toward the power of large technology companies unites both political camps.

However, the ideological justifications differ significantly. Progressive critics see the dominance of Big Tech as a threat to economic justice and democratic public discourse. They argue that the concentration of data, money, and attention in the hands of a few corporations jeopardizes media diversity, harms small businesses, and weakens the bargaining power of consumers and workers. Conservative critics, on the other hand, emphasize national security and American competitiveness. They fear that regulatory overzealousness stifles innovation and harms the US in the global technology race, particularly with regard to China.

This tension became evident during Gail Slater's tenure as Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust. Slater, confirmed in March 2025, championed an approach dubbed "America First Antitrust." She argued that rigorous antitrust enforcement is not contrary to the national interest, but rather necessary to foster innovation. Her argument was that historically, open markets and intense competition, not monopolies, have been the driving force behind American technological leadership. The semiconductor industry, the internet, and smartphones, she asserted, did not emerge from the laboratories of dominant monopolists, but from highly competitive ecosystems where numerous companies vied for the best solutions.

At the same time, Slater warns against adopting the Chinese model, in which state-funded champions drive technological development. While such a system might enable short-term efficiency gains, it would stifle innovation in the long run. The debate surrounding Google is therefore also a debate about the proper balance between market and state, competition and national strategy, and freedom and control in the digital economy.

Comparison with parallel methods

Google is not alone in facing antitrust challenges. In recent years, the US Department of Justice has initiated a series of proceedings against major technology companies, which, taken together, could signal a fundamental reorientation of competition policy. Meta, Amazon, and Apple are each facing lawsuits that challenge their business models.

In the case of Meta, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) sought to reverse its acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp. The argument was that Meta had strategically acquired emerging competitors to secure its dominance in the social networking market. However, in November 2025, a federal judge dismissed this claim. The court ruled that the FTC had failed to demonstrate that Meta now possesses monopoly power, regardless of whether the acquisitions were problematic at the time of their approval. This decision was widely interpreted as a setback for aggressive antitrust enforcement.

In contrast, a parallel case against Google focused on its search engine is unfolding. In August 2024, another federal judge ruled that Google had established an illegal monopoly in the search market through exclusive agreements with device manufacturers and browser operators. In 2021 alone, the company paid $26 billion to Apple, Mozilla, and other partners to be set as the default search engine. In September 2025, the judge ordered various remedial measures but rejected a breakup. Google was required to share certain search data with competitors and terminate exclusive contracts. The Justice Department's demand to divest Chrome or Android was rejected as excessive.

These differing outcomes demonstrate that antitrust enforcement in the technology sector is not a mechanical application of fixed rules, but rather a complex balancing of market definitions, competitive analyses, and proportionality considerations. Each case depends on specific facts, and judges have considerable discretion in determining appropriate remedies. The fact that Google got off lightly in one case does not necessarily mean that the same will happen in the advertising technology case. The evidence and market structures differ significantly.

The European parallel

While American courts deliberate on Google's fate, the European Union has already ruled. In September 2025, the European Commission fined Google €2.95 billion for abusing its dominant position in the advertising technology sector. The Commission reached similar conclusions to the American court: Google systematically favored its own ad exchange, AdX, through self-preferencing, to the detriment of competitors, publishers, and advertisers.

The Commission's decision, however, went beyond a mere fine. Google was ordered to submit a plan within 60 days outlining how it intends to eliminate its conflicts of interest. If the proposed measures are deemed insufficient, the Commission reserves the right to order structural remedies that could effectively amount to a breakup. This strategy, known as black-box enforcement, is remarkable: the authority refrains from setting detailed technical requirements itself, but defines a target and threatens drastic consequences if this target is not met.

Critics see this as a problematic shift in regulatory power. On the one hand, it gives companies the flexibility to develop creative solutions. On the other hand, it creates legal uncertainty and could be interpreted as a covert coercion toward self-destruction. When a company has to choose between a formal order to divest and an informal expectation that only a divestment is acceptable, the line between voluntariness and coercion becomes blurred.

The transatlantic convergence in the assessment of Google's behavior is remarkable. For decades, the US and the EU have pursued different philosophies of competition policy. The American tradition emphasizes consumer welfare, measured primarily in terms of price and output. The European tradition places greater emphasis on market structure and a level playing field for competitors. In Google's case, however, these approaches appear to lead to the same conclusion: the company's business model harms both consumers and competitors and is therefore unacceptable under antitrust law.

This convergence could have far-reaching consequences. Should both the US and the EU conclude that only structural separations can solve the problems, Google would be under immense pressure to globally rethink its business model. While the company could choose to maintain separate structures in different jurisdictions, the operational and strategic costs of such fragmentation would be enormous. It is more likely that Google will try to find a solution that satisfies both sides of the Atlantic, even if that means abandoning business areas that were previously considered indispensable.

Economic consequences of the breakup

The economic implications of a potential breakup of Google's advertising technology business are difficult to overstate. The company generates over $200 billion annually from advertising, a significant portion of which comes from the advertising technology segment that is now up for sale. A divestment of AdX and potentially its ad server would not only reduce Google's revenue but also fundamentally alter the structure of the entire digital advertising market.

Publishers could benefit from a wider selection of ad servers and ad exchanges, with more intense price competition and potentially higher revenues. The plaintiffs argue that Google currently charges fees at every stage of the value chain, which, taken together, increase costs for advertisers and reduce revenue for publishers. If multiple companies performed these functions and competed for customers, margins would shrink, and more money would go to those who actually create value: the content producers and those who monetize attention.

However, there are also legitimate concerns regarding the transition costs. The advertising technology ecosystem is complex and highly integrated. Google's systems, according to its own figures, process 8.2 million requests per second for ad placement. The technical infrastructure that enables this has been optimized over years and operates with remarkable reliability. A forced split would destroy this integration and require the definition of new interfaces, data migration, and process reconfiguration.

Google argues that this transition would be chaotic and could lead to outages, data breaches, and a decline in quality. Publishers and advertisers would have to renegotiate contracts, implement new integrations, and adapt their workflows. Uncertainty about the functionality of a fragmented system could lead to a temporary drop in advertising revenue, especially for smaller publishers who lack the resources to quickly respond to changing technical requirements.

Experts consulted during the proceedings offered differing assessments of feasibility. Technical consultants estimated that separating AdX from the ad server would take between 18 and 24 months. While this sounds like a manageable timeframe, it presupposes Google's cooperation and active assistance in developing new interfaces and transferring data. Whether a company currently being forced into a breakup is willing to constructively support this process remains an open question.

From a macroeconomic perspective, a breakup could foster innovation. The history of antitrust law offers numerous examples where the fragmentation of dominant companies led to a surge in competition and technological progress. The breakup of AT&T in the 1980s enabled the rise of the modern telecommunications market. Antitrust action against Microsoft in the 1990s opened up space for new players in the software industry and may have contributed to the rise of the internet as an open platform. Critics of these analogies argue that circumstances are different today and that global competition, particularly from China, means America cannot afford to weaken its most successful companies.

Xpert.Digital has in-depth knowledge of various industries. This allows us to develop tailor-made strategies that are tailored precisely to the requirements and challenges of your specific market segment. By continually analyzing market trends and following industry developments, we can act with foresight and offer innovative solutions. Through the combination of experience and knowledge, we generate added value and give our customers a decisive competitive advantage.

More about it here:

• Use the 5x expertise of Xpert.Digital in one package - starting at just €500/month

The Publisher Dilemma

At the heart of the antitrust dispute lies the question of who bears the costs of the digital ecosystem and who reaps the profits. Publishers, those who produce content and build audiences, should theoretically be the primary beneficiaries of advertising revenue. In practice, however, many publishers report receiving only a fraction of the advertising money that advertisers spend. The difference goes to intermediaries, primarily Google.

Gannett, the largest newspaper publisher in the US, was one of the first witnesses in the trial. Representatives of the company testified that they felt they had no choice but to use Google's services, even though they knew they were on the losing end of the deal. This statement is paradigmatic of the phenomenon economists call lock-in. Once integrated into a system, the costs of switching are so high that even obviously unfavorable terms are accepted.

The development of the media landscape over the last two decades is closely linked to this dynamic. Local newspapers, trade journals, and independent online publications have experienced drastic declines in revenue, not because their content has become less valuable, but because the monetization of this content through advertising is increasingly controlled by platforms that do not produce content themselves. Google and Meta together rake in the lion's share of digital advertising revenue, while the producers of the content that actually creates audiences and attention struggle with shrinking budgets.

This redistribution has implications for democracy. Local journalism, investigative reporting, and specialized journalism are expensive forms of content production that can only be refinanced if publishers receive a fair share of advertising revenue. If, instead, the money stays with technology platforms, it leads to an impoverishment of public debate. Fewer journalists, less investigative reporting, less diversity of voices.

Header bidding, the technology developed in the late 2010s as a countermeasure to Google's dominance, only partially reversed this trend. The basic idea was that publishers would allow multiple ad exchanges to bid on their ad space simultaneously, instead of favoring one exchange. This increased competition and led to revenue increases of 20 to 70 percent for some publishers. However, Google responded to header bidding with countermeasures that protected its structural advantages, preventing the technology from ever reaching its full potential.

Technological transformation through AI

One complication that became clear in the closing arguments is the role of artificial intelligence. Google's lawyers argued that the technological landscape is changing so rapidly due to AI that antitrust interventions based on today's market structures could be obsolete tomorrow. AI-powered chatbots like OpenAI's ChatGPT are already changing the way people search for and consume information. If users increasingly rely on conversational agents instead of traditional search engines, Google's dominance in search could erode, and with it, potentially its dominance in advertising.

The Justice Department vehemently disagreed with this argument. Government representatives argued that AI will not weaken Google's power, but rather strengthen it. Google possesses more data, more computing resources, and more expertise in machine learning than most of its competitors. If AI is the future of advertising technology, then Google has all the prerequisites to dominate that future as well. The algorithms that govern auctions, predict user behavior, and measure advertising effectiveness are becoming increasingly powerful thanks to AI. However, these algorithms are opaque, difficult to monitor, and even more difficult to regulate.

The debate surrounding AI reveals a fundamental tension in antitrust enforcement. On the one hand, competition policy should promote innovation, not hinder it. Overly strict interventions could discourage companies from investing in new technologies for fear that successful innovations will later be branded as anti-competitive. On the other hand, it is precisely the ability of dominant platforms to adopt new technologies faster and more effectively than their competitors that perpetuates their power. Without intervention, technological development could further intensify concentration rather than reduce it.

The dilemma of behavioral regulations

Besides structural separation, the option of behavior-based restrictions is also being considered. Google has offered to change various business practices to enable competition. This includes granting competitors access to real-time auction data, unbundling DFP and AdX, and giving publishers more control over the terms under which they sell ad space.

Such measures sound reasonable on paper, but raise questions of enforceability. How can it be verified that Google actually grants all competitors equal access? How can it be ensured that subtle algorithm changes don't lead to preferential treatment? The complexity of advertising technology makes external control extremely difficult. An auction that takes place in milliseconds and considers millions of parameters is not easy to understand.

The court is therefore considering establishing a technical committee to monitor the implementation of the conditions. This committee would need to consist of experts who possess both technical expertise and independence from the parties involved. Experience with similar structures in previous cartel proceedings has been mixed. Sometimes external oversight works; sometimes it becomes a bureaucratic formality without any real effect.

Another problem is the duration of behavior-based restrictions. In the search engine case, the court set a six-year term for the imposed measures. After this period, Google would theoretically be free again to conduct its business as it sees fit. Six years is a long time in the technology industry, but it is also short enough for a company to wait. The question is whether a competitive ecosystem of alternative providers can emerge within this timeframe, one that is robust enough to continue to exist after the restrictions expire.

Global competitive dynamics

The antitrust dispute with Google is not taking place in a vacuum, but against the backdrop of global shifts in technology policy. China is pursuing a strategy of promoting national champions that are intended to dominate in strategic sectors. The European Union is relying on strict regulation and is attempting to establish new rules for digital platforms through the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act. The US is caught between these two extremes: On the one hand, there are voices arguing that American companies need support to survive in global competition. On the other hand, there is the traditional belief that open competition is the best industrial policy in the long run.

Gail Slater argues that the US must find a third way: it should neither tolerate monopolies nor stifle companies with excessive regulation. Instead, antitrust law should ensure that markets remain open and new players have a fair chance. This philosophy sounds convincing, but it is challenging to implement. While antitrust cases take years, markets move in months. By the time a ruling becomes legally binding, the technological and economic landscape has already shifted.

The national security debate further complicates the situation. Some observers argue that Google, despite its dominance, is an American company that represents American interests better than hypothetical Chinese or European competitors. A weakening of Google could therefore be interpreted as a strategic error. This argument, however, is dangerous because it confuses corporate nationality with national interest. A monopolistic American company harms American publishers, advertisers, and consumers no less than a monopolistic foreign company.

Alternatives to dismantling

Besides a complete divestiture, there are also intermediate solutions under discussion. One option would be a functional separation: Google would retain ownership of AdX and the ad server, but establish separate business units with their own management structures and strict prohibitions on data sharing between the units. This solution would preserve technical integration while reducing conflicts of interest.

Another option would be to mandate open interfaces. Google could be required to design its ad server software and AdX platform in such a way that competitors can participate on a level playing field. This would mean that publishers using DFP would no longer be obligated to also use AdX, and that competing ad exchanges would receive the same information and response time as AdX. Implementing such measures is technically challenging, but not impossible.

A third option would be to open-source critical parts of the advertising technology. If the auction logic that determines which ad is displayed were publicly accessible, independent experts could verify its fairness. This transparency would limit Google's ability to manipulate the system. However, it would also expose trade secrets that Google considers crucial to its competitiveness.

Each of these alternatives has advantages and disadvantages. None is perfect, and all require intensive monitoring and enforcement. The court must weigh which combination of measures is most likely to restore competition without causing undue harm.

The future of the open internet

At its core, Google's approach revolves around the question of what kind of internet we want. The open internet, where independent publishers and content creators can directly reach and monetize their audiences, competes with closed ecosystems dominated by a few platforms. Meta, Google, Amazon, and other tech giants control, according to various estimates, roughly 80 percent of digital advertising spending. The remainder is accounted for by what is referred to as the open internet.

If Google is forced to break up or at least disentangle its advertising technology, it could give new impetus to the open internet. Smaller publishers would have a better chance of achieving fair prices for their advertising space. Advertisers would benefit from greater transparency and lower costs. Innovation would be encouraged because new advertising technology providers would have a realistic chance of gaining market share.

Skeptics, however, doubt that antitrust intervention can bring about this turnaround. The structural advantages of large platforms, they argue, lie not only in anti-competitive practices but also in fundamental network effects and economies of scale. Even if Google is forced to sell AdX, the buyer will likely be another large technology company with similar incentives to dominate the market. True decentralization would require more than antitrust proceedings against individual companies; it would require a fundamental redesign of the digital infrastructure.

Conclusion without a final line

The case against Google is a test case for whether antitrust law is still an effective tool for controlling economic power in the 21st century. The challenges are enormous: technological complexity, rapid change, global interconnectedness, and political infighting make it difficult to find clear solutions. Judge Brinkema faces the task of reaching a decision that is both legally sound and practically implementable, that repairs damage without causing further harm, and that comes quickly enough to remain relevant.

The decision, expected in the coming months, will have far-reaching consequences, not only for Google but for the entire digital economy. If the court orders a structural separation, it would send a signal that even the most powerful technology companies are not above the law. If the court opts for less stringent measures, critics will interpret this as confirmation that Big Tech has become too large to be effectively regulated.

In any case, it's clear that time doesn't stand still. While lawyers debate market definitions and experts conduct technical feasibility studies, Google's infrastructure continues to process millions of ad requests per second, generating billions of dollars in revenue and solidifying its position in the digital ecosystem. Justice may be slow, but business doesn't wait. This is the dilemma that Justice Brinkema so openly addressed: time is of vital importance, and it is precisely this time that is running out.

The coming years will show whether the American legal system is capable of meeting the challenges of the digital economy. The verdict against Google will not be the final word, but merely one chapter in a much longer story about the relationship between technology, markets, and power. This story is far from over.

☑️ Our business language is English or German

☑️ NEW: Correspondence in your national language!

 

I would be happy to serve you and my team as a personal advisor.

You can contact me by filling out the contact form or simply call me on +49 89 89 674 804 (Munich) . My email address is: wolfenstein ∂ xpert.digital

I'm looking forward to our joint project.

 

 

☑️ SME support in strategy, consulting, planning and implementation

☑️ Creation or realignment of the digital strategy and digitalization

☑️ Expansion and optimization of international sales processes

☑️ Global & Digital B2B trading platforms

☑️ Pioneer Business Development / Marketing / PR / Trade Fairs

Industry focus: B2B, digitalization (from AI to XR), mechanical engineering, logistics, renewable energies and industry

More about it here:

• Xpert Business Hub

A topic hub with insights and expertise:

• Knowledge platform on the global and regional economy, innovation and industry-specific trends
• Collection of analyses, impulses and background information from our focus areas
• A place for expertise and information on current developments in business and technology
• Topic hub for companies that want to learn about markets, digitalization and industry innovations